ROUTLEDGE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOKS

The Routledge International Handbook of Contemporary Muslim Socio-Political Thought

Edited by Lutfi Sunar

THE ROUTLEDGE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY MUSLIM SOCIO-POLITICAL THOUGHT

This volume unfolds the ebbs and flows of Muslim thought in different regions of the world, as well as the struggles between the different intellectual discourses that have surfaced against this backdrop. With a focus on Turkey, Egypt, Iran and the Indian subcontinent – regions that, in spite of their particular histories and forms of thought, are uniquely placed as a mosaic that illustrates the intertwined nature of the development of Muslim socio-political thought – it sheds light on the swing between right and left in different regions, the debates surrounding nationalism, the influence of socialism and liberalism, the rise of Islamism and the conflict between state bureaucracy and social movements. Exploring themes of civil society and democracy, it also considers current trends in Muslim thought and possible future directions. As such, it will appeal to scholars across the fields of sociology, anthropology, political science, history and political economy, as well as those with interests in the study of religion, the development of Muslim thought, and the transformation of Muslim societies in recent decades.

Lutfi Sunar is Professor of Sociology at Istanbul Medeniyet University, Turkey. He is the author of *Marx and Weber on Oriental Societies*, the co-editor of *Eurocentrism at the Margins* and *Social Justice and Islamic Economics*, and the editor of *Debates on Civilization in the Muslim World*.

Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
http://taylorandfrancis.com

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Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2022
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

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This volume is based on *Contemporary Thought in the Muslim World* (4 Volumes) originally published by the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities.

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British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A catalog record for this book has been requested

ISBN: 9780367699130 (hbk)
ISBN: 9780367699154 (pbk)
ISBN: 9781003143826 (ebk)

Typeset in Bembo
by Apex CoVantage, LLC

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This project has a huge amount of work, research, and dedication in its background. It would not have been possible to realize this project if I did not have the support of many individuals and organizations, to all of whom I owe sincere gratitude.

This book succeeds our four-volume edited work on the same topic published in Turkish by Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB). To spread the word farther, YTB supported the idea of publishing the work in English, as well. The English version was, however, created choosing selected chapters from the Turkish edition along with some new chapters. I would like to extend my gratitude to YTB for its permission and support.

I would also like to thank the contributors, who hail from different countries and academic institutions. Their ideas and the discussions paved the way and prepared the framework into which this volume fits. I am grateful to all of them for their meticulous work, collaboration, and patience through the publication process.

Of course, this book would not have been realized without the help and support of Routledge and its very kind staff. From the first moment I contacted them and shared the idea of this edited volume, they encouraged me to jointly work on this project. Therefore, I specifically thank the editorial team members for their supportive attitude and availability at times their help was needed. I would also like to thank the four "anonymous" reviewers for their invaluable insights.

Finally, I would like to thank my colleague Ahsan Shafiq for his invaluable contribution to the entire process of bringing the volume together. This book would not have been realized without his efforts and mastery on every step from editing the chapters to bringing together the volume as a whole.

Lutfi Sunar
Istanbul, January 2021

FOREWORD

Intellectuals, scholars, academics, and political and religious elites in Muslim societies have generally dealt with two basic issues in the contemporary period: political and intellectual confrontation with the West and past. The challenges of colonialism that the Muslim societies have faced for the last two centuries have not only caused Muslim societies to become politically destabilized or economically backward, but have also created an intellectual and scientific inability to sustain themselves. Most of the Muslim countries gained their independence only in the second half of the 20th century. The second issue of the contemporary times is the problem of encountering and confronting modernity. In this sense, there have been problems in the reception of modern thought, as well as in the maintenance of vernacular intellectual traditions.

Today, understanding contemporary thought in Muslim societies has become very important at a time when scientific, intellectual, and technical developments are accelerating. In the face of this reality, I think that this volume will blaze the trail and that the study and understanding of contemporary thought in Muslim societies will constitute a basis for understanding and resolving the problems experienced by the world (or Muslim world) today.

This concise yet comprehensive work is an endeavor that unfolds the historical development and contemporary status of Muslim socio-political thought in selected geographies. Throughout history, Muslim intellectual life was shaped mainly in four countries/regions represented by present-day Turkey, Egypt, Iran, and the Indian subcontinent. These four countries/regions were the main political centers and also intellectual pillars of Muslim socio-political thought for centuries.

This selection is unique in every aspect. While all of these regions share the commonality of their social fabrics and polities pendulating between the right and left extremes, the internal nuances of the intellectual confrontation in these regions make each of them a unique case of its type. In this context, the work is divided into eight broad sections which rotate around different concepts including modernity, religion, social change, politics, political ideologies, formation of nation-states, civil society, and democracy. In this context, the contemporary situation, current dynamics, and future trends of socio-political thought are discussed from a broad perspective and in a comparative manner.

Previous works, when addressing either of the topics brought to light in this book, have usually taken the individual issues in isolation, as a result destroying the overall mosaic formed when the individual concepts are intertwined. The other stream that has addressed these geographies

in isolation has resulted in unrealistic overgeneralizations because what was perceived of the concepts mentioned above did not just change over time; it also differed beyond geographical boundaries. The contribution of this volume, therefore, is unique in many aspects. The most important one is that it is a corpus, and hence does not deal with a single region or thought.

In a time when shortcomings and problems of change are deeply felt within the Muslim world, this book has been prepared with the hope that it will contribute to build a broader and comprehensive perspective for the contemporary thought.

I believe in that building bridges and lines of interaction between societies and groups has been the main dynamics of socioeconomic development through history. I hope this volume will contribute to increase the level of the intellectual interaction.

Lutfi Sunar
Istanbul, January 2021

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EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

Contemporary thought in Muslim societies – renewal, diversification, and transformation

Lutfi Sunar

Four basins, four countries

The past, present, and future of Muslim societies continue to be widely discussed today. However, these debates are mostly centered around political events and individuals. A person who goes to any bookstore in the East or West can find a large number of publications related to these political events, but they would also realize that very little has been produced about contemporary thought in Muslim societies. Compared to Western thought, thought in Muslim societies, especially contemporary thought, has almost been completely ignored. In reality, a lively intellectual life is found in Muslim societies today. This existence of living thought shows diversity within itself and creates new transformations (Kersten, 2019).

Islamic thought has traditionally developed around the East-West [*Mashriq-Maghreb*] axis. The two main areas of this central axis are internally divided into two sub-basins. In this context, we can speak of four basins of Islamic thought. The first of these is the Mesopotamian basin and the main area where Islamic thought has formed. This tradition of thought first formed around Baghdad and Damascus, then expanded into Anatolia with the Seljuks and eventually gained a settled and integrated character in Istanbul in the form of Ottoman thought. The second basin is the thought that fermented in Andalusia. This basin of thought shifted over time to North Africa, where it then developed. The institutionalization of this basin took place around Azhar in Egypt. Eastern Islamic thought was formed within two sub-basins that fed one another. The first is Indo-Islamic thought. Formed by a mutual dialogue with ancient Indian thought, this watershed of thought varies greatly within itself in terms of its issues and developmental dynamics. Finally, the fourth basin of thought is the Iranian basin, which developed around Isfahan-Rey. This basin, which has insulated itself over time and charted a significant course of development revolving around local dynamics, has also become increasingly different from others in terms of its issues and concepts. This book discusses the thought structures of these four main basins throughout the contemporary period.

The fundamental quality of Islamic thought

Islamic thought is known to have four main sources: revelation, the Sunnah, *Ijma* [consensus], and *Qiyas* [analogy]. Throughout history, Islamic thought has developed different views on

the issue of reinterpreting these sources. As mentioned previously, the formation of different thought basins could only occur within such a differentiation. Upon inspection, what Marshal Hodgson (2009) calls the Islamicate world has displayed a very wide framework of custom [*'urf*]. Seeing that Islam has taken different forms and become localized in its lived experience is important for understanding the lines of social integration in the pre-national world.

The basic characteristic of Islamic civilization is that it provides an interaction-based course of development by placing mobility at its center. Islamic civilization was established in Mesopotamia, which forms the basis for how civilizations have met and interacted throughout history, and established itself on dynamism and mobility (Sunar, 2016). In this sense, Islamic civilization has triggered large-scale mobility in three main areas:

1 The most important of these is the mobility of people. Islam has made the movement of people possible by creating a political and legal basis for equality between tribes, clans, and races (Jabri, 2009). After Islam appeared, all the peoples of the geography – especially the Arabs – began to move around, which thus opened the way for new interactions. With the coming of Islam, the Turks, Berbers, Iranians, and Copts not only changed their religions but also their geographies.
2 Another mobility was experienced in the area of commerce. The most important transformation after Islam, which brought an equality-based moral basis to market and trade relations, was the expansion of the volume of trade and the acceleration of its flow. Also referred to as "Oriental globalization" (Pieterse, 2006), this arrangement increased economic interactions and potentials as much as possible, and also enabled the spread of prosperity.
3 In a way that complements these two interactions, we witness the mobility of both Islam and ideas. Some ideas that previously had a local appearance and were specific to a particular geography spread over very large areas under the rule of Muslims; these began to form the basis for differences and diversity. This interactive dynamic, which is the basis of the diversity and richness of Islamic thought, also carried a variety of interactions within it. For example, it created the framework for new and rich thought by encountering, interacting, and contacting the Hellenistic thought in Syria, Christianity in Anatolia, Jewish wisdom in Egypt, Sabeanism and Zoroastrianism in Iran, Indian mysticism in India, and Roman thought in Andalusia. The translation movement started by Muslims at Bayt-ul-Hikma in Baghdad had created the basis of an intellectual interaction that is rare in history. We can see this clearly when looking at the course of the upbringing of a Muslim scholar in the classical period. The travel-based collecting and imparting of knowledge reflects the mobility of knowledge. This is actually the construction of "thought in motion." Therefore, thought in Muslim societies had been established on the axes of mobility, interaction, and renewal.

Muslim societies had a dynamic worldview during the classical period and experienced many confrontations, interactions, and movements. The last major and comprehensive confrontation of Muslim societies was with European colonialism and modernity (Esposito, 1999). Muslim societies had previously encountered various invasive movements (such as the Crusades and the Mongol invasion), and were able to turn these invasions into interactive opportunities. For example, although the Mongol invasion was initially destructive, it subsequently constituted one of the dynamics of the spread of Islam over large areas and was instrumental in leading to a second classical era by re-activating the dynamics that had dulled over time. In the same way, the Crusades brought a destruction that restored stagnant political power with a grounded movement. Thus, while destructive in the short term, it played a foundational role in the

long term. In this regard, evaluating the encounter with modernity from the 19th century onwards becomes possible in a similar framework. Although this encounter has certain destructive dimensions, it has also been stimulating and regenerative within others.

The different shades of contemporary thought

The term "contemporary Islamic thought," widely used today, includes a wide range of intellectual currents that prevailed in the Muslim world at a time when the nation-state was rising. In this regard, the preferred term in this book is "contemporary thought in Muslim societies," which describes the resulting socio-cultural, economic, and political thought after the 1950s in particular, which constitutes the intellectual framework of the period of colonization and modernization. In Muslim societies, contemporary thought has three main forms with respect to the reactions to modernization and interactions with it: (1) modernist; (2) conservative; and (3) reformist. Each of these thoughts has had a wide variety of reflections. These thoughts, neither uniform nor monochrome, have at times also appeared as a synthesis. For example, nationalism is sometimes seen as a shade of Westernism and modernism, and other times as a shade of Islamism. Again, while socialism is a sub-form of Western modernism in general, it has been synthesized from time to time with nationalism and from time to time with Islamism. These ideas, which are diverse rather than one-dimensional, show alternative ways and a different view of the problems faced by Muslim societies.

Muslim societies, whose political and economic order had been disrupted in the classical period, are currently experiencing intellectual and social confusion in the modern period. Furthermore, due to the nature of the political dynamics that gave rise to nation-states, talking about a homogeneous Islamic intellectual history is impossible. A survey of the different intellectual structures in Muslim societies is possible only by understanding the different forms of historicity these societies have had. Undoubtedly, common foundations that make up contemporary thought exist in Muslim societies. However, the power of nation-states to configure history and the present should not be underestimated, and this factor needs to be included when conducting an analysis. The most obvious example of this situation can be seen in Pakistan. We know that Pakistan, which was a natural part of the vast Indian subcontinent before partition in 1947, today historically bases itself on a different thought. Also, we see how the historical continuity between Algerian and Egyptian ideas had been broken due to their colonial heritages and came to form two different strains of thought, one French-leaning and the other English-leaning. As another example, after centuries of Dutch colonialism, studying intellectual life in Indonesia or South Africa independently of this experience is no longer possible. In particular, colonialism, the anti-colonial struggle, the process of independence, and the mechanisms of nation-state formation have shaped the intellectual experience of Muslims in each country in different ways. Consequently, both unifying and differentiating dynamics of intellectual life are found in Muslim societies in the contemporary period.

Currently, many different intellectual currents exist in the Muslim world that work in parallel and interactively with each other. These intellectual currents, which have reflected the complex cultural and economic transformations in Muslim societies since the 19th century, established themselves both in reaction to traditional thought as an attempt at interpreting it and to Western capitalism and colonialism as a comparison. This double responsiveness is also an important factor that has led to the thought of becoming more and more systematic and gaining a speculative character.

Meanwhile, these encounters have also led to the emergence of new actors in the cultural, religious, and intellectual fields. The 19th century was a period when new actors such

as journalists, intellectuals, and political activists – as well as classical ulama and littérateurs – showed themselves in the newly shaped public sphere. Almost all of these new actors have had to re-establish thought in its different dimensions. From time to time, interpretation had to go beyond theorization. Because the new version of the heritage of classical thought was insufficient at explaining, the thought took a new form each time. This, in turn, has led to the institutionalization and continuity of intellectual extremism. While these new power blocs and traditionalists who filled the lost connections with the past in the intellectual realm with nostalgia have created a weak historicity, the modernists who strive to erase these connections have also brought about a baseless innovation.

More studies have been done on the contemporary political history of Muslim societies, and these have received relatively more attention. However, fewer studies are found on contemporary Muslim intellectual history in general. Simply put, academic specialization and a distorted departmentalization in research may have been effective in this regard. But the problem probably is not that simple. The most important reason may be the lack of a theoretical framework. This has made analyzing the structure of political/social thought in Muslim societies difficult because intellectual life in Muslim societies is often seen as either a corrupted form of tradition, a bad imitation of modern thought, or a ball of inconsistent ideas (Legenhausen, 2000). Here, Eurocentric history-writing has also played an important role in denying the internal structures and dynamics of the theories and ideas produced outside Europe during the modern period. The thought that has emerged in contemporary Muslim societies is seen as the subject of history, not theory. From the moment a thought appears, it becomes historicized, and the possibility of replicating it from within itself, no matter how alive and dynamic it is, disappears. If one pays attention, the intellectual world of Muslim societies is always treated as something that has already vanished. This, of course, is another factor preventing both the development and study of this thought. This book intends to fill the great gap in this field and resolve the various currents of thought dominating contemporary Muslim societies, as well as the challenges and limitations they face. In addition, this study aims to help create comprehensive perspectives on intellectual movements in Muslim communities.

In order to meet this difficult goal, a group is needed of experts who follow intellectual life in different countries (basins), have mastery of the intellectual life there, know the local languages, can evaluate the development of modern society and of Muslim societies together, and know the social, economic, and intellectual life. Each author in this book has contributed to the emergence of a holistic image by drawing a part of the picture. Saying that contemporary thinking has been treated comprehensively and holistically in this way in Muslim societies appeared difficult until now.

The basic framework and principles of contemporary thought

In order to comprehensively and holistically examine the life of thought in different countries, some basic principles and a framework are required. First, determining different agendas – as well as common issues – is necessary. To do this requires determining the economic and political context of intellectual life in the relevant country. The post-1950 period discussed in this book is also a time when Muslim societies were becoming increasingly disconnected from each other. In the process of this rupture, the agendas of these societies gradually diverged from one another, with political differences also leading to intellectual differences. But referring to such a disengagement does not mean that these societies have no common agendas. Various points of unification and integration also exist against a backdrop of global issues, common threats, and a unifying past. Therefore, the determination of common issues and differentiated agendas

provides an important initial principle for addressing the intellectual worlds of the various Muslim societies. This book is based on the following eight basic principles:

1 Identifying the continuity and breaks in thought in contemporary Muslim societies is important (Esposito, Voll, & Bakar, 2007). These continuities and breaks have occurred differently in each country. These differences need to be positioned correctly in order to treat contemporary thought holistically. For example, the bond and connection with classical Islamic thought is weaker in Turkey, and discontinuities stand out. But at the same time, a more pronounced continuity is visible on the Indian subcontinent. In Egypt and Iran, traditional thought has continued on separate axes parallel to the formation of modern thought. Therefore, the continuities and breaks there did not exist as alternatives to each other, but instead coexisted. After all, a coexistence of the innovation established around the break that shaped the public had been present for a long time, along with the traditionalism that had formed around the continuity that shaped the private. In Turkey, the continuities that would compensate for the break have begun to exist over time within the modern public sphere, not in an alternative space. Thus, the rupture that had initially been a weakness has become an opportunity in later times. On the other hand, the breaks and continuities have not been experienced similarly in all areas of thought. Therefore, the elements at hand must be re-evaluated according to the content and scope of the subject being considered.
2 The existence, maintenance, and contemporary position of institutional structures has been very significant in the formation of these breaks and continuities. First of all, the fact that madrasas have maintained their existence even if they no longer retain their former prominence anywhere is important. In this regard, Turkey has an anomalous position. This is because the madrasas in Turkey had lost their public position under the influence and pressure of radical modernization, only being able to maintain their existence in the countryside and at the edges of cities in secret. When they became publicized, they were only able to protect their existence by articulating through their modern counterparts (Imam Hatip schools). However, because of the strong position of al-Azhar in Egypt, for example, the madrasas have partially retained their public position and taken their place in the system as modern universities. Similarly, the educational institutions in Qom in Iran have even more strongly retained both their existence and meaning, with each of them having gained university status over time. The madrasa movement also occupies an important place on the Indian subcontinent, both officially and in the civic sphere. Madrasas, which were initially established to preserve and renew their knowledge in the face of modern knowledge, can be said to have adopted a form from the Western model of education, but their informal dimensions are still composed of older elements. Therefore, the institutional endurance capabilities of madrasas actually also offer a framework for constructing the continuity of thought. Similarly, although not as direct or comprehensive in their impact on intellectual life as madrasas, Sufi Lodges occupy a central place in the question of continuity and discontinuity. Turkey, where Sufi Lodges are banned, represents one end of the spectrum in this sense, while the other end is represented by the Indian subcontinent, where Sufi Lodges and sects deeply influence everyday life, politics, and social movements. The continuation and continuity of concrete institutions such as madrasas and khanqahs – as well as the maintenance of intangible institutions such as chains of reputation, titles, and rituals – have had great importance for intellectual life. Self-preserving forms of celebration, chains of reputation, and the use of certain titles have been critically important in the emergence of a continuity that has gone unnoticed. Nevertheless, the continuity of this second type of

intangible institution has provided a legitimizing and harmonizing basis for the emergence of modern institutions.

3 The institutional continuity of madrasas has been as important as the continuity in the social position of the ulama. A major determinant has been the form of contact the ulama – who have shaped and transmitted thought for centuries – have had with society in the modern period. This is because their previously unrivaled position has now been shaken by the introduction and gradual progress of modern knowledge, which has made them become secondary over time. As the influence of people with a modern education has increased, the public and social position of the ulama has been shaken. In this sense, we may speak of a dichotomous attitude being present among the ulama. A large segment of the ulama has developed a conservative attitude as a reflexive response to the loss of position and has formed a rejectionist attitude toward reforms. This is undoubtedly an important aspect that over time has led to the decline of their thought and its break from the existing social order. This segment has formed a closed intellectual community in order to maintain a reactive but static and introverted thought in the face of an extraordinarily dynamic social structure by clinging more tightly to tradition and symbols. On the other hand, a small segment of the ulama has turned toward a regenerative attitude in order to overcome the prevailing situation. A careful evaluation is required of the expansions created by this group, which seeks to regenerate thought by recognizing and sometimes articulating modern science and the mechanisms of knowledge generation. However, the existence of this second group has been difficult in this regard because they have lost their traditional grounding over time and become integrated within modern institutions. Few of them have been able to establish their own private civic structures (magazines, publishing houses, educational institutions) or maintain a separate existence. Consequently, changes in the ulama's position resulted in the end of their public presence after a while.

4 As opposed to the ulama's changing position, the level and form of contact with religion and traditional thought of the newly rising intellectual and educated segment also had an impact on intellectual life. A critical distance was formed between traditional thought and the modernizing role assigned to this group, which was involved in the new institutions that had been established in the Westernization process. In addition, the education this intellectual segment received, the formation it acquired, the meaning it imposed on thought, and its identity formation process also caused traditional thought to no longer appeal to them. Traditional thought experienced a serious problem of comprehensiveness in meeting the new issues and problems that emerged. In addition, the duality caused by the form and content of modernization increasingly led modern educated intellectuals to break away from traditional thinking or even position themselves opposite it, seeing surpassing it to be necessary in order to maintain their own existence. A very small group within the modern intellectual segment (much like how only few of the ulama turned to modern knowledge) has turned to the possibilities of traditional Islamic thought. In this regard, modern Islamic movements since the 1950s in particular have had a very important role. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jamaat-e-Islami on the Indian subcontinent, Husayni Irshad in Iran, and Milli Görüş in Turkey represent this kind of orientation and strive to unite the modern intellectual with the traditional ulama. However, this synthesizing effort having exceeded the mere acquisition of an identity and generally becoming an intellectual formation is an unexpected result. In this sense, the traditional ulama's abstinence from these movements can also be said to have played a role in the failure of this synthesis.

5 Another factor in shaping contemporary thought in Muslim societies is the change in the way thought is established and publicized. Since the mid-19th century, the transfer and

spread of Western-originated literary forms to Muslim societies changed their writing styles and thus differentiated the strains of thought. The birth of new literary genres such as novels, short stories, and dramas; the development of new forms of scientific writing such as essays, articles, and anecdotes; and the formation of new means of transmitting thought such as newspapers and magazines all gradually changed the public view of thought. Yet, these new forms influenced not only the transmission of thought but also the formation of its content. Meanwhile, the transfer of Western literary forms and their mixture with old traditional forms also led to the formation of poetic thought in Muslim societies. The reader will see that the thought formations discussed in this handbook were formed not academically but rather in a literary and political format. This in turn led to the popularization of a speculative rather than systematized form of thought. Those who produced this thought were not the ones acting within academic or scientific frameworks in any ideology, but rather were public intellectuals. Therefore, in a study focusing on contemporary thought in Muslim societies, special attention should be paid to how writing styles formed and thought forms were shaped. This is also necessary to identify ways for adapting to the new problems and issues being encountered.

6 Contact with Western thought has had a significant impact on the formation of contemporary thought in Muslim societies. This interaction has occurred either as a direct transmission or direct rejection, as well as – in very limited cases – as a critical reception. The transfer of modern ideas and systems has primarily taken place through the students who had been sent to the West to learn these, and this significantly influenced the way this contact occurred. When encounters with modern thought occurred not within a relationship of recognition but rather as a transfer, the influence also turned into a transfer rather than a reception. This one-sided relationship reception had has also led to an increased dependence on the transmission of thought in intellectual life (Hanafi & Arvanitis, 2016). Perhaps the most important intellectual problem in Muslim societies in the modern era has been this dependence. Despite limited examples in which the relationship established with Western thought has been critically considered, the relationship has generally remained a secondary issue (Zayd, Amirpur, & Setiawan, 2006). Nevertheless, identifying and presenting original forms of thought in a large-scale study of contemporary thought in Muslim societies is important. Therefore, highlighting not only the transfers but also the receptions and original conceptualizations and analyses is necessary for understanding contemporary thought in the Muslim world.

7 Considering the development of contemporary thought in Muslim societies independent of colonialism and the Western threat is impossible (Aydin, 2007). This threat, which affects the way modern thought has been encountered, is also an important reason why the current systems of thought cannot continue. In this sense, the colonizers destroyed the existing institutional structure, transformed the structure and function of education, and created an indigenous intellectual segment that would spread the former's own thoughts (Abraham, 2014). Newly educated generations, mostly raised in modern educational institutions established by missionaries and colonial administrations, have been rendered ineffective by Western emulation. These intellectuals and bureaucrats, who would later become the main actors in the independence process, played an important role in breaking away from the history and traditions of Muslim societies. Thus, societies whose current system of thought has been destroyed or marginalized have been condemned to live with a thought marred with interruptions as a result of the intellectual violence they have faced. The ideas of colonialists and modernizers had been glorified and encouraged through social opportunities on one hand, while on the other hand, a traditional thought embedded

among the social layers sought to maintain itself informally. Of course, this form of external threat occurred in different regions and forms in each country. For example, in Crimea and Kazan, as well as in Bukhara and Tashkent, social structures and relations were subjected to extensive destruction under Russian occupation, and intellectual life nearly ended. A similar situation occurred in East Turkestan under Chinese occupation. In India, which had been exposed to British colonization from an early period, traditional thought was written into the colony's realm and fed by the reaction to colonialism. However, the effectiveness of traditional thinking had decreased in the process of nation-state formation as a result (Belkeziz, 2009). Although Egypt and Iran had little exposure to direct colonization, they have encountered modern thought under Western political tutelage. This guardianship has been shaped significantly by political and economic pressure; this in effect did not destroy classical thought, but rather made it secondary. In this way, maintaining traditional thought through self-renewal based on its own format became difficult due to its limited public opportunities and functions. A similar situation occurred in Turkey, which did not experience colonial or external guardianship. Although the Ottoman state was not subjected to a central colonial or political guardianship, the opportunities for maintaining and publicizing old classical thought were gradually reduced in the process of establishing modern institutions and bureaucracy, and these completely disappeared during the Republican Period. As a result of these gradual transformations, modernization emerged as a course of historical abandonment. Therefore, contemporary thought in Muslim societies must be examined while taking into account the impact of the colonialization and Westernization processes.

8 Finally, the modern period has been a period when previously established relations between Muslim societies were transformed, suffered various interruptions, and gained new forms. The different experiences of colonization severed the relations Muslim societies had had. As an example, the intellectual languages of colonial subjects were established in their colonizer's language: English for British colonial subjects, French for French colonial subjects, and Russian for Russian colonial subjects. The ideas transmitted from the West led to the formation of different thought systems. At the same time, the process of combating colonialism caused the spread of nationalist ideas. Nationalism created resistance to colonialism, as well as distance among Muslim societies. Thus, the interaction and integrity the ulama had earlier created was replaced with the emergence of structures that were increasingly disconnected from one another. Although these breaks were later compensated for by the various translation movements that have taken place among Muslim societies since the 1960s, the emergence of different thought systems also became a limitation of translation. Thus, although Muslim societies have some common issues due to the similarity of the problems they face, the commonality of their agendas and frameworks of thinking has lessened.

Responding to modernity: renewal or tradition

Two basic dynamics are found to shape contemporary thought in Muslim societies. One is associated with internal developments, and the other with external conditions. Internally, intellectuals and the ulama have encountered issues such as the meaning and maintenance of tradition, the structure and change of Muslim identity, the interpretation of new social problems and the creation of solutions, and the meaning of political developments. In this context, the main agenda in the modern period has been set within the framework of the problematics of Islamic renewal (Saeed, 2006). In the face of current challenges, the vast gap between those who think Islamic thought needs conceptual and methodical renewal in order to sustain itself and those

who think the problem stems from not experiencing Islam enough has been filled by different forms of contemporary thought. In this sense, the possibility exists to see that modernists, who are critically removed from classical thought, have over time broken away from the points of reliance they had based themselves on. Similarly, traditionalists seem to be detached from current social issues and far removed from being able to encompass social issues (Brown, 1996). Thus, the two dimensions can be said to have experienced a break that ironically complements each other.

The second dynamic shaping contemporary thought in the Muslim world is related to external factors. In this regard. The 19th-century confrontation with modern technology, industry, and bureaucracy had led to a serious crisis in Muslim societies because Muslim societies, which were unable to resist the power produced by modern techniques, have been subjected to occupation, exploitation, and oppression over time. This oppression and occupation caused Muslim societies to be unable to live their own intellectual lives; at the same time, the need to respond and overcome these resulted in a new form of thought (Rustom, Khalil, & Chittick, 2011). Ideas such as socialism, liberalism, nationalism, and feminism – modern ideologies of Western origin – are among the important views of contemporary thought in Muslim societies. These external thoughts have also interacted with established Islamic concepts and thoughts, resulting in various intermediate forms. Therefore, someone studying the ideas of Muslim societies today is not able to do so without resorting to modern thought.

In Muslim societies, contemporary thought faces not only modern techniques and thoughts that reshape life, but also Orientalism, which has rewritten and shaped the views of Muslims' political and intellectual history. All European history and, as a consequence, world history was rewritten within the framework of the problems of establishing and explaining European modernity in the 19th century. In this sense, contemporary thought in Muslim societies has been influenced by Orientalism and seeks to respond to it. Orientalism has also subjected the history of Muslim societies and Islamic thought to a new classification and analysis within the framework of its quest to establish European history in a unique and progressive framework (Abu Rabi', 2006). Orientalist studies that have rewritten Islamic history with a completely new critical view in this sense have on one hand made great contributions to the history and thought of Muslims by exploring many unknown issues, while on the other hand, created great obstacles to understanding Muslim societies due to the biased and ideological views they develop. In this way, Orientalism has shaped contemporary thought within its framework of knowledge and interpretation, and the reactive/receptive responses to it have given a new shape to contemporary thought. Today, understanding and explaining Muslim societies' contemporary thought is impossible without taking into account Orientalism's contributions and influence. This also underlines the important need to overcome this effect by addressing it.

The intellectual history approach

Contemporary thought in Muslim societies shows significant diversity within the framework of the previously mentioned factors. In order to address this diversity consistently, a basic study is required that sets out the common groundwork and outlines the development of thoughts. In this sense, an intellectual history approach can be adopted as the method.

Strong orientations and interest have recently been found among social scientists in treating the formation and development of thoughts as an intellectual history (Kelley, 2002). Mark Bevir (1999) stated that intellectual history is a good method for discovering the meanings produced in the past. These social scientists, finding the approach to the history of thought to have been static and limited, recommend intellectual history as a more mobile and dynamic framework.

Intellectual history appears to be a more appropriate approach in terms of analyzing diversity with a greater consideration of concepts, issues, contexts, and circumstances.

In this regard, the intellectual history approach predictably will make an important contribution to addressing contemporary thought, as Lahoud's (2013) study on Turkey, Egypt, Iran, and the Indian subcontinent has done with its evident differences and diversity. Muslim societies are extremely complex and products of diverse political, philosophical, religious, social, and historical conditions and formations; this is why addressing the development of these ideas while viewing them as static, closed, and finished formations cannot be meaningful. For this reason, using approaches that address the social and intellectual development of each country within their interactions with one another is essential.

Intellectual life is always shaped by political, economic, and social patterns. Therefore, intellectual history is necessarily multidisciplinary by nature: It overlaps with different areas of expertise, primarily philosophy, theology, history, politics, and economics. Intellectual history is also driven by different philosophical and ideological positions. As can be seen clearly in this volume, intellectual history focuses on worldviews. In other words, the worldviews that make up intellectual history need to be carefully considered. This means that making different aspects of the issue visible through multiple readings is necessary. Examining only the background is insufficient; considering the formations that appear on the surface is necessary from different angles. However, the study of currents in intellectual history creates a basis for ignoring the problematic parts that do not work, because the focus is always on functioning issues. By recognizing this limitation, we can expand our approach to include the problem areas in the analysis. When considering the study of contemporary thought in Muslim societies only from an apologetic perspective, the need appears for using the opportunities provided by the intellectual history approach.

Meanwhile, the risk exists that the intellectual history approach may neglect those who have been left behind when evaluating those who took the lead; this may pass over the breaks while paying attention to the consequences. Therefore, the intellectual history approach found in this book has had to be expanded to include those who remained on the periphery of society. In order to achieve this, the need has been found to read not only through the results, but also through the flows. For this reason, the main questions that led up to the writings in this book are as follows: what are the dynamics that led to the formation of modern thought in Muslim societies, and what ideas and formations have emerged as a result of these dynamics?

Chapters and organization of the book

The basic framework, overview, methodology, and scope in this study discuss contemporary thought in Turkey, Egypt, Iran, and the Indian subcontinent through eight sections and 32 chapters. Each section contains a chapter on the relevant topic for each country.

The aim of Section I, "Facing with the modernity," is essentially to discuss the encounters with modernization in Turkey, Egypt, Iran, and Southeast Asia, and the attitudes Muslim societies developed within themselves toward their encounters. The fact that modernity caused many sociological and political encounters, especially for Muslim societies, has allowed these societies to take action within themselves. In Chapter 1, "Turkish modernization as a historical and sociological issue," Mahmut Hakkı Akın evaluates the Turkish modernization adventure through the views of Niyazi Berkes, Kemal Karpat, and Şerif Mardin. Turkish modernization, which also has a unique place among non-Western modernization experiences, is a process that should be evaluated by taking into account the situations in which Turkey has historically been both the other and the periphery of the West. In Chapter 2, "Discussions on tradition and

civilization in Egypt," Gökhan Bozbaş discusses how the concepts of tradition and modernity are defined in contemporary Egyptian thought and how society conceptually perceives this issue. In Chapter 3, "Iranians' intellectual confrontation with the modern West and modernity," M. Mansur Hashemi questions the nature of Iran's encounters with the West through the various religious and intellectual groups in Iran. Asking the questions of what Iran's relationship with modernity essentially means and how it positioned itself in the fight against the West, this chapter discusses the experience of this encounter in Iran from the Qajar Dynasty to the present day. In Chapter 4, "Debates on tradition and modernity on the subcontinent," Tauseef Ahmad Parray discusses the reformation movements of the Muslim community in the South Asia region through the experiences of colonialism, Westernism, and modernity. These four chapters also reveal the nature of Muslim societies' confrontations and experiences with modernity as a single unit.

Section II, "Religion, society, and politics," mainly addresses and discusses the position of the conservative and reformist thoughts that have influenced religious thought in the relevant regions on a regional basis. In Chapter 5, "The formation and various forms of conservatism in Turkey," Mahmut Hakkı Akın emphasizes the multiple uses of the concept of conservatism and reveals the diversity and differences of the concept in terms of use. In Chapter 6, "Formation of contemporary Islamic thought in Egypt: new pursuits in Islamic legal and political thought," Özgür Kavak evaluates the formative phase of modern Islamic thought that had emerged in parallel with the modernization process by focusing on Egypt beginning in the second half of the 19th century and extending to the first quarter of the 20th century. In Chapter 7, "Different forms of religious thought in modern Iran," Forough Jahanbakhsh examines the development and formative phase of Shia thought in contemporary Iran. In the development phase of Shia thought, the criticisms brought to it from different religious and thought groups are examined as a subject of contemporary Islamic thought. In Chapter 8, "The voices of Islamic modernism from South Asia," M. A. Muqtedar Khan and Ibrahim Enes Aksu emphasize the arrival of modernity and the fundamental changes in the social, economic, and political structures that came along with them. They evaluate the concept of Islamic modernism through the thoughts of Sayyid Ahmed Khan, Maulana Wahiduddin Khan, Muhammad Iqbal, and Fazlur Rahman. Consequently, the process of the development of religious thought in these Muslim societies, accelerated by encounters and discussions, can be considered an element that has shaped the idea of holistic Islamic thought in these societies.

Section III, "Islam in the political sphere," aims to discuss the experiences of Islamism in Turkey, Egypt, Iran, and South Asia. In Chapter 9, "Rethinking Islamism in Turkey: beyond conservative or modernist rejectionism," Vahdettin Işık discusses the historical development of Islamism in Turkey through various religious groups and individuals. He also examines the development of Islamism over four periods and proposes a periodization. In Chapter 10, "The adventure of Islamism in Egypt: a political system–based analysis," Muhammed Hüseyin Mercan explores political Islam's venture into Egypt, starting from the intellectual impact of Muhammad Abduh and Jamaluddin Afghani up to the integration of the Muslim Brotherhood with the organs of the state. In Chapter 11, "Islamism and post-Islamism in Iran," Yadullah Shahibzadeh investigates the sources of the idea of new Islamism, along with the basic ideology and motives that reveal the idea of Iranian Islamism. He discusses the basic dynamics of Iranian Islamic thought through the various religious and thought factions in Iran. In Chapter 12, "Islam in the Indian subcontinent, with particular reference to Pakistan," Abdul Rashid Moten seeks to understand and convey the development of religious thought in South Asia through Mawdudi's thoughts and influence. Mawdudi's problem with modernity and the way he positioned Islam laid the foundation for the formation of a certain order and way of thinking in South Asia.

The concept of nationalism is an important referential concept that has manifested itself in different ways within Muslim societies. The equivalent of this concept is closely related to the history and sociology of each region. Indeed, Turkish nationalism and South Asian nationalism differ from each other in terms of the areas discussed and their historical courses. In this sense, Section IV, "Making of the nation-state and changing forms of nationalism," emphasizes the conceptual and historical encounters Muslims have had with nationalism in Turkey, Egypt, Iran, and the Indian subcontinent. In Chapter 13, "The emergence and progress of nationalism in Turkey: from imperialism to the global age," Öner Buçukcu discusses how Turkish nationalism was shaped during the historical process instead of attempting to define it. He draws attention to the relationship between Turkish nationalism and the different ideologies using a historical and sociological reading based on the main names in Turkish nationalism such as Yusuf Akçura and Ziya Gökalp. In Chapter 14, "Arab nationalism: emergence, development, and regression," Ismail Numan Telci focuses on the effects that resulted from the nation-state idea that had arisen under the influence of the nationalist political movement in the Arab world. From the independence of Egypt to the nationalist policies of Gamal Abdel Nasser, he examines the development of Arab nationalism in international politics in Egypt. In Chapter 15, "Nationalism in Iran: nation-state, nation-building, and the Iranian identity," Nail Elhan focuses on the birth of nationalism and the formation of the nation-state in Iran before and after the Islamic Revolution. He views the idea of Persianism as a basis for legitimacy, and argues the idea of Iranian nationalism to have formed over it. In Chapter 16, "The transition of Islamic thought on nation-states on the Indian subcontinent," Omair Anas focuses on the origins of the idea of nationalism, namely its anti-colonial aspect. Colonial activities in South Asia led to nationalism in Muslim societies being identical to colonial opposition.

The development of socialist thought in Muslim societies differed from ideologies such as nationalism, liberalism, and conservatism. The course of socialist thought acquired a path through regional nationalism and anti-colonial opposition. Section V, "The rise and demise of socialism," also questions the historical development of socialist thought in Muslim societies. In Chapter 17, "The adventure of socialism in Turkey," Öner Buçukcu discusses the venture of socialist thought in Turkey since the founding of the Republic. He deals with the historical and sociological positioning of socialist thought in Turkish society and politics through certain people (Mehmet Ali Aybar, Hikmet Kıvılcımlı, and Behice Boran) and institutions (the Republican People's Party, the Workers' Party of Turkey, and the left of center). In Chapter 18, "The left and working-class movement in Egypt: a review using the 2011 uprising lens and thereafter," Heba F. El-Shazli studies socialism through the lens of the working class in Egypt. She views the development of socialist thought in Egypt in parallel with the development of the working class. In Chapter 19, "The historical trajectory of the left in 20th-century Iran: trends, debates, and groups," Agah Hazir defines the Tudeh Party as having caused a significant transformation in Iranian politics and thought in terms of its political positioning, especially before the Islamic Revolution. He emphasizes the declaration of socialist thought in Iran, similar to the experience of socialism in Turkey and Egypt, to have been a failed attempt. In Chapter 20, "The place of socialism in Muslim thought in South Asia," Muhammad Reza Kazimi highlights how anti-colonial resistance against the East India Company had had as decisive an impact on the development of socialism in South Asia as it did in the development of nationalism, with colonial activities having a definitive impact on the regional ideologies.

The last two centuries have led to the emergence of an environment of rich intellectual debate in Muslim societies. During the modernization process, different ideologies put forth

their own projects for the future within Muslim societies. To say that the same applies to liberalism can be expressed as a fairly optimistic approach. Section VI, "Liberalism and Muslim liberal thought," focuses on the liberal trend in Muslim societies. In Chapter 21, "Liberalism in Turkey: an incomplete story," Hamit Emrah Beriş discusses the venture liberal thought in Turkey has had since the foundation of the Republic. He considers the historical and sociological positions of socialist thought in Turkish society and politics through specific people (Prince Sabahaddin, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, and Ahmet Emin Yalman) and institutions (Ottoman Ahrar Faction), and concludes that the most important reason why liberalism has lagged behind other ideologies in Turkey can be seen through how the state has constantly maintained its central position in the public's mind throughout the entire history of modernization. In Chapter 22, "Liberal thought and politics in Egypt," M. Tahir Kılavuz focuses on the liberal orientation in Egyptian society and politics. Liberal thought in Egypt dates back to the end of the 19th century; it experienced changes first in the post-Nasser period and then after the Arab Spring. Although each period has its own basic issues, freedoms and democracy, the relationship between religion and state, and cultural and social change, are issues in common between these periods. Tahir Kılavuz considers Egyptian liberal thought to have resulted from the merging and dissociating of different ideas as opposed to a uniform one. In Chapter 23, "*Rowshan fekran-e dini* [new religious thinkers] and the institution of *velayat-e faqih*: crossing the Rubicon of Islamic law and venturing into discourses on human rights," Janet Afary holds Iran to have an overall anti-authority position rather than to have ventured into liberal thought. Mohsen Kadivar, Abdulkarim Surush, and Mujtahid Shebusteri's criticism of the political and religious climate formed after the Islamic Revolution through the concept of *velayet-i-faqih* seems to have directly influenced the transformation of religious thought in Iran. In Chapter 24, "Liberal trends on the contemporary Muslim Indian subcontinent," S. M. Mehboobul Hassan Bukhari attempts to reveal the relationship between Islam and liberalism in the post-colonial Muslim subcontinent.

The reciprocity between everyday life and thought also offers a strong associability when addressing religion. In this context, considering religious life independent of intellectual efforts and initiatives is impossible. Among the processes that affect and feed each other, religion finds itself as a separate medium in many ways, as it is based on on the flow of everyday life and the world of thought. Section VII, "State, civil society, and democracy," examines the state-society-religion relationship in Turkey, Egypt, Iran, and the Indian subcontinent. In Chapter 25, "Reproduction of religious thought in Turkey: major milestones and state-society relations," Necdet Subaşı discusses the transformation of state-society relations in terms of religion's social position in Turkey. The state's position toward society in Turkey has directed the production of religious thought sometimes using pressure and other times with support. In this context, various forms and shades of contemporary religious thought have emerged in Turkey. This chapter reveals these forms of religious thought by following a chronological course. In Chapter 26, "Imagining Egypt in postnormal times: the state of war," Heba Raouf Ezzat explains why the 2011 uprising in Egypt was not a quick transition to democracy and that neither a strain in civil-military relations had occurred that allowed more freedom in civil society nor a reconfiguration of the security sector. In Chapter 27, "The concept of Islamic republic in Iran: before and after the revolution," Serhan Afacan examines the source of the radical administrative change that Iran underwent in the 20th century. He questions the dynamics that were effective, from the Shah's regime to the Islamic Republic, and examines the theoretical discussions criticizing the current Islamic Republic. In Chapter 28, "Discussions on democracy and Islamic states: a study on the ciscourses of Mawdudi, Israr Ahmed, and Ghamidi," M. Faisal Awan critically presents the discussions on Islam and democracy on the Indian subcontinent.

Section VIII, "Current trends and future directions," examines the new trends in Turkey, Egypt, Iran, and the Indian subcontinent, with a perspective of the future. This section presents and discusses proposals for both theoretical and methodical solutions related to each country. In Chapter 29, "A panoramic view of contemporary Turkish thought: historical developments and current trends," Lutfi Sunar aims to critically evaluate contemporary Turkish thought from a historical and sociological perspective, and offers a new perspective on its evolution in the 20th century. Sunar makes a detailed study of modern Turkish thought after the Cold War in this chapter, revealing the main issues of modern Turkish thought in addition to proposing a periodization. In Chapter 30, "Contemporary trends in Egyptian intellectual movements," Muhammed Soliman Al-Zawawy considers the 2011 revolution as the key to transformation and examines the Egyptian intellectual transformations with a focus on the different factions. This revolution created a new regional situation in terms of policies, as well as at the level of the evolution of ideas from the other Arab Spring revolutions that would affect the intellectual struggle within the Egyptian state and pose a challenge to the right-wing movement that supports militarism in the country. In Chapter 31, "Mapping the trends in Iranian social, cultural, religious, and political thought from the post-1979 era to the present," Peyman Eshaghi creates a general map of the most important social, cultural, religious, and political thoughts in Iran. Although he separates thoughts from movements to do this, he also explores the areas where these thoughts ended up becoming important movements. He attempts to determine the current social, cultural, religious, and political thoughts in Iran not only by using their abstract meaning but also by using how these thoughts are culturally embodied and manifested through institutionalization and how they have become movements. In Chapter 32, "Political economy of Islam and its manifestation in Pakistan: past, present, and future," Ahsan Shafiq notes the roots of Islamic political and economic thought and its development in Pakistan after the partition of the Indian subcontinent lie in the awakening witnessed at the end of the 19th century on the Indian subcontinent.

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SECTION I

Facing with the modernity

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1

TURKISH MODERNIZATION AS A HISTORICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL ISSUE

Mahmut Hakkı Akın

Introduction

Turkish modernization is one of the most important sources to have directly determined the direction of Turkish thought, as well as one of the most important topics in the history of Turkish thought. The formation, continuities, and discontinuities in the history of Turkish thought need to be addressed alongside the formation, continuities, and discontinuities in Turkish modernization. Turkish modernization, which has a unique place among the non-Western modernization experiences, is a process that must be evaluated in light of Turkey's historical situation as one that is both the other to and on the periphery of the West. The literature on this subject has been shaped by contributions both from Turkey and abroad, as well as by the influence of theoretical and ideological disparity, and is largely centered around historical and sociological contexts. This is partially due to the fact that sociology is a product of the modernization that emerged and developed in the West. The situation is not different in the case of Turkey. Many years of historical and social change have also placed sociology at the center of Turkish modernization. Therefore, as an answer to questions such as "Who was/were the first sociologist(s) in Turkey?", names such as Ahmed Cevdet Pasha and Ahmet Vefik Pasha can be mentioned among those who, prior to the Second Constitutional Era, were intellectuals who made serious contributions to institutionalizing sociology and generated ideas about the modernization process. This statement is important in terms of the following fundamental assumption: some of the names that have contributed most to the subject of Turkish modernization in the recent period and are regarded as doyen names in their fields with their works today are those who have contributed to the field of sociology, in particular historical sociology, even though they are not from the field. While the many studies that have tried to sociologically analyze the facts and events that emerged as a result of Turkish modernization are clearly seen to have missed the historical reality and continuity, they also have not been able to go beyond taking a periodic photograph.

This chapter will place emphasis on the views of three names who focused on modernization and accepted this issue as a historical and sociological reality: Niyazi Berkes, Şerif Mardin, and Kemal Karpat. Although two of the three were not from the field of sociology, they are all considered to have been sociologists by virtue of their contributions to the field of sociology. Perhaps the most important common point of these names despite their different emphases is

that they are recognized as historians through their significant contributions to the discipline of history in Turkey in addition to their contributions to sociology as a field of social sciences in Turkey and to Turkish thought in general. As a matter of fact, the issue of modernization in Turkish thought can be considered an area where history, sociology, and political disciplines intersect. Of course, non-Turkish names are found to have also addressed the issue from this perspective, and this external perspective certainly has both advantages and disadvantages. The reason why Turkish names have been chosen in this chapter is that the formation of their biographies and mindsets is somewhat related to the history of Turkish modernization. What constitutes another angle of this chapter is that these prominent figures in the literature on Turkish modernization tried to understand and explain the same issue through different perspectives.

Turkish modernization as a social science issue

When mentioning Turkish modernization, Turkey's general process of social change over the course of more than two hundred years comes to mind. Whether this process was a development or evolution toward a general or a macro-uniform modernization worldwide is a controversial issue. The discourse on contemporary civilization vs. century-old prose – which has an important place in Turkish modernization, both in thought and practice – can be argued to implicitly accept this claim as a correct starting point and even a fixed idea. Of course, debates occurred about alternative non-Western modernizations, and these debates go a long way back. For example, Japan's defeat of Russia, whose industrial superiority constituted the biggest threat to the Ottomans, during the Japanese-Russian War (1904–1905) resulted in the formation of a discourse around the possibility of Japanese modernization being a model for Turkish modernization. The more conservative and Islamist sections in particular were the ones that emphasized Japanese modernization. When a similar debate re-emerged in a different context after 1980, these sections can be said to have more easily bought into this approach. As underlined in the introduction section of this chapter, this is due to Turkish modernization being a political process whereby the discussions directly concerning how modernization should occur and be experienced also indirectly shape Turkish politics. Although different emphases have been made in modernization theories such as on economic development, production changes, democratization, and the widespread use of mass media (Sunar, 2019, pp. 25–34), clearly no single theoretical model can fully explain this process. Therefore, as the change in the literature shows, focusing on the elements that a society's own historical and sociological reality put forward has come into prominence because, despite external influences and interventions, society has resisted maintaining its historical and sociological conditions and becoming involved in the change it has experienced through its own reality.

Another important angle in approaching Turkish modernization is periodization. This issue itself is directly related to the title of this chapter. The periodic contexts, continuities, and ruptures of a process of more than two centuries are not just about their own internal dynamics. Understanding Turkish modernization is impossible without considering the change experienced by the world at large. When addressing periodical categorization in particular, the effects of this change become clearer. In both the emphasis on power and other periodization efforts related to Turkish modernization, a context emerges at the intersection of history, sociology, and politics. Of course, this claim concerns more general and determinative institutions.

Lutfi Sunar, who examined the issue of modernization in terms of its contributions to the social sciences (2018a, p. 265), argued three main theoretical bases to be present: the Marxist Asiatic mode of production approach, Weber's patrimonialism model, and modernization theories. In addition, Sunar argued the theory of multiple modernities (i.e., non-Western modernities) to

have partially contributed to these three theoretical tendencies after 1980 as a hybrid explanation. Different theoretical approaches to the same historical and sociological reality would, of course, generate diverse contributions to the field. A dynamism and criticism also developed, especially due to the ongoing controversy between 1960 and 1980. However, although theories were borrowed in all of these discussions, reality imposed itself and successful theoretical constructs that had been prominent for one period were reinterpreted or abandoned over time. The holistic approach issue is particularly noticeable here (Sunar, 2018a, p. 303). One theoretical approach that is thought to have dealt with the issue for some time was almost ignored after a certain period of time, which is really interesting. Solidly establishing the relationship between facts and fiction in accordance with the reality is very important here. The fact that a holistic theory could not be developed for Turkey's own reality makes Turkish modernization in itself a theoretical and methodological issue in terms of social sciences. However, given that a complete realization of an agreement between the fiction and the facts is a utopian expectation, another situation not to be overlooked is that those who contributed to the literature on the issue, even with their shortcomings, had laid the foundations for new studies.

Modernization analysis of Niyazi Berkes: the historical sociology of secularization

When considering Niyazi Berkes's contributions to the special field of sociology in Turkey, the first thing that comes to mind is his village monographs based on field research data while he worked at the Ankara University Faculty of Language and History Geography (DTCF) as a sociology teacher (1939–1948). His PhD education at the University of Chicago and his efforts to implement a concept of sociology based on the empirical studies he conducted during his years at the academy in Turkey are important both in terms of Turkish thought and Turkish sociology. However, the most striking works from Niyazi Berkes were not the scientific studies he conducted during the DTCF years. Being accused of being a "communist" because of the political conjuncture that occurred after World War II, the termination of his professorship at the DTCF Sociology Department and then relocating to Canada did not detract Niyazi Berkes from Turkey's historical and social reality. As a matter of fact, his emphasis on discovering the historical and social reality of Turkey in his studies became even more prominent after his departure to Canada, so much so that the periodical distinction made by those who draw attention to Berkes' pre- and post-Canada works is important (Kayalı, 2018, pp. 89–90; Ak, 2014, p. 422). Berkes participated in the important discussions of the period in the *Yön* journal in the 1960s and also had a decisive impact on the direction of the discussions. In this period, Berkes' closeness to the *Yön* group, which tried to bring Marxism and Kemalism together, was consistent and significant in terms of his own story. However, his sensitivity throughout the discussions – about how the Ottoman Empire could not be understood directly with Western theoretical patterns, including Marxism, and how the specificity of its social and historical reality should not be overlooked – caused him to be regarded as a thinker outside of the general atmosphere of the period and to be alienated (Berkes, 2016, p. 85; Dinçşahin, 2010, pp. 173–175). A close relationship can be established between this sensitivity and his leanings toward Ottoman history. Of course, taking the specificity of historical and sociological reality into consideration and trying to reveal this specificity can also be considered an important methodological attitude. However, a social scientist whose approach to historical and social reality is based on a certain theoretical or ideological framework is a handicap that cannot be overcome in the social sciences, and this can also be said about Niyazi Berkes. He tried to ideologically legitimize the Republican regime and Atatürk's reforms while emphasizing the specificity of Ottoman and Turkish societies' reality.

In other words, the historical and social assessments Niyazi Berkes made regarding the flow of history can be clearly regarded as the result of a purposeful and instrumental perspective.

Niyazi Berkes is notable for his contributions to the historical and sociological transformation of Turkey, and special attention must be drawn to his book *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma* (Berkes 2008), which distinguished him as a sociologist. Berkes may arguably be a predecessor in Turkey in terms of historical sociology with this work of his as well as with his academic articles. Another important aspect of *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, aside from being Berkes' essential work, is that it was the source of the system that could be followed in his later works. Although the original name of the book was *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, the reason why Niyazi Berkes personally preferred *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma* [*Modernization in Turkey*] as the title of the Turkish version is explained in the introduction of the book. Berkes (2008, p. 21) claimed that the term modernization "corresponds to a cause wider than a cause for a religion-state distinction" and that modernization is the true equivalent of secularism, which is equivalent to laicism in terms of both meaning and origin. This concept preference is very important in terms of understanding Niyazi Berkes' thoughts and his approach to Turkish modernization. According to him, Westernization – which has its roots back in the 18th century – corresponds to secularization (i.e., modernization), which gives it its true meaning. Thus, the ultimate goal and *sine qua non* of Turkish modernization in Niyazi Berkes' thinking stands out as the principle of secularism, so much so that Gökhan Ak (2016, pp. 77–80) in his various studies on Niyazi Berkes claimed that Berkes had defined the following concepts that he valued as interconnected with and even identical to secularism: peace, economic development, democracy, freedom of thought, expression and conscience, modernity, nationalism, political independence, and a national democratic state. Thus, for Berkes, secularism is the guarantee and an indispensable part of the most advanced and high principles that humanity has so far achieved in its history. Therefore, secularism has an uncontestable position because it is the cornerstone of the Republican revolutions. This approach, which corresponded to the basic rhetoric (i.e., *idée fixe*) of the official ideology in Turkey for many years, yields clear advocacy and a response in Berkes' mind.

Niyazi Berkes, who attached great importance to secularism and placed it at the base of his system of thought, distinguished the position Christianity has had in European history from the position Islam had in Ottoman history. According to him, fundamental differences exist in both the teachings and historical processes of Christianity and Islam, and secularism is an element that can be understood from the West's own historical experience. Niyazi Berkes, who pointed out the position Islam had in the Ottoman Empire to be unexplainable through Western-based theocratic discussions, identified the intertwining nature of Islam and tradition through the specificity of historical and social reality. Therefore, the indistinguishable presence of Islam in what had been traditional in the Ottoman Empire resulted in the sanctification of the tradition itself. In Niyazi Berkes' thought, secularism represents an understanding toward what has become or is made sacred.

Niyazi Berkes fictionalized modernization in Turkey as a process where what was connected with tradition and what is modern had become separated from one another, taking opposite sides both historically and sociologically. His intense leanings toward Ottoman history involved an in-depth effort to analyze the background of this process. This effort highlights a few of the features that made Niyazi Berkes different. Despite being very strongly attached to the Republic and Atatürk, Niyazi Berkes interpreted the official ideology's concept of "starting the history with the Republic and ignoring the Islamic and Ottoman past" differently. Berkes regarded the Republic and Atatürk's revolutions as the most important period and a turning point in terms of Turkey's modernization. However, he acknowledged the importance of also analyzing the historical and social reality up to this stage in distinguishing this period.

Therefore, Niyazi Berkes' view of the Republic as an extremely important turning point in terms of reaching the secularism stage and applying secularism also means accepting it as the product of a historical transformation. According to him, the Republic needs to be distinguished in the history of modernization and Westernization in Turkey because the Charter of Alliance, the Royal Edict of Reform, and the two subsequent constitutional monarchies had served as stepping stones toward achieving nationalism and secularism (Berkes, 2016, p. 80). According to Berkes, secularism was ensured and the modernization process unfolded as it should have due to Atatürk and the Republic. Berkes also importantly distinguished Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the officer and commander during the constitutional era, the wars, and the National Struggle with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Republican Era (Berkes, 2019, p. 169). This distinction also implies Turkish modernization itself to have had two different stages. In Niyazi Berkes' analysis of Turkish modernization, the process and steps taken since the printing house came to the Ottoman Empire are meaningful only in relation to attaining the Republic. According to him, one of the most basic characteristics of modernization is radical rupture, the result of which is the difference between the Ottoman officer Mustafa Kemal Pasha and the pioneer of the Republican revolutions Atatürk.

According to Niyazi Berkes, the most important feature that distinguishes the Republic as a new stage and as the actual modernization process in Turkish modernization is revolutionism. Seeing ideologies such as Islamism and Turanism as the products of the Ottoman regime, Berkes (2015, p. 79) considered the elimination of these ideologies as the beginning of the Turkish revolution. His modernization thesis was built on the idea that reaching a stage based on revolutionism and secularism was possible only with the Republic. Preserving the past or displaying a limited demand for change regarding the traditional meant contributing to the self-production of tradition. Niyazi Berkes' assessment of Namık Kemal and the Young Ottomans in particular clearly reflects his understanding of modernization (Berkes, 2017, pp. 231–233). Stating Namık Kemal to have had a romantic attitude due to his sensitivity to preserving the traditional and the Islamic, Berkes criticized him for not being able to arrive at the idea of secularism. Although the Young Ottomans were interested in ideas such as natural law, they remained caught in the middle in a contradictory situation during the modernization process because they could not afford the radical break from tradition (Berkes, 2008, pp. 296–297, 2017, p. 239). According to Berkes, revolutionary thought and its implementation were only possible with secularism because the Republic aimed to eliminate the historical and sociological means of traditional production. The duality created by the inability of the reformist actions that had been made in education since the period of Selim III to eliminate the traditional education during the Ottoman modernization process caused an increase in both the self-production of the traditional and the negative reaction to the new (Berkes, 2008, p. 230, 2019, p. 39). Niyazi Berkes, who can also be considered a Kemalist ideologist (2015, p. 83), interpreted the issue of placing the mental structure required by a more advanced civilization in a society whose backward structure has not changed by means of tools or as a result of things such as the alphabet, clothing, calendar, and law as the misfortune of Kemalism. Therefore, he accused the opposition to Kemalism's secular revolution of putting a premium on the traditional and of using the organizations opposing the modern and contemporary as tools. He evaluated the post-Atatürk Republican People's Party and the period of the Democratic Party through this point of view.

Despite being an uncompromising Kemalist and leftist thinker, Niyazi Berkes has been criticized severely by those close to him for accepting Turkey's modernization as a historical issue and for correspondingly concentrating on Ottoman history especially. Those who adhere to the understanding that rejects the pre-Republican era of the official ideology have questioned Berkes' Kemalism and leftism, and have even criticized his "Abdülhamitism" (Kayalı, 2001,

p. 134). On the other hand, his criticism of Westernization caused confusion about him. He claimed that interlocutors were unable to properly understand his evaluations about Westernism such as it being "an uncertain, unrealized utopia that often benefits reactionaryism as well as Islamism, Ottomanism, and Turkism" (Berkes, 2015, p. 265). Nationalism and secularism in Niyazi Berkes' thought carry specific meanings that go beyond a nationalism that tilts toward chauvinism and Westernization.

Şerif Mardin and public division in Turkish modernization

One of the prime aspects that make Şerif Mardin unique in regard to Turkish modernization is the paradigmatic difference in his approach to the issue. Şerif Mardin, who had been working on Turkish modernization since the 1950s, attracted more attention and occupied a central position in the area until the 1990s. The articles collected in Şerif Mardin's book – whose opinions were outside of the dominant paradigm in the 1960s and 1970s, when the writings of names such as Niyazi Berkes and Doğan Avcıoğlu were effective – managed to attract attention long after they had been written. Another important feature of his works is that he initiated epistemology and methodology in social sciences and produced original works on these subjects. Decisive names in the field of sociology theories such as Max Weber, Karl Mannheim, Alfred Schutz, Erving Goffman, and Talcott Parsons were also the names that Şerif Mardin used in his analyses (Doğan, 2013). Therefore, the traces of many different names and theoretical approaches can be followed in Mardin's sociological tendencies. Again, his books *Ideology* and *Political and Social Sciences* are works that can be considered to have contibuted to the field of general social sciences. Şerif Mardin undoubtedly paid attention to theory and methodology in his works. However, this attention was obviously not a theoretical or methodological obsession, but rather an awareness focused on social reality and its changes through which he attempted to understand and explain. However, the paradigm he upheld understandably needed a lot of time to pass in order to receive credit in Turkey, considering the impact and the decisive role of the leftist trend in the general thought, especially in the 1960s. Despite this delay, Şerif Mardin is one of the top names to have changed the direction of the most important debates of Turkish modernization. As Keyman (2015, p. 41) stated, the importance of Şerif Mardin stemmed from his ability to see modernization as an issue beyond dichotomies and from his founding position of the paradigm. For this reason, Şerif Mardin's work on Turkish modernization has become an important reference source for subsequent works as well as in how it formed a rupture in the field.

First of all, the most important aspect of the paradigm Şerif Mardin adopted in his view of the issue of modernization is his insistence on understanding modernization as a social change. Of course, almost all those who are interested in the subject claim that the issue is a social change. However, Şerif Mardin's distinctive aspect was his persistent effort to understand what social reality is in itself (i.e., the source and product of this change). The shift from a line mostly based on realism to the position of a commentator indicates his enriched perspective, according to Arlı (2018, p. 90). Şerif Mardin focused on the epistemological details of cultural reality and reached important concepts through symbols, rituals, and actions. For this reason, the arguments that were considered very important during the times he was ignored (1960s and 1970s) were pushed to the background and placed in a unique position in generating new discussions.

Şerif Mardin approached the issue of modernization beyond the basic dichotomies which the prevailing understanding before him was built upon. Şerif Mardin revealed continuity and discontinuity to be related to each other beyond a classical dichotomy in terms of Turkish

modernization. Constructing the process over two centuries on this basis has resulted in a focus on two important issues. Moreover, even though he claimed that Atatürk, one of the most important leading actors of the modernization of the Republic, had the main goal of discontinuing the Ottoman modernization with the Republic revolutions (Mardin, 1994, p. 228), his works are among the main sources of reference for those who advocate the Republican modernization to have been a continuation of Ottoman modernization.

While Şerif Mardin analyzed the new publicity that changed and even transformed the issue of Turkish modernization on the one hand, on the other hand, he turned to the differentiation created by this new publicity. Dualities such as traditional education and modern education, neighborhood schools and boarding schools, imams and teachers, were symbols reflecting the dilemma of the culture produced by the ongoing traditional culture and modernization happening side by side. This distinction led to the crystallization of his works as being religion- and ideology-oriented studies as a result of the fact that religion had for centuries been the institution that produced meaning in the world of the public in terms of mentality and practice. As a matter of fact, religion and ideology are closely related to each other because they contain worldviews and practices. Both are the sources for the maps of meaning individuals need to make sense of the social reality they experience and to live in that reality with a consistent perspective (Mardin, 1992, p. 18, 2007, pp. 29–30). Of course, Şerif Mardin did not accept religion and ideology as identical concepts, and he paid attention to the distinction between the two. A group of intellectuals had been found who would become the pioneers of the change that had taken place in the West, especially as a result of modernization, and who used the new tools of publicity (e.g., newspapers and magazines) of the West in the Ottoman Empire. These intellectuals' attempts at understanding and expressing their new world of meaning resulted in Şerif Mardin's intense focus on the religious and ideological worldviews of meaning (Mardin, 2008a). The continuity of these two different worldviews of meaning are observable not only in Ottoman modernization, but also in the modernization of the Republic. Mardin's conceptualization of *Volk* [nation/people] and Islam at a distance from one other is remarkable. This distance, rooted in historical and social memory, also caused a political distance, which has obviously been one of the main producers of Turkish political culture.

Studying the issue of Turkish modernization from a religious and ideologically centered perspective and the argument of the incompatibility of the two different forms of publicity led Şerif Mardin to Edward Shils' theoretical model of center-periphery (Mardin, 1994, pp. 34–45). According to this model, the patrimonial bureaucracy, consisting of the parties of the ideological division mentioned previously, is central in the process of modernization; the traditional masses are the environment. The center affects the environment while seeking to preserve the power that makes it privileged. Şerif Mardin claimed this to be a model that could be followed when analyzing the situation in Turkey. Interestingly, this claim was an alternative explanation to the statements made up to that time regarding the issue of modernization: The bureaucracy-centered model was the most prominent determining force for both the Ottoman and Republican modernizations. Mardin (2001, p. 236) claimed the Republic of Turkey to have the characteristic of being a patrimonial state; this theoretical model also offered the opportunity to analyze the Ottoman-Republic continuity. While evaluating some criticisms, Şerif Mardin (2011, p. 238) argued looking at the center-periphery approach as a first step and that the diversity of this duality may arise with detailed studies at the micro level. He even emphasized that the center-periphery duality taken from Edward Shils should not be overlooked as a "metaphor" (Mardin, 2011, p. 240). Nevertheless, Şerif Mardin's attempt to explain Turkish modernization through the change of publicity, and the discovery of the worldviews

of meaning the divided cultures possessed, makes the center-periphery metaphor important for its systematic approach. However, the relationship between the center and the environment was particularly criticized for having been constructed as a unilaterally determined hierarchical relationship (Takış, 2013, pp. 82–83). The facts that the relationship between the center and the periphery has been neither one-sided nor hierarchical, and that sometimes the environment has been much more decisive, requires taking critical precautions, not a complete rejection of the model. Again, the failure of the modernization-based process of change and Turkish democracy to produce a civil society in the style of the West resulted in criticisms of some of the analyses related to the center-periphery argument.

The facts that Kemalism itself is a project of modernization and that it directly took action with the utopia of a new society in mind have brought with it the differentiation of the relations of three institutions that have been particularly emphasized in Turkish modernization: politics, education, and religion. Also significant is that Şerif Mardin especially emphasized the concept of utopia. The fictional aspect of utopia has often caused the facts to be ignored. Based on this understanding, Şerif Mardin (2001, pp. 246–247) criticized Berkes in a discussion with him for not seeing that social reality has innovative mechanisms within itself. The thesis that the sections of society have been based on tradition and affected by change in Turkish modernization has an important position for Şerif Mardin, who included this in the modernization process with their own internal dynamics. Indeed, politics, education, and religion draw attention as three mobilizing institutions in terms of traditional social segments. The change in the modernization of the Republic due to external and internal reasons after World War II resulted in a return to the multi-party system. Although this change initially appeared to be a change in the political structure, clearly the educational and religious institutions had also been affected by this change and new patterns of relations related to these institutions had emerged. Şerif Mardin did not consider the process that progressed from these events to be a process that contradicted modernization. According to him, many new situations caused by this change can be understood by examining different social realities through different actors within the context of Turkish modernization. Şerif Mardin, who focused on thought and strived to explore the worldviews of meanings, was in favor of discovering the newly formed multi-layered and complex social reality through micro analysis.

Kemal Karpat and the search for a balanced state of Turkish modernization

Kemal Karpat, alongside the two other names mentioned in this chapter, made important contributions to the subject of Turkish modernization from the field of historical sociology. However, the fact that his work has received insufficient interest despite having many original characteristics and despite having made contributions to Turkish modernization and recent history of Turkey is another matter (Sunar, 2018b, p. 32). In an article on this subject, Karpat stated his attempt at trying to analyze Turkish modernization around four basic hypotheses, and these hypotheses clearly bear the traces of his systematics that can be observed in many of his studies. These hypotheses are as follows (Karpat, 2009a, p. 25):

1 Development (whether political or not) should be based primarily on a cause-factor applicable to societies.
2 This factor must exist historically at various levels and in all stages of change.
3 Both the forces that contribute to change and the change itself must be quantitatively measurable.

4 Political developments and structural changes should be interrelated and quantitatively measurable (this does not preclude the ability of the political system from being an independent variable).

Based on these assumptions but not rejecting the leading role the state played in the Ottoman and even Western modernization experiences, Kemal Karpat (2014, p. 16) believed that the groups that made up the social strata during the process should also be taken into consideration. This stratified system consisting of soldiers, top executives, scholars, bureaucrats, artisans, traders, and agricultural producers underwent a serious change with modernization. On the religious level, the change in social structure, which was divided between Muslims and non-Muslims, and the alteration of the existing situation can be followed through empirical data. Here, as Sunar argued (2018b, p. 46), Kemal Karpat's attempt at explaining modernization not only through external influences but also mostly through the internal dynamics of society has attracted attention and is a central position in his works. His concentration on the internal dynamics of society is one of Karpat's most important distinguishing characteristics. His methodology, on the other hand, is an alternative way of looking at the political developments and changes linked to these developments experienced at different periods in Turkey. For example, Kemal Karpat considered the proclamation of the Republic and the Democratic Party's coming to power or losing power through military coups to be events observable through many other sources of data in addition to politics. An interdisciplinary attitude can be seen here. In addition, the empirical evidence assists in the analysis of periodic contexts as reflections of sociological and historical reality. Kemal Karpat, who emphasized the fact that the social structure in Turkey had earned a dual character with modernization – as had other social scientists working in the field of modernization – tried to explain the issue through the theory of elites based on its own historical and social reality. However, he argued that the change in the elites from the 19th century to the 20th century should be identified instead of just considering the domination of a single elite group through generations in the bureaucracy (Karpat, 2009a, p. 64) because the emergence of new actors had taken place not only in the military and civil bureaucracies, but also in the economy, art, and many local cultural fields. He claimed modernization to have continued since the time Sultan Mahmud II had produced a bureaucratic centralization on one side and a new Muslim middle class with economic transformations on the other (Karpat, 2010a, p. 35). This segment was a new social stratum and played a central role in the continuation of modernization. However, this middle class had a structure that cannot be evaluated like its counterparts in the West; it should be evaluated while keeping its idiosyncrasies in mind. The vast majority of non-Muslim merchants in the Ottoman cities resulted in the new Turkish middle class being a "dependent" class that used state power rather than its commercial power (Karpat, 2010a, pp. 35–36). Kemal Karpat argued that the carrier roles of these actors of modernization should not be overlooked either in the Constitutional or the Republican eras because, according to him, the Second Constitutional and the Republican eras were changes that had taken place with the support of soldiers, civil servants, and local gentry (Karpat, 2010a, pp. 65–66). This diversification and change contain very important distinctive aspects of Turkish modernization. Kemal Karpat determined in his field research he had been conducting in three slums of Istanbul since the 1960s that the biggest reaction to those who migrated from rural areas to metropolitan cities came from the middle class of the city – those who could also be considered as the carriers of modernization. According to Karpat (2016, p. 99), the old residents of the city (i.e., trusted, well-known, and settled families with old middle-class values) saw migration from rural areas to Istanbul as a peasant invasion. The hierarchical perspective revealed here maintained itself in spatial segregation, various political preferences, and many other cultural elements.

Karpat, who interpreted the new political elite's efforts to take Islam out of nationality as "laying the foundations of the age of ideology" (2009b, p. 321), argued that the wrong interpretation of the cultural and historical reality of the founding elites of the Republic had caused many negativities. In particular, he thought that the mentality that had tried to push Islam out of nationality and create a new nationality with the understanding of secularism was able to accurately understand neither the ongoing modernization of the Ottoman Empire nor the relationship between religion and the state (Karpat, 2009b, p. 322). Thus, the period in which the foundations of the Republican ideology had been laid saw the pursuit of a new history and sociology and the demand that the existing historical and sociological reality be changed. Karpat (2010b, p. 190) expressed this contradiction by saying, "Turkey had a secular government established to manage a society entirely devoted to Islam". Ignoring the reality of Islam as one of the most important sources of Turkey's history and culture and even preventing the possibility of producing its own reality with this understanding had led to the emergence of serious social problems. This has been an important political basis for motivating opposition to the Republican People's Party (CHP) throughout the multi-party experience. As a matter of fact, despite all the implementations, Islam did not leave the stage as a producer of social reality and fulfilled its role in the continuity of social reality under new conditions. However, the definition and use of secularism as an ideological tool for social change in the modernization of the Republic also caused the emergence of cultural division as an ideological division (Karpat, 2011, p. 181). These findings are quite understandable for a social scientist more sensitive to what actually happened than to what should have happened. The fact that cultural division is also a source of ideological division has an important place in terms of understanding Turkey's politics and democracy. Although Karpat (2011, p. 181) said that the division or separation defined as "state-society dichotomy" could be observed from the beginning of Ottoman modernization, he was sensitive about the historical and sociological dynamics of change this distinction previously had. Therefore, the fact that people had the ability to establish a relationship with the state through politics or economics and be from the middle class or somehow included in this class proves the dynamic structure of the state-society dichotomy.

One of the most important works from Kemal Karpat reflecting his sensitivity to factual reality was his slum research, previously mentioned in this chapter in a different context. This study deserves to be evaluated alongside the studies of Mübeccel Kiray, who focused heavily on urbanization in Turkey in the 1960s and also contributed to Kemal Karpat's study. Kemal Karpat studied cases in South America, the Indian subcontinent, and Arab countries, and attempted to identify the unique aspects of the squatting in Turkey in terms of internal mobility in order to examine slums as a phenomenon. Supporting the transformative effect the city has on immigrants using empirical data, Karpat (2016, p. 58) defined the ongoing social life in slums as "modernization" for the city and "urbanization" for rural migrants. Although the rural immigrants' view of city life as being better and their expectations of benefiting from the city's opportunities regarding their future (Karpat, 2016, pp. 146–147) was viewed as the "peasantization of the city" by the established urban middle class, this phenomenon in Karpat's thought was an urbanization process produced by Turkey's modernization that in turn produced the ongoing modernization. The emphasis on "urbanization" points to the result of the cultural and sociological change produced by the process. This argument can be evaluated as a sociological result of living in the city beyond the ideological distinction where one section is considered urban and another as peasants due to spatial/cultural divisions.

Kemal Karpat paid great attention to the need to consider Turkey's historical accumulation and the social reality that this accumulation had formed in terms of modernization in Turkey. According to him, returning from the change produced by Turkish modernization was

impossible (Karpat, 2010b, p. 426). Karpat argued the importance of capturing a state of social balance and harmony and of continuing the process on its own as far as in relation to the cultural segregations in Turkish modernization. According to him, a modernization process that excludes the state and is left alone is as bad as one that works from the top down in disregard of the wishes of society (Karpat, 2010b, p. 427). He claimed the experience of democracy in Turkey to show that the sides of the dichotomy produced by modernization should establish relationships with each other through persuasion – and that this can actually be achieved.

Conclusion

Two interesting and ironic details are that Niyazi Berkes, Şerif Mardin, and Kemal Karpat have written important articles and books on the subject in an effort to explain Turkish modernization while living abroad, and that most of the texts evaluated in this chapter were also translated. Their leanings toward historical and sociological reality by emphasizing the process of change and their efforts to contribute to Turkish modernization with a new historiography can be accepted as one of their common characteristics.

Niyazi Berkes' acceptance of Turkish modernization as a process of nationalization and secularization, and his view of revolutionism and secularism as indispensable principles, position him next to the official ideology of the Republic. Although he insisted on the specificity of Ottoman historical and social reality, he seemed to have adopted the theoretical basis stemming from the West's experience of secularization in terms of modernization – or *çağdaşlaşma*, in his own words. This attitude and insistence were accompanied by accusations of him being an Orientalist. Although Berkes regarded the people who contributed to the modernization process in Turkey as Romantics, he himself can also be said to have followed the Romantism that pertained to the era spanning from the foundation of the Republic to the death of Atatürk. This situation stems from his own modernization model and the systematics he had created based on this model. Despite all this, Niyazi Berkes' attempts to understand the historical process through important events and documents, especially in his work *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, enabled him to be a leading thinker in the field of Turkish modernization.

Şerif Mardin had attempted to understand Turkish modernization and the new publicity formed in this process sociologically. His focus on the new publicity shifted his work to centering on bureaucratic and civil society debates. In this context, he also tried to analyze the mentality of cultural differentiation through religion and ideology. In addition to analyzing modernization based on publicity and mentality, he proposed the center-periphery theoretical model, which over time has seen both support and criticism. Although the news produced through the ingenuity of journalism from the interviews made with him before his death, such as "Would Turkey be like Malaysia?", "Neighborhood Pressure", and "The Teacher Is Defeated by the Imam" (Mardin, 2008b), made headlines for a while, many theoretical and methodological innovations in Turkish modernization have been regarded as Şerif Mardin's contributions. Like Berkes, Şerif Mardin was a prominent figure who insisted that understanding and explaining the Turkish modernization process is possible by focusing on the context of historical and social reality. Şerif Mardin should also be noted to have had an important role in changing the tendencies of studies in the field.

Kemal Karpat made many other unique arguments which differed from Niyazi Berkes' and more closely resembled Şerif Mardin's. When considering Karpat's individual story and comparing him to the other two names, although he seems to be removed from sociology, Karpat was much more circumspect in using empirical data and producing direct data-driven studies as a social scientist. Beyond seeing Turkish modernization as a process under the control of a

particular bureaucratic class, he also preferred focusing on the different social layers' contributions to the production and differentiation of the process. The field surveys he was directly involved in provided him with the opportunity to understand historical and social change through data and observations. Turning to the internal dynamics of society was especially important for Kemal Karpat. His scientific and methodological concern for what the factual reality itself was and how its own dynamics must be understood is one of his distinctive characteristics. Therefore, the facts that his findings had not attracted attention until relatively recently, and that his works have been neglected the most of these three, should be considered unfortunate.

These three people who studied and tried to explain the same change process through different emphases from the perspective of historical sociology not only explained Turkish modernization, but also identified the basic concepts and problems related to the process. A paradigmatic transformation in Turkish modernization is only possible by way of these figures. They each can be regarded as pioneers in the holistic study of Turkish modernization that go beyond just the influences of the period and the theoretical tendencies based on these influences because the rigor of their holism was only possible through their persistence on remaining within the context of historical and social reality. Studying and even fictionalizing the Turkish modernization process through ideological divisions causes each ideological party to attempt to verify its own fiction. This has clearly been seen in the use of historical reality itself as an issue of ideological conflict due to the various ideological actors. The contributions the people addressed in this study made to the development of the literature on Turkish modernization by staying faithful to their own phenomenological development and by employing different theoretical and methodological tendencies are undeniable.

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2

DISCUSSIONS ON TRADITION AND CIVILIZATION IN EGYPT

Gökhan Bozbaş

Introduction

Thanks to Egypt's location, it has always attracted the interest of the civilizations that have had effective roles in the world from past to present. The paths of almost all superpowers and major civilizations mentioned in history books have led to Egypt at some point. At different times in history, these powers fought for domination over this region. Egypt was the first civilization to use an alphabet, to construct buildings from stone, and to use the triangle geometrically. This is why these lands, which witnessed many other similar firsts, are called the *Umm al-Dunya* [Mother of the World] by the Egyptians.

Aside from having had such an impact on the world, Egyptian geography has come to the fore through the internal conflicts experienced in recent years. While these disputes sometimes occur between Islamists and seculars, the question of whether Egyptians are Arab or not has emerged at other times. Despite having sent 30,000 soldiers in support of Arabs to the North Yemen Civil War that began in the early 1960s, Egypt now displays a completely different attitude in its response to the current Yemen civil war, with Egypt's leader Sisi refusing to lend a hand to Arab issues. In fact, all these discourses have taken shape as a result of the different responses to the fundamental questions that emerged against the backdrop of the introduction of modernity. Answers given to the questions "Who are we?" and "Which civilization do we belong to?" differ according to the tradition and perspective of which one is a part.

What I actually intend here is to demonstrate how Egyptians conceptually perceive the concepts of tradition and modernity. Attempting to assess Egypt's situation through another community or group's definitions would mean adopting an Orientalist perspective, which is how the concepts as perceived by Egyptians have been reviewed. Orientalists do not always emerge from the West. For this reason, the first aim of this paper is to analyze Egyptian society's understanding of *turas* [tradition], then to subsequently attempt to explain the kinds of envisagement of civilization that have arisen. In fact, past civilizations and their boundaries are seen to have been redefined in modern times. Afterwards, this chapter will discuss the ways different schools of thought have approached the topic of tradition and will in this way define the various forms in which modernity has been encountered.

Concepts of tradition and modernity

The concepts of modernity and tradition do not project the same thing in people's minds today as they once did. Although modernity in its simplest form represents the new with tradition representing the old, every individual's stance in terms of identity affects their perception of what is old and new. This is because the concepts of modernity and tradition have a historical background that parallel their ideational conception. Almost all the modernization movements societies had gone through in the past founded the phenomena they defined as modern over traditional phenomena that they defined as old in order to render modern phenomena valid in the eyes of people. How the meanings of these concepts were perceived is crucial in understanding this situation.

The concept of tradition in Arabic is mostly expressed through the term *turas*. One should know that the word *turas* does not actually refer to an ordinary value or reality in Egypt. It is derived from the word *we-ra-se*, the primary meaning in the dictionary being "a son receiving a good inheritance from his father" or "anything inherited" (Ibn Manzur, 1970, Vol. 3, pp. 189, 190). *Turas*, which can be defined as the heritage of the past for the present, carries a slightly different meaning as a technical term. The concept of *turas* was defined by Said Selâm (2009, p. 15) as "All of the material or spiritual elements a society carries from its past to its present." Of course, this definition is controversial, especially within Muslim societies. Will the question, "When we say from past to present, does that include the pre-Islamic periods, or are we only the heirs to the culture and the civilization that emerged with the birth of Islam?" be discussed with violence not just in Egypt but in all other Muslim countries?

The issue is not how tradition is defined or what renders the concept problematic. What makes it problematic is the existence of the modern and the new, which claims that tradition should remain in the past and be imprisoned in history. While this newness can rip traditions away from the civilization to which they belong and become included in another civilization, they can also remain in the same civilization and cause change. That is why the meaning of modern becomes important. For most, modernity refers to a society overcoming the obstacles of the past in terms of developing and flourishing.

The Arabic word for modernity is derived from *ha-de-se* (حدث). The primary meaning of the word in the dictionary is given as the opposite of the old. It also means the emergence of something recently being new and modern. Another meaning for this word that is worth mentioning is "to be." In other words, the word *ha-de-se* in Arabic means that something that did not exist has come into being. It also means that new information has been produced or revealed (Ibn Manzur, 1970, Vol. 2, pp. 131–132).

The modernization journey of Egypt

Egypt has been home to many different and long-standing empires and civilizations, thanks to its geopolitical position. Each of these empires came into being by isolating themselves from previous periods. The civilization of pharaohs, which instantly comes to mind when mentioning the Ancient Egyptian civilization, was rejected by the Greeks who came after it. In fact, the fact that the Greek dynasty practiced endogamy in order to avoid mingling with the public is one of the most blatant examples of this situation (Roller, 2010, p. 37; Baker & Baker, 2001, pp. 175–177). After the Greeks, the Egyptian lands came under the rule of the great Roman Empire and continued to be a Roman province for years after. What makes this period stand out most is that Egypt entered a rapid process of Christianization.

After the Greek and Roman periods, Egypt was conquered by Muslims. This led to the laying of yet another civilization's foundations. Having been Islamized by the Arabs, these lands were governed by the Arabs in politically while being dominated militarily by the Turks and Circassians who had previously been enslaved or brought in as tribute payments. In fact, this military class, which had nothing in common with the Egyptian society in terms of language and culture, would later take over the administration of the country altogether (Northrup, 1998, pp. 245, 246). This military class founded the Mamluk State, which the Arabs called *Dawlat al-Atrâk* [the state of the Turks], and continued to rule until the conquest of Egypt by the Ottoman Sultan Selim I after about three centuries (see İbn Tağriberdî, 1855, p. 489). Actually, the Fatimids also displayed a conduct of administration worth mentioning as another period that has had lasting effects on Egypt to date. This period, when Shi'ism was dominant in the region, is regarded as the reason why mysticism and Sufism have survived there to this day.

When these ruling classes that came from the outside are examined with regards to both the pre-modernity period and the period that marks the beginning of modernity, they are seen to have always caused conflicts within the social and political structure and created certain strict class structures. When assessed from this framework, current Egyptian society appears in particular as an intricate community where relations between the civilizations with ancient roots are intertwined (Ibrahim, 1996, pp. 122–123). When assessed from a sociological standpoint, on the other hand, the fact that an outsider class had assumed political, military, and economic dominance over the society for long periods can be said to have especially created a divide between the ruler and the ruled that resulted in conflicts.

Egypt came under the rule of the Ottoman Empire in 1517 with Selim I's conquest that lasted for four centuries. In modern Egyptian sources, the Ottoman period is portrayed as the period when independence was lost – however, its Islamic identity and tradition became established. The Egyptian lands were made safe from invasions and attacks for a long time, which enabled Sunni Islam to be consolidated in Egypt.

Egypt's introduction to modernity in the current sense began with the French invasion of Egypt. Encountering a restless Egyptian society during the invasion, the French constantly inflamed this restlessness. With the propaganda spread by the French, Egyptian society was provoked against Istanbul, where the central authority was situated, thus laying the necessary groundwork for a mutiny. Indeed, although the French were expelled from Egypt with the help of the English, certain intellectual principles that had been instilled in the society, such as nationalism, encouraged a certain circle in Egypt to revolt against the central authority – whether with the support of or against the will of the people ('Imâra, 2011, p. 49). Of course, nationalism here should not be understood as Arab nationalism. What is meant is the emergence of the concepts of Egyptian nationalism and Egyptianism.

The discussions that have been going on for the past one and a half centuries can be gathered under three topics.

The first is the discussion on the Islamist identity vs. the secular/pro-modernization identity that arose from the debates on whether Islam had hindered progress in the face of Western civilization. The second topic of discussion is the emergence of nation-states and the fact that this idea had started to garner a response from Middle Eastern societies after World War I. Finally, another important topic of discussion to be addressed involves discussions on *turas* and modernity, which is more of an ideological topic that emerged from the discussions on the socialist and liberal/capitalist ideologies the Cold War had left behind in this geography.

Discussions on tradition and modernity in Islamic thought in Egypt

Islamic movements tried to be active in Muhammad Ali Pasha's nation-building process, as well as in the process of building a social identity after the abolition of the caliphate, but they failed at first. Their effectiveness was revealed in the 2012 elections in Egypt during the latest Arab Spring, when they found space to operate. Standing out in this context, this section will seek answers to the historical process of how these movements came into being and how the motivations behind this process had impacted perspectives toward modernity. Islamic movements in Egypt should be examined under three headings, especially in terms of their approach toward modernity. When imagining a map of Islamic thought and Islamic movements in Egypt, the oldest and the most established one is seen to be Sufism, while the Muslim Brotherhood comes second. The last one is the Salafi movement, which tries to explain today's world through historical references with the claim of thus being inherited from tradition.

Sufi movement

Egyptian Sufism is a tradition with deep roots in history, a tradition that has had the capacity to impact the Muslim world. Since the day Egyptian Sufism appeared, it has had an institutional structure in al-Azhar and been functioning almost like a religious factory with the people it trained. Until the 19th century, which is considered as the time political Islam came into the picture, Sufi thoughts and institutions had been the only mechanism for conveying religion to the public. In this sense, Sufism, and naturally al-Azhar, played a crucial role in the formation of Egypt's religious and traditional character. In fact, Sufism is thought to also have assumed the role of a buffer between political Islam and the state after the emergence of the former.

The people who lived in rural areas in particular were controlled by people from the same area who had established religious authority; namely, the Sufi orders. The Sufi groups prior to Muhammad Ali Pasha, although they were many in number and effective in Egypt, had no coordination or common activities among themselves (Takahashi, 2007, p. 50). Muhammad Ali Pasha was the first to establish a coordination center for Sufis in 1812, and he attempted to control the Sufi orders with the help of the sheikh he had appointed as their leader. As a matter of fact, Sufi orders at that time were in a sense a state-led intervention into an area under the control of al-Azhar as another institutionalized structure outside of al-Azhar. In fact, an agreement declaring that al-Azhar would completely withdraw from areas where Sufi orders were active was signed between the al-Azhar sheikh and the Sufi orders in 1847, with the state playing the role of mediator and coordinator. This is considered as one of the most striking blows from the state, which had been seeking to have al-Azhar under its control (Dî-Yûnc, 1995, pp. 29–30; Takahashi, 2007, p. 56).

The invasion of the country by the English did not change this situation, and *Majlis al-a'lâ li-l-turuq al-sûfiyya* was founded in 1895 (Takahashi, 2007, p. 51; Dî-Yûnc, 1995, p. 130). The direct instrumentalization of Sufi orders and their introduction into the political arena can be said to have begun in the Nasser period. As a result of the 1952 coup d'état and the subsequent ideological restructuring of the state, the rulers felt the need for public support. This need prompted the state to use the Sufi orders as an instrument for legitimizing the new regime (Hasan, 2009, p. 99).

When the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 began on January 25, Sufi orders did not participate in this movement institutionally for three apparent reasons. The first was that the Sufi orders had no active political tradition and lacked political and social experience based on protesting.

Another point needing underlining here is that a divide existed between the public's style and discourse that had poured into the streets and the Sufi's teachings and discourse (Fehmî, 2011). Another important aspect worth emphasizing besides these apparent reasons was that the Muslim Brothers' rise to prominence during and after the revolution had bothered the Salafis. From this point of view, how Sufis would react within the socio-political void in the wake of the revolution had great importance, especially for Egypt; however, public opinion missed this point.

The most prominent aspect that renders the Sufis significant is that they respond well in the face of state-centric reforms. This is actually a mission that has been ingrained into the character of the Sufism movements and orders since the foundation of al-Azhar in the Fatimid era. The Sufi orders have had no problems with any sort of modern approach or vision of modernity that is brought by the state. Of course, the questions of who the state is and what kind of a structure represents the state are important. This is because the state acknowledges only the Sufis among the Islamic movements in order to prepare society for the new phenomena that will emerge.

Salafis' approach to tradition

One of the topics that drew the attention of the world along with the Arab Spring has been the role of Salafi groups. Although Salafism is a long-established thought, it started to garner more attention in recent years from the global public opinion toward the Middle Eastern agenda. From the beginning, Salafism primarily defined itself through the rejection of certain social, cultural, and political innovations [*bid'ah*] that had emerged after the first three generations of Islam (the *Sahabah*, the *Tâbi'ûn*, and the *Tâbiʿū al-Tābʿīn*; Akgün & Bozbaş, 2013, pp. 1–5).

The rise of Salafism, which is characterized by a total rejection of modernity (and a Salafi discourse in this vein that has found a crowd for itself in Egypt), dates back to the years when Egypt was under occupation. Egypt, which was invaded in 1882, saw several different reactionary movements emerge in the Islamic structure upon its direct contact with the Western world, and the most severe reaction came from the Salafi movement against the social, cultural, and political demands Great Britain in particular had imposed. On the other hand, the Salafi movement did not take on an organized and institutionalized form until after 1923 when Egypt adopted a parliamentary system. Regarding the parliamentary system as blasphemy, Salafis opted to isolate themselves from the political arena rather than integrate into this system (Ebû-Rummân, 2014, p. 75; Shellâta, 2001, p. 201; Abdüllatîf, 2011, p. 5).

Tradition and modernity within the Muslim Brotherhood movement

The Muslim Brotherhood is a socio-political formation that has made impacts not only on Egypt but also on the whole Muslim world, and has left a visible mark over the past decade on Egypt as an Islamic community. This organization primarily aims to end the passive and static state of Islamic thought and the Islamic understanding of life that had emerged at the beginning of the 20th century and to return to the good old days (el-Bişrî, 2002, p. 9; 'Ali, 2007, p. 27). In this sense, this movement has aimed ever since its emergence at recreating the strong society of the past by accepting the new and the modern.

The adoption of secularism and laicity in many Muslim countries, which had started at the beginning of the 20th century and has lasted since then, is seen to have emerged as a serious challenge to religious lifestyle. In Egypt, this situation was especially institutionalized with the 1922 Constitution and the transition into the monarchical parliamentary system. The early thinkers within the Muslim Brotherhood stated that this mindset was consolidated most

particularly by the students who had been sent to Europe to study and then returned to their homeland (e.g., Taha Hussein, Ahmed Lutfi el-Sayed). This movement, which brought the European waves into Egypt, had been initiated through educational activities (Ferhûd, 1991, pp. 31–35). Both as a result of the impact of the years under invasion and the residual revolutionary atmosphere of the 1919 Revolution, new regulations were additionally implemented in Egypt that directly affected the social structure. The campaigns concerning women took the lead in this regard. The Muslim Brotherhood reacted to the disinformation in these regulations that was being spread over the social structure with the intention of preserving and consolidating the traditional structure (Ferhûd, 1991, pp. 35–36; Rubin, 2010, pp. 40–41).

A major alteration in politics occurred in Egypt with Sayyid Qutb. During the period of Gamal Abdel Nasser, who came into power with the 1952 coup d'état, the Muslim Brotherhood movement adopted a different manner of defiance against Nasser. Nasser also rejected many of the Western policies that the Muslim Brotherhood had previously regarded as the colonialist methods of the West and rejected. The difference between the two schools of thought was that, while one was dominant in all government bodies, the other was not even able to become a legitimate organization or structure within the state. All in all, these two ideologies entered into a long-running conflict by defining themselves through one another (see Telci, 2013, Mercan, 2019).

The fate of the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam in general went through a major transformation/change with the 1967 defeat. This defeat was an indication that the secular nationalist discourse had crashed in the Arab Middle East because millions of people had witnessed the incompetence of Gamal Abdel Nasser. The ones who benefited most from this situation were Saudi Arabia and the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood was influential in almost all countries in the region; they had gained considerable advantage in terms of garnering a base in society during this identity crisis through the influence of Sayyid Qutb, who presented Islam and Islamic thought as an identity (Hamid, 2014, p. 63).

On the other hand, both during the Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak periods, the Muslim Brotherhood officially remained among the list of banned organizations. Despite all these hardships, the Muslim Brotherhood has always put up a fight to continue its activities in both the social and political arenas and has been in competition with the Salafi movement in particular. Part of their Islamic discourse was based on violence while Sufism represented the discourse of the state. Among these formations, however, the only Islamic group that took active part in politics, aside from Salafis contesting elections, was again the Muslim Brotherhood organization ('Awadi, 2004, pp. 98–101).

Salafis only consider embracing the *turas* of the *salaf* [predecessors]; they reject everything that is new. Sufism's discourse and movement, on the other hand, has always tended to adopt the modern discourse in line with the official discourse adopted as a state apparatus. As for the Muslim Brotherhood, they attempt to internalize the material culture of modern envisagement while trying in parallel to preserve the spiritual culture of *turas*.

Tradition and modernity debates among nationalists in Egypt

Serious controversies exist about when the concept of Arab nationalism emerged and evolved in the Arab world. Because of the challenge of discussing a single Arab nationalism, every Arab state's reflex toward Arab nationalism as a concept differs. When assessing Egypt within this framework, two different nationalist discourses are seen to have been developed. The first of these is Egyptian nationalism, which defines itself through Egypt by centering on the element of homeland; the other is Arab nationalism, which has developed around the Arab race.

Egyptian nationalism

Egyptian nationalism is actually built on patriotism, with no emphasis on ethnicity or religion. Although various definitions are found for this understanding of nationalism, these descriptions can be categorized into two groups in terms of content. The first group emphasizes the cultural heritage that has remained from the past to the present, while the other emphasizes Egypt's geographic position as the foundation underlying this heritage and identity. When pharaoh, Greco-Roman, Coptic, and Islamic periods are mentioned while discussing cultural heritage, attempts are made at creating an identity by defining Egypt geographically within the Mediterranean, Africa, and Asia triangle (see Hanâ, 2013).

The understanding of nationalism that emphasizes the sense of Egyptianism is known to have emerged within the society with the French Revolution in particular. Having invaded Egypt, France was aware that conducting an identity policy using a new identity was necessary in order to impose its modern understanding on Egyptian society. To break Egypt away from the Islamic community, to which it had belonged for more than a millennium, an Egyptian identity with a new perspective in the context of its geostrategic location and historical background was redefined through propaganda, and campaigns were conducted to make this publicly valid (Sâyiğ, 1959, p. 87).

This intellectual and identity movement, which had been initiated by an external influence, in time found an audience within the intelligentsia, as well as with the public, especially through the educational policies pursued by Mehmet Ali Pasha. The idea that Egypt is a part of the European civilization gained considerable support, especially with the return of students who had gone to Europe. This mentality reached its peak in Egypt with the British occupation, and Egyptian society began to define itself as part of Europe. Taha Hussein can be said to have been the most influential intellectual from this perspective (Mustafâ, 1973, p. 47).

When examining the principles of the civilization surrounding this identity construction, the most important instruments were seen to be the emphasis on pharaoh culture and embracement and use of the art from that period as a territorial and national symbol of Egypt (Sâyiğ, 1959, p. 93).

Some radical-minded intellectuals such as Hussain Monis regard the period that started with the conquest by the Arabs as an interregnum in the history of Egypt. These thinkers, who suggested that the Arab and Islamic cultures had caused the oblivion of the old culture, ignored the role of Arab and Islamic civilizations in the cultural accumulation of the country by claiming that these civilizations generally did this, not just in Egypt but also in Syria and Iraq ('Abdu'r-Rahman, 1980, p. 37). When analyzing this mindset within the framework of that period, the glorification of the pharaonic period was in fact consciously chosen by the British, who were trying to isolate Egypt from the Arab world both regionally and intellectually. Indeed, only in this way could Egypt have a singular identity structure that excluded its traditional Arabian and Islamic aspects.

The second emphasis in terms of the idea of Egyptianism and identity structure was on the Greek and Roman cultures that had prevailed in Egypt after the pharaonic period because this is when Greeks and Romans present the origin of philosophy, which is the basis of the intellectual foundations of the European civilization that had also once been dominant in Egypt. By highlighting these two periods, Egyptian intellectuals actually connected their culture and identity with European culture and identity. (Hanâ, 2013, pp. 80–82).

Egypt also has some features whose importance is due to its geographic position. The most prominent among these is that Egyptian society is basically a part of the Mediterranean civilization. In particular, the mindset that accompanied Napoleon's campaign was the most frequently

used feature for establishing a cultural and identity bond between France, the rest of Europe, and Egypt. Some of the discussions largely claimed Egypt to be a part of European civilization due to the fact that its connection with Eastern civilizations is limited only to the Bilad al-Sham region, a Mediterranean country that had been home to both Greek and Roman civilizations.

On the other hand, those who take Egypt's geographic position as the sole criteria in defining their identity claim half of Egypt to be geographically connected to the Mediterranean, and thus to Europe, as well (Hanâ, 2013, p. 63). Among the names that had been most influential in preparing and disseminating this idea were thinkers such as Rifaa al-Tahtawi, Taha Hussein, and Lutfi al-Sayed, who had all been sent to Europe during the Mehmet Ali Pasha period and returned to the country after being educated abroad (Hanâ, 2013, p. 132).

Another point underscored in this definition is that Egypt is the most important representative of the existing culture in the Nile basin. Especially with Mehmet Pasha starting to assume an active role in Sudan in order to remove the Ottoman mandate, Egypt began to be reminded of its existence in Africa. After the British invasion of Egypt and the removal of Sudan from Egyptian administration, a serious intellectual mutiny began in Egypt. Many intellectuals spread the idea that Egypt and Sudan were in fact whole and indivisible, resulting in the idea of Africanism and connection to the Nile River spreading into society ('Abdu'r-Rahman, 1980, p. 23). Some authors still consider Egypt's path to becoming a regional and international power to occur by playing an effective role in Africa (Hanâ, 2013, p. 135).

The intellectual foundations of the idea of Egyptian nationalism were first laid by Rifaa al-Tahtawi (1801–1873). Tahtawi went to France as an imam from al-Azhar and part of one of the first student groups sent to Europe; he spent five years there. After this, Tahtawi emerged as the first intellectual to bring concepts such as "Egyptian nation" and "love of homeland" to Egypt ('Imâra, 2010, pp. 153–155).

Transforming the idea of Egyptianism into a social action was expressed and sloganized in the most serious sense with the motto "Egypt belongs to Egyptians" [*Misr li'l-Misriyyin*] during the Ahmad 'Orabi uprising prior to Egypt's occupation by the British. The prominent issue with the 'Orabi uprising was that the Egyptian soldiers in the army had been subjected to second-class treatment, especially compared to the military class consisting of Turks and Circassians. This uprising, which was carried out under nationalist sentiment and love of homeland in the face of the increasing European and especially British influence throughout the country, received great support from society and resulted in Egypt's direct occupation by Great Britain, which realized that Egypt could no longer be ruled under the Ottoman's shadow (see Schölch, 1981).

This ideological structure, which had serious influence prior to the 1952 Free Officers Coup and was especially inured by all apparatuses of the state, experienced an axis shift due especially to Nasser himself after the coup. In fact, Egyptian consciousness did not end during the Nasser period. The only things that changed were the definitions of the concepts of Egypt and Egyptian. Nasser declared Egypt, which had been defined by the West and Europe until his period, as a part of the three rings [*Fasl*]. While defining Egypt's position, he emphasized it as an Arab country and part of Africa and in terms of its relations and history with the Islamic world. These early definitions changed in favor of pure Arabism as Nasser gathered all power into his hands in 1954, and a new constitutional declaration was published in 1956. Egypt then started to be defined through concepts such as the Arab nation and the Arab union (see Tibi, 1997).

This understanding came to the fore again with Sisi, who took office after the July 2013 coup. Sisi used the slogan "Long live Egypt" [*Tahya Misr*] in all pieces of election propaganda. The people of Egypt, who had come together without any need to assert identity during the revolution, became divided into Islamist and secular groups (nationalist, liberal, and left-winger) after the coup, and Egyptian nationalism became the only identity.

Arab nationalism

When evaluated in terms of Egyptian society, Arab nationalism was able to maintain a certain base, and it spread in the social sphere until the end of World War II. Of course, this had some reasons in and of itself. First of all, certain historical factors hindered the development of Arab nationalism in Egypt. Above all, Mehmet Ali Pasha, who had rebelled against the Ottoman Empire, mobilized the people not by stressing a certain race but by emphasizing certain social characteristics. As a matter of fact, Mehmet Ali Pasha fought not only against the Ottomans, but also against other Arab countries in order to achieve his goal.

In the early 20th century, when the politics of identity intensified, another trend also emerged in Egypt that place an Arabian emphasis across from this mainly Egyptianist/Egyptian identity. This idea having a base in Egypt only became possible in the late 1920s and early 1930s. An elite intellectual group was found acting against the Egyptian nationalist movement; it became dominant in Egypt and based itself on Arab nationalism and the idea of being the leader of the Arab world, or "The Red Apple" (Coury, 1982, p. 459). This group stressed that Egypt was a part of the Arab world due particularly to the fact that Egyptians shared a common culture as a result of speaking the same language and having lived together with Arabs for centuries. As growing numbers of people started to talk about an Arab union as a natural consequence of this idea, Nasser appeared.

In many of Nasser's speeches he made after becoming the single man in power in 1954, he can be seen emphasizing Egypt as an Arab country, that it was Arabian and part of the Arab League. Nasser described all Egyptians as Arab people of Egypt, regardless of their religion or religious school. In fact, the image he conveyed directly contrasted with the desire for Egyptian nationalism and the claim of Egypt being part of Western civilization, because within Nasser's Arab nationalist view, he had otherized the West.

Egypt's defeat in 1967 resulted in the collapse of Arab nationalism and the emergence of the idea of the Arab unity, as well as the beginning of the search for a new social identity. The Arab nationalism discourse failed with the 1967 defeat (Robbe, 1976, pp. 57–64). Sadat became the head of the state in a period when Islamic movements increased their influence within society. Sadat overlooked it, while the state officially abandoned any arguments of Arab unity or Arab nationalism, especially after 1973. This is because the October War in 1973 was won by mobilizing the people under the ideas of Egyptian nationalism and national interests.

The most important feature of the Sadat period regarding Arab nationalism and unity is that these ideas came under serious criticism. Sadat's serious pursuit of liberal policies in radical defiance of Nasser's socialist worldview played an important role in this. In 1979, he ended the identity policy based on Arab nationalism by signing the Camp David Accord with Israel. In fact, Sadat changed the name of the Egyptian state from the United Arab Republic to the Arab Republic of Egypt (Kienle, 1995, p. 66). Sadat paid for such a hard transformation with his life, being assassinated in 1981. Thus, during the Sadat period, all Arab countries turned their backs on Egypt, even suspending Egypt's membership in the Arab League in 1979. Egypt was only able to return to the Arab League in 1989 (see Hilal, 2012). As a natural consequence of this exclusion from Arab society, Egypt began to lean more on Egyptian nationalism.

Hosni Mubarak, on the other hand, tried to keep his administration alive with some balanced policies throughout his entire administration. Mubarak tried to continue with the policies of the Sadat period during his first 10 years. While prioritizing Egypt and its national interests, he did not actually deny his own or society's Arab identity. He made serious efforts to bring relations with the Arab-region countries closer. Indeed, Egypt became a member of the Arab League again in 1989, and its relationship with the Arab countries returned to normal

(Shehata, 2009, p. 195). Again, as a result of this, not much intervention occurred regarding the presence of Islamic movements in Egyptian society until the 1990s; nor were Islamic groups perceived as a threat to the state in this early period (see Wickham, 2002).

This situation continued into the 1990s; afterward, the increasing frequency of terror incidents in the country in particular, as well as the Islamic discourse used by these terrorist groups, changed and hardened the regime's view toward Islamic movements (Kienle, 2001, pp. 137–139). Nevertheless, after signing agreements with the International Monetary Fund in 1991, Egypt started to adopt neoliberal policies. This meant that Egypt got closer to Western countries, and hence to Israel as well, because Egypt's relations with the West practically directly affected its relations with Israel (Harrigan, Wang, & El-Said, 2006, p. 78). As Egypt got closer to the West, Egyptian nationalism as an identity took precedence, and Egypt drifted apart from the Arab world.

However, even though the state did not adopt the discourse of Arab nationalism as an identity but instead moved away from it, international conjunctures and technological developments have kept this mentality alive in the society. One can count the satellite channels that have broadcast in Arabic since the mid-1990s and the websites that appeared in the 2000s. Directly or indirectly, these have reached Egyptian society and mediated the formation of a certain public opinion on Arab nationalism (Fahmy, 2003, p. 174). After the second Intifada that took place in the early 2000s, a serious Arab consciousness emerged (Norton, 2003, pp. 19, 20). Mubarak also allowed foreign minister Amr Musa to make anti-Israel statements (Del Sarto, 2006, p. 138).

The revolutionary movement, known as the January 25 Revolution in Egypt, is actually accepted as a part of a series of the Arab Spring. These events also allowed for the opportunity to talk about a global Arab society and strengthened Arab awareness, but this was not reflected in the slogans shouted in the squares in Egypt. Slogans in the squares were formed around pure human needs.

On the other hand, after the revolution, the parties and groups making propaganda about Arab nationalism became manifest. The Dignity Party [Hizb al-Karama] gathered and shaped around Hamdeen Sabahi, the greatest representative of this, and became the center of Arab nationalism. As a result, Arab nationalism can be said to be heavily socialist, specifically in Egypt, and to have proceeded in the shadow of Nasser. The Arab Spring process has shown that although this ideological structure carries out its discourses over Western and Israeli opposition, it is too secular to accept the Islamic movements that carry out anti-Western politics in the country in power (Faludi, 2013).

An Islamist Arab nationalism with a particularly religious character can also be discussed, as opposed to the secular Arab nationalism mentioned previously. Here, the Salafist movement comes to the fore. Religion-based Arab nationalism, which is based on the notion that Islam was brought down to the Arab Prophet in the Arabian Peninsula in Arabic, and that is why religion can be best understood by Arabs, is especially common among some Salafi groups in Egypt. Their understanding of legacy leaves no room for the heritage that non-Arab or non-Muslim elements would leave to a society. For this reason, the customs and traditions of non-Arab Muslims have been rejected.

Conclusion

The civilizations that Egypt has claimed until today and their heritage left to today's society have caused controversy regarding three main issues. Of particular importance is the envisioning of civilization regarding which significant differences exist in way civilization is perceived by three different groups within the Islamic tradition in Egypt. The Sufi perspective is the most radical

tradition. The Sufi perspective, organized within al-Azhar and established by Fatimids, has positioned itself from the beginning as a device of the central authority according to its envisagement. The second group is the Salafi movement, which only accepts the first three generations that lived after the birth of Islam and does not accept any other understanding than the material and spiritual culture put forward by these three generations. The third and last Islamic fraction is the understanding represented by the Muslim Brotherhood. This understanding does not differ in keeping the Islamic tradition superior and having it be adopted. But this group has not seen any trouble in taking the material cultures of other civilizations, especially since the point when the Islamic world lost its superiority to the West. In this context, the vision put forward by the Muslim Brotherhood has drawn a more universal and inclusive framework in this regard.

Another faction that has been effective in the discussions of civilization and tradition in Egypt is the nationalist understanding. The conception of Egyptian nationalism actually disconnects and isolates Egypt from the Muslim and Arab geography to which it belongs. This approach, which is trapped within certain boundaries through the motto of "We are all Egyptians," sees itself as a part of Western civilization with the identity it has built. The second trend that stands out in the understanding of nationalism is Arab nationalism. The most important line of this trend is the secular socialist Arab nationalism. This approach was most prevalent under the rule of Gamal Abdel Nasser, and after that, it did not have much influence on the ideological philosophy of the state. This understanding's conceptualization of civilization emerged with the dream of an Arab unity above all religions/religious schools. Pre-Islamic Arab culture and customs also have an important place in this understanding. Of course, Arab nationalism cannot be trapped only within the secular and socialist understanding of Nasser. An understanding of Arab nationalism also exists in Egypt that has religious motives, especially among its Saudi-based Salafist schools. This conception positions its perception of civilization through Arabs and Arabic Islam.

The final debate on civilization was actually carried out over an ideological platform in Egypt, especially during the Cold War. While these ideological approaches mostly discussed whether they belonged to the socialist world or the liberal one, they used what they found to be suitable among the Islamist and nationalist motives. While the socialist understanding developed a concept of civilization first through a universal union of workers and an anticapitalistic understanding, it was able to hold onto Egypt mostly by using the concepts of Arab nationalism and Islamic socialism. In contrast to the socialist ideological approach, the liberal ideological movement has claimed Egypt to be a part of Western civilization, mostly through Egyptian nationalism and secularism.

In conclusion, Egypt has been home to great civilizations throughout history. People from many different civilizations have come and ruled there. The existence of each civilization with a different understanding and envisagement has led to the emergence of deep and sharp discussions in these lands today. That these discussions will end soon is quite unlikely. The July 3, 2013 coup attempted to install an envisagement of civilization based on Egyptian nationalism out of nowhere. What kind of a response this approach gets from the society and whether this approach will be able to be consolidated or not needs to be examined, but the other envisages of civilization will of course continue to exist.

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3

IRANIANS' INTELLECTUAL CONFRONTATION WITH THE MODERN WEST AND MODERNITY

M. Mansur Hashemi

Introduction

The cannon makes right![1]

This sentence encapsulates the long years of Iranians' encounter with the modern West. Iranians first came to know about the modern West during the Safavid era, when they met the Portuguese expedition ships looking for new colonies in the Persian Gulf. They surely knew about the Western world before, as Iran was a neighbour to the West in the pre-Islamic period. In the Islamic period, too, although no longer being adjacent to the West, Iranians were more or less knowledgeable about it. One of the greatest pre-modern historiographies was written in Persian under the auspices of the erudite vizier Rashid al-Din Fadhlullah Hamedani during the Ilkhanate period. The book included, along with material about Eastern countries like China and India, information about the history of the West (e.g. European emperors and popes; See Hamedânî, 2005).

Iranians have maintained their distinct culture and identity both before and after Islam under various governments, due to shared cultural elements, including the Persian language. During the Safavid period, Iran took its place next to the Ottomans as one of the two empires of the Islamic world. The period was both an era of cultural renewal, in which masterpieces of Iranian art, such as the elegant mosques in Isfahan, appeared, and a time when Iranians experienced their first military conflicts with modern Westerners. Except for some early victories like recapturing a southern port city, Iranians soon realized their weakness against the Western powers and the need for European consultants. At the same time, the European culture found its way to Iran. One of the most observable examples of that was the reflection of Western realistic painting in Persian art with the initiation of *farangi-sazi* [literally: making in European style].[2] Suddenly, an overflow of cannons, watches, and painting styles came from the West. That was the most natural course of events. Before modernity, the deep-rooted cultures existed in a kind of equilibrium in which sometimes one gained military superiority and sometimes the other would have the cultural supremacy. In short, there was no absolute superiority. The relationship of Iran and the Ottoman is an instance of such balance. But when, for example,

Mulla Sadra built the last grand system of Iranian metaphysics in the seventeenth century and reproached Ibn Sina for failing to attain this sort of theosophy due to preoccupation with the empirical sciences (Sadra, 1981, Vol. 9, pp. 118–119; Hashemi, 2004b, p. 79), modern thought was replacing scholasticism in the West. Sadra's mystical philosophy had no room for doubt in the manner of Michel de Montaigne, or empirical approach like Francis Bacon's, or sceptical rationalism as that of René Descartes. Modern science and technology were not the product of these philosophies, but they were concomitant with them. Despite their differences, all modern philosophers reflected the changes in human understanding of the world that occurred after the scientific advances, which have disrupted the balance ever since.

With a long philosophical tradition, Iranians during the rule of the Qajar Dynasty tried to identify the theoretical foundations of this brave new world. At first, the attempts yielded no results.[3] Yet, the journey continued. The Qajar era became the end of the empire, but Iranians retained its global spirit even after the Safavids, either by the futile expansions of Nader Shah or by the reforms done under the Zand rulers. But during the Qajar period, "The Guarded Domains of Iran" shrunk more and more. Not even the calls for jihad by the clerics quite worked. In short, the cannon made right. Now Iranians needed to think about their failure. Intellectuals in the Qajar period each tried to find an answer. Some found the fault in Islam; some blamed the political structures and asked for constitutionalism. Others focused on public education or the nation's temperament. These debates are still alive. But, from a certain point onwards, Iranians also have engaged in theorizations about their relationship to the West and modernity. In what follows, I shall discuss those theorizations. After outlining their background, I will discuss the thoughts of the two main groups of thinkers in pre-Revolutionary and Revolutionary Iran. Finally, I will gloss over some characteristics of the post-Revolutionary generation of intellectuals, which their new approaches are yet less studied.

From the first intellectual endeavours to the first philosophical theorizations

During the Qajar period, the intellectuals aimed at awakening the people and reforming the government. So they directed their attention to the public superstitions, sometimes recklessly ignoring their backgrounds, and attempted to change the rulers by penetrating the political structure. They published critical plays, essays, and journal articles addressing the masses and the rulers, and founded modern educational institutions alongside the traditional schools. The most prominent outcome of these enlightening activities was the Constitutional Revolution.[4] For a while, the traditional monarchy turned into a monarchy model based on and confined to the constitution. However, the partial democracy did not last long – not because the next king attempted to abolish it by the help of the northern neighbour and the conservative clerics. Attempts to overthrow the constitutional government had failed before with efforts of the more enlightened clerics, intellectuals, and the public who defended constitutionalism with their lives. What caused the collapse of that half-democracy was its inefficiency. When the Pahlavi Dynasty replaced the increasingly feeble old dynasty (see Ghani, 2000; Katouzian, 2006), the monarchy kept the constitutional façade. But Reza Shah's authoritarian rule practically narrowed the scope of this half-democracy, replacing it with an "enlightened despotism" trying to modernize Iran from the top down.

In this new period, intellectuals assumed a different role. While the intellectuals in the Qajar period criticized the government, this generation cooperated with the government to accelerate Iran's modernization. In this respect, Reza Shah's period was the period of Iran's fast exit out of the traditional world. The process of modernization had started in the time of Naser

al-Din Shah from the Qajar Dynasty (see Amanat, 1997), with politicians like Amir Kabir (see Adamiyat, 1975) and Sepahsalar (see Adamiyat, 1972). The movement they initiated progressed very slowly with frequent unwanted interruptions. Thus, Reza Shah's rule was a turning point which ensured the foundation and continuity of modern institutions in Iran. However, the government had two main flaws. Its patriarchal and despotic nature made the reformist part of society react to its extreme practices – including the strict guidelines about clothing and bans on the hijab – upsetting the conservative majority (Sadeghi, 2013). What caused the collapse of Reza Shah's government was not either of these two though, but the interference of the Allies during World War II.

The two protesting groups remained and grew during the rule of Reza Shah's son, the second Pahlavi Mohammad Reza, who started with the constitutional monarchy model but returned to the absolute monarchy. They would reveal themselves in the future through a great revolution not only against the Pahlavi government, but also against both the monarchy and the modernism-inclined government models. I shall return to the intellectual dimensions of this event. Now, to maintain the chronological order, I will give an outline of the intellectual movements in the first Pahlavi period (Reza Shah), and then in the second Pahlavi period (Shah).

The first efforts to know the West in the Qajar period were almost elementary in the depth of knowledge and the power of analysis. But during Reza Shah's period, Iranians founded Institutions like universities and attempted to learn the research methods in empirical and human sciences and to become familiar with the modern philosophies. At the beginning of the second Pahlavi era, Iranians produced the first Persian history of modern philosophy, as well as other texts in social sciences from economics to sociology. The authors of these texts were either intellectuals cooperating with the government or scholars who had not taken any position against the regime, even if they were not pro-government.[5] Because of these intellectuals, Iranians learned not only the modern knowledge but also their own past more precisely. Literary and historical texts were widely revised and published, and the first Academy of Iran was established.

As evident from the name, the "Pahlavi Dynasty" desired to revive the memory of the ancient Iranian empire. Iranians have managed to preserve their ancient and mythological history by recreating it in Persian since ninth century onwards. But the new nationalism was a patriarchal ideology (Sadeghi, 2005) introduced by Reza Shah and a group of intellectuals in imitation of the Europeans, entailing a sort of archaism and not the customary continuity. The archaism persisted in the second Pahlavi period, although with a less anti-Islam flavour. The public, however, did not feel any need for this artificial sense of rootedness. That was evident e.g. in *Pardeh-khaani* and *Naghali*, the traditional arts of story-telling that narrate both religious and national epic stories.

The archaism, along with the patriarchal and despotic modernization, made people discontented. Besides, by and by, the cooperating intellectuals were replaced by the leftist intellectuals who – dreaming of a communist government model – talked about social justice, an economic system that would benefit everyone, and the revolt against the current situation. This intellectual movement, which emerged during the reign of Reza Shah (see Ahmadi, 2006), became more apparent during the Shah period (see Behrooz, 1991). Shah saw the leftists as the main danger because they looked up to the Soviets as their supporters or took Castro's Cuba as their ideal. The Revolution proved the idea wrong. The Islamic Revolution made clear that, even though the left intellectuals had some influence on Iranian's understanding of economic and political matters, they could not be candidates for the political and social rule in Iran's religious society.

Out of all these different and sometimes contradictory efforts, two main Iranian intellectual movements, i.e. identity-thinkers and religion-thinkers, developed,[6] and the first indigenous speculations about Iran's historical condition started to sprout.

Identity-thinkers

As mentioned, Iran's crisis in confrontation with Europeans was a crucial question for Iranians since the Qajar period. Iranians addressed this question in different ways within the framework of patriotism. Gradually, attention drew to the historical roots and borders of the homeland. Later, some even tried to comprehend the stages of the Iranian spirit by following the philosophical theories learned from Europeans.

However, before Sayyed Ahmad Fardid, no one put forth a comprehensive theory about Iran's historical condition in the modern period. The intellectuals of the Qajar period talked about modernity, but for the sake of socio-political reforms. Fardid was the first thinker who, by including the historical perspective in the Iranians philosophical understanding, made a synthesis which became the first philosophical system to explain Iranian's historical condition encountering modernity. Because of this, he can be named the first Iranian philosopher of the modern era, which does not imply precision or correctness of his ideas. It only means that Fardid philosophized about something never uttered before. It was not accidental that he repeatedly said: "the opening of our history of modernization is the extension of the end of the West history".[7] He recognized the historicity, a pivotal element of modern thought, and thus understood the consequences of modernity. Of course, his attitude was rather hostile toward the modern world.

What did Fardid say? He believed that our condition, like it or not, is a state of Western awe or Westoxification [*gharbzadegi*]. To explain this, he categorized types of Westoxification: multiplied vs. non-multiplied, inherent vs. accidental, simple vs. double, conscious vs. unconscious, and positive/accepting vs. negative. Influenced by Martin Heidegger's critique of metaphysics and modernity, Fardid traced the beginning of Westoxification back to the end of the mythological world at the beginning of the Greek philosophy. So, he believed, the non- multiplied Westoxification was awe of the Greek philosophy that continued with the translation movement in the Islamic era. Multiplied Westoxification began in the West by the Renaissance and the rise of modernity. So, being Westoxified is for Westerners inherent, as it is born out of their own culture. But with others, it is accidental. Westoxification conforms to historical periods. We live in a period of multiplied Westoxification. If we become conscious of this fact, we will have the simple kind; ignorance of this will entrap us in the double type. Westoxification admitted is the positive kind; it is negative when one tries to reject it.

Not only Heidegger, but other influences formed Fardid's negative attitude toward westoxification. On the one hand, he was influenced by the revolutionary leftist and Marxist thought. On the other, he developed an interpretation of Ibn Arabi's mysticism he called *ʿelmu'l-asmā'-e tarīkhī* [knowledge of the divine names manifested in history]. He combined the significance of divine names, borrowed from theoretical mysticism of Ibn Arabi, with the approaches of some German thinkers (e.g., Oswald Spengler) to history. In his synthetic system, each period of history is a manifestation of a divine name. For example, the current age reflects the meaning of the name al-Kahhar (The Subduer); or, to put it in Heidegger's words, our period is the age of the occultation of gods; or Kali Yuga in Hindu terms. Combining the revolutionary view with this approach, Fardid often opened his speeches saying: "in the name of the God of the previous past and a far-off future, not the God of the past, present, and future". Here was the point where Fardid's thought found an apocalyptic tone in combination with the Shiite hope for the reappearance of the hidden Imam. In his system, the esoteric aspect of religion joined the socio-political revolutionary attitude and thus became earthly. In this sense, Fardid himself suffered from the double/unconscious Westoxification. That was not his only contradiction. As a Muslim, he put the historical ages in such an order that would render the advent of Islam insignificant. The curious mixture of Heidegger, Ibn Arabi, and Marx was another contradiction. Despite all

these, because he tried to understand the historical condition of Iranians within world history, Fardid influenced many of the important Iranian thinkers (see Hashemi, 2004a, pp. 19–146).[8]

Fardid was not an articulate writer and almost avoided writing. What he presented as a philosophical-mystical idea in a vague language, in 1962 came in a simple form in a book called *Gharbzadegi* [*The Weststruckness/Westoxification*]. Its author, Jalal Al-e-Ahmad, a successful novelist and a passionate essayist, was a leftist activist with religious roots who renounced the Tudeh Party and the groups close to the Soviet, somewhat returning to indigenous values. As a social democrat with nationalist concerns, he criticized the government that was trying to move the process of economic and social development ahead without conceding to political development. Thus, in his book, Westoxification did not refer to a historical era, as Fardid had in mind, but was a name for something that Al-e-Ahmad identified as the disease of machinism. It turned into a code word against modernization and development. He even rephrased the historical debates about the constitutional government as the battle between the Westoxification and anti-constitutionalism. The path he hastily took dragged Al-e-Ahmad to rejecting development and modernization without devising an alternative. In his view, all that mattered was changing the culture and overthrowing the government that made the Iranian society Westoxified (Hashemi, 2004a, pp. 147–171).

Another author influenced by Fardid was Ehsan Naraghi, who was not a revolutionary and was actively involved in the government. As a sociologist, he published works in refusal of the West and its modernity, advocating for the indigenous values. In his books *Gorbat-e Gharb* [*Exile of the West*] (1974/1353 AH) and *Aanche Khod Daasht* [*What it had itself*] (1976/1355 AH), he presented simplified narratives against Westoxification (Hashemi, 2004a, pp. 173–197; Boroujerdi, 1996, pp. 136–140).

Of course, not all the interpretations of Fardid's thought were this shallow. Daryush Ashouri, an intellectual influenced by Fardid, for example, disapproved Al-e-Ahmed's version. Ashouri attempted to both introduce Eastern cultures and to criticize the modern world more fundamentally, for instance by the Nietzschean idea of nihilism (Hashemi, 2004a, pp. 273–290). Daryush Shayegan, in his well-written book *Asia dar baraabar-e gharb* [*Asia Confronting the West*] (1977/1356 AH), depicted the essence of these attempts thoroughly. He enumerated the characteristics of Eastern cultures and compared them with the modern Western culture, creating a combination of Fardid's and Henry Corbin's ideas. Published a year before the Islamic Revolution, that was a book expressing in philosophical terms what was present in the *Zeitgeist*. What Shayegan wrote was not revolutionary. However, despite the author's warning against taking his criticism of modernism as an extremist anti-enlightenment attack or new obscurantism, the book reflected the opposition of times to the West (Hashemi, 2004a, pp. 291–324). Interestingly, the author of the book was involved in the government pursuing the development of Iran – interestingly and yet not oddly, because the very government was practically intensifying the anti-Western traditionalist tendency. While praising tradition was to some extent a reaction to Marxist and revolutionary ideologies, such a stance would also expose bigger aspirations. One could see the signs of the monarchy's desire to be "something" before the West in Shah's responses to European reporters or in the Empress's efforts to revive the Iranian tradition. It was in this same period that Iranian architects designed modern buildings with noticeably traditional elements, and in modern Iranian art, the school of *saghakhane* developed which used traditional motifs along with modern styles. Even thinkers with no nationalist approach talked about the revival of tradition. One prominent example was Seyyed Hossain Nasr, a Traditionalist[9] with religious concerns and not an identity-thinker, who became the head of the Empress's Private Bureau on the eve of the Revolution. Nasr and Shayegan founded two significant international institutions in Iran: The Imperial Iranian Academy of Philosophy and The Iranian Center for

the Study of Cultures. The aim was to revive the traditional Iranian thought, combining it with the East through common spiritual values, and thus criticizing the modern culture of the West. These institutions were themselves parts of an organism consisting of the search for the Iranian identity that led to a rebirth of tradition in a new form, the Islamic Revolution of Iran.

The only version of Fardid's line of thought that did not reflect that atmosphere was a book by Reza Davari titled *Vaz'-e Konnî-e Tafakkor dar Iran* [*The Present State of Thought in Iran*] (1978/1357 AH). This despairing work criticized the modern world and Westoxification like many others, but also emphasized the historical condition of Iran that was one of imitation, not contemplation, which would lead nowhere. Despite its exaggerations, this book deserves attention in this respect. While the events of the 1960s and movements such as the counter-culture influenced Iranian intellectuals, and reconciliation of left revolutionism with religious faith attracted the masses (as shall be discussed later on), Davari's book wanted to say otherwise. According to him, it was impossible to get rid of backwardness with such fascinations or by repeating the words of Western intellectuals in localized moulds. Perhaps the work was self-contradictory with its anti-Western stance and yet its deep tendency towards Heidegger. Nevertheless, at least it cautioned against the fantastical assessments of the internal condition, but its publication just a few months before the Revolution became overshadowed by the collective fervour (Hashemi, 2004a, pp. 199–234).

Religious reformists and religion-thinkers

In the modern era in Iran, attempts to reform religion and to criticize religious beliefs both traced back to the Qajar period. While some attributed backwardness to religion, others ascribed it to moving away from true Islam. For the second group, problems had begun with the decline of the Islamic world in general and Iran as an Islamic country in particular. During the Qajar period, Sayyid Jamal al-Din Asadabadi, one of the most influential Muslim revivalists (see Keddie, 1972), sought to awaken the Islamic world and bring together modernity with Islam to benefit from modern science and its power. Sayyid Jamal was an Iranian Shiite who, due to his passion for strengthening the Islamic world, introduced himself as Afghani and did not bring his sect to the foreground, as the Sunni reformist Muhammad Abduh was among his disciples. Although he published some writings, Sayyid Jamal mostly engaged in social and political issues rather than forming a system of thought. Naturally, Muslim revivalists were influencing each other beyond the national borders. For example, Sayyid Qutb (see Vahdat, 2015, Ch. 3), who regarded the modern world as a new Age of Ignorance, had an impact on some Iranians. Amongst the thinkers of the Islamic world, Muhammad Iqbal was perhaps the one with the most influence in Iran. The author of *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (1930), and a leader in making the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, he was the heir of the Persian language in the Indian peninsula who wrote many Persian poems. His somehow mystical poems called for the revival of Islamic tradition and rejecting imitating the West while still benefiting from its science and technology. His Persian poems naturally would make him a spiritual fellow citizen in the hearts of Iranians.[10] But for many reasons, including the sectarian and cultural differences, Iranians would not easily come along with the religious revivalists of other Islamic countries. They have always had their own set of religious reformists.

One example of such reformists was Mehdi Bazargan, who gained considerable influence in Iranian society during the Pahlavi period. As a politically active nationalist and also an educated religious man, he tried to show that Islam not only does not contrast modern science and civil activities, but strongly supports them (Hashemi, 2015, pp. 117–131; also see Jahanbakhsh, 2001, pp. 80–112). Another example was clerics, like Sayyid Mahmoud Taleghani and Morteza

Motahhari (see Jahanbakhsh, 2001, pp. 69–80, 126–130), who were no longer satisfied with the life in seclusion. They criticized both the prevalent kind of religiosity and the modern world. But without a doubt, the one most significant of religious reformists was Ali Shariati, the celebrated intellectual who seemed to become the mouthpiece of the times.

What did Shariati say? He argued that Islam is a political religion and Shiism is a total political party. Therefore, for him, religion was not only for the hereafter but also for this world, leading to a classless society. Shariati cleansed Marxism, the common ideology of the period, from materialism, putting instead his version of Islam and Shiite faith in it. His system was an Islamicated version of an Eastern Marxism. He turned every religious element into a leftist revolutionary ideology, interpreting the story of Abel and Cain not as a story of greed and envy but as a struggle over property between agriculture and animal husbandry, and seeing Imamate not as a theological topic but similar to the dictatorship of the proletariat. He positioned Abu Dhar against Ibn Sina and the Alid Shia against the Safavid Shia to bring about ideological dichotomies in which one represented good and the other represented evil. In line with identity-thinkers, he stirred the discourse of "back to ourselves". Yet his inclination toward modern ideologies made him preach a purge of cultural resources, attacking traditional class of clergies in favour of revolutionary ones. Using an emotional language, he offered aesthetic interpretations of all the aspects of religion, all to provoke the people against the status quo to attain the promised classless monotheistic society (Hashemi, 2006, pp. 21–119, 2015, pp. 103–116, 363–368, 655–676; see also Rahnema, 2000). Here was the crossroad of the apocalyptic thought of Fardid and the utopian social ideas of Shariati, despite their fundamental differences. While Shariati coined the term pious intellectual, Fardid rejected the whole concept of intellectualism as a sort of Westoxification. For Shariati, Ibn Sina was unacceptable because he was not a revolutionary; for Fardid, he was so because he was Greek-toxified and Westoxified. But, despite differences in terminology and the principles, their orientation was the same at the end: refusing the current condition to achieve the ideal situation.[11]

The prevalent attitude of intellectuals in the pre-revolutionary Iran, contrary to the intellectuals during the reign of Reza Shah, was refusal and rejection of the West, which they gradually identified with modernity. The intellectuals in the reign of Reza Shah had tried to bring the modernity mentioned by the Qajar period intellectuals to Iran. But in the Shah's period, the discourse of "Eastern vs. Western" replaced the discourse of "modernity vs. tradition". Iranians, who associated the memory of modernization with the right by the cannon, as soon as recovered and gained a better economy, stood to not only a monarchy that refused the political development but the very development that the monarchy was seeking. Since the Qajar period, the idea was common that if the West has material power, we have the spiritual strength because of a longstanding tradition wealthy with poetry and literature. Relying on that spiritual power, they rejected the West/modernity. One remarkable instance is the unison against the modern West between the extremist organization of *Fadaiyan-e eslam* [Devotees of Islam] and the radical critic of Shiite Islam, Ahmad Kasravi, who the former assassinated for apostasy. In a nutshell, some decades before the Revolution, Iranian thinkers, each in their way, positioned their country against the West. All of those stances, whether they liked it or not, later were manifested under the guidance of Ayatollah Khomeini in the form of a revolution to revive tradition, to renounce modernity and the West, and to establish a religious/spiritual government.

Identity-thinkers and religion-thinkers after the Revolution

The Islamic Revolution in Iran, regardless of how it should be viewed or judged, was a grand event that – like any other revolution – displaced the social layers. The alliance between the

leftists, the nationalists, and the religious turned out to be fleeting, as soon as the Revolution identified itself as religious. A radical change happened in the relationship between the monarchy and the clergy. Historically, the relationship was always one of mutual limiting. The Shiites traditionally regard every government in the Occultation Era as illegitimate and the ruler as a usurper. They have had varied relationships with various governments, some more deferential and some with more tension because of governmental pressures. A government by Shiite clergy was never seen before. None of the past Shiite governments, e.g. the Būids or the Safavids, had ever been administrated directly by the clerics.

In this entirely new government, questions were slowly surfacing. Is Islamic jurisprudence enough to managing social affairs? To what extent should modern sciences be consulted in administration? Is there such a thing as Islamic economics? Should the government guarantee the application of Sharia in its all entirety? Is it useful for Shi'ism to establish a government in the Era of Occultation? Is the Islamic government the same as the democratic rule of a Muslim majority in an Islamic society, or is ruling exclusive to the clergy as their divine right? Is it better to try to execute the Islamic laws maximally or minimally? Which would lead to continuity of faithfulness? These and many other questions emerged because of and during the reign of religion.

At the dawn of the Islamic Revolution, both Shariati, the ideologist of religion-thinking, and Al-e-Ahmed, the ideologist of identity-thinking, had passed away. Fardid was still alive and trying to reiterate his philosophical ideas within the zealous atmosphere of the Revolution, but it was not his time. It was a time of Sharia, and he did not practice Islamic rituals. It was the time of the leadership of a jurist involved in Islamic philosophy, which Fardid believed to be a form of Greek-toxication. A Traditionalist like Nasr too would find no position within the new government. He left the country not only due to his political past but because he believed in the traditional harmony of monarchy and clergy that the Revolution had disturbed. Besides, the *velayat-e faqih* [guardianship of the jurists] had left no place for a guru of a mystical cult [*Maryamiyya*].

Among the identity-thinkers, three continued their work in earnest after the Revolution. Daryush Shayegan, in *Qu'est-ce qu'une révolution religieuse?* published in 1982, chose the concept of "Islamic Revolution" as the main subject of his thought.[12] He argued that revolution and religion are notions belonging to two different worlds; in combining them, religion becomes reduced to the ideology and subjugated by the modern world. The rule of religion, he argued, is only the appearance. The truth is that religion is manipulated by the rigid forms of modern thought, i.e. leftist revolutionary ideologies and popular Marxism. In *Le regard mutilé: schizophrénie culturelle* published in 1989, Shayegan analyzed the same confusion of different systems at a psychological level, talking about "cultural schizophrenia".[13] It was in this route that, in *La lumière vient de l'occident: Le réenchantement du monde et la pensée nomade* published in 2001, he eventually concluded that the age of pure identities is over, and we now live with multiple identities.[14] So, what we should be concerned with is avoiding ideology and embracing democracy and human rights, while at the same time seeking spirituality and giving back the share of the soul in the modern world (Hashemi, 2004a, pp. 324–371; Hashemi, 2010, pp. 11–24; also see Gächter, 2005). Daryush Ashouri turned from the idea of the East to the concept of the Third World and accepted modernity as valuable. To understand modernity and to include Iranians in it, he contemplated most about the renewal of the Persian language to express modern science and thought (Hashemi, 2004a, pp. 284–286; Hashemi, 2018; also see Mottaghi & Rokoee, 2018, pp. 182–187, 2019). Reza Davari, however, welcomed the Islamic Revolution as a radical criticism of the West and modernity. He saw the Revolution as a new page opened in human history. He also tried to warn against the possibility of Westoxification at some stages

of the Revolution, and, as I will soon elaborate, made long debates with a religion-thinker in this respect. But two decades later, the author of *The Present State of Thought in Iran* seemed to have revised his revolutionary thoughts and returned to this book. Davari now talked about the need for development and prioritized critique of the internal crisis to disparaging the West (Hashemi, 2004a, pp. 234–271).[15]

After the Revolution, Aramesh Dustdar joined the identity-thinkers. Influenced by the European philosophy, especially Heidegger, he wrote his first book before the Revolution to explain the difference between philosophy, science, and religion. But after the Revolution, he became radically anti-religion, criticizing any kind of religious thought (or "religious ethos", in his words), which he believed was ubiquitous in the history of Iran. He argued about the impossibility of thinking in religious cultures in books like *Derakhsheshha-ye Tîre* [*Dark Shines*] (1991/1370 AH; revised edition 1998/1377 AH) and *Emtenaa ʿ-e tafakkor dar Farhang-e dînî* [*The Impossibility of Thought in a Religious Culture*] (2004/1383 AH) (Hashemi, 2015, pp. 167–184; see Rokoee, 2017, pp. 88–92, 228, 255–262).

Another identity-thinker, Sayyid Javad Tabatabai, also tried to think about the causes for the waning of thought, especially political philosophy, in Iran. He talked about petrification of tradition, focusing on the history of political thought in Iran and Iranians' encounters with the West. Despite his inclination towards leftist thought in his youth, Tabatabai came out of the tradition of identity-thinking. (He attended Fardid's classes and was influenced by Davari's attention to Farabi as the founding political philosopher in the Islamic era and the theorist for the ideal city in the Islamic civilization.) By a historical approach, he both stated that there is no escape from modernism and also chose "Iran" as his focus in his philosophical and political thought (Hashemi, 2015, pp. 373–383; See also Zâreʿ, 2016, pp. 179–407).

The Iranian Islamic Revolution raised its own thinkers alongside the identity-thinkers. These were direct heirs of Shariati and his modernist religion-thinking. The most significant and most influential of them was Abdolkarim Soroush. He introduced the concept of religious intellectualism (or enlightened religious thought [*roshanfekrî-e dînî*]) to bring together intellectualism with religiosity, in distinction from non-religious intellectualism and traditional religiosity. Soroush made the religious intellectualism the leading intellectual movement in Iran for a long while. Identity-thinkers, despite all their differences, agreed that the modern West is a historical whole to be accepted or rejected altogether. But the modernist religion-thinkers questioned that very principle. Identity-thinkers all conceded that being intellectuals, i.e. free-thinkers, is a modern phenomenon tracing back to the age of Enlightenment in a sense and to the leftist revolts in another. Again, the modernist religion-thinkers who used Shariati's expression of "pious intellectual" or Soroush's "religious intellectual" clearly showed disfavour to such distinctions and chose to combine tradition with what they selected from the modern world. This disagreement caused a long dispute between Davari and Soroush.

At the beginning of the Islamic Republic, Soroush was a young theorist who used Karl Popper's ideas to fight against the Marxists. From Davari's point of view, modern philosophy in general and Popper's ideas in particular were incompatible with Islam. Yet, for Soroush, as a Muslim educated in Alavi, a religious school that favoured adopting what is logically and scientifically useful and compatible with religiosity, Davari's words were not only erroneous but also irrelevant to Islam. Thus, if the opponent accused him of Westoxification, Soroush in his turn described them suffering from *gharb-gereftegî* [humorously used, as in electric shock, it literary means being West-shocked].

The religious intellectuals were, in fact, theologians concomitant with the Islamic Revolution. They reflected the spirit of times, and as such, their discourse prevailed in the society. The major challenge for them was neithr identity-thinking nor even the religious government that

they grew in and gradually became its opposition. It was their own intellectual tradition. Shariati had introduced religion as a directive for attaining an ideal government. But faced with the rigid reality after the Revolution, the ideals started to turn out as wishful thinking. Now they would ask: what should we do in the real world? For Soroush, the traditional approach was insufficient regarding this issue. What was needed was dynamism in jurisprudence in particular and in religion in general. In *Ghabż va basṭ-e teorík-e sharí'at* [*The Devolution and Evolution of Sharia*] (1991/1370 AH), he articulated the idea that our understanding of religion is always shaped by everything else we know, and is thus continually under transformation. So, to better understand religion, looking into the natural and human sciences is necessary, whether Eastern or Western. Later, in *Basṭ-e tajrobe-ye nabaví* [*The Development of Prophetic Experience*] (2003/1382 AH), he added that religion itself is a historical phenomenon and thus its essential and accidental aspects should be distinguished (Hashemi, 2006, pp. 123–232, 2015, pp. 203–208, 395–402, 677–684; see also Jahanbakhsh, 2001, pp. 140–171; Tığlı, 2018, pp. 85–149). Almost the same path was followed by the other famous religious intellectual, Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari (Hashemi, 2006, pp. 235–257, 317–332; Vahdat, 2015, Ch. 6; Tığlı, 2018, pp. 153–190). From the heart of religious intellectualism also came Mustafa Malekiyan. But over time, he rejected the whole project of religious intellectualism, especially the very combination of intellectualism and religiosity (Hashemi, 2006, pp. 261–281, 305–315, 2015, pp. 209–216; See also Tığlı, 2018, pp. 241–289). The simplified earthly religion of Shariati was no longer fashionable.

In this way, over the decades after the Revolution, identity-thinkers and religion-thinkers reached practically similar conclusions: to prioritize human rights, democracy, and the development of the country; to see religion beyond ideology; to focus on religion's spiritual kernel in contrast to its ritual shell; to accept the historicity of both identity and religion; and to see the necessity of modern sciences and philosophies.[16] The questions that the main intellectual movements – i.e. the first identity-thinkers and religion-thinkers – had raised now lead to paths way beyond their initial plans. The discourse of the East/spirituality/Islam vs. the West/materiality/infidelity changed into the discourse of "tradition and modernity". In the new discourse, modernity is a period in which we all are situated and living in it has requirements no one can deny or refuse.

The post-Revolutionary intellectuals of Iran

A detailed discussion about the post-Revolutionary thought is beyond the scope of this chapter.[17] However, it is worth noting that 40 years after the Islamic Revolution in Iran, now a new generation has emerged strikingly different from the previous thinkers. To this new generation, the division between identity-thinkers/religion-thinkers does not apply, as they have lived in a world of intertwined identity and religion. The atmosphere now is different from that of the pre-Revolution and Revolution. Today, by a translation movement out of genuine curiosity, many works in the fields of philosophy, social sciences, literature, and art have been translated into Persian. Obviously, in the time of global communications, the dichotomy of either education in the West or living in the traditional environment no longer holds. Nowadays, the hostility towards the West and modernity that was apparent in the thought and art of the pre-Revolution and the Revolutionary generations has increasingly diminished. At the same time, under the religious government, religious tradition is part of the public education, creating graduates in various fields that even though they are not necessarily religious, know the traditional culture and thus can add fuel to the current debates and revisions. Despite having reactionary features, the Islamic Revolution of Iran was a modern phenomenon that, just like

other revolutions, dismantled not only the monarchy but also the rule of tradition. Even a kind of secularization process arose under the reign of religion. Here, one could metaphorically use Hegel's phrase a "cunning of reason" [*die List der Vernunft*]. It is in such an atmosphere that for example, girls of religious families, who were not allowed to continue their education before, went to universities and sought out professional careers. A generation came that would not submit – not only to monarchy, but also to other traditional kinds of authority. There we find neither the nostalgia for the tradition nor the hegemony of a Western ideology. Many Iranians now recognize that Iran has more in common with Western cultures than with the so-called Eastern traditional cultures (e.g. China or Japan). That is evident from the Greek impact on the Islamic world, on the one hand, and the impact of Islam on the Western medieval and renaissance culture, on the other hand. The intellectuals of the post-Revolutionary generation are now at work. About this new generation of intellectuals and their work, the future will judge. What I should say here is that for this generation, matters like the contrast of East and West or the relationship of religion and politics has changed, and some kind of social pluralism has become a necessity.

Conclusion

As one of the centres for philosophy, literature, and art in the Islamic world, when Iran underwent a crisis confronting the civilization that it first knew by its force, Iranians have endeavoured to remove the backwardness, including by offering various theories about their historical position in the modern world. Such endeavours, due to the present marginality of the country, had rarely become contributions in the proceeding world history, yet they have always been there to ensure the survival of a lively culture. The idea of a religious government and its critiques all are theoretical experiments and should be assessed as such. Of Iranian contemporary cultural life, perhaps the most known by the world is its cinema – but that cinema is a reflection of the dynamic intellectual tradition that has always been apparent in the culture, sometimes shining dimmer and sometimes brighter. The theological and philosophical thought in contemporary Iran has started to form a history of its own in continuity with Iran's intellectual tradition. For this brief period, the central question has been this: "What is our relationship with modernity, and how can we find a suitable place in the modern world?" The answers and approaches to this question have varied. But they always have taken shape in a dialogue with Iran's long history, compared to which Iranians' centuries of encounters with the West seem to be merely a moment. What the result will be of the efforts of different generations at intellectually grappling with this moment will be determined in the future.

Notes

1 The complete version of this sentence, written by a famous Iranian intellectual from the Qajar period, Mirza Malkam Khan, is as follows: "In the political battle of power, the cannon makes a state right" (see Malkam, 2002, p. 280). Although Malkam admired the development and socio-political functioning of the West, he wanted to express the twofold nature of the modern civilization, which the Iranians found simultaneously efficient and hostile (for a history of this twofold attitude, see Haeri, 1986). Due to feeling weak, hostility toward the West gradually became a common feature of Iranian thought. For this process, see Gheissari (1998). For the representation of Westerners in contemporary Iranian fiction, see Ghanoonparvar (1993).

2 One finds the description of this change in many books on the history of Iranian art. Yet, a beautiful story of the clash between the traditional and new approaches to painting is told in the novel *My Name is Red* (especially the chapter "It is I, Master Osman") by Orhan Pamuk (2001).

3 For instances of Iranian scholastic philosophers' first encounters with the modern Western philosophy, see Modarres Zonûzî (1997, pp. 525–528); Modarres Yazdî (1986, pp. 139–147). See also Mojtahedi (2000, pp. 237–287).
4 For more on the Constitutional Revolution, see Afary (1996).
5 Muhammed Ali Foroughi is one of the pioneering intellectuals of this period. About him, see Varedi (1992).
6 I have made this distinction in my books Hashemi (2004a, 2006). For more information, see Hashemi (2015, pp. 865–886).
7 Hashemi (2004a, pp. 123–124).
8 For a somehow similar critical approach to the political and social aspects of Fardid's thoughts, see Mirsepassi (2017).
9 For Traditionalism, see Houman (2010, 2014). For Traditionalism and Iranian thought, see Hashemi (2015, pp. 387–394).
10 Iqbal's poems are undoubtedly an integral part of Persian literature. In this respect, the interest shown to Iqbal in Iran has been for two reasons, his poetry and his religious reformism. The two are not entirely unrelated, as his reformist thoughts are expressed in his poems. For this reason, Iqbal has attracted the attention of both religious reformists and those interested in cultural authenticity and Persian literature. The following diverse works are examples of this interest: Shariati (2001); Sa'idî (1991); Eslamî Nadûshan (1979); Mashâyekh Farîdanî (1980); Haddâd-e-âdel (2017a, 2017b).
11 For a comparison between Fardid's and Shariati's ideas, see Hashemi (2006, pp. 295–304).
12 Shayegan, 1991, pp. 206–209.
13 Shayegan, 1997, pp. 22–29, 59–174.
14 Shayegan, 2001, Chs 2–3.
15 The concept of development is used increasingly in the works of Davari since two decades after the Revolution. The word even appears in the titles of some of his recent books.
16 These are ignored in the dominant intellectual discourse before the Revolution. For some examples, see Hashemi, 2015, pp. 133–166, 185–194. For a picture of the atmosphere of Iranian Intellectualism before the Revolution, see Nabavi (2003).
17 In my forthcoming book *Sharayet-e Emkan-e Naghd* [*The Conditions of Possibility for Critique*], I discuss the distinct differences between the post-Revolutionary generation of Iranian intellectuals and the pre-Revolution and the Revolutionary ones, especially in the articles "The forty-year-olds under the shadow of fathers" and "Identity, religion and the post-Revolutionary Iranian intellectuals".

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4

DEBATES ON TRADITION AND MODERNITY ON THE SUBCONTINENT

Tauseef Ahmad Parray

Introduction: Islam-Modernity discourse (past to present)

Throughout history, Islam has been discussed as a religion, civilization, and ideology, and has been analyzed and evaluated through different perspectives both by Muslims and non-Muslims. As history testifies, different schools of thought emerged during the classical and early medieval eras, discussing and deliberating on Islam and things Islamic. This trend has not only continued in modern times, as well, but has also gained tremendous momentum. Especially with the onslaught of colonialism and Islam being confronted with developments such as modernization and Westernization, rigorous scholarship has been produced on Islam and its varied dimensions, ranging from the history of its foundational texts, Islamic law, culture, and civilization to contemporary issues.

Though history and Islamic history have been broadly divided into classical, medieval, and modern eras, however, Ghorbal (1958, pp. 75–76, as cited in Choueiri, 2010, p. 13) is of the opinion that historically Islam can be studied under two broad phases: "historical Islam" (610–1453 CE) and "modern Islam" (post-1453 CE) – the latter suggesting the "moment Europe left behind the Renaissance, and embarked on a new venture of commercial expansion and military conquests."

In the modern period, especially at the end of the 18th century, Islam faced numerous internal and external challenges. This period later came to be known as the colonial era and is the time when most Muslim countries came under the control and dominance of European rule. History also testifies that, in reaction and response to these challenges, Muslim intellectuals both individually and collectively (via organizations or movements) made serious efforts to defend Islam. A number of trends and tendencies thus emerged, ranging from "agitation for reform in declining Islamic empires" to "efforts to modernize Islamic societies and reform religious thought in order to deal with contemporary challenges" (Sonn, 2010, p. 113). All of them took recourse to Islamic dynamic concepts such as *islah* [Reform], *ihya* [Revival], *tajdid* [Renewal], and more (Rahman, 1970, pp. 632–656; Voll, 1983, pp. 32–47). For Voll (1983, p. 32), *Tajdid* and *islah* are two "great concepts in the Islamic vocabulary of resurgence . . . [that] reflect a continuing tradition of revitalization of Islamic faith and practice". About *tajdid* and *islah* – stemming from the root words *j-d-d* [to make new, to innovate, and to refresh] and *s-l-h* [to mend, restore, and improve], respectively – Ebrahim Moosa and Sher

Ali Tareen (2015, pp. 202) point out that both these terms have been "widely disseminated across a range of genres in Muslim literature," for each concept "addresses stability and change, the mutable and immutable in Muslim thought." Moreover, both concepts have been "integral to Islam from its very beginnings," and in the modern period they relate "to mending a fractured present in order to generate something entirely new or to rehabilitate an original form" (Moosa & Tareen, 2015, p. 216)

For Saruhan (2006, p. 675), *islah* connotes reform, and occurs "in forty verses of the Qur'an in the sense of 'to restore oneself or to reconcile people with one another, to make peace'"; for Afsaruddin (2006, p. 678), *tajdid* "means 'renewal' and that is usually coupled with *din* to mean 'renewal of the religion' . . . expressing the belief that the religion is always capable of regenerating itself."

Although the concepts of Revival and Reform were implemented differently by various Muslim actors and social movements, the fact remains that in the modern era, different developments transformed "the Muslim reform [reformist] tradition" in profound ways, as it is "neither monolithic nor predictable" but is "continually invested with and divested of particular meanings, knowledge, and aspirations" (Moosa & Tareen, 2015, pp. 204, 216–217)

As Samira Haj (2009, p. 7) stated, "These concepts are understood within the tradition as imperative for safeguarding and ensuring the continuity of a moral community."

Islam possesses a rich, long tradition of Revival and Reform. Down through the ages, individuals and organizations have undertaken the renewal of the community in times of weakness and decline, responding to the apparent gap between the Islamic ideal and the realities of Muslim life (Voll, 1983, p. 45; Esposito, 1993, p. 49). As with all things, a return to the Islamic fundamentals offered the model for Islamic Reform. In continuation with this dynamic legacy, modern Islamic Reform was not simply a response to the challenge of the West, but in fact its roots are both Islamic (i.e., Islamic Revivalist Tradition) and Western (i.e., Muslim response to the European colonialism; Voll, 1983; Esposito, 1993).

During the 18th and 19th centuries, Revivalism had engulfed the whole Muslim world as a response to diverse situations and challenges. Stretching across the Muslim world from Africa to Asia, Muslim responses to colonialism and imperialism were conditioned both by the source of threat and by the Islamic Tradition, ranging from holy war [jihad] to emigration [*hijra*] and from non-cooperation to adaptation and cultural synthesis. Certain Muslims with orientations ranging from secular to Modernist pursued a path accommodating an embrace of the West's scientific and technological power in order to revitalize the community and regain independence. In other words, Muslim views of the West and their responses to its power and ideas varied from rejection and confrontation to admiration and imitation. Esposito (1993, pp. 53–62) expressed four diverse responses to the West to have taken shape: rejection, withdrawal, secularism and Westernization, and Islamic Modernism. Voll (1982) claimed the continuity of Islamic history to have provided the basic framework for understanding Islamic movements (including Reformists, Revivalists, and Islamists) and to have categorized Muslim actions (styles of action) into four broad types: adaptationist, conservative, fundamentalist, and individualist. Moreover, Voll (1982, p. 30) saw the emergence of a fundamentalist style of action that had been embodied in 18th-century Revivalism as an archetype of modern Revivalism.

From the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) to Asia, Muslims responded to the adversities of colonialism with organizational efforts. These efforts continued into the 20th century, as well, during which the whole Muslim world (with few exceptions) lost its political power and came under European colonialism (Sonn, 2010, pp. 113–114; Choueiri, 2010, pp. 20–24).

All these Revivalist movements from MENA to Asia were primarily concerned with "the socio-moral reconstruction and form of society [and thus] strengthened, in varying degrees, the

activism and the moral dynamism which had been characteristic of pristine Islam" (Rahman, 1970, p. 640). Nonetheless, these movements had conceptual and practical characteristics in common that Choueiri (2010, pp. 24–25) summarized as:

1 The return to original Islam as the religion of the oneness of God [*tawhid*].
2 The advocacy of independent reasoning in matters of legal judgments [*ijtihad*], coupled with an abhorrence of blind imitation [*taqlid*].
3 The necessity of fleeing [*hijra*] from territories dominated by unbelievers, polytheists, and heathens.
4 The fervent belief in one single leader as either the embodiment of the "renewer" [*Mujaddid*] and just imam or as the Expected Mahdi.

Colonialism, Modernization (and/or Westernization), its effects on Muslim societies, and later developments such as the abolition of the caliphate in 1924 became the major collective reasons responsible for the rise and emergence of several socio-religio-political movements in the Muslim world. Prominent ones on the Indian subcontinent, the Aligarh Movement (Quraishi, 1960; Lelyveld, 1977; Kidwai, 2017), Darul 'Ulum Deoband (Faruqi, 1963; Metcalf, 1982; Ingram, 2018), Nadwatul 'Ulama (al-Hasani, 1964; Metcalf, 1982, pp. 335–347; Nadwi & Khan, 1983–1984), Jam'aat-e-Islami (Nasr, 1994, 1996; Shehabuddin, 2008; Ahmad, 2009, 2013; Bokhari, 2013), and others, along with the individual efforts of many other scholars. For Moten (1996, p. 139), though these movements have "various manifestations" ranging from their concern with "moral reform" to "socio-politically motivated," nevertheless, "the goal of all these movements are one and the same, which is to establish a sane, humane world order." These past and present Islamic movements have produced "generations of reformers" throughout the Muslim world from MENA to Asia (Esposito, 1999, p. 680).

Moreover, the occurrence of numerous types of responses to Westernization (Modernization), European colonialism, and the challenges they collectively posed to Muslims must be mentioned here. The three broad kinds of responses from the intellectual point of view have been labeled as: Traditionalist, Modernist, and Revivalist/Islamist (i.e., Traditionalism, Modernism, and pan-Islamism; Rozehnal, 2004, pp. 107–113; Moten, 2008, p. 33).

In the South Asian context, for example, Robert Rozehnal (2004) explained this categorization as: Traditionalists, mostly including the 19th-century religious scholars (ulama] who found solace in Islam's past glory to have "worked to establish [a] network of religious schools (madrasas) across the Subcontinent in an effort to safeguard tradition and defend their own intellectual turf" (Rozehnal, 2004, pp. 107–108); Modernists, those who proposed "to rescue Islam from cultural stasis and political implosion through a program of adaptation and accommodation." Among the South Asian pioneering Modernists, Rozehnal (2004, pp. 111–112) mentioned Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817–1898) and Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938), arguing that these influential Modernist thinkers "promoted Muslim unity and resistance to Western cultural hegemony by adopting the fruits of science and technology while overhauling Muslim educational, legal, and political institutions" by embracing "the ideas of *islah* (reform), *tajdid* (renewal), and *ijtihad* (independent legal reasoning" (Rozehnal, 2004, p. 111); and Revivalists or Islamists (or Islamic Revivalism): those who "seek to revitalize and reinvigorate tradition [such as Mawdudi (1902–79) by restoring] Islam's past glory through a systematic program of social, religious, and political activism" (Rozehnal, 2004, p. 113).

That is why "they interpret Islam as a comprehensive ideological system [and thus] Islamic revivalism is grounded in the concepts of *nahdah* (renaissance), *thawrah* (revolution), and *awdah* (a return to foundations)" (Rozehnal, 2004, p. 113).

Moten (2008, p. 33) explained his categorization as:

> In the South Asian context, traditionalism was represented by the 'ulama, of Deoband and their offshoots. The exponents of modernism were the luminaries of the Aligarh Movement and the pan-Islamism of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Sir Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, Abul 'Ala Mawdudi and others belonged to the tajdid category.

On defining and contextualizing Tradition and Modernity

In the lexical meaning, tradition represents the collection of beliefs, principles, or ways of acting that people in a particular society or group have followed for a long time. Edward Shils (1981, pp. 12, 13, as cited in Moten, 2011, p. 1) defined tradition as "anything which is transmitted or handed down from the past to the present," including beliefs, practices, and institutions. "It is the *traditum*" which has been and is being "handed down or transmitted." Usually set in opposition to modernity and secularism, traditions are also defined as the "patterns of belief and practice . . . that have been inherited, transmitted, or established from generation to generation" (Frassetto, 2006, p. 1106).

However, in the context of the Islam-Modernity discourse, Tradition is not seen as inherently opposed to Modernity, but is approached and advanced "as a continuing moral argument that has undergone particular shifts and transformations in new political and institutional conditions" (Sutton, 1963, p. 71, as cited in Moten, 2011, p. 1).

In contrast, modern as a term refers to current or recent times, in particular the span of history from the Middle Ages (1500 CE) onwards. It refers to the era that began politically with the French Revolution and economically with the British Industrial Revolution. This has led many social scientists to "identify modernity with the West and to refer to modernization as Westernization" (Moten, 2011, p. 1). Thus, modern in this context has been defined as "a national state characterized by a complex of traits including urbanization, extensive mechanization, high rate of social mobility and the like" (Smith & Inkeles, 1966, p. 353, as cited in Moten, 2011, p. 2). The terms modern and modernity, as defined by Michael Welker (2003, pp. 579–582), suggest that either "certain new habits, practices, or worldviews are inferior to those of ancient, medieval, or classical times and origins" or "they claim the superiority of these habits, practices, or worldviews, ascribing a positive meaning to their being new, up to date, fashionable, progressive, or evolutionarily successful." Modernity designates the epoch in human history that "strives for the freedom of the person, the equality of all human beings, and for the universality of reason." According to Armando Salvatore (2013, p. 352), "The idea of modernity combines a variety of vectors and paths of transformation" ranging from socio-political and economic to religious and cultural.

The word modernity, which for Louay Safi (1994, pp. 12, 14) is synonymous with modern Western thought, is usually used in the Western literature to denote certain cognitive, normative, and structural changes that emerged in modern history in contrast with what had existed in the classical and medieval world. The ideal of modernity consists of two distinctive aspects: the first is technical, relating to production and organizational skills and techniques; the other is normative and associated with the values and beliefs of a specific culture. The technical and normative aspects of modernity were spread by the expansion of Western powers to non-Western areas, including the Muslim world. Therefore, Tradition and Modernity are seen as "mutually exclusive polar opposites" (Moten, 2011, p. 2) that rest "on misdiagnosis of tradition as it is found in traditional societies, a misunderstanding of modernity as it is found in modern societies, and a misapprehension of the relationship between them" (Rudolph & Rudolph,

1967, p. 3, as cited in Moten, 2011, p. 2); these actually need not be polar opposites; it is a false dichotomy because both intermingle and affect each other (Appelbaum, 1998, p. 92, as cited in Moten, 2011, p. 2).

Thus, having contextualized the issue under discussion, an assessment from certain selected intellectuals from the Indian subcontinent (stating from Shah Waliullah) and their contributions to the Revival and Reform of Muslim thought, and how their intellectual legacy has been sustained by their successors is provided.

Shah Waliullah: a pioneer of Islamic Reformist legacy on the subcontinent

On the 18th-century Indian subcontinent, Shah Waliullah (1703–1762) of Delhi (Dehalvi) was an intellectual par excellence (Jalbani, 1967/2005; Rizvi, 1980; Baljon, 1986; Hermansen, 1996; al-Ghazali, 2001). He is recognized as the precursor to Modernist/liberal Islamic thought (Jackson, 2006), the leader of the 18th-century Muslim response to the disruption of Islamicate society (Hodgson, 1974), and the "father of Islamic modernism" (Ansari, 1965, pp. 254–255), He was an influential theologian and Revivalist, and quite an innovative, original thinker who stood as a bridge connecting classical and contemporary scholarship (Hermansen, 2001; Al-Ghazali, 2001; Ahmad, 2004; Jackson, 2006). As a synthetic thinker, who in his magnum opus *Hujjat Allah al-Baligha* [*The Conclusive Argument from God*], 1996, hereafter abbreviated as *Hujjat*), particularly propounded a socio-moral reconstruction and synthesis of the Islamic intellectual disciplines (Hermansen, 1996, 2013; Nadwi, 2004). As a significant representative of a tolerant and rich synthesis of Islam, he emphasized *ijtihad* and *maslaha*, two dynamic concepts of immense importance within the context of Reformist thought (Ansari, 1965; Dallal, 1993; Siddiqi, 2009; Parray, 2017).

All schools of thought in the subsequent centuries trace their lineage to his immense scholarship, which ranged from theology, philosophy, mysticism, jurisprudence, politics, and economics to sociology. Hermansen (2001, p. v) declared him the intellectual inspiration for almost all contemporary interpretations of Muslim thought. "Modernists, Ahl-i Sunnat wa al-Jama'at, Ahl-i Hadith, Deobandis, the Jama'at-i Islami and others view him as an intellectual precursor to their own interpretations of Islam" (Hermansen, 2008, as cited in Ahmad, 2015, p. 148). He combined rationalism with traditionalism and piety with progress, leaving a lasting effect on the Muslim ethos, and a legacy of Reformatory/Revivalist efforts on all successive generations (Al-Ghazali, 2001; Nadwi, 2004; Parray, 2017, 2019).

Shah Waliullah's works, especially his magnum opus *Hujjat* (Hermansen, 1996) dealt with the inner meanings of religion [*asrar al-din*] and various other subjects ranging from metaphysics and politics to finance and political economy. He interpreted almost all aspects of din (i.e., '*Aqa'id*, '*Ibadat*, *Mu'amulat*, '*Aqubat*, and *Ikhlaqiyat*) from the reformist and rational point of view, discussing in detail and more broadly the religious rulings from the *maslaha* and *maqasid* perspectives.

Like other reformist of his time, Shah Waliullah argued categorically for *ijtihad* in his works like '*Iqd al-Jid* (Waliullah & Rahbar, 1955, 346–358) and *Hujjat*, stating one of the causes behind the distortion in practicing the Shari'ah was *taqlid*. He defined *ijtihad* as an effort at understanding the derivative [*furu*'] rulings of the Shari'ah using detailed argument based on four sources of Islamic law: the Qur'an, Sunnah, *ijma*, and *qiyas*. By means of *ijtihad*, Walliullah developed "an inter-juristic eclecticism recommending that on any point of doctrine or ritual a [Sunni] Muslim could follow the rulings of any one of the four principal juristic schools" (Ahmad, 1969, p. 8). He suggested that Muslims should practice *ijtihad* to reach conclusions relevant to

the times. A revolutionary thinker, Shah Waliullah attempted the "reintegration of the socio-economic and religio-ethical structure of Islam" (Ansari, 1965, p. 254).

Thus, *ijtihad*, the employment of reflective reasoning, and a critique of *taqlid* were central to Waliullah's "intellectual project the cornerstone of which was his methodology to address and synthesize the universal and the particular" (Ahmad, 2015, pp. 150–151); his approach to *ijtihad* and its nature and methodology shows his "deep insight into the intellectual and academic legacy of the subject vis-à-vis his foresight about the future of *ummah* that has to shun away the path of decadence for the path of intellectual dynamism and social development" (Bhat, 2010, pp. 34–35).

Shah Waliuallah's intellectual eclecticism was vividly reflected in *fiqh*, as well (Dallal, 1993, pp. 347–348; Ahmad, 2015, p. 150). In a milieu where most Muslims followed one specific *fiqh* from the main four of *Hanafi*, *Shafi'i*, *Maliki*, and *Hanbali*, regarding that *fiqh* as the only true path, he considered all four equally valid. His approach was *tahqiqi* [investigative], not *taqlidi* [imitative]; hence, his position was *Hanafi* in one respect, *Shafi'i* in another, *Maliki* in yet another, and *Hanbali* in a different respect. Behind this eclecticism and plurality was Waliullah's larger point that differences were integral to the process of understanding God's will.

For Shah Waliullah, the belief that rulings of the divine laws do not encompass any aspects of beneficial purpose [*Masalih*] is a false idea and no relationship exists between human actions and that for which God has made a requital (Hermansen, 1996, p. 11). Moreover, he was not convinced by the argument that the preceding generations had not recorded the beneficial purposes and human interests and therefore any effort to clarify this discipline was unnecessary (Parray, 2017). He enumerated various benefits in codifying this discipline of *maqasid*, as seen in various passages of his *Hujjat* (Hermansen, 1996, pp. 15–16).

According to Roy Jackson (2006, p. 157), "Like al-Ghazali before him, [Shah Waliullah] called for 'balance' (*tawazun*) . . .: a middle way that is in accordance with the time and circumstance." Muhammad al-Ghazali (2001, p. ix) summed up Shah Waliullah's Reformist legacy in these words:

> Shah Wali Allah stands as a bridge between the classical and contemporary streams of scholarship . . . . The spiritual and intellectual successors of Shah Wali Allah left a perennial impact on the Muslim ethos of the Sub-continent by their unremitting efforts for the revival of the true perception of Islam and the application of its teachings to the dynamic and diverse conditions of society.

Heirs of Shah Waliullah's Reformist legacy: from past to present

Reflecting on Islamic Modernist and Reformist trends, Rifat Hassan (2009, p. 159) aptly remarks regarding Islamic Modernist and Reformist trends that the "Ideas and methodologies [developed by thinkers like Sir Sayyid, Iqbal, and Fazlur Rahman] have helped reformist thought to flourish throughout the Islamic world" and beyond. Pertaining to this, the following section includes a brief assessment of the views of Sir Sayyid, Iqbal, and Rahman as representatives of Revival and Reform on the subcontinent during the 19th and 20th centuries.

Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan as a pioneering Modernist thinker of colonial India

After Shah Waliullah, Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1818–1898 CE) was first to lay emphasis on socio-religious and intellectual reform. He is considered one of the pioneering figures in the

Modernist thought, an educational and political activist, theologian, journalist, and chief organizer of the 19th-century Modernist Islamic movement on the subcontinent (Nizami, 1979, p. vi) who inaugurated "a revolution in Muslim thought" (Chand, 1967, p. 359). Sir Sayyid called for a new theology (*Jadid Ilm al-Kalam*) to respond to the modern change (Esposito, 1993, p. 58) and stated:

> Today we need, as in former days, a modern *'ilm al-kalam* [scholastic theology/ new science of dialectics] by which we either render futile the tenets of modern sciences or [show them to be] doubtful, or bring them into harmony with the doctrines of Islam.
> *(Khan, 1884/2002, p. 256)*

Sir Sayyid espoused a rationalist approach to Islam and things Islamic, and held that there is no contradiction between the Word of God (the Qur'an) and the Work of God (Nature). He insisted that *ijtihad* was a fundamental right for all Muslims and should be exercised freely and without limitation (Khan, 1884/2002; Dar, 1957; Troll, 1978; Ahmad, 1967; Hassan, 2009, pp. 182–184; Parray, 2015, p. 28; Parray, 2020, pp. 226–256). "Drawing inspiration from the writings of Shah Wali Allah, he spent his life promoting Islamic modernism, stressing a rational approach to Islam, and undertaking social reforms" (Parray, 2017, p. 83). His life-long passion was modernizing the lives of the subcontinent's Muslims.

Sir Sayyid denounced *taqlid*, which in his opinion had been responsible for the decline of Islam. For him, *ijitihad* was the need of the hour and desisting from *taqlid* and stagnation in one's thought processes was imperative. For him, progress was directly proportional to the uptake of modern sciences and technology. He maintained a valiant posture, succeeded in realizing the intellectual energy of Muslims, and motivated them to gain knowledge of the modern sciences (Parray, 2015, p. 29, 2020, pp. 230–233).

Sir Sayyid was "the first man in modern India to realize the necessity for a new interpretation of Islam that was liberal, modern, and progressive" (Dar, 1957, p. 262), and is, thus, regarded not only as be a true heir of Waliullah's Reformist legacy but also the "first representative of Islamic modernism in South Asia who presented a new orientation of Islam and reacted to the modern age" (Parray, 2015, p. 32, 2019, p. 56, 2020, p. 235). That is why Mazherrudin Siddiqi (1982/2014, pp. 4, 12, 42, 60, 105, 190) calls Sir Sayyid, time and again, "the Indian Reformer."

(Allama) Muhammad Iqbal: 20th-century poet/philosopher and Muslim Reformer

Sir Sayyid was followed by Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938), who was commonly known as Allama Iqbal and greatly emphasized the reform and reconstruction of religious thought by laying stress on the concepts of *ijma* and *ijtihad*. Iqbal was an influential poet-philosopher, Muslim Reformer, political ideologist/activist, and one of the most celebrated figures of the 20th-century subcontinent (Beg, 1939; Schimmel, 1963; Malik, 1971; Vahid, 1988, 1992; Masud, 2003a; Mir, 2007).

An ardent advocate of *ijtihad*, Iqbal discussed this concept exhaustively and saw it as the catalyst for Islam's intellectual resurgence. For Iqbal (1934, 2012), *ijtihad* is the "Principle of Movement [and legal advance] in the structure of Islam" which relates to "dynamism, mobility and creative spirit of Islam" and reconciles the categories of permanence and change in life and represents spiritual eternity which manifests through variety and change (Bhat, 1996, p. 109).

Tracing its origin from the Qur'an (29:69) and substantiating it with the prophetic Hadith, Iqbal defined *ijtihad* both literally and in Islamic legal terminology: literally meaning "to exert"

and in Islamic legal terminology implying "to exert with a view to form an independent judgment on a legal question" (Iqbal, 1934, 2012, p. 117).

He desired to reconstruct Islamic law according to the needs and requirements of the modern era. "Seeking the re-evaluation and re-codification of Islamic *fiqh*, Iqbal stressed the critical need for *ijtihad* by contemporary Muslims" (Parray, 2019, p. 66). He considered it the only way to blast a way out of the cul-de-sac of Traditionalist Islam. The Muslim intelligentsia of the subcontinent, influenced by modern thought, quickly accepted these views, which soon came to be equated with public opinion and parliamentary institutions (Hassan, 2009, p. 168; Parray, 2017, p. 84, 2019, p. 69). Iqbal thus created a new intellectual framework for a more authentic Islamic modernity and searched for ways to regenerate Muslims and their civilization on the basis of their own religious and cultural heritage.

Fazlur Rahman: late-20th-century influential Reformist thinker

This legacy of intellectual Revival, Reform, and Modernism was carried on critically but successfully by Fazlur Rahman (1919–1988), who is unquestionably considered as "one of the most important and influential Muslim modernist thinkers of the second half of the 20th century" in both the Western and Muslim worlds (Hassan, 2009, p. 170; Ahmed, 2017, p. xv). He is described by Abdullah Saeed (2004, p. 37) as "one of most daring and original contributors to the discussion on the reform of Islamic thought in the twentieth century" and as (Saeed, 2008, p. 222) "best known for his major contribution to modern discussions of reform in Islamic thought." For Rozehnal (2004, p. 113), Rahman was "a spokesman for liberal, reformist Islam, [who] championed Islam's relevance in the modern world [and] embraced an open, dynamic, and adaptive faith," and for Ahad Ahmed (2017, p. 1), he was "a noble scholar of Islamic philosophy and an important liberal Muslim thinker of the twentieth century" who wrote on a wide range of subjects.

Concepts such as *ijma*, *ijtihad*, and *maslaha* are encountered in his writings by way of Islamic Modernism and Reformism, as much of his works focus on Modernist thought and classical Islamic philosophy. Overall, his thought is characterized in the tradition of Shah Waliullah and Sir Sayyid. Rahman preferred an approach that sought to recover the spirit behind Qur'anic injunctions while contextualizing the historical development of the Islamic Tradition (Parray, 2017, p. 84). He characterized the intellectual element in both movements (i.e., fundamentalism and modernism) as *ijtihad*, or fresh thinking, which he defined as

> the effort to understand the meaning of a relevant text or precedent in the past, containing a rule, and to alter that rule by extending or restricting or otherwise modifying it in such a manner that a new situation can be subsumed under it by a new solution.
>
> *(Rahman, 1982, p. 8)*

Equipped with new analytical tools, Rahman developed these ideas into a theory articulated in contemporary terms:

> With perfect justification have the lawyers of Islam emphasized four fundamental freedoms or rights – life, religion, earning and owning property, and personal human honor and dignity ('ird), all of which it is the duty of the state to protect [as in Q. 5: 32; 2: 256; and 2: 30] . . . Any large-scale violation of these, including, of course, demeaning man through sheer poverty, would constitute "corruption on the earth."
>
> *(Rahman, 1980, p. 31)*

21st-century Muslim Reformists of the subcontinent

This section highlights the contributions from Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi (b. 1931), Islamic economist and scholar who may be aptly described as an inheritor of Reformist legacy with regard to *maqasid al-Shari'ah*', and Muhammad Khalid Masud (b. 1939) who has been rightly labeled as the Keeper of the Reformist Tradition in Pakistan. Both are prominent and influential voices of Reformist thought in present-day India and Pakistan, respectively, and thus heirs of Shah Waliullah's Reformist legacy.

Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi: an inheritor of Reformist legacy with respect to maqasid al-Shari'ah

A recent trend in Reformist thought has been the *maqasid al-Shariah* discourse, which has been profoundly articulated on the subcontinent by Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi (b. 1931), a renowned Muslim economist and recipient of the King Faisal International Prize (1982) and Shah Waliullah Award (2003). His momentous work in Urdu on *maqasid* discourse underscores crucial themes/issues, ranging from socio-political and economic to environment and peace and security. Abdul Azeem Islahi (2010, p. 238) stated that due to the wide range of content, issues highlighted, and sources utilized, one finds "deep thinking, serious discussions, innovative methodology, serious issues, and strong argumentation."

For Siddiqi, every era witnesses the rise of intellectuals who deal with new issues and challenges. During the classical and medieval periods, *fiqh* was a fully developed science that had answered all relevant questions. But the needs of modern Muslims, regardless of where they live, are different. Thus, the *maqasid* paradigm needs to provide practical answers to entirely new situations. For this, Sidiqi lays emphasis on *ijtihad* and *maslaha*, which keep on changing due to different contexts, situations, perspectives, and states of affairs (Siddiqi, 2009; Parray, 2017, pp. 89–90).

Siddiqi (2009, p. 332) opined that the challenges of the 21st century demand humanity "to look critically at the present situation, analyze past experiences and experiments critically, and think and deliberate future prospects" and that:

> reconstructing the Islamic way of life necessitates that intellectuals of various ideological bents familiarize themselves with their existing disagreements and discrepancies in terms of understanding, applying, and implementing the of maqasid and to interact and exchange ideas with each other in order to maintain the standards of Islam's universal message, as well as for humanity's sanctity and inviolability.
>
> *(Parray, 2017, p. 94)*

For Siddiqi, Muslim intellectuals must learn and practice the ethics of disagreement [*adab al-ikhtilaf*] so that differences do not become barriers to mutual interaction and cooperation.

Muhammad Khalid Masud: the Keeper of the Reformist Tradition in Pakistan

One of the pioneering examples of 21st-century Muslim Reformist thinkers is Muhammad Khalid Masud (b. 1939), a Pakistani scholar whose methodology, according to Riffat Hassan (2009, p. 173), "notably in its emphasis on context, is similar to that of Fazlur Rahman"; Hassan goes on to describe Masud as the Keeper of the Reformist Tradition. Having completed his

doctoral thesis on Shatibi's philosophy of Islamic law with a special focus on his contribution to *maslaha*, Masud has spent his career writing extensively on Islamic law, pluralism, Muslim minorities, and their related subjects (Masud, 1995).

Masud stresses a holistic rather than piecemeal approach to the study of the Qur'an. He views the Qur'an and the Hadith as basic Islamic texts and does not consider the Qur'an a book of laws but acknowledges its normative character (Hassan, 2009, p. 174). For Masud (2009, p. 257), the discourses on reform have "varied in their perception of modernity and tradition," going on to identify three Reform discourses: Revivalist, Modernist and Islamic Modernist.

Masud (2009, pp. 237–238) defines Islamic Modernism as "an interactive discourse that revisited the notions of compatibility, modernity and tradition during its debate with others," contrasting the two other discourses of Revivalism and Reform discourse, and Western Modernist discourse, that "aims to root 'modernism' in Islamic tradition." Masud (2009, p. 238) adds that this pushes "to reform Muslim society" by affirming that "modernity is compatible with Islam, and a new Islamic theology is required in order to justify this compatibility."

Likewise, Masud opines on pluralism that it is

> a part of the project of modernity that favours the freedom of the individual. Pluralism does not stress multiplicity per se as much as it is concerned with questioning the traditional monopoly of certain persons, groups, or institutions on prescribing ethical values authoritatively.
>
> *(Masud, 2003b, p. 180)*

Masud maintains that Islam favors pluralism on two grounds: first because it appeals to human reason and second because of the social acceptance of Islamic values as understood by different communities. This basis also "regulates the permissible scope of dissent from what are widely accepted social norms" (Masud, 2003b, p. 190).

Similarly, in Islam-politics discourse, Masud (2004, 2011) is of the opinion that "Islamic democracy" differs from "Western" democracy in form as well as in objectives. Whatever the perspective, he argues that studies on Islam and democracy "never fail to stress the point that building democracy in Muslim countries is a formidable task" (Masud, 2004, as cited in Hassan, 2009, p. 174). In his view, the real issue in defining democracy is the place and value assigned to the common man as an individual, which is something not yet openly fully developed in current political systems. He concludes that not the religion (Islam) but "religious arguments" and religious interpretations, along with a multitude of factors, dominate the obstruction to democracy and create interruptions in firmly establishing democratic governance in Muslim countries (Masud, 2011, p. 20).

Conclusion

The study brings under examination the meanings, relevance, significance, and application of Revival and Reform in the modern-day Muslim world, with an emphasis on the dynamism of *ijtihad* from Shah Waliullah, Sir Sayyid, Iqbal, and Rahman in the 19th and 20th centuries to Siddiqi and Masud as 21st-century Reformist intellectuals of the subcontinent. The discussion amply reveals that Tradition and Modernity need not be looked upon as two polar opposites. Islam and Modernity do not contradict but are able to merge and reconcile because neither Islam nor its law and history are opposed to dynamism, development, advancement, or progress. As Moten (2011, pp. 12–13) expressed, "Tradition is in the process of transformation and

modernity is not averse to accommodating tradition. Evidently, there is modernity in tradition and vice versa; they interact and affect each other."

Also, the emergence of Islamic Reformist thought and the legacy it produced can be aptly inferred to have influenced the development of the Muslim community and its attitudes toward the West and Western ideologies/thought. Their vision inspired Muslims to emphasize educational reforms, legitimatized legal and social change, and contributed to the formation of anti-colonial independence movements. It also reveals that the Islamic Modernist/Reformist discourse emerged in Muslim societies in response to the twin challenges of modernity and colonialism. Past and present Muslim thinkers from the subcontinent have provided much to this movement, having made remarkable contributions to various facets of this discourse.

Acknowledgment

The author would like to acknowledge the editorial input, suggestions, and feedback received from the editor and reviewer on the earlier draft of this chapter. The author is grateful to his friend Mr. Muhammad Irfan Shah (Research Scholar in Islamic Studies, Aligarh Muslim University, India) for his help in revising some parts of the earlier draft. All this input has proved very helpful in reshaping many arguments in this chapter. Needless to mention, none of them is responsible for the views contained herein or for any errors.

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SECTION II

Religion, society, and politics

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5

THE FORMATION AND VARIOUS FORMS OF CONSERVATISM IN TURKEY

Mahmut Hakkı Akın

Introduction

The disparity between conservatism and its representatives in the areas of art and literature, and the cultural conservatism to which rural people have a sense of belonging and shapes their social structure, can raise the question of "Which conservatism is it?" Similarly, conservatism in political terms may have different appearances than other kinds of conservatism. This confusion around the concept comes into view more clearly with conservatism than other ideologies. In addition, the issue takes on another aspect when considering the change and differentiation that each ideology undergoes due to historical and social conditions and the difficulty in determining the definitional limitations of conservatism itself. One of the most important reasons for this situation is related to the issue of institutionalization. Every organization that has emerged as a social reality wants to survive and maintain its existence. Meanwhile, the continuity of social organizations or structures directly depends on institutionalization. The case appears similar when considering society as a macro organization. Societies also want to maintain their structural reality or existence. This continuity also requires maintaining certain institutionalized suborganizations and many structural elements that are regarded to provide continuity. Therefore, an implicit reference to conservatism exists in sociology's claim positing itself as a scientific discipline, and its founders are known to have attached importance to conservatism due to how it accepts what is social rather than what is individual as the primary and supreme reality. Taking the understanding of reorganizing social structures that have been turned upside down by economic or political revolutions and ensuring the continuity of social structures as the premise of this claim, conservation is seen to have quite a central position. Considering that conservatism itself is an ideology that emerged in the modern era and refers to an understanding of preserving what is traditional, conservatism clearly will be manifested in almost every society where the various effects of modernization are observed. As a historical event, the French Revolution not only initiated discussions on conservatism but also led to the development of the theory and literature on conservatism. Based on this appraisal, when taking conservatism in Turkey into consideration, a general Turkish conservatism can be said to have developed alongside the modernization process, which has conservative trends within its conceptualization. The common point the various and presumably distant and disparate appearances of conservatism have in Turkey may be their own peculiar reactionary attitudes towards revolution and change during

Turkish modernization. This study discusses Turkish conservatism through various sociological configurations in addition to it as a theory.

Investigating conservatism in Turkey

Social reality gains meaning through the change due to its inherent historical character. The approach of the German idealist tradition, which assumes social structure and historicity as almost identical realities, differentiates the human existential basis from natural reality. Based on this assumption, natural reality is regarded as non-historical. Depending on the historical change, humanity also changes in addition to social reality, which is one of the most important products and producers of human coexistence. However, although appearing as a contradiction, social reality constructs itself over certain constants and orderings. When coming to society, constants or standards also have an indirect mechanism for conserving and not changing their own existence. For example, the preservation of a social belief or norm is maintained by the people who share that sociality as the members and producers of the social reality. However, beliefs, norms, and values may change due to historical changes, lose their former influence, and even get replaced by other beliefs, norms, and values. This change is inevitably painful and automatically produces a social and cultural separation and distance between those who demand change and those who resist it. The word *conserve*, being the root of conservatism, is directly related to being against or resisting a certain change. However, the change highlighted here indicates a change that can be defined as radical (i.e., revolution) rather than a spontaneous ongoing change. Therefore, as Ahmet Çiğdem (2013, p. 16) stated, "The conservative momentum owes its *raison d'être* to the French Revolution; as a political thought, it is one of the most important turning points of modernity and has no pre-modern history." As a revolution becomes radical and transforms into a radical practice to eliminate what belongs to the past, conservatism gains just as much meaning and gains the power to organize people in its own realm of meaning as an ideology. As the person who made the first and most serious contributions to the development of conservative theory, the British aristocrat Edmund Burke (1790, pp. 58–60) claimed the revolutionary war against the institutions that convey the past had left a wreckage, and this results in a very negative experience when forming the new order. Moreover, Edmund Burke made these assessments before the Reign of Terror, which is known as the main era of destruction when the Jacobins were in charge. Perhaps the clearest and most noncontroversial issue in the literature on conservatism is that conservatism is an anti-revolutionary understanding that gains meaning in reaction to the revolution (Nisbet, 2002, p. 100). In terms of the French Revolution in particular, the events that made conservatism strong and meaningful, and one of the most important political views in the literature on political history, occurred under the rule of the Jacobins, known as the Reign of Terror. The horror of this absolutely destructive era that completely rejected the past and the chaos and crisis caused by the use of terrorism as a tool have been among the most important sources of legitimacy for conservatism (Beneton (2011, pp. 11, 19). Conservatism as an ideology in the literature on politics gains a meaning beyond being a reaction to the new. Additionally, in societies that did not experience revolution like in France, political and cultural conservatism can still be seen to have emerged opposite the segments with radical tendencies. The fact that the historical and social reality unique to each society produces its own forms of conservatism also needs to be accepted.

Turkey's modernization process has also continued, with clashes between the new and the old. A common rhetoric occurred that referred to the fight between the old and the new based on the late arrival of the printing press, which was the machine symbolizing modernization in Turkey. Conservative trends and the process of institutionalizing conservatism can be generally

seen from the Ottoman modernization and onwards. For example, with the beginning of the modernization movement in the Ottoman army, the reactions from the Janissary Corps, who represented the traditional (i.e., old) against the innovations can be accepted as conservative reactions. Indeed, eliminating the Janissary Corps during the reign of Mahmut II, one of the most important figures to accelerate and even radicalize the momentum of change through determination and with risk of great conflict, draws attention as a radical movement. One can also observe Mahmut II and certain bureaucrats who followed him to have made more radical moves in the first half of the 19th century in the name of modernization, which in turn created a legitimacy for the conservative reactions of those who did not abandon the realm of meaning they had in their own way attributed to conservatism. Nonetheless, conservatism during Ottoman modernization cannot be said to have been organized ideologically or institutionalized in a way that could affect politics for a long time. Only local reactions occurred within certain periods, events, and conditions. Of course, the emphasis of the state-centered Ottoman modernization on returning to the bright past and its traditions, meanwhile, continued throughout the 19th century and even into the 20th century. For example; Niyazi Berkes (2008, p. 297) argued this emphasis that had been maintained in the Ottoman modernization process to be a directly conservative emphasis and modernization to have been unable to actually be experienced "unless there is a radical break from the institutions coming from the past." This assessment from Niyazi Berkes has some aspects that correspond to reality. The understanding of reforming institutions from the past enables the old to survive, as well as the new. Indeed, the political change that Britain experienced is often seen compared with the radical change experienced in the French Revolution. Conservatives regard and accept Britain's process of change to have been healthier because it had provided the combination of the old and the new rather than the destructive change the revolution in France had brought about. Similar debates have also occurred in Turkey, especially during the periods when the republic's founding years and ideological understanding from those years were being criticized.

The Republican Period essentially construed Turkish conservatism, or as quoted from Ahmet Çiğdem (2013, p. 16), this period was the *reason d'être* of the conservative momentum because even if accepting republican modernization as a product of Ottoman modernization, the period is distinguished as a time when the understanding that applied social engineering using a Jacobin method had been dominant. The French Revolution has constituted a model for the republican revolutions in the Republic of Turkey since its foundation. One can mention many similarities between the two countries' revolutions, such as the specific changes in the clock, calendar, measuring units, national holidays, and ceremonies; the general changes in the field of culture; Mustafa Kemal Atatürk being construed like Robespierre as the pioneer of the revolution; and Kemalism's similarity to Robespierre's civil religion (Türköz, 2019). Secularism here is again noticed as the main and indispensable principle upon which the revolutionism of republican modernization was based and as an influence carried over from the French Revolution. Of course, the destruction in Turkey was not as large-scale as it was in France during the Reign of Terror. However, in the years following the declaration of the Republic of Turkey, the elite of the republic attempted to minimize the appearance and influence of Islam in the public sphere as much as possible (Tezel, 2013, p. 34), and to introduce a new national culture based on secularism and positivism, which were considered as the principles of the republic's existence. Thus, in this respect, conservatism in Turkey noteworthily brings to mind a name or a group that had gained its conservative inclinations according to the experience of the republic rather than from the Ottomans. Just as the idea of revolution is central in conservatism's emergence as an ideology, the revolution can also be surmised to have been brought about and conservatism produced in the context of Turkish modernization by the republic. The relationship of Turkish

conservatism with the republic is identical to the relationship modernity has with conservatism: it is a republic ideology (Çiğdem, 1997, p. 46). The republican revolutions and the mentality behind them during the One-Party Era makes the development of conservatism and its relative boundaries in Turkey understandable.

Considering the reactionary aspect of conservatism, the republican revolutions can be seen to have brought about and produced a great reactiveness in terms of attitudes, manners, and behaviors. In the face of the radical change-oriented mentality and practices of the revolution, conservatism had the opportunity to build the foundation of its own mentality and practices based on protecting the past from the devastating effect of the revolution. The main agency of Turkish modernization being the state represented a split in politics between revolutionism and conservatism. Because the Turkish Republican Revolution also has the facet of social engineering, its social reform policies caused the conservatism in the public to become even more crystallized. In the fields of culture, art, and literature, a conservatism generally definable as cultural conservatism had also similarly emerged against the revolutionary approach. Nevertheless, the fact that the reactionary aspect of these different forms of conservatism directly relate to some radical practices of the One-Party Period is an important detail that requires attention. Here, a dialectical relationship can be found between Kemalism and Turkish conservatism (Aktaşlı, 2011). Both Kemalism and Turkish conservatism correspond to two understandings that produce each other based on their positions to one other. Because the person of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is often excluded from the discussions, Kemalism is generally preferred for defining the revolutionary understanding of the republic's One-Party Period. The reactionary mentality that developed against the efforts of the ruling elite in Turkey, who had defended and applied the republican revolutions to block the continuity of tradition in various areas, can be regarded as the most significant and the general characteristic of Turkish conservatism. This reaction, sometimes maintained with a louder voice and other times quietly, has achieved and managed to produce a realm of meaning despite everything. However, the claims that Turkish conservatism is against Turkish modernization or out of date are incorrect. On the contrary, Turkish conservatism is also a product of Turkish modernization, and the difference between revolution and change shows up here through its spontaneous dynamics. Therefore, rather than being anti-modernization, Turkish conservatism is a product of modernization and even one of the producers of this process.

Political conservatism: Turkish right and discussions of counter-revolution

When analyzing Turkish modernization, one of the most emphasized social institutions are political institutions. Although political conservatism has been analyzed with reference to the political conflict between Âli Pasha and the intellectuals of the Tanzimat, the period of Abdulhamid II between the First and Second Constitutional Eras, and the March 31 Incident in 1909, one can say that political conservatism in Turkey gained a foothold after the War of Independence. As is known, a serious debate occurred between the two most important symbolic figures of the War of Independence, Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Kazım Karabekir Pasha, about how the new structure should be. Kazım Karabekir (1995, p. 142) remarked that during the Lausanne negotiations, Mustafa Kemal Pasha and many of people whom he had led the War of Independence with grew distant. Many people were found to advocate the idea of Islam having been an impediment to progress; during the war they had been afraid to voice this, but now they started to express their ideas openly. This debate between the two prominent commanders of the War of Independence later resulted in an important crossroads in Turkish politics. At a

meclis [gathering] where Mustafa Kemal Pasha was in attendance, Kazım Karabekir Pasha advocated the view that Islam was not an obstacle to progress opposite Fethi Okyar, Tevfik Rüştü Aras, and Mahmut Esat Bozkurt; he addressed Mustafa Kemal Pasha, saying (Karabekir, 1995, pp. 144–147):

> You opened the National Assembly with takbirs and salats! You have also declared Islam to be the highest religion in your speeches! We all walked the same path with the same faith and opinions! Now on which foundations and with what right will we embark on a bloody adventure?

Here, three names Kazım Karabekir Pasha mentioned should be noted as the favorite names of the Republican Period. According to him, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Ismet Pasha, and Fethi Bey (Ismet Pasha and Fethi Bey were the first prime ministers after the establishment of the republic) agreed on the following three-point program as the basic policy to be followed after the establishment of the republic (Karabekir, 1995, p. 165): (1) Islam is an impediment to progress; (2) the meaning of the Arabs' gibberish (referring to Qur'an) should be taught to the Turks; and (3) *hodjas* should be removed for good.

Disagreements continued after the establishment of the republic, and the Progressive Republican Party (TCF) was established as the opposition party, in which Kazım Karabekir served as the leader. This political party is generally regarded as the pioneer of the conservatively oriented political parties that have participated in Turkish right-wing politics. First of all, the separation of the party from the Republican People's Party (CHF) and its organization as an opposition party by democratic means has conservative aspects. Against the revolutionary character of the republic, the TCF carried liberal tendencies and was opposed to government intervention in society. This method of differentiation evokes the comparison between English and French modernization as mentioned earlier. In addition, the effect of liberalism on the TCF program was clearer. Founded in November 1924, the party was shut down after the Sheikh Said Incident in accordance with the law of *Takrir-i Sükûn* [Establishment of Silence] and charged with the following accusations with reference to the official ideology: being a secret supporter of sultanate, and being anti-secular with the statement of "reverence to Islam" in the party program and supporting the Sheikh Said Rebellion (Zürcher, 2013, pp. 42–50). All these accusations were in line with the rhetoric of *irtica* [religious reactionism] vs. secularism. However, the trial of TCF members due to the İzmir assassination, their disposal from the political arena, and the dissolution of the opposition party led to identifying every political structure organized in opposition against the CHF as conservative or *mürteci* [religious reactionary], which was the nomenclature of the time. Many parties branched off from the CHF. The Democrat Party (DP) and Free Republican Party (SCF) were established with the knowledge of the presidents of the time and with promises from the party founders to commit to the principle of secularism (Kahraman, 2010, pp. 199–200; Akın, 2012, p. 55). However, because having power means determining the dominant rhetoric, how these political organizations emerging from the CHF were defined when they lost their power had been determined more by their political positions rather than what they actually were.

The DP, the Justice Party (AP), the Motherland Party (ANAP), and the Justice and Development Party (AK Party), all of which gained the authority to form the government by themselves in the multi-party system – in particular with large support from the conservative section of society – have been identified as opposing the CHF and charged as being counter-revolutionary. Whether these political parties clearly represent the same line ideologically is controversial. This political positioning was not only viewed as positioned against the CHF

but against "Western-secular bureaucratic forces" (Idris Küçükömer, 2007, p. 72). Küçükömer included on this axis the Freedom and Accord Party against the Committee of Union and Progress, the second group in the National Assembly during the War of Independence, in addition to the political parties TCF, SCF, DP, and AP mentioned previously. According to him, the reflection of the separation between the state and the people in the political field continued in this way. Although the ideological continuity of these political parties is a matter of debate, they may have a counterpart in terms of the continuity of the Turkish right. Although the definition of being conservative is included in the ANAP program, the AK Party was the first one to directly define itself as being conservative.

Important turning points in the political history of Turkey on the discussions of counter-revolution include the military coups. In particular, the May 27 Coup of 1960 drew attention as a grassroots-based CHF coup. What happened after this coup continued as a process whereby the Kemalist dialectic operated through the CHF-DP conflict, which holds key importance in understanding Turkish conservatism. The coup administration even claimed that the second republic had been founded, and this definition was frequently used in the first year of the coup. In fact, during the DP's rise to power, the CHF was directly accused of deviating from Atatürkism. However, the CHF, which over time became an opposition party rather than the ruling party, succeeded in turning the privilege of being "the party of Atatürk" into a political advantage. The DP was accused of being an opportunist party, giving credit to reactionism, and abandoning the Atatürk revolutions; although it often held sole power, and remained on the defensive in this regard. Other parties that allegedly continued the same tradition after DP were known to also frequently fall to this defensive position. In all of the military coups that have occurred or been attempted in Turkey, an emphasis on being the guardian of the military, the republic, and the reforms is noticeable. This emphasis can be tracked to the May 27 Coup in 1960, to Talat Aydemir's two unsuccessful coup attempts in 1962 and 1963, to the March 12 Coup in 1971, to the September 12 Coup in 1980, to the February 28 Coup in 1997, to the e-memorandum of April 24, 2007, and to the coup attempt on July 15, 2016. As for the elections after the coups, the results that the coup plotters wanted were not achieved; the political parties supported by the conservatives received considerable votes and the rhetoric on counter-revolutionism continued.

One important issue to be addressed in terms of political conservatism in Turkey is the Turkish right. The conceptualization of right and left in Turkey corresponds to a distinction that has been established in the literature since the 1960s. In this distinction, discussions regarding the left-of-center debate within the CHF and the statement İsmet İnönü made about the party being left of the center have a decisive place. In other words, the attitude of the CHF not only determined the position of conservatism, but also the position of the Turkish right as being on the right. When considering that the three pillars of the Turkish right are nationalism, conservatism, and Islamism, conservatism can be seen to have been easily adopted and included in other ideologies due to its flexibility. Based on the claim that every institutionalized structure reveals conservative reactions in order to maintain its continuity, the CHF and the military and civil bureaucracies as representatives of the status quo in Turkey have also been previously argued to have a conservative character. Along these lines, Idris Küçükömer's (2007) thesis stating the concepts of right and left to be used incorrectly in Turkey is based on this claim. The politics of the Turkish right – which emphasizes the historical past through the symbols of the homeland, flag, and *adhan* – and CHF's interpretation of the leftist discourse and understanding of secularism between 1960 and 1980 being based on anti-communism have been important for the political tradition of the right to survive. This is because in the 2010s, reference to the CHF's one-party practices and its adoption of nationalism strongly made following such a tradition

possible. Again, in the 2000s, the use of a poster that brought together the pictures of Adnan Menderes, Turgut Özal, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as propaganda for the AK Party strongly addressed the conservative memory.

Taking the concurrence of the three ideologies that make up the Turkish right into account, the position of Turkish conservatism in political history becomes evident. Considering the various intellectuals and politicians associated with conservatism in Turkey, these names also are noteworthy in the ideology of nationalism. One of the most important goals of the revolutionary understanding of the republic had been to create a society that is compatible with the nation-state understanding. Whereas Islamists were pushed out of the political arena just before the establishment of the republic, the nationalism that continued through Turkism and Turanism over time also faced the problem of discordance with the ideology of the republic (Kılıç, 2016). A significant gap has existed between nationalism (one of the six basic principles of the republic) and Turkism, which has developed since the 19th century. In addition, a serious gap and tension exists between the nationalists who defended the racist and Turanian approach under the leadership of Nihal Atsız (who followed Rıza Nur) and the Anatolianist advocates of Turkish-Islamic understanding such as Nurettin Topçu and Remzi Oğuz Arık. The fact that the Anatolian people had accepted Turkishness and Islam together is central to the continuity of Turkish conservatism. Therefore, nationalism has become like a cover for conservatism and Islamism; at the very least, its use as a concept depends on this legitimacy. In other words, the primary reason that brings these three ideologies together is that the revolutionist ideology of the republic dominated the political and cultural sphere. Both nationalism and Islamism had the tendency to be conservative after the establishment of the republic. Islamism became more conservative both because it was not able to ensure its own continuity and because the republican revolutions had practices that disturbed the religious people in particular. Islamists, who had made a serious criticism of the traditional religious understanding in the journals *Sırat-ı Müstakim* and *Sebilürreşad* after the constitutional monarchy and who have a very critical and destructive style for the average conservative *mukaddesatçı* [someone who follows what is holy and sacred; a term generally referring to a group of nationalist-Islamists], have become more conservative in relation to their exclusion by the republican revolutions (Aktay, 2013, p. 351). This conservatizing is clearly seen in the journal *Sebilürreşad*, which was re-published by Eşref Edip Fergan after the *Takrir-i Sükûn* Law had been abolished. Likewise, Fergan's banned book *Kara Kitap* [*Black Book*] can be interpreted as an important study reflecting this change. Noteworthily, another development that brought these three ideologies together is communism, and communism was the subject of discussions focusing on religion rather than economics or politics.

Understanding public conservatism

The mass migrations from rural areas and small towns to metropolitan cities are an important data source reflecting the sociological changes conservatism has experienced in Turkey aside from being a product of Turkish modernization. These migrations reveal four generally interconnected sub-mobilities (Akın, 2011, pp. 94–95): (1) place mobility (urbanization and the urbanization of people); (2) economic mobility (development and enrichment); (3) political mobility (becoming an actor in politics and bureaucracy locally or generally; and (4) mobility in education (higher education levels and schooling). This change can be defined with a general assessment as the differentiation of conservatism according to new conditions with an accumulation of a more provincial and long-standing tradition. In fact, this process of change can be considered in its own way as a process of urbanization and becoming. After the

1980s in particular, the stories of many individuals who were called conservatives and who had become actors in many fields such as politics, bureaucracy, academia, art, literature, and industry had been products of the listed mobilities. However, the areas where the conservative section of society had become actors related to social change were not areas that had previously been empty or appeared for the first time with the efforts of these people. Therefore, the conflict between people who had previously held certain positions in these areas and those who became the new actors (or who claim to be) is an expected scene. This conflict has continued within other institutions, as well, foremost and quite obviously in politics – so much so that those who have grown up by taking advantage of the possibilities of being urban for several generations have shown a sensitivity about preserving their own positions, which should be accepted as a natural process. Therefore, the reaction in Turkey from those in the center toward those in the periphery who gravitate toward the center can be argued as a type of conservatism.

In Turkey, mobility from rural to urban areas started in 1949 and 1950, and occurred as a development that exceeded the state's understanding of control over the people up to that time. In addition, the transition to democracy in the same period had revealed a form of interaction between the people who are ruled and the rulers, in which the benefits related to mutual power relations were looked after. Indeed, the fact that the people with public conservatism backgrounds had become visible and increased their demands was directly related to the continuity of the democracy, despite the interruptions along this form of relationship, and this situation is important for understanding the macro-social change in Turkey. Through democracy, the public relations of the representatives who were active in politics changed. This change can be regarded as a development that caused a differentiation of the dialectic relationship in Turkey between conservatism and Kemalism, one that maintained public conservatism with new dynamics.

The two institutions with the most importance to public conservatism in Turkey are family and religion. For the conservatism institutionalized in the West, having three institutions be the least affected by the harmful effects of the revolution was important for the preservation of their historical accumulation. These three institutions are religion (church), family, and private property. In Turkey, secularism was the main principle the republican revolutions had been based on, as Turkish conservatism being sensitive to preserving the sacredness of the past is plausible. Although practices such as the closure of religious orders and hermitages, the banning of religious education, and the recitation of the *adhan* in Turkish did not directly face a serious reaction, the case may also have been that conservatives in the public frequently used the opportunity to react to these practices from the 1950 elections onwards. Religious groups and orders also draw attention as important mediators of Turkish popular conservatism due to this process of change. The claims of following a certain lineage and being included in the tradition have made these groups advantageous in terms of the mobility of the urbanized sections of society. This is because religious groups are also among the important actors of place, politics, economy, and education mobility, which have been mentioned as the sub-mobilities of urbanization. This process has enabled religious groups to grow demographically, gain economic power, establish relations with political institutions based on power and benefit, and participate in politics. These groups, which mostly have traditional religious understandings, can be considered as the maintainers of popular conservatism. In addition to the preservation of sacred sensibilities, the possibility of having a place in the public sphere – or at least carrying this claim – has caused religious groups to be regarded as important alternatives by the urbanized sections of the society. One of the common features of most religious groups which have become increasingly active in Turkey since the 1950s is getting organized under a figure who was marginalized by the

secularist politics during the Republican Period. The role of this marginalization in building a common memory is an undeniable fact.

In this process of change, what the conservative section of society can or cannot conserve and to what extent they can pass on their values to new generations are other matters of discussion. In particular, one important issue to elaborate on is what the new generations of this segment, who have grown up in the cities and benefited from the opportunities offered by urbanization, will or will not be able to pass on from the previous generations. Fırat Mollaer (2016) defined post-1980 conservatism as techno-conservatism based on the political and economic changes experienced in Turkey. The conceptualization of techno-conservatism focuses on the replacement of cities' old textures with shopping malls and mass-housing complexes; many conservative politicians and bureaucrats regard this as a kind of development or modernization. In addition to this, the conservative section of society has not reacted to the rapid transformation; they mostly support it and want to benefit from the advantages and opportunities it has to offer. Here, talking about a public lore or sensitivity related to the Turkish-Islamic understanding means missing out on the sociological aspect of the issue. The migration of people from villages or small cities to metropolises, trying to hold on to life in these metropolises, and trying to increase the worldly benefit and power they have obtained, only corresponds to one aspect of the issue. On the other hand, various activities such as observing the sensibilities related to children's religious education and helping religious groups, mosques, and charities constitute another aspect of the issue. Public conservatism has transformed into another situation through the experienced changes. The rapid development of these changes in a period of few generations has resulted in many traumatic consequences. So many that, in the self-defined conservative and democrat AK Party period, which has the longest ruling period in the history of Turkey's democracy, concerns about the institutions of family and religion have been frequently expressed and debated in the public sphere. This situation is not only about party politics; it can also be experienced in a period when a conservative political party is not in power. This is because these changes have not only been a very significant process, but also a fast-developing one. Which mentality the next generation of the representatives of public conservatism will have, and which continuities or breaks their lives will witness, involve many unpredictable elements.

Intelligentsia conservatism: another realm

A confusing situation related to conservatism in Turkey arises when one compares the public conservatism with the conservatism in the fields of art and literature in particular. Various everyday rituals of the people have been strongly institutionalized and solidified because they have religious meaning, or because that is what the public thinks. On the other hand, when one examines the everyday life of the intelligentsia through its conservative inclinations, a serious cultural distance is seen to clearly exist between them and the public. This distance, which can be due to different sources, has maintained the differentiation between the two sections throughout the historical process. Because a separation has existed between the people and the intelligentsia in every period and all societies, its distancing from the public should not be overlooked as one of the most important features that established and has maintained the intelligentsia conservatism. This situation foremost has an ontological aspect regarding the fact that the intelligentsia individuates itself. For example; the Hat Revolution was put into practice two years after the declaration of the republic as a symbolic revolutionary application. While the fedora was worn by trained men with high status, the majority of peasants wore a cap, a legacy of the traditional neighborhood culture in the cities. Although this symbolic distance has continued for many years, the symbolic revolutions of the republic have not had the same

effect on the traditional masses as they did for many people who are considered conservative intellectuals. In this sense, Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Nurettin Topçu, and Samiha Ayverdi were noteworthily rather similarly educated and highbrow people, even non-conservative. This distance shows itself more clearly in the chronic case of the headscarf issue spanning over many years, which has been quite significant for the conservatives.

Differentiating the sensibilities and definitions of problems of intellectuals with conservative tendencies from those of the traditional masses has also been due to the sociological differentiation mentioned previously. Differentiating the assumptions of reality for worlds with different mentalities and different senses of belonging has also separated the forms of conservatism of the two sections of society. Thus, the distance between the two conservative sections also differs in terms of the sensitivities about what should be conserved. The conservatism of the intelligentsia has been nurtured by intellectual sources built on their cultural capital. As a poet and bureaucrat, Yahya Kemal's embracement of Ottoman history, which was ignored by the modernization of the republic, is different from the same history being embraced by public conservatism. Moreover, how these two conservatisms construe the Ottomans also differ from one another. Although Yahya Kemal, who wrote less poetry and prose during the republican era, was marginalized particularly during the implementation of the revolutions, he has been argued to have intellectually served as a bridge between the Ottomans and the republic (Ayvazoğlu, 2013, pp. 420–421). Yahya Kemal's acceptance of the ignored and shunned Ottoman of his past as shown in his poem "*Süleymaniye'de Bayram Sabahı*" ["Eid Morning in Suleymaniye"], and his verse "I am a future with a root in the past" (Beyatlı, 2010, p. 16) was able to arouse excitement even for the section of society that shared a different world meaning than his. Whether Yahya Kemal really felt the emotion that inspired that poem while he was praying or whether he had observed people without praying himself had even been debated. One can point here to a search for a sense of belonging brought about by being marginalized, which is perhaps one of the most important characteristic features of Turkish conservatism. The conservative people in particular were delighted with the respect shown for their own values, immediately embracing the man who showed this respect. The fact that Yahya Kemal, Arif Nihat Asya, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, and Ali Fuat Başgil had drawn the attention of this segment as symbolic personalities indicates a situation that goes beyond the question of whether what they wrote had been comprehended. Indeed, the European home life of Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, who is one of the people most valued by the religious section of society in particular, had puzzled many of the religious youths from Anatolia who had contacted him (Mengüşoğlu, 2013).

Intellectuals produce their works by taking into account a section of the society in their own environment whom they regard as the addressees. This fact is one of the most distinctive elements that distinguished the conservatism of the intelligentsia from that of the public. One of the most important sources of conservatism in Turkish thought is the journal *Dergah* (*Dervish Lodge*), where many intellectuals made an appearance. The journal was named after Yahya Kemal's poem "*İthaf*" ["Dedication"] and published between 1921 and 1923 in support of the War of Independence and to take a stand against materialism (Çınar, 2013, p. 86). The featured names of the journal were Yahya Kemal as poet, and Mustafa Şekip in particular as a thinker and one of the most important representatives of Bergsonism in Turkey with his philosophical texts. Although Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar was very young at the time, his poems and writings were published in the journal, and the influence the journal had on him continued (Dellaloğlu, 2012, p. 85). Because the *Dergah* journal represented an understanding outside the official positivist ideology of the republic and even completely opposite it, the journal has been regarded as one of the most important sources of intellectual conservatism in Turkey. In fact, no organized intellectual conservatism had existed in terms of thought (Aksakal, 2017, p. 24), nor did the *Dergah*

journal maintain its presence around any organized or monolithic thought. One of the claims most voiced about conservative intellectuals has been their contradictory states. The reason for this claim is that the intellectuals who were considered to be conservative did not comply with certain patterns associated with conservatism. Many conservative-oriented intellectuals lived a European lifestyle. They showed different tendencies at different times in the cultural environment dominated by politics. These accusations were frequently mentioned for names such as Peyami Safa and Necip Fazıl Kısakürek – names that come to mind when coming to conservatism and that were able to produce very powerful populism (Aksakal, 2017, pp. 129–131). The main question to be asked here is whether these intellectuals' contradictory states had stemmed from their conservative attitudes. A positive answer to this question would be to take the easy way out; moreover, those who are eager to interpret the issues through political antagonisms can easily claim that conservatism directly brought about such a personality. A universal aspect is present in this contradictory situation. A similar situation can be observed in many representatives of various ideological approaches. However, this general situation is also related to the variability in the conditions of historical and social change rather than the ideologies themselves. When this aspect of the issue's historical and sociological reality is overlooked, the risk exists of getting stuck in the rhetoric of an inter-ideological conflict. This prevents one from seeing the bigger picture.

Talking about the conservatism of intellectuals is based on a few common points, such as the impropriety of the rejection of the past and the acceptance of the continuity of tradition. Therefore, barely a few constants can be found for determining the limits of intellectuals' conservatism. Moreover, these constants differ from the prominent constants of political conservatism or public conservatism. For that matter, almost all intellectuals in Turkey who are considered conservative and who emphasized the ambivalence of Turkish society in the historical process in their works should be highlighted as having had a positive attitude about being modern. As Besim Dellaloğlu (2012, pp. 179–181) indicated in his prominent work on Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, a distinction is found between being modern and modernization in both the West and Turkey; to defend being modern is to defend the perspective that tradition changes spontaneously by being itself. Modernization, on the other hand, is a modern typification that takes place through ongoing interventions regardless of the situation. Two of the most important reasons for Tanpınar being perceived as a conservative are his ideas and works that he developed based on his interest in establishing the link between the past and the present. For certain segments of Turkey's society, modernization focuses on the future by ignoring the past, and in this way misses the present in the favor of a non-existent future. Do these analyses make Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar a conservative? Surely, the answer to this question is not easy, given the ambiguity of the boundaries of conservatism as emphasized at the beginning of the chapter. Perhaps the foundation of the intelligentsia conservatism is to acknowledge the existence of a memory passed on from the past against an out-of-sync Alzheimer patient produced through a construal that ignores the past.

Conclusion

As a modern ideology, conservatism in Turkey refers to defining the entire reactive responses to the revolution coming from the past. Moreover, these responses can easily be defined as conservative even if they come from different contexts and sources. The prominent features of conservatism are the assumptions that even if what comes from the past will change, it must change through its own dynamics; and that what is institutionalized acquires an organic character and is better than an artificial one. In Turkey, the modernization experience of more than

two centuries – events that at times could be described as radical – have occurred. However, the decision to break radically from the past first appeared in the debates after the Second Constitutional Era, when the opportunity for implementation came in the republic. In this period when new generations were expected to have a worldview in line with the official ideology of the republic, breaking ties with the past was among the primary objectives. As one of the most important institutions that pass on the past, implementation of certain practices to reduce the effectiveness of religion in the public sphere were initially attempted. Those who advocate this view and the many practices carried out in line with it have made the social separation that has been going on since the Ottoman modernization even sharper. However, the revolutionist official ideology was in opposition to the different forms and interpretations of Turkish conservatism. This is because the continuous reproduction of conservatism by itself has been based on establishing a dialectical relationship with its opposing revolutionist view. Almost everything the official ideology has attempted to construct through social engineering during the One-Party Period had caused a counter-response. Although the official ideology is regarded as the source maintaining and motivating conservatism in Turkey, the changes experienced through the spontaneous internal dynamics of Turkish society have also transformed conservatism. Drawing attention to the opportunities produced by the change experienced due to urbanization is also necessary. The discussions on conservatism in Turkey have also been discussions of a broad process of social change experienced within a few generations. This change contains some continuities, as well as some interruptions, and even deserves the term *transformation* rather than change. Just as one cannot notice any clear boundaries for conservatism, the forms of conservatism that arose from the same historical and social reality appearing distant to one another is also nature. The causes that shaped the conservative tendencies of the intelligentsia and those of the public are very distinct from each other. This inevitably produced a considerable distance between these two segments and disparate conservatisms because of their different realms of meaning. As in the West, conservatism in Turkey gained meaning through the process of modernization and has maintained its existence by changing alongside modernization. The peculiar aspects of the different forms and types of conservatism need to be noted.

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6

FORMATION OF CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIC THOUGHT IN EGYPT

New pursuits in Islamic legal and political thought

Özgür Kavak

Introduction: Islamic thought in Egypt in the modernization process

This investigation, covering the second half of the 19th century to the first quarter of the 20th century, will discuss with a focus on Egypt the formation phase of contemporary Islamic thought that had emerged in parallel with the modernization process. The list of individuals and works that represent this field is long and spread over a large span of time, starting with names like Jamal ad-Din Al-Afghani (d. 1897) and Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905), and extending to Rashid Rida (d. 1935) and others. Undoubtedly, the Al-Afghani-Abduh line has different ideological extensions in Egypt. However, when coming to Islamic thought, Rashid Rida and *the Manar* school are rather representative. Given the multidimensionality of Islamic thought, this chapter will limit the focus of the subject to the fields of law and politics. This chapter will examine the liberal approaches, which are in close relation with *the Manar* school and had thus developed within the Islamist line, using Ali Abd al-Raziq (d. 1966) as a representative example, and will also cover critiques on him in terms of Islamic political thought.

As in the case of the Ottoman empire, Iran, and Muslim states on the Indian subcontinent, reforms started toward the end of the 19th century in direct relation to the field of religion – which included the field of law – in Egypt, which had been under British occupation since 1882, and in this respect encompassed several main areas such as the constitution, legislation, the establishment of new courts, the annulment of the *shariah* [Islamic law] courts, the opening of law schools, and the positioning of *madrasahs* [Islamic schools] and ulama [Islamic scholars]. Western/secular intellectuals gained influential position in the state ranks thanks to the modern legal education they had received. They developed the legal doctrines and concepts that gave rise to the popularization of secular approaches in law. This popularization led to the involvement of conservative and modernist Islamists in addition to the nationalists of the period, and the discussions they had among themselves. This popularization led to the involvement of the conservative and modernist Islamists, as well as the nationalists of the period, and they had to take into account in their discussions the fundamental leanings of the non-Muslim British administration, unlike in the case of the Ottoman State after 1882 (Kavak, 2011, p. 302; Ziadeh, 1968, pp. 18–19).

The first manifestation of intellectual contact with the West in Egypt was largely due to the influence of the students who had been sent to Paris for legal education on the orders of Mehmed Ali Pasha. These students, who had completed their education in the fields of natural law, international law, public law, political economy, statistics, and administration, and returned to Egypt in 1831, started to transfer their background to public opinion, on the one hand, and to translate the basic texts of French law in particular, on the other hand. Their activities were centralized in the Language School [*Madrasah al-Alsun*], founded in 1836 under the direction of Rifa'a al-Tahtawi (d. 1873). During this period, a commission headed by Tahtawi translated the French civil code [*Codé Civil*]. Tahtawi himself translated and published the commercial law in 1868, while his student Salih Majdi translated the code on criminal proceedings, two other students Abdullah Suud and Hasan Fahmi the law of civil procedure, and Ahmed Abîd Bey the military law. With three important works, as well as a translation of the French penal law, Mohammed Qadri Pasha (d. 1888) was a student from the same school and one of the most important figures in the history of Egyptian law. Qadri Pasha was involved in preparing the laws of the newly established courts in Egypt as the Minister of Justice in Sherif Pasha's government, which was established after the 1882 Urâbî Rebellion during Khedive Tawfiq's reign (1879–1892). Qadri Pasha played a role in preparing Egypt's first constitution and its laws for the civil, commercial, and criminal investigations (see Kavak, 2011, pp. 302–303; Ziadeh, 1968, p. 19; Rafiî, 1947, pp. 401, 412–413). For a brief history of the transformation that Egypt has experienced since the process starting with Mehmed Ali Pasha, see Hopwood (1993, pp. 9–17).

The idea of the need for a reform in religious thought started being articulated when Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani came to Egypt in 1871 (Görgün, 2004). Muhammad Abduh, the most important representative of his ideas, aimed to re-activate the role of religion in changing world conditions by strengthening its relationship with reason and science. He insisted on the negative consequences of shifting away from the *ijtihad* [independent legal reasoning] and of prioritizing wording and form over the wisdom and purpose of *nass* [rulings from the Qur'an and Hadith]. He argued that collective efforts should be made among Muslims to restore the authority of *fiqh* [Islamic jurisprudence] and the tradition of scientific cooperation. While he was an Egyptian mufti, he did not fall within the boundaries of a single sect and gave special importance to the principle of *maslaha* [rulings not mentioned in the Qur'an or Hadith; Özervarlı, 2005] and thus laid the foundations of a new understanding of law. Rashid Rida, who was influenced by Al-Afghani through the magazine *al-Urwat al-Wuthqa*,[1] migrated to Egypt to act alongside Mohammed Abduh, whom he thought to be preserving Al-Afghani's ideas, and became the most important representative of Abduh's ideas in Egypt after his death in 1905.[2]

The claim "The West is advancing, the Muslims are lagging behind" became the dominant portrayal of the period and was internalized by both intellectuals and state officials, which in turn brought about a pursuit for new quests to rectify certain issues facing the Muslim world. These quests, which employed the concepts of *islah* [reform] and *tajdid* [renewal],[3] were instead used to point towards a struggle against *bid'ah* [innovations] and to revive Sunnah in the classical world. On one hand, these quests encompassed improvements within the body of the state, and on the other, they aimed to eliminate inaccuracies from the life and thoughts of Muslims.

Rashid Rida and new quests in the Islamic law and political thought

Al-Afghani/Abduh-Rida's school of thought had profound effects on the Islamic thought that had been taking shape since the beginning of the modernization process in the Islamic world.[4] The ideas of Rashid Rida (1865–1935) as one of the leading figures of contemporary Islamic thought with his identity as a scholar, thinker, journalist, and politician, have left a lasting legacy

on the Islamic world, including Turkey, through his articles in the magazine *al-Manar* and his most comprehensive and effective arguments in relation to discussions on both the sources and methods of Islamic sciences. These thoughts, which form a comprehensive understanding of *fiqh* based on concepts such as *islah*, *ijtihad*, *taqlid* [imitation], *madhhab* [Islamic school] and *maslaha*, differ from the scholarly insights of the classical world. This chapter will attempt to explain how the aforementioned understanding is reflected in the science of *fiqh* based on Rida's distinction between religious rulings and worldly ones.

In a period when the validity and the social reflection of the classical Islamic science and methodology were being seriously questioned as a result of their confrontation with political and legal transformations, and when the classical legacy had begun to be perceived differently or being abandoned altogether, Rashid Rida partially amended and mostly directed this legacy in the light of his own orientations and goals in the new framework of a construct. These efforts became solidified, especially in the field of *usul al-fiqh*, which has been accepted as the most important criterion for producing *sahih* [authentic] knowledge of *fiqh* for centuries. Rida, who did not fully adopt the conception of the classical method, had developed a two-way approach against *usul al-fiqh*.

First, he tried to eliminate the validity/correctness of *usul al-fiqh* with expressions such as "returning to the sources," "being subjected to evidence," and "abandoning the *taqlid*"; then he developed a methodological approach that would become the new criteria for arguing in the field of religion and more specifically *fiqh*. This new approach either completely abandoned or substantially revised some of the concepts of classical Islamic sciences and *usul al-fiqh*, while bringing others to a completely different content, as was the case with *ijma* [consensus on an Islamic law], which is established by parliamentary decision. The exact equivalent of these activities appears in Rashid Rida's texts as *islah*.[5] The point Rida's critique of *usul al-fiqh* reached is expressed as follows:

> It is clear that most of the [*usul al-fiqh*] principles have been established with such motives as to prove the words of imams, to reject the opponents of each group, and to make excuses for abandoning the deeds provisioned by the Book and Sunnah. In this case, would it be right to accept all the principles of the fiqh?
>
> *(Rida, 1367 AH, p. 57)*

Following his statement that a significant part of the classical *fiqh* method is invalid, he determined a new methodological approach based on universal principles allegedly derived from the Book, Sunnah, and the practice of the companions. An argument in the area of *fiqh* area is considered valid based on the acceptance of these universal principles. At the center of these principles is a classification of *ahkam* [rulings]. Rashid Rida's *ahkam* classification is the most important aspect that determined his views on *fiqh*.

The principles of modern thought on Islamic law

Rashid Rida attributed special importance to the exegesis of the Qur'an while forming the modern idea of *fiqh* and arrived at the *usul* [fundamentals] on how to approach the issues of *fiqh* in general and *nass* in particular while interpreting certain verses.[6] While these principles draw a general framework for religious *ahkam*, they on the other hand classify the *ahkam* in religious and worldly terms, and make some methodological references for acquiring both sets of rulings.

These articles in a nutshell evaluated the concepts of *fiqh* science, such as proofs, the subjects of ruling, *taqlid*, and *madhhab*, with a new approach after noting: "The religion has been

perfected and the main principle in religion is convenience." According to this, the Book constitutes the essence of religion. According to the rulings of Islam as a religion of convenience, the role and authority of the Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him) is not solely in the field of religion. He is also an authority for consultancy in other fields. Therefore, rulings can be divided into pure religious and worldly rulings [*al-ahkam al-dunyawiyyah*]. Only the pure religious field does not differ with respect to changes in time and space, and this field is composed of *aqaid* (the discipline of faith), acts of worship, and certain issues related to *halal-haram*. Only the worldly field of ruling is open to change due to factors such as differences in time and space, yet the rulings in this field are to be based on *mizan* [balance]. In turn, *Mizan* accepts *maslaha* in legal and civil issues, while justice and equality are the main criteria of ruling in judicial issues. Ensuring that *mizan* gains functionality in this way is up to the *ulu al-amr* [decision makers or rulers]. These people have the last say in these fields based first on the principle of *shura* and then on the universal principles whose essence consists of *maslaha*, thus saving the Muslims from division (Rida, 1367 AH, pp. 42–49, 51–54).

The classification of rulings or the secularization of these rulings

The *ahkam* [rulings] classification is at the center of Rashid Rida's principles on the modern idea of *fiqh*. The main structure of this classification is formed by separating the rulings first into religious and worldly, then into the principles of belief, acts of worship, moral rules, and *muamalat* [worldly matters]. According to this classification, the rulings Islam brings are divided into several sections:

1 Those related to the fundamentals of *aqaid* and faith, which have two sub-parts:
   a The Qur'anic part that asks for evidence and requires knowledge of *yaqeen* [certainty]. Such matters include belief in Allah's *wahdaniyah* [oneness], knowledge, might, will, wisdom regarding the order of creation, maintaining this order, and sending messengers.
   b The part that only commands being accepted provided it does not go against reason; it includes topics related to the realm of *al-ghaib* [the unknowable] such as angels, resurrection, and the realm of *akhirah* [afterlife].
2 Those related to acts of worship. These are *dhikr* [remembrance], ideas, and deeds that nurture the soul, such as prayer, *zakat*, and fasting.
3 Those related to moral qualities, propriety, disciplining *nafs* [self], and leaving harmful and evil acts [i.e., leaving what is *haram* and performing good deeds as much as possible]. *Halal* [permitted acts] and *haram* [prohibited acts] are included in this section.
4 Those related to worldly conduct, which is the conduct reflected in dealings that take place among the people who form the *ummah* or between the Islamic *ummah* and other nations. All the types of political, civil, judicial, and administrative affairs constitute this section of conduct.

(Rida, 1367 AH, pp. 126–127)

While some of the rulings in the first part (area of belief) have been obtained from conclusive evidence, the rest have been obtained by accepting the rulings in the Qur'an and the *mutawatir* [mass transmitted] that are conclusively Sunnah. Even if the proof is authentic in this field, *ahad* hadiths [narrated by only one person] are not acceptable because this type of hadith only expresses speculative information. Conclusive knowledge is needed in the area of belief, and this area is not open to *ijtihad* or *taqlid*.

In the second section (area of acts of worship), every Muslim must obligatorily accept the rulings as they are in the Qur'an and Sunnah. *Mujtahids* [people who exercise *ijtihad*] do not have the authority to add to or subtract from this section because Allah has perfected it. Neither is *Taqlid* valid in this field.

The third group has the *nass* rulings about what is *halal* and *haram*. No *mujtahid* has the authority to change these. However, how some of the general principles pledged in this field are applied is left to the *mujtahids* and the people's disposition. In summary, this field may be divided into two parts. The first part is called *al-dharuriyyat al-dinniyyah* [imperatives of the religion]. In other words, all Muslims should know that things like truth, pudicity, and *amanat* [trust] and being faithful to it are good, whereas adultery, intoxication, and gambling are evil. The second part is the area that cannot be known by all Muslims, only to those engaged in scholarly activities. Just like women are equal to men, slaves are equal to free people, and *kafir*s [non-Muslims] are equal to Muslims. In the first part of these rulings, *ijtihad* and *taqlid* are out of question under all circumstances. On the contrary, the general evidence should be known for the second part. In addition, any special evidence, if it exists, should be known. No one has the authority to conclude that "This is *halal* according to the religion of Islam" or "This is *haram*" if it is not based on evidence. All the issues in these two groups are purely religious ones (Rida, 1367 AH, pp. 126–129).

These fields that concern religion – or, put more correctly, that constitute the essence of religion – need to be subjected to *nass* rulings. The mind alone can neither know the procedure nor the *furu'* (substantive law) for these rulings. Reason can only understand the benefit and worldly advantage of a ruling that allows one to become closer to God. As for the advantages of *akhirah*, Allah knows these. Topics such as faith in *al-ghaib*, and the amount and time of acts of worship[7] are learned as a whole from the *Shari'* [Law-Maker, Allah], and reason cannot modify these whatsoever (Rida, 1367 AH, p. 111). As these do not change with time, *qiyas* [comparison of Qur'an and hadiths for the injunction of rulings] or *ray* [propositions which *Hanafi*s call *istihsan*] cannot be valid in the field of faith or acts of worship (Rida, 1947, Vol. 7, p. 198, 1367 AH, p. 48). This is because these fields are not open to addition or subtraction. Anyone who tends to add or subtract from these subjects has replaced the religion of Islam with another religion (Rida, 1947, Vol. 7, p. 198, 1367 AH, p. 53).

According to Rida, rulings apart from the religious ones constitute the area of *muamalat*. Two main points are found that render this field different from the others. First, the number of rulings included in *muamalat* is quite high. Second, limiting the *juziyat* [particulars] of this field to general and all-time valid rules is impossible due to factors such as time and space, customs and circumstances, and strengths and weaknesses (Rida, 1367 AH, pp. 128–129). The *Shari'* pledged certain principles in this area and left their application to people. The necessity of rulings being just, rights being equal, and oppression, hostility, and extravagance being *haram* (Rida, 1367 AH, p. 53), as well as preventing harm, appealing for benefit, and choosing the lesser evil when one has to choose from two conflicting harmful acts constitute this field of *muamalat* (Rida, 1367 AH, pp. 111–112).[8] This field is open to the *ijtihad* from scholars and administrators, who are called the *ulu al-amr*, because after Allah pledged the principle of *shura*, He transmitted the particulars of ruling in this field to the *ulu al-amr* (Rida, 1367 AH, pp. 53, 112). In this field, people are expected to imitate and be subject to *ulu al-amr* (Rida, 1367 AH, p. 129).[9]

Rashid Rida deemed a different procedure to be followed in *ijtihad*, stating the classical *fiqh* method to not require strictness. *Shariah* constitutes the basis of the particular rulings for this section and has pledged the general rules that can be applied if necessary. These general principles will guide the mind (Rida, 1367 AH, p. 111). The *ulu al-amr*, who should be competent in knowledge and justice in terms of *shariah*, will pledge the most appropriate rulings for the

ummah congruently with the conditions of the time using *mushawara* (consultancy). Indeed, the companions of the Prophet Muhammad were exemplary on this issue and set forth that *ray* and *ijtihad* should be used in this field. The fact that the Prophet Muhammad approved Muaz b. Jebel's utterance that he would make rulings with his own *ray* and *ijtihad* on issues where no *nass* rulings exist affirms this statement (Rida, 1367 AH, p. 53).

Rashid Rida expanded the scope of the *muamalat* rulings to include some of the *halal* and *haram*. In addition, Rashid Rida clarified certain issues that had previously remained implicit. Accordingly, worldly rulings that are composed over *halal-haram* issues and those related to politics, *qada* [court judgment], and morals are divided into five parts in terms of the evidence from which they are obtained:

1 The first section has subjects about which a definite *nass* exists, as well as a general proposition of *shariah*. Here, one should act according to the already current *nass*, provided no contradiction exists and the more specific *nass* or a general one in terms of its topic. If contradictions do exist, one abandons this *nass* and applies the general principle or the specific *nass*. As a matter of fact, this was the case in certain matters where Caliph Umar had performed *ijtihad*.
2 The second part contains rulings based on definite *nass*, *nass* by deduction, and *nass* signified by the obvious character of the concept. Rulings also exist that the first-generation Muslims had agreed upon and deemed essential. Conditions for applying this section are the same as those for the first section.
3 Both the companions and *fiqh* experts are in dispute about what to do if an indefinite proposition occurs with a *nass* or non-*sahih* hadith. These include some rulings on cleanliness and filthiness. Here, the question is raised: "Should each authority make *ijtihad* on his/her own, but not defame those who oppose?" However, the rulings in this field have a different aspect. If the provision has been obtained from the Qur'an and Sunnah, imams have conducted *ijtihad* in this direction, and one concludes that this provision is within the religion finding evidence from the Qur'an and Sunnah, one can act in accordance with it. However, if an issue related to public affairs exists, such as worldly matters and political affairs, the *ulu al-amr* must correct the hearsay information through *mushawara* and determine the evidence for the provision. Thus, if the issue can be included in the two issues mentioned previously, do so; if this is not possible, no provision is considered to exist about the matter.
4 This situation is where things included in the Qur'an or Sunnah are not about a proposition, but point to customs. For example, the hadiths related to eating, drinking, and medicine are such cases. The most appropriate thing for Muslims to do is to act in accordance with them unless an impediment exists or it contradicts a general interest.
5 On the topics for which the *shariah* is silent, the subjects of Allah have absolute liberty, and no one has the right to force anyone to do or abandon anything without their consent (Rida, 1947, Vol. 7, pp. 198–201).

One issue exists that has been left partially implicit in the statements made so far. What will be the attitude about the rulings expressed as worldly by this classification but appear in the Qur'an and Sunnah? This issue, determined by the first of the five items in the preceding list, remains highly ambiguous. On one hand, Rida considers as heresy the view that deems religion to be merely composed of acts of worship, and the political, social, and civil rulings in the Qur'an and Sunnah to not be binding (Rida, 1930, p. 689); on the other hand, he posits that a certain *nass* could be abandoned if this required by another more specific or more general *nass*.

According to Rida, the companions made rulings in the field of *muamalat* as required by *maslaha* at the expense of being contrary to the Sunnah of the Prophet (Rida, 1367 AH, p. 114). With this practice, the companions virtually stated not particulars or *furu'* but *maslaha* to be the fundamental principle (Rida, 1367 AH, pp. 53–54).[10] In this field, which covers the subjects of *uqûbât* [criminal law], *hudud* [punishments sanctioned by Qur'an and Sunnah], civil conduct, and worldly matters,[11] Imam Mâlik and many other *fiqh* experts have adopted a similar path. Moreover, the practice *Hanafi*s call *istihsan* can be regarded as the reflection of a reasoning similar to the *usul* (Rida, 1367 AH, p. 54). Accordingly, the specification and determination of worldly rulings and the right to apply them according to the needs of the time shall belong to the class of ulama and the rulers (*ulu al-amr*). However, the *ulu al-amr* are not equipped with absolute authority, and obedience to them is not absolute. As stated by the Prophet, a subject should not be obeyed for an issue when *ma'siyah* (disobedience to something violating Allah's commands) is required (Rida, 1947, Vol. 7, p. 201).[12] The field of *muamalat* is covered by the field of religion, and what the religion demands from the people who pass ruling in this field is to adhere to *haqq* (truth) and realize justice. A ruler who finds *haqq* and justice in this field means the ruler has found ruling that pleases Allah. The decisive expression here is the sentence, "Wherever justice is found, God's ruling is there."[13] This is indicated by the fact that Allah ordered people to rule with justice and gave them *mizan* as a criterion. The *mizan* of Allah is composed of the general principles mentioned previously. Justice is the way to reach and protect the *haqq*. The aim is justice itself; the roads leading to justice may change with respect to time, place, and conditions, but justice is permanent (Rida, 1367 AH, pp. 117–118).

According to Rida, Islam has determined certain universal principles in the field of *muamalat*, most essential being the realization of justice in human relations. Another principle is that religion protects the people's *maslaha*. In other words, according to Rida, the criteria that determine the field of *muamalat*, the widest area of *fiqh*, are composed of the abstract concepts collected under the title of "general *nass*" within a quite superordinate framework. As a natural consequence, this field is opened to an activity that completely belongs to the human realm – so much so that even the *nass* related to this field are not regarded as indispensable criteria for ensuring justice, and *ulu al-amr* are presented as the only judges of this field (Rida, 1947, Vol. 5, pp. 188, 198–199).[14]

An insider criticism of Islamic political thought: Alī Abd al-Rāziq's critics and reactions toward him

Despite these new legal proposals, Rashid Rida adhered to the idea of the caliphate and advocated its continuity, albeit in a modern form. Alī Abd al-Rāziq was one of the top Egyptian thinkers coming from the Al-Afghani-Abduh line and expressed modern radical tendencies in the field of politics. Alī Abd al-Rāziq benefited from conversations with Muhammed Abduh, thanks to his friendship with Abd al-Rāziq's father, and was a student of Abduh for some time during his education at Azhar (Abd al-Rāziq, 1957, pp. 5–7, 13). He went to England to study economics at Oxford University and upon the start of World War I; he returned to Egypt in 1915 and was appointed as a *qadi* (judge) to the Mansûre Sharia Court. After the accusations against him for his book *al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm* (Abd al-Rāziq, 2012), which he wrote in 1925 discussing the nature of the caliphate, he was removed from the ulama category of Azhar and his post as judge ended in September of the same year.[15] When his brother Mustafa Abd al-Rāziq became the sheikh of Azhar in 1945, his title as scholar was returned.[16]

A "liberal" commentary on the relationship between Islam and politics or a "scholar" against the caliphate

Abd al-Rāziq is best known for his ideas about the nature of political authority in Islam that he presented in his book *al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm*. In this book, which he wrote a year after the abolition of the caliphate in Turkey, at a time when a congress was being organized under the auspices of the King of Fuad in Egypt, he claimed that Islam does not propose state organization or the caliphate, which was deemed a necessity of *shariah* in the classical literature, and state organization to have no religious or reason-based foundation.

al-Rāziq stated being inclined to investigate the history of the Islamic judiciary upon his appointment as a *qadi* in 1915, and that he had started studying this issue with the subject of governance in Islam as the judiciary was seen as a basic element of the Islamic government. For this reason, the work emerged as the first stage of a comprehensive project on the history of Islamic judicial law. Adopting a liberal-secular perspective, the book consists of three main chapters, each consisting of three subsections.[17] According to Alī Abd al-Rāziq, Islam does not prescribe any regulation in the field of politics. His main objection to the classical perception was that the caliphate had been put forth as the only type of *shariah* management in the literature so far. Alī Abd al-Rāziq's evaluations on the caliphate revolved around the characterization of caliph as an authoritarian and absolute ruler. Especially after the 5th Hijri (11th century AD), a superhuman position of caliphs was founded on the fact that the ulama had attributed this position to maliks and sultans, and caliphate was accepted as a superior position, taking its source from Allah. However, no *sahih* evidence about the necessity of the caliphate exists in the form of verses, hadiths, or *ijma*. Alī Abd al-Rāziq talked about the concept of caliphate in association with the concepts of tyranny and oppression, and further claimed the caliphate to continue to be a source of disaster, evil, and mischief for Islam and Muslims. Among the points put forward by those who had advocated the necessity of the caliphate, the position of the Prophet plays a central part. However, the absence of the basic elements of the state such as budget, *divan* [assembly] records, and the principles of the political system during the prophethood shows that he did not have an authority similar to the authority of maliks and sultans over their subjects. The fact that the authority of the prophethood in the *ummah* is related to the spirituality and the faith of the heart differs it from political authority that is based on the obedience of subjects. Authority based on finding and acting according to the true path and guidance has a religious character and belongs to Allah, whereas the authority shaped to provide general benefits to the populace with the aim of developing the earth is worldly. This area belongs entirely to the human realm. The evidence for the concepts of the messenger from the Qur'an and Sunnah and of reason shows the authority the Prophet had over the believers is the authority of the messenger, not a political authority (Kavak, 2016, pp. 74–77).

The Prophet, who had not made a reference to the Islamic state throughout his life, did not leave a caliph after himself. The later claims of the Shiites that Ali and those of some Sunnis that Abu Bakr was appointed caliph are unfounded. The idea that the caliphate has been a religious authority throughout history does not make sense beyond being a discourse used by kings to consolidate their positions and to ensure the people's absolute obedience. Allah granted people freedom to regulate worldly affairs. The work ends with a call to all Muslims to abandon the outdated caliphate order and to re-establish the principles that their states will bear on the basis of the most modern forms of administration that the human mind has put forward. Direct references to books on *kalam* [Islamic theology] and *fiqh* that deal with the issue of caliphate are almost non-existent. From time to time, references are also made to representatives of Western

political thought (Kavak, 2016, 74–77; e.g., Locke and Hobbes, as cited in Abd al-Rāziq, 2012, p. 22).

Criticism of the criticism: refutations of Alī Abd al-Rāziq, or the caliphate crisis in contemporary Egypt

One one hand, while *al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm* gave the impression of being the product of a project spread over many years (Abd al-Rāziq, [1443 AH] 2012, p. 38), it appears on the other hand to have been written hastily as a response to the existing conditions and to have left deficiencies to be corrected later (Abd al-Rāziq, [1443 AH] 2012, p. 4). These claims completely rejecting a respected institution that had existed throughout the history of Islam caused great repercussions, especially in Egypt, as they were put forward by a scholar of Azhar; the claims were rejected by the circles representing the Islamist community. The Azhar administration opened an investigation and found Alī Abd al-Rāziq guilty, revoking his title of scholar on the basis of presenting the Islamic *shariah* as a spiritual religion not relevant to worldly affairs (Kavak, 2016).

Important figures of the time who wrote similar refutations of the book include Muhammad Khidir Hussain, Mamduh Haqqi, Mustafa Sabri Efendi, Muhammad Mahid al-Mutii, Muhammad al-Tahir Ibn Ashur, Abd al-Rāziq Ahmad al-Sanhûrî, Muhammad Diya al-Din al-Rayyis (1976), and Muhammad Imara (1989). On the contrary, representatives of the liberal-secular view such as Taha Hussein, Muhammad Hussain Haykal, and Ahmad Amin supported Alī Abd al-Rāziq. Ömer Rıza Doğrul translated the book into Turkish. He considered it to be a product of the Turkish revolution, thus falling int the latter liberal-secular category (Kavak, 2016).

One of the main criticisms of the book is about the problems it contains in terms of *usul al-fiqh*, most importantly its rejection of the *ijma* evidence supporting the need for a caliphate. Likewise, al-Rāziq tried to interpret the perception of the classical literature through Ibn Khaldûn while ignoring the literature on *kalam* and *fiqh*; he perceived unidimensional historical events by being selective in the examples he quoted from the history of Islam by highlighting negative events such as Yazîd's shedding blood from the *Ahl al-Bayt* [the family of the Prophet] and tried to interpret religious *nass* in accordance with the modern perceptions of his time using the influence of the discourse on returning to sources. In certain criticisms, he is emphasized to have decontextualized quoted texts, highlighted the current liberal movement against King Fuad in the current political discussions, and written his piece to support a political model similar to the Republic of Turkey. Rashid Rida, on the other hand, claimed the book to be the product of a project supported by Protestants. He made this claim based on the fact that the book had been distributed freely in Egypt (Rida, 1926, pp. 101–102).

The work, which can also be seen as an attempt to apply Western political experience to the history of Islam, places Alī Abd al-Rāziq with his Azhar identity among the representatives of the liberal-secular movement in the debate of Islam and secularism. On the other hand, according to the information that Muhammad Imara conveyed from Abdurraziq's elder son Muhammad, the author had started to write a new book to replace this book at the end of his life, but died before he could complete this work, of which he had written the first three pages that also were lost (Imara, 1989, p. 27).

Conclusion and discussion

The claim that "the West is advancing, the Muslims are lagging behind," which became the dominant image of the period, was internalized by intellectuals and government officials and

in turn led them to new pursuits of rectifying certain issues facing the Muslim world. These pursuits ultimately brought up evaluations that eventually led to opening politics as a way out of stagnation, resulting in the ulama being pushed into the background. The stagnation of the Islamic world was attributed to the conception of law/religion being represented by the agencies of religious schools and the oppression-based politics by the agencies of caliphs/sultans.

The fanaticism of schools and *taqlid* had caused the dissolution of the Islamic union, conflicts within the *ummah*, and ultimately the Islamic world's loss and lagging behind the West. Therefore, a new understanding of religion should be built for advancement, and a new methodology is needed that will lead to an authentic Islamic life that frees Muslims from conflict. This methodology is based on the concepts of *islah/tajdid* and separates the rulings of Islam into two: solely religious and solely worldly. The field of religious rulings, which is composed of issues related to faith and certain things that are *halal* and *haram*, is an area closed to *ijtihad* and *taqlid*. Muslims should adopt the rulings on these issues from basic religious sources as they are. Mostly covering the field of *muamalat*, worldly rulings constitute the area where *ijtihad* activities can be carried out. In this field, which is open to change and interpretation, the rulings that the entire *ummah* should be subjected to are determined according to the criteria of *maslaha*, *haqq*, and justice, and is called general *nass*.

What emanates as the institutional outcomes of these pursuits that had undermined the privileged position of the *ulama* in the classical period are caliphs' loss of authority in politics, modern state structure inspired by the quest for democracy, schooling and quests for new curriculums in education, legislation movements in law, legitimization of the new economic system with the approval of interest in the economy, rejection of miracles to a large extent with various interpretations from the perspective of science, and surrender to a positivist understanding. Modern schools supporting or opposing *madrasah*s in particular pave the way for bureaucrats and civil servants to replace the *'alim* [scholar] prototype. This change, established in opposition to ulama in the modern period, resulted in weakening religion's validity, area of influence, and perhaps its complete loss. The discourse against the ulama, which started with the criticism of *usul al-fiqh*, was further reinforced through various instruments. This understanding has been largely established using slogan-like expressions: "There is no clergy in Islam," "Islam is the religion of reason," "Islam is the religion of equality," and "*Taqlid* and fanaticism for religious schools is bad."[18] However, the nature of the connection between religion and life constitutes an ancient problematic area with a history spanning centuries. The level of overlap between the revealed religion and the religion that people apply to their lives continues to be relevant as a subject open to developments that can be handled within various Islamic disciplines. However, the intellectual experience of the West is ignored, whose accumulation was inherited within the framework of the assumptions discussed previously. This attitude, which was seen in many intellectuals during the time of Rashid Rida, contains important problems. The religious-worldly distinction reached as a product of reform movements affected by scientific and economic changes in the West had manifested as the public/private distinction in political thought. Imprisoned in the private area in this distinction, the evaluation of religion within the limits of religious rulings in Rashid Rida's thought is a concrete manifestation of the aforementioned influence of the West. The value-independent feature of the public sphere in Western political thought and the acceptance of its arrangement with a consensus-based mechanism that enables people to live together had brought along the parliamentary system. This is the result of a process that started with Machiavelli in Western thought and continued with pro-social-contract and pro-parliamentary system philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Montesquieu. Autonomous individuals are at the core of Western democracy. This individual is constantly in conflict with the state and tries to open up a space for self-freedom.

Rashid Rida's advocation of democracy similarly manifested in the form of anti-oppressionism. In this respect, Rida had opened a door for a common point with Alī Abd al-Rāziq, whom he criticized, especially on the issue of caliphate. However, considering the absence of the Western idea of the sinful/bad person in Islam, deconstructing Islamic concepts and reconstructing them as counterparts to concepts found in Western thought and culture and regarding this as a simple transfer mechanism without sufficiently evaluating the causes and consequences of the progress, change, and transformation in the West are attempts "doomed to fail" in the best-case scenario. This is because this approach ignores the fact that religion has been replaced by the state in the equation among religion, people, and society in the Western experience, and the mechanism has been structured accordingly.

Notes

1 For introductory information about this magazine, which is one of the concrete emanations of the movements against the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, see Görgün (2012).

2 Muhammad Abduh made the following evaluation of his relationship with Rashid Rida in the last moments of his life:

> No one among you is like him or on a level as to replace him. . . . Allah sent this young person to help me in my life and to extend my life. I held many things I wanted to say and write to the Ummah in myself. My busyness prevented me from doing this. He is now declaring all this as I believe and want. When I ask him to write on a subject, he writes as I want, he says what I want to say. He explains a topic that I have outlined to him in an elaborate way that pleases my heart. He finishes what I started. . . . I did nothing for him. He did everything for me. He did [for me] what people whom I trained, taught something, and devoted my life to haven't done.(Rida, 1931, Vol. 1, p. 1018)

3 For an evaluation of classical and modern *tajdid* perspectives, see Kavak (2009, pp. 157–172).

4 Karaman writes:

> al-Afghani's ideological influence in Egypt has developed in different directions, as in Turkey. His most important student, friend and assistant, Muhammad Abduh was a mid-way reformer; Rashid Rida had fundamentalist tendencies; and those like Qasım Amin, Ali Abd al-Rāziq and Lutfi Sayyid followed a more secular and liberal path. Saad Zaglul, the founder of the Wafd Party and the leader of the war of Egyptians on the path of national independence, was among his students and friends. al-Afghani tried to realize his goals such as overthrowing Khedive Ismail Pasha, and awakening the people of Egypt in the face of oppression and colonialism by means of using the masonic lodges of which he was a member, president or founder, and using the community of Tanzîm al-hizb al-vatanî of which he was a pioneer. al-Afghani had an important contribution to the movement which strengthened against the British and French interventions to reach its peak with the mutiny of Urâbî Pasha. In this period, al-Afghani, among other agents, had an impact on the development of journalism in Egypt. As a result of these incentives, Salim al-Naqqash and Adib Ishaq published the newspapers named *Misr and al-Tijarah*, Salim Anjuri the newspaper *Mir'at al-Sharq*, and Adib Ishaq the newspaper *Misr al-Fatat*.(Karaman, 1994, p. 463)

5 For the subject of returning to sources as an essential part of Rashid Rida's project on *islah*, see Rida (1367 AH, pp. 56–57).

6 Rashid Rida gives the principles similar to those listed here in various issues of *Al-Manar*, especially in the exegesis section. There is no significant difference between these principles and those mentioned above, except for nuances (see Rida, 1926, pp. 497–499).

7 In these topics contained in religion, he also included the subjects that are described in certain writings as *sheair*s (see Rida, 1904a, p. 243).

8 In another place, Rida proposes that the verses revealed in this field correspond to one-tenth of the verses on ruling (see Rida, 1367 AH, p. 211).

9 There is an important issue here that reveals Rashid Rida's view on the *taqlid* issue. Rashid Riza constantly opposed almost all kinds of *taqlid*. One understands from this expression of Rashid Rida that he

had distinguished the field of *taqlid*. The need to imitate the *ulu-l emr* here is explained by the fact that their ruling has the value of *ijma*.

10 Rashid Rida thought that some of Caliph Umer's *ijtihads* in particular reveal this. In this context, he goes to the point of supporting his own opinion by discussing the issue of triple-divorce in an assembly. Likewise, he mentions the rulings of the Companions and the *fiqh* experts within this framework, such as changing rulings about *muta* marriage [temporary marriage], abolishing the application of *hudud*, permitting interest under certain conditions. and all corrupt contracts in *dar al-harb* [non-Muslim territories not in peace with Muslim countries] (see Rida, 1904a, pp. 579–580; Rida, 1367 AH, p. 114).

11 Rashid Rida covered three topics under the title "The Rulings Concerning the World" in his previously mentioned fatwa, (see Rida, 1904b, p. 579).

12 For the Hadith, see Bukharî, "Ahkam," 4 & "Meghazi," 59; Muslim, "Imarat," 39.

13 Rashid Rida holds the opinion that the distinction of worldly-religious rulings by the *fiqh* experts, the Prophet Muhammad's evidence-based decision when judging the cases brought to him, and his statement that nobody should violate the right of his Muslim brother by cheating in evidence demonstrate the realization of justice in the field of *muamalat* (Rida, 1367 AH, p. 117).

14 For an analysis of the operations of *ulu al-amr* in this field, and the fatwa given through Rida's ruling classification, see Kavak (2011, pp. 264–336).

15 For the official records regarding the court procedure of Ali Abd al-Rāziq see İmâre (1989, pp. 86–151).

16 He later had been to England and North Africa for a while. He started his active political life by joining Hizb ahrâr el-dustûrî. He wrote articles in the party's editorial, *al-Siyâsah*. He was elected congressman to the Egyptian Parliament and then became a senator. He served as the Minister of *Awqaf* [charity foundations] under the government of İbrahim Hadi Pasha (1948–1949). In 1948, he was elected a member of Mejma al-lugat a'l-Arabiyyah in Cairo. He taught literary history at the American University. He gave serial conferences at Cairo University Faculty of Law. He wrote many articles in weekly and monthly publications. He died in Cairo on September 23, 1966 (see Kavak, 2016).

17 Ömer Rıza (Doğrul) first serialized the book in the newspaper *Vakit* as a summary translation and then translated it into Turkish under the title *İslâmiyet ve Hükümet* [*Islam and Government*] with some subtractions (İstanbul, 1346 AH/1927). Abd alfilâlî Ansârî (Abdou Filali-Ansary) (*l'Islam et les fondements du pouvoir*, Paris 1995), and Léon Bercher ("*l'Islam et les bases du pouvoir par ʿAlī ʿAbdurrāziq*," REI, VII/3 [1933], pp. 353–391, VIII/2 [1934], pp. 163–222) translated the book into French, Amîr Rizavî to Persian (*İslâm ve Mebânî-yi Ḳudret*, Tehran 1380 AH), and Maryam Loutfi to English (*Islam and the Foundations of Political Power*, Edinburgh, 2012). On the subject, see also Kavak, (2016); Hourani, (1983, pp. 183–192); Inâyet, (1991, pp. 202–211).

18 For a comprehensive evaluation regarding the topic, see Kara (2001/2, pp. 5–21).

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7

DIFFERENT FORMS OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT IN MODERN IRAN

Forough Jahanbakhsh

Introduction

The 18th century bore witness to a highly consequential development in Shi'i thought, one that has had important ramifications for Shi'i Islam into the modern era. A vigorous debate had been raging between two groups of Shi'i scholars: the Akhbaris and the Usulis, who challenged each other regarding the necessity of *uṣūl al-fiqh* and *ijtihad*. This debate would shape the subsequent trend of Shi'i jurisprudence, and ultimately defined the role of the *'ulama* as *mujtahids* in the Shi'i tradition. The Akhbaris, under the influence of Mulla Muhammad Amin Astarabadi (d. 1624), who had strengthened their popularity and influence under the Safavids, rejected the importance of *ijtihad*. They contended the only true and necessary sources of Shi'i jurisprudence to be the Qur'an, the prophetic *Hadīth*, and the *Rivayaat* (narratives) of the Imams. The Akhbaris emphasized the sufficiency of the Imams' narratives, holding that believers could directly adhere to these in matters of religion. Thus, they held that no need existed for *ijtihad*, the systematic effort at deducing laws of the *Shari'ah* from the sources. On the other hand, the Usulis argued that, in the absence of the Twelfth Imam as the ultimate religious authority, scholars should engage in *ijtihad*. Therefore, *ijma'* (i.e., the consensus of the *'ulama*) and *'aql* (i.e., human intellect) should be added to the sources of the *Shari'ah*. The *'ulama* who would exercise the methodic *ijtihad* were called *mujtahids*, and in the absence of the last Imam, they would be considered sources of reference and authority on religious matters for lay people to follow.

This complex and prolonged scholarly debate, which indeed had its beginnings long before the 18th century, was eventually settled by the rise of a very influential Usuli *mujtahid*, Agha Muhammad Baqir Bihbahani (d.1790), who vehemently rejected the Akhbari position in his writings and teaching circles. Following the rise of the Usuli School and its *mujtahids* to prominence, a centralized position for the supreme and most learned *mujtahids* was established; they became known as the *marja'-i taqlid* (i.e., the source of emulation). Establishing the *marja'-i taqlid* as the highest authority in the Shi'i religious hierarchy necessitated that ordinary Shi'ites practice *taqlid*; namely, they were mandated to adhere to the legal opinions of their *marja*, who was usually chosen from among only a few publicly recognized knowledgeable jurists. The *marja*'s fatwas would have a binding effect on their followers. This doctrine was further developed and consolidated by Shaykh Murtada Ansari (d. 1864), Shaykh Muhammad Hasan Najafi Isfahani (d. 1849), and Mirza Hasan Shirazi (d. 1896) (Kazemi Moussavi, 1996, pp. 35–37, 185–217).

By the middle of the 19th century, a student of Bihbahani, Mulla Ahmad Naraqi (d. 1830), had developed a thesis stating the institution of the *marja'* to be able to assume the Hidden Imam's authority in its fullest sense. The impact of this idea went beyond the formerly juridical scope of the *marja'*, and expanded their authoritative mandate into socio-political matters as well. In this way, the Shi'i *'ulama*, who had traditionally been apolitical figures awaiting the return of the Twelfth Imam, began to intervene in the community's socio-political affairs whenever their authority was felt able to serve the cause of justice and benefit the Shi'ites. A famous instance of such an intervention is Mirza Hasan Shirazi's 1891 anti-tobacco fatwa, which declared the consumption, purchase, and sale of tobacco to be *haram* [a religiously forbidden and sinful act]. This fatwa proved to be a devastating blow to the power of the Qajar king, Nasir al-Din Shah (d. 1896), who had granted an exclusive concession to a foreign company to the disadvantage of Iranian peasants and merchants. Following Shirazi's fatwa, widespread protests forced the government to nullify this concession. This event emphasized the significance of the *'ulama*'s position as one to whom the public would turn with the expectation of support against tyrannical and corrupt Qajar rulers.

Shi'ism and constitutionalism

During the uprisings against the Qajar's oppression, the supreme *marja*, who were then living in the Shi'ite centers of Iraq, lent their support to the public demands for a constitution and the establishment of a *majlis* (an elected parliament) and judicial system that were independent from the king and his appointed officials. While the educated elite, intelligentsia, and journalists had been responsible for promulgating the idea of constitutionalism, the support of the *'ulama* at different stages in the movement proved crucial for empowering public morale and helped mobilize the people in establishing a "just" order. Many *marja's*, such as Akhound Khorasani (d. 1911) and Ayatollahs Mazandarani (d. 1911), supported religious leaders of the movement inside Iran. Namely, figures such as Muhammad Tabatabai and Abdullah Behbahani coordinated the people against a tyrant king whom they considered an illegitimate usurper of the rule of the Imam. The *marja's* did not eschew words in lending religious legitimacy to full-fledged public uprising against the ruler, something unprecedented in Shi'ite political theory during the absence of the Last Imam. They *declared* a *fatwa* that supporting and working toward establishing a constitutional regime is equivalent to participate in a *jihad* led by the Hidden Imam, the most meritorious act in Shi'ite theology. And that any opposition to constitutionalism would be equivalent to rebellion and fighting against the Imam (Hairi, 1977, p. 2).

The *'ulama*'s unequivocal support and leadership were vital in reviving the constitutional movement and paved the way for its eventual success in 1911. However, they did not necessarily have the chance to evaluate the implications of constitutional rule through elected representatives with regard to the *Shari'ah*, nor did they consider the role of the *'ulama* in such a system.[1] However, the most comprehensive and scholarly religious defense of constitutionalism had come from a high-ranking *mujtahid*, Mirza Muhammad Hussain Na'ini (d. 1936). In 1909, Na'ini wrote *Tanbih al-Ummah wa Tanzih al-Millah* [*The Admonition and Refinement of the People*] in order to reconcile Shi'i political theory with notions of constitutionalism. The former considers all worldly leaders to be usurpers of the Imam's right to govern. Na'ini uses both rational and religious arguments to refute despotism, invoking *hadīth* as well as Sunna and the Qur'anic teachings regarding *shura* [consultative councils] as being the proper way of running affairs as mandated by God to the Prophet and the believers. Na'ini follows the logic that, because Islam

is against absolute obedience to worldly rulers and considers this a kind of idolatry and cause of injustice, establishing a system of checks and balances to limit the absolute autocracy of the king would be rationally defendable during the absence of the infallible Imam. Thus, although a constitutional monarchy technically still usurps the Imam's right, at least it does not usurp the people's right to justice and freedom.

A religious protest against constitutionalism

Na'ini's book seems motivated by contemporaneous religious upheaval among the constitutionalists who were headed by figures such as Shaykh Fazlullah Nuri, who had initially supported the constitutional movement before turning against it. Nuri and like-minded others found the written constitution and some legislation passed by the first parliament to be against *Shari'ah* and Islam, e.g., the legal equality of all citizens regardless of gender and religion, freedom of press, which would not allow for the *'ulama*'s supervision. After long resistance by the secular nationalist faction, Nuri eventually succeeded in having the Second Amendment ratified in parliament. A committee of five *mujtahids* were to be given final say over the ratifications of laws, ensuring their compatibility with the *Shari'ah*.

The interim period of 1907–1909, when Mohammad Ali Shah annulled the parliament and restored his despotic rule, was the nadir of Iran's contemporary history for many reasons. The national unity that had propelled the constitutional movement fractionated into secular and religious factionalism, along with a resurgence of anti-constitutionalism. The secular faction wanted unconditional constitutionalism (*Mashruteh*), which would pave the way toward secular modernization. The religious faction, led by Shaykh Fazullah Nuri, demanded what he called *Mashruteh-i Mashru'ah* (religious constitutionalism) based on traditional *Shari'ah* laws, which would preserve the *'ulama*'s exclusive rights over the educational, judicial, and endowment systems. The fragmentation among religious supporters of the movement caused great confusion and disillusionment among the public. *Marja's* in Iraq issued fatwas condemning Nuri, who had joined Muhammad Ali Shah and wreaked havoc by propagating that the entire constitutionalist effort was a conspiracy against Islam. Nuri was eventually charged with treason and publicly hanged by nationalists in 1909 in Tehran. The Nuri episode caused disillusionment, not just among the masses, but also among the religious elite. Many activist clergy withdrew from politics, preferring to return to their seminaries. The influence of the secular faction and its almost uncontested political leadership subsequently increased. The Second Amendment to the constitution was never actualized because the committee of five *mujtahid*s never took shape in parliament. From among the nominated clergy, only Sayyed Hasan Mudarris (d. 1937) joined the parliament and remained an elected member for the next five terms. Unlike Nuri, Mudarris did not want an Islamic government and was very supportive of modernizing policies such as public schooling and mandatory conscription into a central national army. However, he held an uncompromising anti-dictatorial position, which eventually cost him his life in the political struggle against the first Pahlavi monarch, Reza Shah.

Naini's book, a gem among religious defenses of modern constitutional political systems, gradually fell into abeyance. Nevertheless, it remained a source of inspiration for later generations who would stand against oppressive regimes. It resurfaced during the 1960s thanks to the release of a new edition by Ayatollah S. Mahmoud Taliqani, who saw its merit as a religious discourse in defense of democracy and against the tyranny of the Second Pahlavi, Muhammad Reza Shah. Na'ini's refutation of religious despotism in the book has also been quoted in post-Revolutionary theocratic Iran.

Shi'ism in 20th-century Iran

Following the secularists' rise to dominance and the establishment of the Pahlavi Dynasty by Reza Shah in 1925, religion almost disappeared from the Iranian government. This was in part due to the clergy's disenchantment with politics in the aftermath of the constitutional movement; a more significant factor, however, was the influence of Reza Shah's plans for modernization. In the wake of these waves of change, the legacy of religious actors on the Iranian political landscape shrank down to just two names: the reformist *mujtahid* Shari'at Sangelaji and the ill-fated political opponent of Reza Shah in Parliament, Sayyed Hasan Mudarris.

Mirza Reza Quli Shari'at Sangelaji (1891–1944) became renowned not for his political arguments but rather for his progressive modernist ideas. Although he himself was a *mujtahid*, Sangelaji criticized the religious establishment and the prevalent forms of Shi'i religiosity. He sought to purify the Shi'is of what he viewed as superstitious beliefs and practices. In particular, he targeted the practices of *taqlid* which perpetuated the dominance of the *'ulama* over ordinary people. Sangelaji condemned certain popular practices such as visiting the tombs of saints, the belief in intercession, and the self-flagellations that occurred on Ashura as in commemorating the martyrdom of Imam Hussein. He questioned the authenticity of many of the hadiths and *rivayaat* attributed to Shi'i Imams. Sangelaji believed that true Islam should be based only on the Qur'an, holding that every individual should engage with the text for oneself. Sangelaji's puritanical views were met with fierce criticism from the orthodoxy, to the point where clerics accused him of being an anti-Shi'i Wahhabi.[2] Sangelaji's significance and legacy lies in the fact that, unlike others, his ideas were not political, rather aiming to reform Shi'i religiosity and reconciling it with rationality; though not without political implications, during a time when society was marching fast toward modernization.

Amidst these stirrings of religious transformation during Reza Shah's reign, one of the most important religious developments benefiting the Shi'i orthodoxy also occurred: the establishment of the Shi'i seminary in Qum by Ayatollah Borujerdi (d. 1961). Borujerdi, who was politically aloof, devoted his time and resources to the creation of a vibrant religious educational center in Iran, which gradually came to rival and even surpass the significance of the authoritative Shi'i seminaries in Iraq. Borujerdi's political pacifism, combined with Reza Shah's top-down secular modernization, brought about a complete institutional differentiation of the sacred and profane in Iran. The last blows of secularization to the power and influence of the Shi'i *'ulama* were the introduction of modern state-run public schools, a Western-style court system, and the nationalization of religious endowments. These steps toward modernization severely curtailed the traditional prerogatives of the *'ulama*, namely their educational, judicial, and financial sources of influence.

During the first half of the 20th century, Iran had also been heavily influenced by exposure to the hegemonies of Western ideas. The most significant of these was the intellectual challenge posed by the dichotomy of Western liberalism as espoused by the state, and socialism and communism as championed by its opponents. The rivalry between these competing ideologies intensified during the era of the Cold War, as Iran under the leadership of the second Pahlavi king, Muhammad Reza Shah, became the stronghold for the U.S. presence in the Middle East. Under these circumstances, the vanguard critique of Iran's rapid Westernization and increasing dependency on the United States came mostly from Marxist socialist intelligentsia who propagated anti-capitalism, anti-liberalism, and anti-imperialism ideologies in universities and workers' unions where they could easily recruit members. Religious discourse became the territory of traditionalist *'ulama*, whose main constituents were bazaar merchants and the working-class

masses; youth and the educated classes were socially and intellectually engaged with either Western liberalism or the counter-trend of communism.

Within this milieu is when a new trend in religious thought emerged: religious modernism. Contrary to pacifist traditionalism, religious modernism expressed itself in terms that were relevant to the social and political problems of that time. Its most immediate momentum came after the CIA-engineered military coup d'état in 1953, which toppled the democratically elected nationalist Prime Minister Muhammad Musaddiq and gave political power to Iran's monarch.[3]

Religious modernism in the making

The early 1960s witnessed a number of powerful political assertions made by religious forces that heralded the return of Islam to the public sphere in then-secularized Iran. In 1961, three men founded Iran's first religious-nationalist political party, the Freedom Movement of Iran (FMI), and declared its commitment to religion, modernization, and progress. Mehdi Bazargan (d. 1995), a religiously committed engineering professor educated in France who had been politically active in the National Front party under Musaddiq, along with his colleague, Yadullah Sahabi, and a like-minded clergyman, Sayyed Mahmoud Taliqani, created the party based on four fundamental principles geared toward distinguishing itself from secular nationalists and Marxist groups. The party's manifesto described its members as being Muslim, Iranian, constitutionalist, and Musaddiqist. The first principle emphasized Islamic identity; the second one indicated devotion to nationalism; and the last two rejected autocracy and demanded democratic rule under the Iranian constitution (Jahanbakhsh, 2001, pp. 91–94).

Another prominent incident, the White Revolution, concerned the Shah's plan for a process of economic and socio-political reform. This plan was met with severe resistance from the religious establishment led by Ayatollah Borujerdi, the sole *marja'* at this time; Borujerdi supposedly threatened the Shah with a public uprising. Borujerdi's main objection was with specific clauses that he found to be anti-Islamic, particularly the Shah's plans for land reform and women's suffrage. Thus, the Shah delayed starting his process until after Borujerdi's death (which happened very shortly after their discord). However, the dispute awakened the political interest of the seminarians in Qum who had thus far been remaining quiet. Qum is from where Ayatollah Rouhullah Khomeini, Borujerdi's disciple and successor as *marja'*, began to disseminate his political criticism of the Shah – in particular, his close relationship with Israel and excessive dependency on the United States. Khomeini eventually led a violent public uprising against the Shah's regime in 1963. The revolt was crushed by the military, and Khomeini was arrested and sent into exile for 15 years in Iraq. However, no call in Iran had yet to occur for the establishment of an Islamic state; the thrust of the movement was purely anti-dictatorial, anti-Westernization, and anti-imperialist.

Nevertheless, politics was not the only item on religious activists' agenda during this time. In light of the ongoing ideological battle between liberalism and communism, religious activists sought to show socio-political activism to not be incompatible with faith, and thus won back for Islam the educated youth who were increasingly attracted to the atheist trends of thought.

Ali Shari'ati and the rise of revolutionary discourse

In 1964, Hoseinieh Irshad, a modern religious educational center, was founded thanks to the efforts of Ayatollah Murtaza Mutahhari, the lawyer Nasir Minachi, and the prominent merchant Muhammad Humayoun, who was also the center's main financial benefactor. The center's programs, lecture hall setting, and indeed almost every aspect of its edifice represented a marked

departure from the traditional centers usually run in mosques and controlled by the orthodox *'ulama*. Soon, Hoseinieh Irshad became the hub of religious modernist activities in Iran. In particular, lecturers such as Bazargan, Mutahhari, Taliqani, and especially Ali Shari'ati regularly drew large enthusiastic audiences.

Ali Shari'ati was a young professor of literature and Islamic history from Mashhad. The son of Muhammad Taqi Shari'ati, Ali was brought up in the intellectual and political milieu of the post-Musaddiq era and was in regular contact with the religious modernists that his father had befriended. He was educated at the Sorbonne in Paris, where he became affiliated with members of the Algerian Freedom Movement who were fighting for independence from France. While at university, he engaged in some sociological, ideological, and post-colonial studies, and was influenced by the writings of authors such as Frantz Fanon (1925–1961). All thses exposed Ali Shari'ati to modern, transnational developments in Islamic thought; the writings of Sayyed Qutb from Egypt and Abul'ala Mawdudi from Pakistan were especially influential, presenting Islam as a comprehensive way of life and a viable alternative to capitalism and communism.

Ali Shari'ati's lectures on the early phases of Islamic history and the stories of its heroes and heroines presented a dynamic vision of Islam. His fire-and-brimstone lectures appealed to the masses through his relatable discussions on Islam while at the same time providing much-needed revolutionary religious rhetoric for the intelligentsia attempting to pursue socio-political justice without invoking alien ideologies. During the 1960s and 1970s, religious modernists produced exactly what the young intelligentsia had been desiring. In Abrahamian's words: "It was a radical layman's religion that disassociated itself from the traditional clergy and associated itself with the secular trinity of social revolution, technological innovation, and cultural self-assertion" (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 473).

Under the ideological spell of the time, liberation movements were sweeping across developing countries. In Iran, the intensifying opposition had begun organizing guerrilla cells and promoting armed resistance. In response, the Shah's regime acted more adamantly to suppress them. Shari'ati and even the mild-mannered Bazargan continued to lecture, emphasizing the necessity of developing a native ideology to help achieve change and revolution. In his 1966 book, *Bi'that va ideolozhi* [Prophetic Mission and Ideology], Bazargan insisted that a strong ideological foundation is indispensable in fueling uprising and achieving national liberation and posited that Islamic ideology, being divine and based on prophetic mission, was more comprehensive and well-suited to supporting constructive changes in Iran than any man-made ideology (Bazargan, 1966, pp. 80–89).

While developing this new Islamic ideology, Shari'ati proposed the concept of Red Shi'ism. Shari'ati's Red Shi'ism, also known as Alavid Shi'ism, referred to the revolutionary, uncompromising Shi'ism of Imam Hussein, the martyr of Karbala who had resisted the unjust rule of the Umayyad Caliph; this was an analogue for Iran's present political regime. In dubbing his interpretation as Red Shi'ism, Shari'ati rejected the quietist, conservative Shi'ism of the *'ulama*. He deemed their traditional orthodoxy to be a historical construct tracing back to the 16th-century Safavid Dynasty, which had declared their interpretation of Shi'ism to be the state religion of Iran. In Shari'ati's view, this Safavid Shi'ism was void of revolutionary truth and zeal and a counterfeit of the original tradition of resistance and activism begun by Imam Ali and his son, Hussein.[4]

The juxtaposition of Safavid Shi'ism and Alavid Shi'ism – one being conservative and reactionary, and the other dynamic and progressive – is well-indicative of the black-and-white, utopian worldview that Shari'ati and his followers were promoting. Subscription to this change-seeking, action-oriented Islamic ideology became the goal of religious freedom fighters. In creating his Islamic ideology, Shari'ati synthesized the Marxist lexicon and categories of thought

with liberationist ideas and Islamic notions of justice, freedom, and equality. He then applied this ideology to Shi'i history – its symbols, heroes, and events – to stir the emotions and the mindset of the Iranian people with enormous success.

This ideological reading of Islam undoubtedly did not find support from the orthodox *'ulama*. Some rejected Shari'ati as a religious innovator, an anti-cleric Wahhabi, or, at best, an agitator. Even Mutahhari and Bazargan, Shari'ati's fellow religious modernists, did not endorse all his ideas and eventually resigned from activities in Hoseinieh Irshad. Many attempts were made to have Ayatollah Khomeini, who still resided in Iraq, publicly denounce Shari'ati, but to no avail: Khomeini remained silent on the matter, offering no condemnation. In order to initially counteract the influence of communist groups, the Shah's secret police tolerated Shari'ati's religious discourse. However, they were quick to arrest and imprison his followers, eventually shutting down the Irshad and banning Shari'ati from lecturing. Ultimately, Shari'ati was imprisoned, along with many other leaders of religious activism including Taliqani, Bazargan, and Montazeri, receiving a fate similar to many of the communist activists. Nevertheless, Islamic ideology paved the way for an unprecedented mobilization of the educated and working-class masses, fostering the national uprising that led to the Iranian Revolution in 1979. While any revolution is fueled by a myriad of factors, Iran's ideological age during the 1960s and 1970s – in addition to its actors' revolutionary interpretation of Shi'ism – played a considerable role in the mass mobilization and unification that turned the Iranian uprising into a reality.

Post-Revolutionary Shi'ism

At every stage of its development, modern Sh'ite thought has been thoroughly intertwined with the evolving Iranian political climate. This pattern remained consistent after the 1979 Revolution following the first-ever establishment of an Islamic Republic in Iran. The political change brought about two distinct developments in Shi'ite thought: the first pertains to the change in the role of the *'ulama* and the religious establishment. The second development relates to a new trend in religious thought that emerged from outside of the establishment and the challenges it posed to the revolutionary and the traditional modes of religious thought.

Revolution and religious establishment

After the Revolution, Iranian Shi'ism was dramatically influenced by the adoption of *vilayat-e faqih* [guardianship of jurist consults], a theocratic reorganization of the country's political system. *Vilayat-e faqih* was based on the blueprints of a juridical theory originally presented by Ayatollah Khomeini in Iraqi seminaries during his exile. The theory involved an innovative development in Shi'ite jurisprudence related to the principle of the guardianship of jurists over minors, the insane, and unprotected women during the absence of the last Imam. Khomeini suggested that the scope of jurists' responsibilities could be exponentially expanded to include guardianship over the entire Shi'ite community. He was inspired by a 19th-century *mujtahid*, Mulla Ahmad Naraqi, who had proposed that during the absence of the Twelfth Imam, *mujtahids* could assume the full responsibilities of the Imam.

After the Revolution and successful referendum for establishing the Islamic Republic, a constitution draft was circulated for ratification among an elected assembly dominated by influential and popular clergy. The assembly revised the draft, resulting in a new Iranian constitution in which religion played a much more prominent role guided by the principle of *vilayat-e faqih*. This type of theocracy, unprecedented in any Muslim society, assigned the country's leadership to a supreme *marja'-e taqlid* called the *Rahbar* [Leader]. The success of the Revolution had

resulted in extraordinary public support for Ayatollah Khomeini, who had united the revolutionary factions under his charismatic leadership. Thus, the few other *marja'*s of the time either lent their support for the new constitution or remained silent on the matter. Any religious opposition to the theocracy would have been considered political opposition and thus suppressed, an obvious example being the house arrest of Ayatollah S. Kazem Shri'atmadari, a senior *marja'* of the time and an initial supporter of Khomeini's leadership.

The appointment of a supreme *marja'* at the helm of Iran's entire political system put the *'ulama* in a position of unprecedented power. According to the new constitution, the supreme leader [*vali-e faqih*] was the country's highest authority, presiding over the judicial, legislative, and executive branches of the political system, in addition to being the Commander-in-Chief of Iran's military forces. The *vali-e faqih*'s constitutional power and jurisdiction was essentially tailored for the charismatic person, Ayatollah Khomeini, who was naturally selected by the public as the supreme leader. This appointment, like the constitution itself, was overwhelmingly supported in referendum by an Iranian populace that was likely not fully cognizant of the implications of these changes to their government, blinded as they were by the fires of revolution.

For the purpose of choosing future leaders, the constitution envisioned a clerical institution: *Majles-e Khobregan* [Assembly of Experts], an elected assembly made up entirely of *'ulama*. Many of Iran's other governmental institutions and assemblies were also to be largely or entirely composed of appointed clergy members under the new constitution. For instance, the Council of Guardians, a religio-legal council, was created to oversee parliament's legislations and approve or veto them based on their adherence to Islamic principles. The *vali-e faqih*'s immense power was relegated to a proliferation of various representatives and corollary institutions, with all positions being populated by the clergy. As representatives of the *vali-e faqih*, the clergy were granted positions of power in all Iranian ministries, as well as in the army and universities. These changes radically transformed the traditional role of the clergy. No longer simple prayer leaders or seminarians of modest means, the clergy became the official employees of the regime with government-budgeted salaries and unprecedented benefits and privileges. The complete overlap of the clergy and secular governmental roles created a kind of theo-bureaucracy in Iran.

This governmentalizing of religion had profound impacts on the role and power of religion in Iran, particularly as it applied to the *Shari'ah* and its function in society. Soon after the regime consolidated itself, the shortcomings of using traditional *Shari'ah* law for running the Islamic Republic became obvious. While Ayatollah Khomeini was alive, he would frequently intervene to resolve the oft-bitter disputes that arose between parliament and the Council of Guardians over issues for which no clear-cut jurisprudential interpretation existed. In order to facilitate running the country's affairs during the Iran-Iraq war, Khomeini in 1987 eventually appointed another council of elite clerical and political officials, the *Majma' tashkhis-e Maslehat-e Nizam* [Expediency Discerning Council], to evaluate the exigencies of the regime relative to the imperatives of religious convention. That traditional *Shari'ah* had not been an effective framework for running a complex society became clear, and the subordination of religion to political practicality was confirmed when Khomeini repeatedly emphasized the exigency of preserving the Islamic Republic regime to take precedence over the implementation of religious edicts.

Perhaps the most learned and principled move Ayatollah Khomeini made was his recommendation for *fiqh-e pouya*, the dynamic *ijtihad*. Khomeini indirectly accepted that current *fiqh* had stagnated and asked for the context of the era to be taken into consideration when issuing fatwas or implementing *Shari'ah* laws. Being an Usuli *mujtahid*, Khomeini was in fact following in the footsteps of predecessors such as Shaykh Ansari and Shaykh Mufid. Incorporating time and context into the *fiqh* process would require *mujtahids*' methodical use of *'aql* [human intellect]. Khomeini himself did not live to see *fiqh-e pouya* implemented. Although his conviction

regarding the need for jurisprudential reform was indisputable and his intentions for developing a dynamic *Shari'ah* had been included in his will, after his death, this idea went into abeyance due to the religious establishment's interest, which by then was well entrenched in political power.

Challenges from outside the establishment

In light of the ongoing politicization of religion, a counter-trend inevitably emerged from outside the religious establishment demanding religious reform. The primary proponents of this reform are known in Iran as the religious intellectuals. Religious intellectuals are educated lay individuals who, concerned for their faith, sought to address the ideologization of religion and rectify the social imbalances created by the jurists in power. Ultimately, religious intellectuals aimed to reform the traditional understanding of Islam.[5] The new religious discourse was wholly unique in terms of its leading proponents, the issues it addressed, its practical implications, its impacts on the socio-political consciousness of Iranians, and its implications for the intellectual dynamics within traditional Muslim seminaries. In this section, I will first briefly introduce the emergence of the religious intellectual movement and its leaders, then examine some of its main traits and topics of concern. Finally, I will explore how the discourse has evolved, and scan its current status.

The new wave of religious thought began to take shape in the mid-1980s and was spearheaded by Abdulkarim Soroush (b. 1945). Soroush belonged to a younger generation of religious modernists, who were of a very different intellectual disposition than their revolutionary predecessors such as Ali Shari'ati. Soroush was professor of philosophy who had studied pharmacology and philosophy of science in Iran and England. Before and during the Revolution, he had built a reputation by publishing systematic philosophical refutations of Marxism and materialism, which became a Bible of sorts for religious university students during ideological debates. Soroush was also well-versed in traditional Islamic philosophy and mysticism. His book on Mulla Sadra's philosophy of substantial motion [*harekat-e jouhari*] became popular in university circles and received approval from scholars, including Ayatollahs Mutahhari, Tabataba'i, and Khomeini. As a public intellectual, Soroush's arguments had an unbeatably vigorous but consistently calm delivery, unlike the inflammatory revolutionary lectures of the Shari'ati and others. In this sense, Soroush was something of an antidote to the violent social atmosphere in Iran in the aftermath of the Revolution and during the eight years of bloody war with Iraq.[6]

In the mid-1980s, the cultural magazine *Keyhan-e Farhangi* emerged, with a young religious editorial board seeking to revive the intellectual tradition of Iran. After a few years, it was rebranded as *Kiyan* in 1991. Amidst a plethora of religious publications promoting traditional interpretations and ideologically correct materials, these new journals were a breath of fresh air. Their novel approach to cultural, religious, and literary topics and roster of sophisticated authors made them very popular among the educated class.[7] *Kiyan* quickly became a highly influential forum for intellectual debates and created a paradigmatic shift in the Iranian understanding of religion. From 1989–1990, Abdulkarim Soroush published a three-article series in *Keyhan-e Farhangi*: "Qabz va Bast-e teorik-e Shi'at" ["Contraction and Expansion of Religious Knowledge"]. These articles, which explored a hermeneutical and epistemological theory of religion, served as a catalyst for the new religious discourse that flourished in *Kiyan*. Under mounting pressure from the orthodoxy and restrictions imposed by political officials, *Kiyan* was eventually shut down in 2001.

Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari (b. 1936) was a progressive clergy member who taught theology at the University of Tehran and came to be a major contributor along with Soroush

to post-Revolutionary religious thought. He had received a traditional seminary education in Qum. From 1970–1979, Shabestari served as director of the Islamic Centre at Hamburg. He became fluent in German and developed an interest in German scholarship on theology and philosophy. After the Revolution, Shabestari was elected to the first parliament for a four-year term, after which he resigned from politics and returned to scholarly activities. His popularity increased with contributions to the journals of *Keyhan-e Farhangi* and *Kiyan*. Around the same time period, he also published a collection of his articles in a book: *Hermenieutik, Kitab va Sunnat* (Mojtahed Shabestari, 1996). Gradually, the gap widened between Shabestari's new understanding of Islam and the views of his fellow clerics; in 2007, he de-frocked himself of clerical attire, signifying a total departure from his religious past.

The most distinctive trait of the religio-intellectual movement of the late 1980s was its hermeneutical and epistemological basis. The ideological understanding of religion relied on grand narratives in which right and wrong had fixed, absolute meanings and prescribed immediate solutions to society's ills through the implementation of its platforms (Soroush, 1996). Contrastingly, religio-intellectual thought explores the transient nature of religious interpretation with a new knowledge-based epistemological discourse, giving primacy to human reason and rationality. While the ideological exclusivism of traditional understandings had relied solely on religious texts and sources, pluralistic religio-intellectualism presented religious interpretation as multi-sourced and influenced by all other disciplines of human knowledge (Mojtahed Shabestari, 2000). Its epistemological pluralism inevitably entailed a plurality of interpretations and recognition of social and political pluralism at a practical level. This new method of thought was established based on foundational principles first theorized by Soroush, which later underwent extensive elaboration:

1 From an epistemological and historical point of view, religion is different from the understanding of religion.
2 Religion per se is divine, eternal, immutable, and sacred.
3 The understanding of religion is a human endeavor like any other (e.g., the attempt to understand nature). Thus, religious knowledge is not sacred.
4 Similarly, inasmuch as it is a human endeavor, the understanding of religion and religious knowledge are certainly affected by and in constant exchange with all other fields of human knowledge.
5 This being the case, religious knowledge is in flux, relative, and time-bound.

(Jahanbakhsh, 2001, p. 148)[8]

At first glance, some of these principles may seem obvious. However, the formulation of a sound theory required a systematic rendering of premises and a level of intellectual vigor that Soroush delivered admirably. Furthermore, given the context of Shi'ite Iran under a theocracy ruled by the *'ulama*, Soroush's hermeneutical formulation of these principles had revolutionary impacts on religious thought. For almost a decade, the official religio-political establishment criticized and condemned his ideas as being *bed'ah* and even heretical. Nevertheless, thanks to the relative freedom of press available under President Khatami's administration and the plethora of literature delineating the implications of the theory, Soroushian jargon eventually became common parlance in any discussion on religion, even among his most severe critics. Gradually, hermeneutical ideas such as distinguishing between religion and its interpretations, the multiplicity of these interpretations, their temporal and contextual nature, and interpretations not being sacred – unlike religion – became less and less taboo. One of the most resisted implications of this theory, of course, is that no final or official interpretation of religion exists. Therefore, unlike in ideological or traditional understandings, no need exists for an official class

(the clergy) or ideologue to be the chief interpreter of religion. Nevertheless, the hermeneutical discourse still rejects any unsystematic or haphazard interpretations that are not based on a sound methodology or authoritative sources. According to this trend, the only acceptable interpretations are those that are rationally and ethically defendable.

Contrary to the dominant view of the religious orthodoxy, the new discourse held that faith and ethics are far more essential than the rituals and outward practices of the *Shar'iah*, emphasizing the significance of religious experience (Soroush, 1997, 2009; Mojtahed Shabestari, 1999). It promoted obedience to and observation of religious precepts out of love for God, not fear of hell. With regard to *Shari'ah*, the new discourse welcomed reform and update, but proponents of religio-intellectualism did not perceive the piecemeal changes to be sufficient. Instead, they demanded reform at a more foundational level: namely that of *kalam* [theology]. The religio-intellectual discourse called for new ideas regarding the nature of God and human beings, and how the relationship between the two is defined – ideas that respond to the radical evolution of our understanding of self and the universe in the modern era. Thus, any reform of law without having a reform in theology first would not bring about viable solutions (Soroush, 2001; Mojtahed Shabestari, 2003). A cornerstone of the worldview of post-Revolutionary religious intellectualism is that individual human beings are entitled to certain inalienable and a priori rights of which no religion or interpretation thereof can or should undermine. This stands in sharp contrast to the prevalent jurisprudential understanding of religion in which humans are foremost duty-bound individuals. While I cannot explore every iteration and debate involving this philosophy, I hope to show how religious intellectualism deserves to be considered as a new phase in religious thought in modern Iran by showcasing the dramatic changes involved.

Since its inception, the scope of influence of this discourse has remarkably expanded and its impact deepened as an increasing number of scholars, publications, lectures, and seminars have engaged with religious intellectualism. Even the traditionalist seminaries have begun to discuss subjects such as modern hermeneutics, philosophy of ethics, human rights, and pluralism. In the 2000s, a young *mujtahid*, Mohsen Kadivar, published a series of articles on human rights aiming to show their compatibility with Islamic law, the Qur'an, and Hadith. Interestingly, when applying hermeneutical premises, he arrived at the same conclusion regarding the inalienable a priori rights individuals have.[9] Kadivar has also engaged in debates regarding pluralism and democracy and has been a vocal clergy member critiquing the *velayat-e faqih*, publishing two volumes critically analyzing the theory (Kadivar, 1997, 1998). He promotes the idea of reform in jurisprudence, though his specialty remains political jurisprudence. He has published works on the political philosophy of Akhound Khorasani, a leading constitutionalist *marja'*, and more recently on a volume of analytical refutations of the jurisprudential credentials of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the current Supreme Leader of Iran (Kadivar, 2015).[10]

Regarding gender equality under *Shar'iah* law, considerable steps have been taken by a number of *mujtahids* to improve women's rights in Iran; prominent individuals in this process include Ayatollah Yousef Sane'i, known as an open minded *marja'*, Muhammad Taqi Fazel Meybodi, Mehdi Mohaqiq Damad, Ahmad Qabel, Amir Hosein Turkashvand, and Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari. The fatwas issued by these reformist clerics, though still unaccepted by the religious orthodoxy, have become very popular among the Iranian people. Furthermore, numerous female scholars have taken up the task of challenging orthodox religious views and traditional Qur'anic interpretations regarding women. Recent works in this field have been written by the female reformist scholar and university professor of Islamic law, Sedigheh Vasmaghi, who has published books on women and jurisprudence, as well as re-interpretation of the *Shari'ah* (Vasmaghi, 2014, 2017). Such changes indicate the intellectual foundations of traditional and political understandings of religion in Iran to have been shaken. Other factors including the

ruling clergy's socio-political and economic exploitation have also fueled a fundamental shift in public religiosity in the post-Revolution generations. The response of the religious political establishment to these shifts has been varied: at best, resistance, and at worst, imprisonment, forced exile, defamation, and even clashes in the streets.

Nevertheless, the project of new religious thinking continues to evolve. Two top figures of post-Revolutionary religious thought, Abdulkarim Soroush and Muhammad Mujtahed Shabestari, have progressed toward new intellectual horizons. In light of their previous discussions regarding the need for a new theology [*kalam-e Jadid*], they have expanded their ideas regarding the historicity of the Qur'an and the role of human agency of the Prophet Muhammad – already a major point of contention with the Islamic orthodoxy (Mojtahed Shabestari, 2003; Soroush, 2009).[11] In recent years, Soroush has introduced his theory of *Royaha-ye Rasulaneh* [Prophetic Dreams] with the aim of explaining the nature and mechanism of revelation and human agency regarding the Word of God/Word of Muhammad. These views have received criticism from the orthodoxy, as well as from like-minded individuals engaged in the project of new religious thinking. Shabestari developed a theory parallel to Soroush's that uses more familiar language in order to increase the theory's appeal to traditional scholars and the general public.[12] While new, this recent development in post-Revolutionary thought may have important theological ramifications for Islam in Iran.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have examined the trajectory of developments in Iranian Shi'ism from the 19th century to modern days and explained four major phases of religious evolution. As the detailed study of each phase has revealed, religious thought in modern Iran has consistently been intertwined with the contemporary politics of its time. While constantly evolving in response to socio-political realities, one unfailing Shi'ite theme has been a strong anti-despotism and anti-dictatorial stance.

Following the first phase of development (i.e., the establishment of the *marja'-e taqlid* as the highest authority in the Shi'ite *'ulama* hierarchy), theories began to form that recognized the Hidden Imam's social and political prerogatives for the *marja'*. These theories led to the *marja'*s increased political activity during the constitutional movement in the early 20th century, wherein the grand Ayatollahs responded to the predicament of Iranians revolting against regressive Qajar dictators. The *marja'*s leading role in the movement, as well as their official lending of religious legitimacy to the newly emerging political order, had established a precedent for their subsequent interventions in Iranian politics.

For almost two-thirds of the 20th century, Iran experienced institutional separation of religion and state while undergoing a process of modernization and secularization. In the latter part of the century, a new trend in religious thought emerged as the second phase, which involved a proliferation of ideological and political interpretation of Shi'ism and was led by lay scholars and activists. During this phase, the religious sector compensated for its long political absence with revolutionary ideological advancements, ultimately contributing to the fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty and its secular autocracy.

The third phase began with the establishment of a Shi'ite theocracy based on the theory of *Vilayat-e Faqih*, the official legitimacy underlying the rule of the clergy in the Islamic Republic of Iran. One of the defining features of the 1979 Revolution was its anti-dictatorial demands. However, the rule established after the Revolution's success gradually became less democratic and revealed itself to be an autocratic regime often dubbed as "religious despotism."

The last phase, the de-ideologization and de-politicization of religion, began in the post-Revolutionary era. In this current phase, new religious theories have been developed in an attempt to rectify the failings of the previous phase (i.e., the combining of religion and politics and the religious justification of oppression and inequality). The hermeneutical approach and epistemological pluralism of this final phase have caused a paradigmatic shift in Iranian religious discourse, and it continues to evolve with and impact the religious thinking in Iran, as well as the religiosity of the new generation.

Notes

1 For a detailed analysis, see: Abdul-Hadi Hairi (1977).
2 For a full account of Shari'at Sangelaji's life and activities, see: Ali Rahnema (2015).
3 For a documented account of the coup, see Kinzer (2008).
4 Numerous works exist that study the breadth of Ali Shari'ati's life and ideas; here, I just highlight those that marked the beginning of a new understanding of Shi'ism. For an example, see Rahnema (2000).
5 For a detailed account, see Jahanbakhsh (2004).
6 For an autobiography of Soroush, see his book *Reason, Freedom and Democracy in Islam: Essential Writings of Abdolkarim Soroush* (2000).
7 For a detailed history and significance of these journals, see Jahanbakhsh (2001, pp. 141–143).
8 These are based on Soroush's (1994) book *Qabz va bast-e Te'urik-e Shari'at*.
9 A revised version of these articles has been published (Kadivar, 2008).
10 For detailed information about Kadivar's publications, see: https://kadivar.com
11 See Appendices to Soroush's (2009) book *Expansion of Prophetic Experience*.
12 Soroush (2014–2016), *Royaha-ye Rasulaneh* was written over 2014–2016. Its webbook was published in 2019; Mojtahed Shabestari (2013–2017), *Qara'at-e Nabavi az Jahan* was written between 2013–2017, see his webpage: http://mohammadmojtahedshabestari.com

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8

THE VOICES OF ISLAMIC MODERNISM FROM SOUTH ASIA

M. A. Muqtedar Khan and Ibrahim Enes Aksu

Introduction

The advent of modernity brought fundamental changes in the social, economic, and political structures of the world. In the political arena, societies moved from being organized as kingdoms, empires, and vassal states to territorially defined nation-states with sovereignty residing in the body politic of the state. In the economic arena, the biggest shift was the replacement of the feudal agricultural system with a capitalist industrial system, which has had an irreversible and profound impact on society by creating the modern middle class. The philosophical and epistemological foundations of thinking were also altered by modernity as more and more of the global elite became secular and scientific, moving away from traditional and theocentric thinking. Many of these changes began and came to fruition in Europe, making the West a dominant political, scientific, and economic force on the planet. The Muslim encounter with modernity came through colonization and forced Muslim societies to consider and counter the Western way that had proven to be powerful (Arnason, 2006; Curtis, 2009; Mavelli, 2012).

Muslims and the challenge of modernity

Modernity and Western cultural and political dominance came to the Muslim world around the time when Napoleon conquered Egypt in 1798 and the British defeated the Mughal empire in India in 1857. The contrast was palpable. The West was fresh, scientific, dynamic, advanced, militarily powerful, and triumphant. Though still rich, the Muslim world was now old, tired, traditional, stagnant, and defeated. The final blow came with the end of the Ottoman empire in 1923, but by then, the writing had already been on the wall: The modern Western way, if not better, was definitely more powerful and successful than the old Muslim way. The Mughal defeat of 1857 was traumatic for the Muslim intelligentsia (Sharma, 1999; Dalrymple, 2006). India was lost to the British and now, ironically, more Muslims were living in the British empire than in the Ottoman empire. In the last war of the empires (World War I), more Muslims were fighting for the modern West than the traditional Muslim world (Aydın, 2017; Karandikar, 1968).

Muslims' defeat, loss of global domination, and colonization of their lands triggered intense intellectual soul searching among Muslim scholars and the literati. They tried to come to terms with and articulate a Muslim response to modernity. Muqtedar Khan (2019) argued in his recent book, *Islam and Global Governance*, that two types of Muslim responses were found to the challenge of modernity: the secular and the Islamic. He further divided the Islamic response into three types: (1) traditional Islam; (2) political Islam; and (3) Islamic modernism. He contended that the secular Muslim response had in essence been an entire surrender to Western culture that made no distinction between modernity and Western culture. Secular Muslims blamed Islam and tradition for the Muslims' defeats and weakness, and chose to secularize, sometimes more radically and with more extreme measures as in Turkey under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Mimicking the West was the only way forward for secular Muslims.

The Islamic response essentially was a mixture of rejection and a selective embrace of modernity and Western systems. Traditional Muslims more or less rejected modernity in its entirety. They found it un-Islamic and irreligious, and feared that modernization necessarily meant secularization (i.e., de-Islamization). Political Islam understood the power of modernity and sought to embrace it by Islamizing it, and Islamists advanced ideas such as the Islamization of the state and the economy. Modernist Muslims, on the other hand, recognized the inevitability and irreversibility of modernity and sought to Islamize knowledge, science, and even democracy (Devji, 2007; Khan, 2019; Masud, 2009; Masud, Salvatore, & van Bruinessen, 2009).

While Muslim secular responses to modernity are best highlighted by Atatürk in Turkey and the Ba'ath Party and its intellectual affiliates in the Arab world, the Islamic responses more or less began on the Indian subcontinent. In our view, Maulana Maududi – who began his work in India and crystallized his Islamist ideological movement (Jamaat-e-Islami) and its institutionalization in Pakistan – was the father of modern political Islam. Even the Muslim Brotherhood was shaped by the ideology of Jamaat-e-Islami through Sayyid Qutb and his reading of Maududi. The Tablighi Jamaat, a movement to restore tradition and piety, started on the Indian subcontinent in the mid-19th century and remains to this day the biggest traditionalist Islamic movement in the world. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, the founder of Aligarh Muslim University, was the founding intellectual of the loose consortium of ideas known as Islamic modernism. In this chapter, despite the temptation to address the other response, we will confine our discussion to Islamic modernism, its dialogue with modernity, and its response to modernity through the work of four South Asian modernist intellectuals. Two of them are from the region that is now India: Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and Maulana Waheeduddin Khan. The other two, Muhammad Iqbal and Dr. Fazlur Rahman, are from the region that became Pakistan after the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947.

What is Islamic modernism?

Muslim responses to modernity have taken various institutional forms. Political parties and social movements are the two main vehicles that secular nationalists and political Islamists have employed. These institutions gave them reach and access to power, and predominantly secular nationalists – and to some extent, political Islamists – have left their mark through them on the postcolonial realities of modern Muslim nations. Social, political, and economic development took either the form of modernization or Islamization. However, Islamic modernists were not as successful as secularists or nationalists. For example, Pakistan has seen the secular Pakistan People's Party come to power several times, but the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami has never come to power. Islamic modernists have institutions like Aligarh Muslim University and Nadwatul

Ulema (a religious institution) in India and the International Islamic University in Pakistan. One of the reasons for the institutional underdevelopment of Islamic modernism, which has remained confined to journals, literature, universities, and arts, has been the overall low level of intellectual and educational development in Muslim countries, which has been further compounded by the case of South Asia. This limitation has kept the ideas and developments in Islamic modernist thought confined to the community's elite and limited its transformative impact.

Islamic modernism defies definition. Some Western observers view it as a consequence or manifestation of modernity rather than a response, while others view it as a product of a dialectical relationship with the dominant Islamic trend of Islamism (Ahmad, 1967; Binder, 1988; Masud, 2009; Moaddel, 2005; Rahman, 1970). We view Islamic modernism as a constellation of ideas and a Muslim dialogue with modernity. It is neither a social nor a political movement, but rather an intellectual movement that seeks to engage with the philosophical underpinnings of modernity. In a conversation with Muqtedar Khan, the famous Iranian philosopher Abdolkarim Soroush, who himself is an Islamic modernist, argued that Muslims are willing to embrace such fruits of modernity as the Internet, capitalism, neoliberalism, and even the nation-state, but are reluctant to embrace and are even opposed to the roots of modernity (personal communication, 1999). Soroush identified reason, science, and secularism as the roots of modernity and suggested that Muslim cultures were reluctant to embrace them. We submit Islamic modernism to be one dimension of the Muslim intellectual engagement with reason, science, and secularism, and the ideologies of the modern state.

In order to explain the rise of the West and, to some extent, justify European colonization as a responsibility of the West to bring civilization to the Muslim world, some Western scholars of the East have reflected upon the superiority of Western values and the backwardness and inferiority of Islamic values and culture. This continues to this day, as Western leaders use the term "spread of democracy" as a surrogate for civilization and justification for military invasions and occupation of Muslim nations (e.g., in defense of Israeli human rights abuses in Palestine). Islamic modernists had also engaged in a defensive discourse that attempted to argue Islam to indeed be compatible and consistent with the universal human values of equality, human rights, democracy, justice, and peace, which are by no means solely modern or Western. Therefore, Islamic modernists were engaged in a *dual dialogue* – one with modernity, and one with the West. The engagement with modernity was both introspective and self-critical, and the one with the West was defensive and nationalistic. South Asian modernists were clearly engaged in both forms of the dialogue and to a great degree provided the intellectual basis to modernists elsewhere (Said, 1979, 2008).

Four modern challenges existed that South Asian Islamic modernists addressed broadly: the challenge of modern science, the challenge of nationalism, the challenge of secularism, and the challenge of a stagnant Islamic intellectual tradition. They collectively believed that the stagnation of Islamic thought was the main problem and, once its dynamism was restored through a revival of the practice of *ijtihad*, Muslims could confront and face all modern challenges through authentic Islamic solutions. Thus, unlike the secularists who believed that one had to abandon Islam as an organizing principle of Muslim society in order to modernize, modernists were confident that Muslims could modernize through *ijtihad* and still retain Islam. While they did not actually articulate this in as many words, modernists essentially felt that *ijtihad* would modernize not just Muslim societies but also provide a modern understanding of Islam that was more compatible with modernity. In this chapter, we examine the work of four South Asian modernists and their contribution to the development of Islamic modernist thought.

Islam's compatibility with science and rationality: Sir Syed Ahmad Khan

Sir Syed Ahmad Khan was critical of the modernist school of thought. Along with Muhammad Abduh of Egypt and Said Nursi of Turkey, he was one of the pioneers in advocating the key themes of Islamic modernism: the compatibility of Islam with science and nationalism. Khan (1817–1898) had a very long and productive life in the fields of jurisprudence and public policy, as well as in community development and Islamic thought. He came from an elite family with ties to the Mughals and worked as a judge for the British East India company, thus traversing multiple circles of power and influence. Khan left an indelible impact on how Muslims from the subcontinent understood modernity and faced the challenges of science and Western domination.

He witnessed the steady decline of Muslim influence and culture in India, and struggled to institute reforms and development programs. He was not in favor of Muslims opposing the rise of the British and hoped that Muslims could cooperate and benefit from the British presence. He wanted Indian Muslims to concentrate on educational development rather than politics. Toward this end, he instituted the All-India Muhammadan Educational Conference, which worked towards Muslim educational development and progressive reforms. It met regularly from 1866–1937 and was the principal vehicle for Muslim national activism and coordination. It eventually gave way to the All-India Muslim League, which was an advocate for the two-state solution and led to the creation of Pakistan. Even today, Indian Muslims are struggling to establish a national forum that will bring Muslim intellectuals, concerned citizens, policy makers, and other stakeholders together regularly to plan and work towards the upliftment of Indian Muslims. Seven decades after the independence of India, over 175 million Muslims were in India, but they lag behind other communities in education, socio-economic development, and political representation (Hassan, 2016; Rahman, 2019). The educational and development deficit is palpable, as well as the lack of a national forum for addressing this meaningfully (Mujahid, 1999; Parray, 2015; Sherwani, 1944; Waseem, 2014).

Sir Syed Ahmad Khan's intellectual contributions are vast. He translated the Bible, wrote a commentary on the Holy Quran, and tried to advance a conception of Islam that specifically sought to underscore Islam's compatibility with science and rationality. His intellectual goals were clearly to increase the rational dimension of Islamic thought and encourage the pursuit of scientific knowledge among Muslim youth. He argued creation to be the *Work* of God, the Quran the *Word* of God, and that the two could not be inconsistent. Khan, unlike the other modernists who later tried to show that all scientific discoveries had already been revealed in the Quran, saw it as a religious text, as well, but one that advocated the use of reason and empirical study of the world. Khan primarily focused on the development of the Muslim community and sought to understand the cultural roots of Muslim decline, insisting education and reform, not politics, to be the best ways to arrest the decline of the *ummah* and launch its redevelopment (Baljon, 1964; Muhammad, 1972; Parray, 2015).

In our view, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan's most important contribution was the creation and establishment of the Aligarh Mohammadan Anglo-Oriental College in 1875, now known as the Aligarh Muslim University. The creation of this college is also a testament to the fact that Khan was not only a man of thought, but also a man of action: he practiced what he preached and showed how practice should emerge from one's thought. The purpose and vision behind the founding of this institution was premised on the principles of Islamic modernism. Its mission was to produce modern Muslims who had pride in their religious identity, faith in their religion, and knowledge of their sacred texts and people and who not only believed in science but

were themselves scientific in their outlook. Today, Aligarh Muslim University is one of India's premier higher education institutions and serves Muslims as well as members of other religious communities. It is an extraordinarily effective and essential model of the Muslim response to modern challenges; unfortunately, however, it has not been replicated. It is his greatest legacy and is also an institutional promise of the power of Islamic modernist ideas. If Muslims in India and elsewhere had prioritized education in the way Khan advocated, and if they had established hundreds of similar universities, the Muslim world would have been in much better shape today.

Ijtihad and re-interpretation: Maulana Waheeduddin Khan

Maulana Waheeduddin was born on January 1, 1925 in a historic but small town in Uttar Pradesh, India called Azamgarh, a place well known for its *madrasah*s [Islamic seminaries]. He acquired traditional Islamic education and was part of the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami movement in India. He was also briefly associated with the Islamic Dawah movement in India, the Tablighi Jamaat, but from 1976 onwards, he started running his own Islamic center in New Delhi which publishes his journal *Al-Risala* and his numerous books and essays. He has written nearly 200 books and booklets, and numerous articles for his journal, given lectures worldwide, and now uses social and digital media to disseminate his ideas. He has a large global following and has been recognized by both Indian and foreign governments for his service.

Waheeduddin Khan in many ways inherited his thoughts and political ideas from Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and can be described as a contemporary avatar of the first modernist Muslim thinker in India. Like Ahmad Khan, Waheeduddin Khan has also endeavored to bring the Muslim community into modern times and in line with science and scientific thinking in particular. He also is an Indian nationalist like the former Khan, and his nationalism compels him to sometimes align with political forces that the Muslim rank and file oppose. Ahmad Khan was close to the British, and Waheeduddin Khan is sometimes seen as aligned with Hindu nationalists, despite the fact that both British and Hindu nationalists have been responsible for the decline and political marginalization of Muslims in India during the past three centuries.

Maulana Waheeduddin's Islamic modernism has two main characteristic features: his undiluted commitment to nonviolence and his firm belief in the principle of *ijtihad*. Maulana Waheeduddin is a Gandhian at heart and has published his thesis on Islam's promotion of nonviolence over the decades both in book form and in the form of articles. The Maulana relies on the direct textual meaning of several verses of the Quran that state God's displeasure with those who cause trouble on Earth (Quran, 2:205). The case can easily be made that Islam is a religion of peace, and many have made it prior to and after the Maulana, but in order to advance his pacifistic ideas, the Maulana ignores the prophetic tradition (Sunnah), the history of Islam, and even the traditional understanding of Quranic teachings. He basically relies upon a few verses from the Holy Quran, whose literal meaning supports pacifism, especially when taken out of their historical and textual context, and has built his thesis around these (Omar, 2008; Seedat, 2006).

This leads us to the second constitutive feature of the Maulana's work: his emphasis on *ijtihad*. The meaning of *ijtihad* varies widely. *Ijtihad*, for a conservative jurist, is the use of analogical reasoning when sacred texts (Quran, Hadith, and the records of the opinions of early Muslims) do not directly address an issue. For a modernist like Maulana Waheeduddin, *ijtihad* is a license to think and an invitation to exercise reason, even on subjects that sacred texts have addressed, in order to reinterpret them in the light of new existential realities. In our view, advancing, defending, and putting into practice this understanding of *ijtihad* is itself an outstanding contribution to Islamic thought, but Maulana's methodology of reinterpretation is often simplistic and relies primarily on a selective reading of the Quran.

Maulana Waheeduddin has made several re-interpretive contributions in his *ijtihad*, the most important ones being his advocacy for science and gender equality. Here again, Maulana not only argues that Islam and science are compatible, but he has proceeded to posit that the Quranic message itself is scientific and encourages Muslims to reflect on the scientific basis of nature and creation. He insists that science will not only authenticate the basic message of Islam, but Muslims as an imperative must rethink their understanding of Islam in the light of science. In his worldview, science has thus become a pathway rather than a hindrance to faith. In a similar vein, he insists that Islam has always intended gender equality. One limitation of Maulana's work is his style. He presents his thoughts based solely on the reading of selective sources without a systematic or rigorous critique of the traditional viewpoints that have also used the same sources to advance interpretations of Islam contrary to Maulana's. This has allowed traditional thought to thrive in India, despite all his efforts.

Maulana Waheeduddin finds himself frequently involved in controversy. Perhaps he even quotes controversy as a means to either draw attention to his body of work or to his own persona. The controversies are sometimes of a political nature (e.g., when he started associating himself with the Bharatiya Janata Party, a party viewed by many Muslims as anti-Muslim, communal, and determined to undermine Islam and Muslim well-being in India). At other times, the learned Maulana has triggered theological controversies that do not advance the cause of Islamic revivalism or reform, but rather merely serve to undermine his own influence within the Muslim community while raising his profile outside of it. His suggestions that perhaps the Christian model of prophesy is better for Muslims in this age than the prophetic model of Muhammad has attracted a lot of criticism from the Muslim orthodoxy and alienated many younger Muslims who otherwise would have found a spiritual model and guide in Maulana Waheeduddin in this age when they feel lost and are in a search for true guidance (Khan, 2001a, 2001b).

In spite of all the controversy surrounding his thoughts and politics, Maulana Waheeduddin has for decades enjoyed a reputation as a very thoughtful, independent, and critical Muslim thinker in India. Since the death of Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi in 1999, Maulana Waheeduddin has been the most prominent scholarly Islamic voice on Islam and Muslim affairs in India, though without enjoying the widespread respect that Ali Nadwi had commanded. Both mainstream and Muslim media pay much attention to his ideas, and he clearly has shaped the debate on key Muslim issues in India such as the Babri Masjid conflict, the Salman Rushdi fatwa issue, the plight of Muslim minorities in India, Hindu-Muslim relations, and the current global hullabaloo about blasphemy against the Prophet of Islam.

Reconstruction of religious thought: Muhammad Iqbal

Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938) is India's most prominent Islamic poet and thinker, but he is often seen as belonging to Pakistan for reasons which are beyond the scope of this chapter, even though he died before the birth of Pakistan. While Iqbal's thoughts were influenced by both his Eastern Islamic heritage and Western philosophical education, they were laced with the most prominent of Islamic modernist themes such as Islam and nationalism, Islam and science, and the revival and reinterpretation of Islamic sources (Yılmaz, 2019). Iqbal, despite being of the opinion that Western modernism has brought major scientific and economic benefits, did not favor the idea of embracing Western thought and reason as a whole in order to ameliorate the horrid situation of the Muslim world. He instead proposed to revitalize the humanistic spirit of Islam, which is based on love and affection, and which, according to him, had been disrupted by the strict interpretations of traditional Islamic scholars (Hussain, 2016, p. 64). Thus, he

suggested that Muslims must "approach modern knowledge with a respectful but independent attitude and appreciate the teachings of Islam in the light of that knowledge"; for him, the main task had been the reconstruction of religious thought "to rethink the whole system of Islam without completely breaking with the past" (Iqbal, 1930/2009, p. 107).

Iqbal spent so much effort emphasizing the importance of self-realization [*khudi* in Persian and Urdu], a concept defined as "self-reliance, self-respect, self-confidence, self-preservation, even self-assertion" (Schimmel, 1963, p. 42). For Iqbal, Muslims had been deprived from self-realization of their identity and value because they were in the state of ignorance, either blindly following the interpretations of semi-literate clergy or carelessly copying the West without having a critical eye. Iqbal's poetry implied that Muslims can liberate themselves from the enslavement of the West by knowing themselves (i.e., *khudi*), which mainly requires demolishing their own dogmatism, as well as reviving the spiritual powers of resistance that are needed for self-discovery and recapturing dignity. Iqbal saw similar problems in modern humans, who had stopped living a soulful life. In the area of thought, he experienced an apparent self-conflict while living in conflict with others in the economic and political areas of life. Modern humans are unable to control their cruel egoism and boundless hunger for material wealth, thus destroying their higher ideals and bringing them tiredness in life (Hussain, 2016, p. 65). Thus, for Iqbal, modern humans – including Muslims – could overcome these problems by attaining *khudi*, reaching an eternally powerful self, and therefore achieving the state of *Mard-e Momen* (i.e., *Insan-i Kamil* [the believing human/perfected human]), which refers to a morally fulfilled human being with the qualities and merits ordained by Islam and the Prophet (Hussain, 2016, pp. 68–72). Here, Iqbal called for a revival or renewal of Muslim thought and identity through education and self-development.

Iqbal as a political poet mainly sought to awaken Muslims' self-consciousness. As an anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist thinker, Iqbal favored a republican form of government and tried to develop a political system for Muslims in line with both the ethical principles of Islam and the modern world. According to Iqbal, this system must serve the purpose of enabling Muslims in discovering, cultivating, and strengthening their *khudi* by giving them personal freedom; this in turn would allow them to fulfil the requirements of their role as God's vicegerents on Earth. However, he was a fierce critic of the major political and economic systems of the West, which he called *Iblees Ki Majlis-i-Shura* [Parliament of the Devil], as they conveyed too many injustices rooted in imperialism and capitalism. He also criticized Western democracy for only counting people rather than weighing their character, morality, and ethics (Hussain, 2016, pp. 68–72).

Iqbal also attacked the traditional religious authorities in the Muslim world of his time for refusing to use reason in interpreting *shariah* in line with the changing world and thus leaving the "unthinking masses" of Muslims in the "hands of intellectual mediocrities" who coerced Muslims to blindly follow the most influential schools of jurisprudence, thus degrading Islam into a state of immobility (Iqbal, 1930/2009, pp. 177–179). According to Iqbal, the system of education conducted by the purely religious *madrasahs* had failed to provide knowledge of the sciences required of the modern age. They solely focused on religious education and disregarded the significance of being inspired by modern science and knowledge; this had deepened the material and intellectual demise of Muslims. His main aim was to create a system of education that combined the learning of *ilm* [science] with *ishq* [love]; this would allow the healthy transmission of the *ummah*'s collective memory from one generation to another in order to create a unity of self-consciousness and a "truly national character" (Sevea, 2011, pp. 78–79). Iqbal also believed that Muslims who do not equip themselves for confronting the challenges of the modern world have made their lands vulnerable to invasion by foreign powers. Such a tragic

situation, while on one hand causes damage to their self-esteem and dignity, on the other hand, causes the loss of freedom of speech and ability to act.

For Iqbal, the laws and practices in Islam are universal and must remain in harmony with the changing times, and for this reason, Muslims should also revitalize the principles of *ijma* [consensus] and *ijtihad*, which constitute the major aspects of Quranic jurisprudence (Hussain, 2016, pp. 73–74). Iqbal (1930/2009, p. 107) plainly stated:

> The task before the modern Muslim is immense. He has to rethink the whole system of Islam without completely breaking with the past. The only course open is to approach modern knowledge with a respectful but independent attitude and to appreciate the teachings of Islam in the light of that great knowledge, even though we may be led to differ from those who have gone before us.

Iqbal (1930/2009, p. 203) called his ideal state a "spiritual democracy" based on consensus and aimed at strengthening the exercise of *ijtihad* to reform Islamic practices in a changing world. By transmitting the authority of *ijtihad* to the assembly of people, Iqbal aimed at including contributions from ordinary people in legal matters. However, he spared a portion of the assembly to the jurists, as they are important for assisting and managing free discussion on issues related to law (Iqbal, 1930/2009, p. 198). Iqbal's critique of democracy regarding the rule of majority had come from his experience under the Hindu domination of Muslims. He argued that peace could come if many groups in India had the chance for free self-development in line with modernity, only without losing their ties to the past. For him, spiritually self-developed communities – rather than majorities – could prevent discrimination and defend the equality of human dignity (Lee, 1997, p. 72).

Critical-rationalist interpretation of religion: Fazlur Rahman

Fazlur Rahman (1919–1988) believed the absence of political and cultural progress in the Muslim world compared to the West to have been the direct result of the unwillingness and inability to utilize a critical-rationalist interpretation of religion in Muslim societies. For him, the only way to resolve such a problem was the renewal of Islamic thought by going beyond the traditional and atomistic readings of Islamic sources, the Quran, and Sunnah. Rahman considered Western modernity on the one hand as a source of knowledge, and on the other hand as a danger to Islamic identity, which placed him in a dilemma. He had aspired to modern scientific methods and rejected the domination of Western thought (Bektovic, 2016, pp. 160–161).

Like Iqbal, Rahman had been educated in the West, but unlike Iqbal, he had studied Islamic philosophy and was not a poet. After his education in England, he returned to Pakistan at the invitation of President Ayyub Khan to direct the Islamic Research Institute in Karachi and lead the initiative for Islamic reforms (Bijlefeld, 1989). Rahman's modernist ideas caused much controversy in Pakistan, and he was later forced to take refuge in American academia.

Rahman's reading of the Quran and prophecy was simply historical and humanistic, and he argued ethical values to have a transcendental character. According to his methodology, the interpretation of truth must be holistic, considering that any interpretation of truth must be bounded by the interpreter or by history. Rahman argued that all the accessible interpretations of the Quran had been fitted to their own specific timeframe. They were all the result of the experiences of each generation of Muslims who had been responding to specific historical challenges by applying the teachings in the Quran. However, the rise of *taqlid*, or blind imitation, had significantly damaged the authenticity of later Muslim scholars, who found themselves

intellectually indebted to their forerunners. According to Rahman, *taqlid* is an absolute disaster that had significantly curbed any development in the Islamic civilization by introducing a strictly obedient culture, which in turn had caused an intellectual inertia and prevented any chance of renewal. For Rahman and similarly to Sir Syed, Iqbal, and Waheeduddin Khan, the antidote was *ijtihad* [the quest for a modern understanding of Islamic sources)].

Rahman believed that the complete doctrine of Islam had originated from an ethical basis whose center revolves around the divine principle of justice. For him, a systematic study of Quranic ethics would pave the way toward realizing the harmony and interaction between the central notions of Islam. Rahman criticized the Muslim community for lacking a coherent relationship between its ethical ideals and legal principles, and for allowing the political manipulation of the *shariah*. According to Rahman, Muslims were successful at applying the *shariah*-based law, but they had been unable to find a system that could achieve and impose the Quranic ethos alongside its key teachings of justice. He specifically blamed the Muslim scholars for paying unnecessary attention to Greek, Persian, and other ethical traditions rather than attempting to frame a systematic ethical theory originating from the Quran (Bektovic, 2016, p. 167). For Rahman, "no one who has done any careful study of the Quran can fail to be impressed by its ethical fervor," and the ethics of the Quran actually imply its essence, which is "also the necessary link between theology and law" (Rahman, 1982, p. 154).

Rahman claimed the model of Prophet Muhammad to be able to be an example for Islam-based democracies because the Prophet was an egalitarian ruler who had used the notion of *shura* and consulted with his companions in making significant decisions within the early Muslim community (Armajani, 2015, p. 39). However, Rahman was critical of the traditional methods of Islamic government (i.e., theocratic imamate and monarchical caliphate) and argued them to be merely historical endeavors at creating a just society. Such methods may have been compatible with the traditions of that period when confronted with the political challenges of their historical context, but that method is not in line with the Quranic notion of *shura* (Rahman, 1982, p. 29). However, the same exact methods cannot be applied to modern times due to the political situations and challenges that had newly emerged. According to Rahman, Muslims therefore need to discover new models that are compatible with the existing context, as well as with the notion of *shura* as a central concept for organizing society. Even though Rahman – by taking an ambivalent position – did not clearly delineate a specific model, he did emphasize the significance of concretizing the notion of *shura* as a political institution and the importance of cooperation between religious and secular experts (Rahman, 1970, pp. 331–333).

Any modernist scholar who has made a distinction between normative Islam (i.e., Islam of the Quran and Sunnah) and historical Islam after being inspired by Rahman's methods has faced harsh criticism from the advocates of traditionalism who do not recognize such a distinction, as they believe both refer to the same Islam. On the other hand, such distinctions – in Rahman's view – should not lead to the conclusion that he was against tradition. On the contrary, he considered Islam to possess a rich tradition, and the only way to benefit from such a rich tradition would be to approach it from a critical perspective (Aydın, 1990). Furthermore, Rahman argued that this wealth in the Islamic tradition stemmed from the free intellectual activities of the early scholars of Islam, which should be called *ijtihad* (Açikgenç, 1990). Tamara Sonn (1991, p. 213) argued that Rahman's "comprehensive and systematic methodology" was crucial for understanding Islam by "distinguishing clearly between essential Islamic principles and the historical circumstances in which they were instantiated." One can understand such a relationship through Rahman's double movement, which for him was a prerequisite for applying the Quranic principles. Thus, the work of historians and social scientists are significant, according to Rahman, meaning that he favored inserting the humanities and social sciences into the

attempts at interpreting the Quran. However, "the actual 'effective orientation' and 'ethical engineering' are the work of the ethicist," indicating that the role of an ethicist is crucial, especially with regard to practical implementation (Bektovic, 2016, p. 171; Rahman, 1982, p. 7).

Conclusion

Islamic modernism is a rich Islamic intellectual tradition and has permeated the thinking of many scholars, intellectual reformists, and poets in South Asia. Even in the Muslim communities of South Asia, especially among the educated urban classes and their foreign diasporas, one can find modernist thinking deeply entrenched. It has empowered Muslims to both practice Islam by paying great attention to its rituals and traditions and also pursue modern scientific education and contribute to science and modern economic and political development. Even those who belong to the school of reformist Islam are informed by the modernist perspective in the sense that they rely on the language and concepts of modernity. One example of this would be Maududi's innovative conceptualization of *al-hakimiyyah* as essentially a translation of the modern principle of sovereignty (Khan, 1995). One can argue that an intellectual modernization has gradually been taking place among Muslims in Turkey, Pakistan, Malaysia, India, Indonesia, Egypt, Iran, and Morocco. The main modernist idea taking root is that Islam can adapt to different time-space contexts through *ijtihad*. Islam is compatible with modernity, and the so-called new and modern values of democracy, freedom, political justice, gender equality, scientific outlook, rational and critical thinking, and even secularism are not entirely alien to the Islamic ethos. These, too, can be absorbed under the umbrella of Islamic ethos. The future is indeed going to be shaped by the Islamic modernist thinking that seeks to balance tradition with newness.

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SECTION III

Islam in the political sphere

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9

RETHINKING ISLAMISM IN TURKEY

Beyond conservative or modernist rejectionism

Vahdettin Işık

Introduction

The fact that the 19th century resulted in the removal of Muslims as a global locus of power is widely known. As a result of the efforts that occurred in the wake of making sense of this new situation, various currents of thought emerged. Some took a negative attitude toward renewal efforts based on the attitude of preserving what had already existed in response to modernization. Others proposed completely replacing what had existed. A third approach evaluated the issue not in terms of the new or the old, but in terms of the nature of the new and the old – and whether it responded to what was needed. Those who adopted the last approach regarded a continuation of the old as it had been to be impossible, believing change to be necessary, but did not reject what was traditional. They saw that adopting the new without questioning its nature would contradict Islamic principles as well as historical-social reality. The order formed by those who adopted this approach can be called the Islamic Renewal Movement. In other words, unlike conservative rejectionism and modernist rejectionism, the proposed interpretation of the Islamic Renewal Movement was based on protecting what needed protection and renewing what needed renewal. This approach sought to both remain as itself and also respond to the contemporary challenges through this choice. These three approaches can be said to still continue to shape Turkey's political thoughts and tendencies.

Today, the Islamic Renewal Movement has once again become the focus of discussions on issues such as the connection violent movements have with the Islamization of politics, the relationship between religion and politics, deism, and the place of women in society. Moreover, this debate has been specifically deployed in shaping the frameworks of the discourses of global showdowns rather than being limited to local figures. This chapter aims to identify the problems faced and opportunities that exist and to evaluate them from perspective of the Islamic Renewal Movement's significant experience of more than a century.

The tension between transformation (*Tahawwul*) and remaining true to one's self (*Tahaffuz*)

Early modernization theories, assuming that religion had fulfilled its role, replaced the sacred with the rational in life. According to this approach, the sacred should be left in the heavens, and

ideas and life should be arranged according to earthly principles. This new theology, built upon an anthropocentric world vision, has been defined as Enlightenment in the history of European thought (Kant, 1784/1983).

As a new human design, this European ideology over time projected its views on the universe and life onto the non-European world (İnalcık, 1992, p. 53). An intense effort is known to have occurred in the Islamic world that followed Western philosophy in trying to understand the philosophy of life as shaped by modernity. While some of the policy makers and intellectuals who made this effort preferred to be a part of the Enlightenment thought, others preferred to preserve the historical heritage as it is.[1] A third community found it necessary to both take a stance against the Enlightenment attitude and confront the weaknesses of the accumulation that its civilization had inherited.[2] This line, which I refer to as the Islamic Renewal Movement, is commonly called Islamism today.

Recalling the main currents of the Islamic tradition in order to ground our conceptualization of the Islamic Renewal Movement may enable its connection to the classical Islamic tradition to be seen. Therefore, the chapter begins by contextualizing the historical Islamic experience. According to Fahreddin al-Razi's classification, two main attitudes can be discussed in the Islamic tradition. One of these lines is the practical and narrative tradition based on the Medina Custom. The second is the mental-theoretical approach that develops an attitude based on the priority of solving the questions/problems Muslims face as a result of encountering different cultures using a dynamic method (er-Râzî, 1986, p. 389; İbn Haldûn, 1981, pp. 1017–1028).

Elmalılı Hamdi Efendi is one of the people who showed the possibilities for talking about the issue within the tradition of Islamic science at a time when the tension between changing and preserving its own identity was at the highest level (Yazır, 1909). Elmalılı tried to explain the issue by asking the question: "Will *fiqh* make new expansions to meet the needs of the time and the environment, or will it withdraw into itself and drag the country into a bigotry?" Elmalılı's answer to this question on one of the famous discussion topics of the period, "whether Islam is an obstacle in the way of progress" (as cited in Corm, 2011, p. 41) is important in terms of showing virtue in determining the relationship between the "new" and the "traditional." According to Hamdi Efendi, the concept of progress has a versatile and relative meaning.[3] Nothing in the world alone can provide progress. Real progress is about having virtue. This is because the happiness of society is ensured through virtue. However, virtue means to compromise with oneself for the sake of public good, to prioritize the interests of society over one's personal interests. According to Elmalılı Hamdi Efendi, the only agent of such a renunciation is religion (Yazır, 2011, p. 262). Therefore, progress according to him means to not condescend the values of the past but to bring them to higher values through modifications and new discoveries. What needs to be done for this is to add the values left by those who lived in the past to the values of those who come after (Yazır, 1923, p. 16).

Elmalılı Hamdi Efendi makes an explanation within the framework of the principle of unity. According to him, renewal does not mean giving up being oneself, but revealing the opportunities of the principle of unity [unity of God] to regain existence within its different dimensions. In this way, preserving the existence of the Islamic *ummah* becomes possible as long as a renewal that will meet both theoretical-practical [mental-actual] and material-spiritual needs can be achieved (Yazır, 1923, pp. 34–35).

This modest attitude is not unique to Hamdi Efendi, but can be seen in his contemporary scholars, as well. One of these sound scholars is Babanzade Ahmed Naim Bey, who made the statement in his thesis that made an important proposal for preventing the change from causing a shift in direction that in fact acknowledged: "What we cannot remain indifferent to is to discover what has existed for a long time, rather than to reveal something new" (Naim, 1331 AH,

p. 5). Elmalılı Hamdi Efendi's idea of renewing the exercise by preserving the principles of the explicit provisions express the same *usul* in a different way.

What does Islamism say?

The varying meanings that different people attribute to the concept of Islamism confronts people with certain difficulties in evaluating the concept. Defining as Islamist terrorist organizations that have been deployed as the other of the asymmetric war under the leadership of the United States, and are based on violence, aggravates this difficulty. This stems from the fact that the concept has become ordinary in a way that includes wider concerns, categories, and orientations on a socio-cultural basis (Subaşı, 2015). On the other hand, the forms of the concept based on *tajdid* [novation] and *ihya* [improvement] proposing a purifying, pan-Islamist, anti-imperialist, pluralist, participatory, and libertarian structure that reshapes itself within the framework of needs also makes use the concept of Islamism in a common sense difficult. However, the main principle inherent in the acquis of the concept is the same in general terms: the strong mobilization of the Islamic sentiment to build a new civilization (Subaşı, 2015). In other words, the main principle is to have Islam speak to the perceptions of the current century (Ersoy, 2008, p. 403). In fact, those who define Islamism as "an ideology of liberation" point to exactly this truth.[4] Based on this emphasis, Islamism can be defined on the one hand as the effort at having Islam re-dominate life under the conditions of the new world, and on the other hand as a self-defense movement against the West.

Given this historical context, the aforementioned discussions should be admitted as having a factual correspondence. Differences in approaches toward specific issues do not change this fact. For example, Muslims, who started to disintegrate with the invasion of some Islamic regions and the effect of nationalist movements, understandably brought the concept of *ummah* again to the agenda as a remedy. Likewise, the fact that Muslims who need restructuring in order to make sense of their weakness against the West and overcome this problem see deficiencies in the current administrative structure and engage in discussions about the nature of the proper type of administration (İnayet, 1988, p. 99). As Mohammad Ikbal (2002, p. 217) pointed out, Islam started to mean being in a problematic situation in the eyes of others, because Islam depicts a world with problems that can be listed as poverty, despair, struggling in conflicts, and being incapable of resisting the occupation.

This defect that Iqbal speaks of constitutes one aspect of the issue. The other aspect was the alienation between the public and the thinkers who were in a position to guide them. Like Iqbal, Said Halim Pasha saw problems in scholars' attitudes toward change. This is because the scholars were stuck on the periphery of a conservatively rigid attitude due to not having acted properly in determining what was dispensable. However, Said Halim Pasha stated the intellectuals to have had extremist attitudes because they could not determine a limit to change and to have been alienated from the public because they had discarded the values that had brought them into existence and therefore were unable to fulfill their pioneering role.[5] In this context, explaining the issue by talking about the four main determinations and, in a sense, proposals made by the different scholars for different contexts would be appropriate.

Proposal 1: necessity of renewal

The existing situation was unsustainable in the face of the successive defeats and increasing Western influence. One of the most striking expressions showing how this situation was perceived by the Muslims of the period was expressed by Said-i Nursî as "*eski hâl muhâl, ya yeni*

hâl ya izmihlâl" ["Impossible to return to the old order, either adopt a new state or collapse"] (Bediu'z-Zaman, 1339 AH, pp. 51–53). In his answer to a question in the treatise called *Münazarat*, Said-i Nursî pointed out few important truths as a scholar who had taken on the mental background that manifestation has no repetition to show his interlocutors the changing conditions of the period. First, repeating what had happened and going back in history is impossible. Hence, living with the fears of the past is pointless. Second, creating a new state is natural and, in fact, necessary. For this reason, those who do not fulfill the requirements of the situation perish.

One of the fundamental questions to ask here may be: "Does what is conceptualized as a new state not lead to a transformation that makes Muslims no longer themselves?" This is a question that the Islamists of the time were also aware of. In fact, considering the conditions of the period, concern about Europe's influence was natural. The *seyl-i huruşan* [flood of enthusiasm], which is included in many texts of the period, had great transformative power. For this reason, a stance had to be determined by taking its power into account. The real issue seems to have arisen at the point of determining this stance. Those who claimed that joining the flow or identifying another path was necessary shaped the main currents of modern Turkish thought. As I have stated before, the line that proposed joining the flow can be called Westernism, the approach that stated the renewal of historical heritage would lead to a break from its own course can be called the traditional-conservative attitude, and the mainstream that sees the possibility of following a middle path between the two options can be called Islamism.

The procedural proposal of following a different path also constitutes the second main proposition of Islamism. One of these two propositions can be seen in the phrase "What we cannot remain indifferent to is to discover what has existed for a long time, rather than to reveal something new" in Babanzade's preface of his translation titled *Mebadi-i Felsefe'den İlmü'n-Nefs* (Naim, 1331 AH, p. 5). The second proposition points to an important distinction between the demand for Western-modernist change and the proposal for renewal within the framework of Islamic Renewal in showing both their own and the interlocutor's perceptions. Interestingly, this second emphasis is also included in the preface to a translation of the history of European philosophy. This time, Elmalılı Hamdi Efendi was the translator. His proposition: "Progress is not for condoning past assets but for bringing them to higher values through modification and new discoveries: namely to add the values left by those who came before to that of those who come later" (Yazır, 1923, p. 16), which he expressed in the introduction to the translation of *Metalib and Mezâhib*, recommends both maintaining contact with one's own historical experiences and reshaping them by rearranging them with new discoveries in order to overcome problems.

Proposal 2: the importance of exploring the ancient for a new construction

Coming to the second proposition, which shows Islamism's approach about what should be protected and what should be changed (Naim, 1331 AH, p. 5). Islamist intellectuals of the period see the discovery of the ancient as a more enduring and primary effort, though perhaps more difficult than revealing the new. According to Babanzade Ahmed Naim, what one needs to do today is to discover what has always existed rather than to reveal something new (Naim, 1331 AH, p. 5).

The third proposition, as proposed by Elmalılı Hamdi Efendi, will help clarify the difference between the Westernist-modernist demand for change and the renewal effort of Islamism on the axis of Babanzade's proposition.

Proposal 3: developing by adding the new to the old

Understanding Islamism within the context of itself necessitates positioning it somewhere within the unity of Islamic history. Elmalılı Hamdi Efendi's statements as follow show that understandable reasons are found as to why the scholars had a prudent attitude toward change.[6] Elmalılı interpreted the strict anti-change attitude of the ulama as a deficiency in the perception of reality (Yazır, 1924, pp. 49–52).

Elmalılı Hamdi Efendi's rejection of the frivolous attitude that "wants to cut off all of its relevance to the past" and Said Halim Pasha's previously mentioned explanations about his distinction between the methods of change by adjusting and change by transforming should be seen as explanations of the same preference. In the method of change by adjusting, the needs arising from new conditions are satisfied and solutions are found for new problems while preserving the principles forming identity. In the method of change by transforming, essential things are abandoned on the other hand and replaced by different principles and institutions. These evaluations from Elmalılı and Said Halim Pasha show that one does not need to choose between protecting one's own identity and acting in accordance with the requirements of historical-social change; on the contrary, one can renew by preserving the constants that make up the self (Yazır, 1909, pp. 18, 404). Elmalılı's arguments on this issue were a summary of the Islamist acceptance whereby proceeding without having to go through a state of constriction between staying oneself and historical-social change is possible. Moreover, the fact that a scholar like Elmalılı, who was a member of the classical madrasah tradition, had not only added the knowledge of other religious schools to the opportunities of his own science and school's tradition, but had also viewed awareness of the European acquis as being essential is an important example of open-mindedness. However, this openness does not permit alienating Muslims by citing the European experience, as this does not meet their own needs or solve their problems but rests upon the ease of taking what is ready rather than finding a solution derived from their own tradition (Yazır, 1909, p. 415).

Proposal 4: the politics of Islamization as a holistic life order

By stating that Muslims' decline could only be overcome by reformed change, the advocates of Westernist intellectual thought claimed that religion in its most optimistic form could survive as a conscientious principle through the impact of the modernist paradigm, which they saw as the solution because this new world, shaped by the decisive victory of the Europeans, could only be rendered in this way (Asad, 2003, pp. 30–37). According to Westerners, no other way existed for Muslims to be able to survive. In fact, this was not a choice but a necessity: "They can only procure their national assets subject to this trend" (Cevdet, 1905, p. 70).

Said Halim Pasha saw the solution to be in Islamizing life with all its branches. The term Islamization also expresses a much more comprehensive and concise definition than Islamism does, in my opinion. According to Said Halim Paşa (2019, p. 149), Islamization consists of interpreting the knowledge and beliefs, ethics, science, and politics of Islam in the most appropriate way for the needs of the time and the environment, and also acting in accordance with them.

Undoubtedly, the aforementioned propositions of the projection of Islamization had a dynamism that reshaped itself in the historical process. The stages through which another existence apart from the rejectionist modernist attitude and the conservative attitude that does not allow a renewal to maintain its vitality in the face of changing conditions has reached the present day is now explained.

The centennial course of Islamism

Periodizing the history of a thought and/or movement within the framework of certain criteria essentially requires accepting that a historical-sociological existence reshapes itself as it encounters new situations. Although periodizing a century-long time interval is possible in many ways, the work talks about four periods by taking into account the changes in the local power processes with the changes in the position of Muslims in the world system and the serious differences in the intellectual and institutional enterprises that affected or were affected by these changes.

The first period: the pre-nation-state period (before 1924)

This period involves an important part of the 19th century and the first quarter of the 20th century, which was the downturn period of the Ottoman Empire. During this period, Islamism was shaped by an anti-imperialist attitude and had the priority of reviving the Islamic nation [*ummah*], and one of the most common agenda topics of the period was the issue of the Union of Islam. Of course, the Islamists of the period, who had a serious civic and scientific background, did not interpret the course of events only through external influences. What separates Islamism from traditional rejectionism can even be said to precisely stem from its approach to this issue. The Islamists' very confident behavior can be seen in the differentiation shaped around both their own historical heritage and the issue of how to respond to the new. Indeed, the Islamist approach toward determining the opportunities and limits of renewal took shape in the context of whether what was new was compatible with the truth and whether it corresponded to the need.

While some Islamists of the period criticized the established understanding of religion as having been shaped by false interpretations, regarded it as fatalistic, and saw creating inner vitality and renewal to be required by current conditions, other Islamists were based on preserving a pro-traditional framework in order not to be subject to degeneration. The magazine *Sırat-ı Müstakim* [*The Straight Path*] was a gathering place for the first group of Islamists, and the magazine *Beyânu'l-Hak* [*Declaration of God*] was for the second group. Although some Islamists sought outside of these two main trends, these two leanings can be said to constitute the main differentiation. Authors such as Said Halim Pasha, Mehmed Akif, Şeyhülislam Musa Kazım Efendi, Babanzade Ahmed Naim Bey, Mehmed Ali Aynî, Şehbenderzade Ahmed Hilmi, Elmalılı Hamdi Efendi, Şeyhülislam Mustafa Sabri Efendi, and Tahiru'l-Mevlevi were the most published in these magazines, which began printing after the Second Constitutional Monarchy. Said-i Nursî, an important name of the period, wrote in *Volkan* magazine, which followed a more populist course.

Despite the differences reflected in the agendas and languages of the Ottoman Muslims, who were the followers of a relatively independent state, the basic propositions of Islamism at this stage can be discussed under the following headings.

Anti-imperialism

Putting an end to the occupation inevitably became a priority on the agenda of statesmen and scholars who were responsible for a country whose lands had been continually occupied since the end of the 17th century. For this reason, a consciousness was formed in almost all discussions of the period against exploitation politics, which had gained a global dimension with the occupations by European states.

Unity of Islam

During this period, a large part of the Islamic nation was occupied. Almost all Muslims – with the exceptions of the Ottoman Empire, Iran, and Afghanistan – were under colonial rule. The Ottomans, Iran, and Afghanistan, however, were under the influence of European states and Russia. Thus, this practical situation almost led to a consensus over the need for a policy of solidarity among Muslims. The pioneers of the period, who saw cooperation as a necessity, reinforced this approach with concepts such as Islamic brotherhood, unity, caliphate, and Islamic *ummah*, and brought the issue to a conceptual framework on the basis of Islamic legitimacy (Reşid Rıza, 2015).

Renewal and revival

The 11th verse of Surah Ra'd, which Islamists of the period referred to as a motto, shows that Muslim scholars perceived the problem primarily along the axis of their own weaknesses, and therefore they thought that the collapse they experienced had happened to them because of their own weaknesses. In this context, the proposals for what needed to be done can be gathered under six headings.

1 The first is returning to the sources. Widespread emphasis on returning to the Quran and the Sunnah of the prophet were seen to be found as a source of legitimacy for renewal.
2 The second is developing the idea of jihad in a new and comprehensive sense. This acceptance considers mobilizing opportunities in all areas that need repair as the duty to overcome their own weaknesses and fight the enemy. Therefore, interpreting jihad not only as a war but as a comprehensive effort to improve all areas of life is seen as one of the basic acceptances of Islamism.
3 The third is abandoning imitation in thought and inertia in action by transforming the fatalistic belief and moral understanding that prevails over a large part of the *ummah*. The aim is to form believers who assume responsibility for their own action instead of the understanding that expects every problem to be solved by Allah.
4 The fourth is to gain competence in *ijtihad*. Acknowledging the necessity of a new accumulation in order to overcome the problems the new situations had cause and forming competence to meet the needs of new situations was only possible by overcoming mediocre thinking styles and gaining the competence of *ijtihad*.
5 The fifth is to establish a new education system that will also compensate for the lack of science: The successive defeats of Muslims in the face of the productions brought about by the intellectual vitality and scientific accumulation that made Europeans strong were not seen as a problem that could be overcome by preserving the old education system as it was. For this reason, renewing the education system was assumed to be the basis for overcoming the problems experienced.
6 The sixth is a management proposal based on the *shura*. According to the Islamists, authoritarian regimes were principally improper because they are not based on the principle of *shura* and suppress the internal dynamism of the society by blocking society's channels of participation. For this reason, having the administration be based on the *shura* in principle and be one that encourages the participation of different segments of society in the process had importance.

While determining what was important, some prioritized the reform of thought and humanity, while others directly considered the fortification of institutions and political power

as central. The first course was represented by Muhammed Abduh and Mehmed Akif, and the second one was represented by many Muslim pioneers, especially Efgânî. Meanwhile, Said Halim Pasha reflected the opportunities of a holistic struggle that did not ignore the difference between historical-sociological reality and the nature of political reality, or neglect either of the lines in his works (Said Halim Paşa, 2019). Undoubtedly, the main goal of almost all of these approaches was to bring Islam to its purity in the Age of Happiness and to re-activate the role of Islam in changing world conditions. As can be clearly seen in the works of the aforementioned pioneer figures, Islamism prioritized a method that could on one hand ensure preserving what was to be preserved, while changing what needed to be changed on the other.[7]

Second period: the abolition of the caliphate and the establishment of nation-states (1924–1960)

March 3, 1924 was a turning point that led to radical changes in the course of Islamist thought. The three laws enacted in the National Assembly of the Republic of Turkey liquidated the scientific, political, and social institutions that had been shaped in the previous periods. The abolition of the caliphate led to discussions on political legitimacy, and the abolition of the Ministry of Sharia and Foundations led to the transfer of the facilities of all kinds of non-state bodies such as foundations to the state and eventually to the state monopolization of all scientific institutions with the enacting of the *Tawhid-i Tedrisat* [Unification of Education Law].

In this period, known as the Age of Islamic Movements, Islamists prioritized the rebuilding of the Islamic personality, on the one hand, and the Islamic state, on the other hand, with the priority being to fill the gap left behind by the collapsed state, the scholars who had lost their leadership, and the *fiqh* that was rapidly moving away from being a reference point. For this purpose, they embarked on organized efforts. This is how Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Jamaat-i Islami [Islamic Community], and Hizbu't-Tahrir [Salvation Party] emerged.

The religious life and the world of ideas that had been a part of Turkey lost their traditional institutions and foundation due to the tight clampdown from oppressive policies. As a result, issues appeared on the agenda such as how to interpret the existing political order in Turkey, how to create a fairer political order, how to resolve the problems the modernist paradigm had caused in its singular design of education, and how to position society in terms of gender.

In these single-party years, when all channels for political and social participation were closed, communities such as *Süleymanism* and *Nurizm*, and sects such as *Naqshbandi*, carried the religious envisagement of the society through secret activities (Büyükkara, 2006, p. 113). Undoubtedly, emphasis needs to be placed on the special position the Religious Affairs Administration had in this process. Religious Affairs played the role of counterbalancing the demands of the state for modernization, on the one hand, and the widely accepted Islamic vision and practices, on the other hand. Likewise, although the written sources do not make much mention, the madrasas [Muslim theological schools], which continued under the difficult conditions and were subject to prosecution, can easily be said to have undertaken a serious mission in this sense. Although they did not compose their curricula or activities directly as a political priority, the tragic rupture that had occurred from the classical curriculum that had been taught to the present, as well as the personalities and sensitivities of the scholars, laid the groundwork for the formation of an opposition, at the very least. Even today, finding those who witnessed these observations is not difficult, especially in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolian madrasas.[8]

The third period: domestic opposition (1960–1980)

The Independence and *Nahda* [Awakening] movements in the Arab world, the Independence movement on the Indian subcontinent, and the single-party government leading the way for the transition to the multi-party period in Turkey as a result of both internal and external motives being enforced played a decisive function in shaping this period. Turkey's previously held tight stance on keeping religious life and broadcasting as a whole under control was partly shaken after 1945. In the Republican People's Party (CHP) Congress, which can be considered as the beginning of a transition period in 1947, some signs were given about how the tension created by society's religious feelings could be used for political maneuverings. In this context, the opening of Imam Hatip schools (religious vocational schools) and the appointment of a former Islamist, Şemseddin Günaltay, to the Prime Ministry can be interpreted as indicators of a different political pursuit. This process bears the concern of causing the opposition's attack to fail, on the one hand, and to appropriately reorganize the increasingly crippled social structure in the integrated context of religion, on the other hand. However, no deep intellectual concern or comprehensive project can be seen to have been proposed under these decisions. Given that these changes took place on the eve of the 1950 elections, bringing the needs and opposition that had accumulated in society under control was what was being hoped for.

The Democrat Party (DP), which took over power in 1950, was more inclined than the CHP to open up some space for religious practices. With the DP's victory in the 1950 elections, the revival of religious life began, accompanied with official relief attempts as a reflection of this policy. The number and diversity of published journals published clearly reflect this revival. As can be seen in the information imprinted by the journals, a rapid movement had started in the publishing world at the end of the 1940s. While the names of the journals mostly referred to religious sources, the promotional texts under the journal names were mostly expressed through words such as religious, moral, scientific, and literary. In a sense, this situation also shows a certain uneasiness and can be read as an effort at moving carefully in a new environment. The seedbed magazines can be said to have been formed around a language that took local dynamics into account more intensely. As a matter of fact, most of the journals published in this period attempted to redefine the nationalist understanding in a way that was compatible with Islam.

The journal *Büyük Doğu* [*The Great East*], as well as *Hareket* [*Movement*] magazine, can be seen as some of the efforts to bring Turkish nationalism together with Islam. The attitude that later led to the Turkish-Islamic synthesis can be said to have been a search for an answer to the identity crisis caused by Turkey's modernization policies, which were more specifically needed after World War II. As a matter of fact, new problems were encountered as the number of people migrating to cities increased and the traditional relations of society dissolved. In addition to this, the unfamiliarity of the official ideology with the values of the people can be understood more accurately as the reason why Necip Fazıl had established his language with both an Islamic and a nationalist conceptual framework. This discourse can be said to have been based on a framework that was aware of the state-drawn boundaries, on the one hand, and on forcing these boundaries in favor of the religious demands and needs of the people, on the other hand.

Meanwhile, Muslims in Turkey – encountering an accumulation of Islamic movements beyond the national borders during this period – distanced themselves from the nationalist discourse that had been formed, especially those before 1950, and strengthened during the Cold War years. In the process, a variety of magazines can be observed; the aforementioned course seems to have increasingly begun to shape the intellectual and political language of Turkey. This new language allowed for a critique of the established understanding of religion in Turkey and positioned its differences with the conservative-right-wing religiosity in a conceptual

framework by redefining such concepts as *dar'ul harp* [territory of war], *dar'ül İslam* [territory of peace], *rab* [Lord], Islamic Caliph, people, worshiping, the country, and the nation-state. This discourse, which has a pan-Islamist understanding, expanded and deepened after 1980 and contributed to the appeal of the Islamist community.

During this period, a relative flexibility in the constitutional framework was created as a result of both global changes and domestic political developments. Constitutional flexibility triggered an observable revival in the world of thought. Thus, the Muslims in Turkey – whose connections with the world had been severed under the supervision of a single-party administration – began to be affected by the *acquis* in other regions of the Islamic nation [*ummah*] that had emerged in the age of the nation-state. A serious loss of altitude had occurred within the boundaries of the Turkish Republic that liquidated all kinds of concepts and institutions, as well as the sociality of Islamic existence. When looking at the enlightenment resources the Muslims in Turkey had before the translations made in the 1960s, the limitedness of the opportunities for comprehending the era can easily be seen both numerically and qualitatively. Therefore, the Muslims of Turkey had understandably been seriously affected by the Jamaat-i Islami in Pakistan under the guidance of Mawdudi and by the acquis of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt and Syria.

A movement that emerged on the basis of the relative relaxation that emerged in the same period, differentiated not only by its wide openness but also with its scattered interests and attempts at setting its own line in publications, can also more clearly be observed to have entered into an effort to dissociate. Nevertheless, Islamists were only able to clarify a specific political demand and strategy from the 1960s onward. The increase in the Islamists' contacts outside of Turkey can be said to have had a serious effect on shaping political demands, because Muslims in Turkey had found their imaginations to have been limited by the periphery of a life framed by nationalism as a result of the subjective conditions of the nation-state process. This was the most obvious shortcoming of the contacts in the Islamic world that they encountered. After a policy without the Ottoman Empire, Muslims in Turkey discovered the consciousness of becoming an Islamic nation again with great excitement through the works they read. This tendency, which started to find a response in ideas, art, and politics, led to an observable sociality in the last quarter of the 1970s.

The fourth period: the post-modern and post-Kemalist period (post-1980)

With the interventions of the Military Coup of September 20, 1980, almost all kinds of institutions, political formations, and ideological circles were banned. With the liquidation of organized structures, the younger generations began to debate the many concepts and conceptions that were being established in the name of the research and inquiry process rather than blindly accepting the homogeneous claims created by institutional affiliations. In this context, studies on traditional Islamic concepts gained intensity, especially concepts such as Sunnah [habits and customs of the prophet], *bidat* [innovation], *tawhid* [oneness], *shirk* [disbelief], Sufism, and worship. This tendency aimed to create a new and healthy cultural climate by consecutively bringing many translations and studies on the Quran into Turkish (Ertürk, 1990, pp. 101–108).

Of course, explaining the radicalization process of Islamist thought in Turkey just by linking it only to external contacts as a mere reflection of neo-Salafism would be reductionist. As M. Ali Büyükkara (2006, pp. 115–116) indeed ascertained,

> even though Salafism was deeply rooted or external violence tendencies and takfirism are relatively dominant and fed by the same ideological and cultural resources in the

> Islamism of Indonesia, the Philippines, or Morocco, these features remained fairly superficial in Turkey.

The most important part of these elements is the existence of even a relatively independent state and the accumulation of Islamic knowledge that continues its existence, sometimes officially and sometimes illegally. For example, the fact that the literary discourses such as those of Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Sezai Karakoç, and Nuri Pakdil have a special place in the Islamic discourse in Turkey should be evaluated in this context.[9] Nevertheless, the fact that Islamists in Turkey continued to reinforce their contacts with the Islamic world in the second half of the 1970s, especially in Egypt and Syria, needs to be emphasized.

After World War II, however, and in parallel with the world, an axial change had occurred in terms of the military, politics, and paradigms in Turkey. The main transformation that was realized late in Turkey – which had been subjected to military and political sieges first with the United Nations and then with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as well as an economic siege with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund – was experienced as a siege in the world of mentality. Thus, Turkey found itself surrounded by an anti-communist priority in the 1970s and with a framework that prioritized stopping the rising Islamist wave in the 1980s. Everything from politics to the structuring of education and from the regulations made in the economic system to international priorities was closely related to this climate. Nevertheless, the 1980s will remain in memory as a period in which radical thought and practices in Turkey were revealed at their highest level (Büyükkara, 2006, p. 130).

Contrary to the rise of radical discourse and circles, the line that existed as the National Order Party in 1970 and the National Salvation Party in 1972 was seen to have been unable to create a strong presence in the 1980s. The Welfare Party, the third party of the National Vision course, went through a rather ineffective process. With the cyclical change, the Welfare Party was the first partner of the government with the highest votes, heralding a new process. However, as a reflection of the concept of changing global order, the Welfare Party was overthrown as a result of the balance adjustment made with the post-modern coup. Balanced with the post-modern coup of February 28, 1997, Turkey was stabilized through a series of constitutional, military, administrative, and educational amendments.

The feeling that the language scholars, intellectuals, and communities used misses the current reality results in different segments of society, especially young generations and women, having problems with the current religious language. The need exists to negotiate this situation using a more comprehensive evaluation process rather than a language that leads to defining and marginalizing the situation such as "the corruption of women" or "transforming young people to deists." The current religious language used by preachers will apparently continue to exist unless what is to be protected, changed, and abstained from in the historical heritage gets clarified in the process of negotiations. This language is not enough for understanding, explaining, and determining the current reality.

Conclusion

Muslims these days are caught between the mental bluntness in Islamist circles that proposes *tajdid* [renewal] and the imperative language of traditionalist discourse that appears ahistorical. Being under an overly introverted agenda also sustains this tension. A heavy air is currently being inhaled whereby almost every Islamic claim is perceived as a problem center by another devout Muslim community. A language has suddenly circulated in which everyone tries to define themselves with historical identities while demonizing others. The perception of threat has been put on the

periphery of Muslims' vicious internal conflicts. Even developments in the region are evaluated through this perception of an internal threat. These and similar motives force Islamist imaginaries to live in a period of pragmatic rule. Undoubtedly, many political utopias have resulted with totalitarian regimes and organizational structures that contributed to this conclusion.

In summary, Islamism based its existence in the 19th century on two main elements. The first of these elements was based on making sense of and repairing the internal weaknesses and overcoming the colonial siege. In fact, the preference of existence built on these two elements was based on both a realistic and encompassing point of view. For this reason, any construction activity to be undertaken today will not be able to go a long way without considering these two principles. Any understanding that neglects or devaluates one of these points will continue to either end up in an adventure that ends with mass disappointments or be buried in a way that does not lead to its purpose. However, the point that needs to be considered today is acting with the realization that the intention to achieve these goals is primarily necessary but not sufficient for achieving the purpose.

Islamists have currently reached a point where the issue is either based on constructing a new system or participating in the current one. The narrowing of Islamists' understanding of construction and opposition needs to be discussed at this point. In my opinion, speaking about or deploying Islamism as a discourse and opposition within the nation-state is not the proper approach, for Islamism expresses the Muslim stance against the modernist paradigm, on the one hand, while expressing the struggle to renew its historical heritage, on the other hand. Reducing Islamism to a stance opposed to national power rather than a total opposition to imperialism while ignoring the possibility of building a different life would be a serious error in assessment. Carefully reading the following lines from Mehmed Akif Ersoy (2008, pp. 160–195), which evaluate what happened as a whole, will be sufficient for determining the validity of this judgment.

Sırr-ı terakkinizi siz,	[You are the secret to your progress]
Başka yerlerde taharriye heveslenmeyiniz.	[Do not desire to search for it elsewhere]
Onu kendinde bulur yükselecek bir millet;	[A nation that will rise finds it within itself]
Çünkü her noktada taklid ile sökmez hareket.	[Because movement through imitation does not work at every point]
Alınız ilmini Garb'ın, alınız san'atini;	[Receive the West's knowledge, receive its art]
Veriniz hem de mesaînize son sür'atini.	[And also give your effort with full haste]
Çünkü kâbil değil artık yaşamak bunlarsız;	[For without these, survival is impossible]
Çünkü milliyyeti yok san'atin, ilmin; yalnız,	[For alone there is no nation, no art, no science]
İyi hâtırda tutun ettiğim ihtârı demin:	[Remember well the warning I have just given]
Bütün edvâr-ı terakkîyi yarıp geçmek için,	[To plow through all the circles of progress]
Kendi "mâhiyyet-i rûhiyye" niz olsun kılavuz.	[May your natural spirituality be your guide]
Çünkü beyhûdedir ümmîd-i selâmet onsuz.	[Because without it, the hope for peace is in vain]

Akif's verses are a summary of the thoughts of the lead author of *Sirat al-Mustaqeem* magazine, which had constituted the most important environment of Islamist discourse in Akif's time. Here, Akif should be remembered as the person who wrote the Turkish national anthem as the text of the broadest social consensus that had occurred during the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. Therefore, making an assessment of what Islamism is would certainly be more accurate by taking it on the axis of such a text instead of current indicators. If this were to happen, the attitudes of Islamists could be seen in the face of both past knowledge and discussions on innovation. As can be clearly understood from Akif's verses, the Islamist imagination adapts to contact within the framework of both principles and needs rather than fighting with tradition and the new situation. This attitude can be said to be the most fundamental choice that distinguishes Islamism from traditionalist rejectionism and modernist rejectionism.

Notes

1 These movements, which adopted the "idea of progress" of the West, developed in the second half of the century in many other non-European states and colonies besides the Ottoman Empire. Most of those who led these movements were "intellectuals" from the developing middle class of those countries (M Abu-Rabi, 1996, p. 10).
2 For the effects of this period on intellectuals, see Ülken (1966, pp. 33–120).
3 "*Terakki öyle bir mefhum-i âmmdır ki müteallikine ve gayesine göre birçok medlûller ile alakadardır*" ["Progress is such a general concept that it can be used in different ways depending on the place and purpose of use"] (Yazır, 2011, p. 261).
4 For different evaluations on the nature of Islamism, see Karpat (2001, pp. 7–38).
5 For a literary description of this situation, see Ersoy (2015, pp. 46–60).
6 For a detailed assessment of the role of the scholars in modernization/innovation efforts, see Cihan (2004), Bein (2011).
7 In this context, the following works can be viewed as important documents of the language formed: Said Halim Paşa (2019), Yazır (2011), Ersoy (2008).
8 Regarding the witnesses to this tradition, see Çelen (2013), Öztoprak (2003).
9 Regarding these people's position on Turkish Islamism, see Büyükkara, (2006, pp. 116–119).

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10

THE ADVENTURE OF ISLAMISM IN EGYPT

A political system–based analysis

Muhammed Hüseyin Mercan

Introduction

Egypt has a special place in the formation and development of Islamic thought and Islamic movements. Being the land from which important thoughts and movements that influenced the Islamic world have originated, Egypt has a central and unignorable place in studies on Islamism. The fact that thinkers who are considered as the founding fathers of Islamism were either Egyptian or lived in Egypt at some point in time has resulted in an increased number of references to this country and an understanding of the early journey of Islamism through the political dynamics of Egypt. In addition, the Society of the Muslim Brothers, which can be regarded as the first organized political structure in Muslim societies to have been built upon an aim and discourse based on Islamic order, was established in Egypt, which clearly exhibits the importance of the country in the Islamic thought.

The Islamic world substantially lost ground in the political realm in the 19th century, and the resulting economic and social crises compelled the scholars and intellectuals of the Muslim geography to embark upon new quests. The manifestation of various approaches to reinterpret the religion and political order in the Muslim geography implied the formation of a new intellectual framework. Just at this point, Egypt became the center of different proposals presented for solutions to the crises as a country where the Westernization strategy had been implemented decisively and Western forces had increased their influence to exploit the authority gap resulting from the weakening of the Ottoman Empire.

In the new nation-state–centered system established after World War I, the nature of political power and how an Islamic order could be formed under such circumstances became the main subjects of debate in Islamic thought. Thus, Islamic thought extended beyond theological- [*fiqh*-]centered discussions and became centered around and repositioned through political order. With reference to the assumption that the Islamization of society and system is possible only by adopting a stance against Western politics and questioning the global order, Islamic thought in Egypt can be claimed to have formed due to the need to leave *kalam* or *fiqh* discussions aside and talk about political and social areas directly. This chapter will describe the development of Islamic thought in Egypt and how it became settled and discuss the turning points in its history within the theoretical framework of Islamic thought.

The nature of Islamic thought and its first manifestation in Egypt

Islamic thought and the Islamic movement that can be described as the institutionalized version of Islamic thought differ from other religious movements that have a social base. The main reason for this difference is that, along with attributing a new identity to its members who adopt and follow its proposed methods, it also contains the idea of political order within itself. This identity goes beyond the religious Muslim profile where the imperatives and prohibitions of Islam are respectively practiced and avoided in individual life, and instead constructs a Muslim individual who reasons within a new political framework. At this point, the Islamic movement should be described as an institution that created a Muslim identity revolving around the idea of order whereby Islamic thought with its settled rules and attributed values is concretized and provides an identity for its members.

The main purpose of this institution of individuals who had adopted the Islamist identity was to establish an order based on the basic principles and legal aspects of Islam. Through these aspects, an Islamist can be defined as a person who tries to place Islam at the center of the political system, puts their Muslim identity at the center of the political practice, taps into the conceptual world of Islam when dealing with their political goals, and sees their political future in Islam (Sayyid, 2000, p. 37). As indicated by this definition, an Islamist following an Islamic movement shapes their entire realm of values and political practices through an ideology and thought system centered around Islam.

Islamist thinking essentially has a characteristic that questions the idea of the order produced by Western politics and challenges its policies with an alternative point of view. The reductionist approaches toward Islamic thinking from some thinkers such as Oliver Roy, a prominent name in the literature on Islamism, have resulted in the essence of this thought system being neglected as a form of Islamism. According to Roy (2005, pp. 17–18), Islamists find not only a religion but also an ideology in the Qur'an, and they aim to obtain state power and transform society by referencing this ideology. However, Islamist thought has a much deeper and more comprehensive theoretical foundation than this that cannot be reduced to the idea of state administration or absolute acquisition of political power in order to achieve its goals. Such a definition is nothing but a deficient, directive, and unidimensional explanation. Islamic thinking aims to establish a Muslim subjectivity and to create a politic through the values it attributes to its members as well as to provide a vision of order based on Islamic principles. This politic, beyond being "projects aiming to take control of the state power with a singular founding action (revolution)" involves an "intellectual-moral reform strategy" (Sayyid, 2000, p. 38).

The most explicit characteristic of Islamic thinking is that it does not take concepts such as religion, politics, life, and order under separate and distinct categories, but approaches all these concepts holistically. Therefore, the main motives behind the development of Islamic thinking include taking a position against the tension felt in Muslim societies alongside the modernization and secularization process, and resisting the idea of the new order that had emerged as the religion was separated from life and political realm (Kepel, 2014, p. 24). Movements that adopt this line of thought assume an approach that includes becoming personally involved in the process and taking responsibility as opposed to being isolated from society and the political realm. This is because the structures created by Islamist thought have an institutionalized and collective nature to include the people who carry out Islam's project of reorganizing society in a way to manage the lives of all the segments of society (Al-Qardhawi, 1990, p. 5). Therefore, the formation of movements supported by Islamist thought has been directly related to political developments and their effects within the environment Islamists live in.

The roots of the Islamic thought in Egypt are usually attributed to Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (1838–1897) and Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905). Undoubtedly, the fact that Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood, had been influenced by these names suggests their crucial role in the Islamist organization to be undeniable; however, reducing Islamism and the Islamic movement to the ideas of these thinkers limits Islamism itself (Saeed, 2013, p. 31).

Afghani emphasized that Muslim societies would weaken unless they genuinely understood Islam (Hourani, 2014, p. 135). What renders Afghani important in the development of Islamist thought is that he did not regard the issues of renaissance and reform as theological issues, but instead offered a more political perspective centered around the idea of Islamic unity. (Weismann, 2001, p. 232).

On the other hand, Muhammad Abduh, who is referenced more than Afghani within the Islamist literature, did not reflect on the practice and opportunities of politics in relation to the vision of political order as much as Afghani did, though he was positioned against imperialism politically. The main reason for this was his focus on making reforms in the areas of education and thought resulting from his lack of confidence in political institutions because of the developments and increasing influence of the British in Egyptian political life (Nafi, 2012, p. 32). Abduh placed an emphasis on Egyptianism and gave importance to nationalist elements in his thought (Hourani, 2014, p. 179). The obvious intertwining of Egyptian nationalism with Abduh's thinking is one of the major causes of his failure in developing a consistent and explicit vision about how Islam should be positioned in global politics.

After Mohammad Abduh, Mohammad Rashid Rida is the most important name in the development of Islamist thought. Rashid Rida (1865–1935), who passed on Abduh's ideas to the next generation and – in a way – was Abduh's spokesperson, adopted a modernist approach by regarding the scholars as the greatest obstacle in the way of the Islamic world and Islamic reform. However, he tried to develop a political theory around the concept of the caliphate (Saeed, 2013, pp. 34–35). However, Rashid Rida believed that the caliph should oversee the making and implementation of laws rather than being an absolute ruler (Hourani, 2014, pp. 267–268).

The foundations of Islamism are often described in the related literature as an extension of the Afghani, Abduh, and Rashid Rida formulation. In this respect, Rashid Rida is seen to have influenced Islamist thought with a caliphate-oriented approach, while Afghani and Abduh mostly did it in regard to the resistance against colonialism. Within the scope of this influence, Islamism is a response to the victory of the colonial powers and the political, religious, intellectual, and profound inadequacies Arab and Muslim societies faced in the nascent political order, including the abolition of the caliphate (Ebu-Rabi, 2005, p. 106). This intellectual background and its ensuing tension revealed a new form of movements in Muslim societies around the search for political order (Hroub, 2010, p. 15). In addition, the separation of the elite that emerged during the colonial process from society due to the effect of modernization and Westernization and their contempt for and alienation from their own people provided serious momentum to the expansion and consolidation of the Islamic movement. (Ajami, 1981, p. 171). In this context, Egypt has succeeded in becoming the homeland of Islamism in terms of confronting the colonialists and creating a strong intellectual foundation for Islamic revival.

The birth and development of the organized Islamic movement in Egypt

Although the Muslim Brotherhood is the most well-known Islamic movement in Egypt, the Young Men's Muslim Association (Jamiyyat al-Shubban al-Muslimin), founded in 1927, can

be considered as the country's first organized Islamic movement (Botman, 1991, p. 116). The main program and activities of the Association focused on strengthening the bonds of brotherhood among Muslims, reviving the glorious days of Islam, and building a society under the guidance of Islam (Gershoni & Jankowski, 2002, p. 19). The most important factor in the emergence of the Association was the establishment of the Young Christians Association in 1923 with the support of American Protestant missionaries. In this context, the most important aims of the Association were to raise awareness among the Egyptian youth regarding missionary activities and to encourage Muslims to participate in social and political development (Sharkey, 2013, p. 99).

Young Muslims tried to operate mostly in social, cultural, and religious areas without ignoring the political sphere (Botman, 1991, pp. 116–117). The daily developments surrounding Palestine evolving into a new state and the increase in Jewish settlements in the region drew serious reactions from religious groups in Egypt. In this period, the Young Muslims Association was one of the most effective movements in Egypt in terms of mobilizing society against Zionism and supporting the Palestinians (Gershoni & Jankowski, 2002, p. 251). The association played an important role, especially in the widely attended Jerusalem Conference held in 1931 (Mayer, 1982, pp. 311–313).

The Young Muslims Association encouraged Hasan al-Banna to create a similar institution. The Muslim Brotherhood, whose foundations were laid in Ismailiyya in 1928, has great parallels with the Young Muslims in terms of its starting point (Husaini, 1956, p. 1). In this respect, the most important point of similarity between the two structures was that the founding period of the Brotherhood Organization was based on activities that promoted society's adoption of the Islamic lifestyle rather than any political character. At that time, Ismailiyya was the leader of the European-styled cities of Egypt, and the dominant administration of the British in the city had caused al-Banna to take on the responsibility of raising public awareness and warning society about the negative effects of Westernization. The Muslim Brotherhood can appropriately have been defined as a local and religious formation in the early periods and then to have turned into a completely political movement in the following periods. However, the headquarters of the movement were moved to Cairo in the summer of 1932 alongside al-Banna's request for being appointed to Cairo; this was the most important turning point in the history of the Muslim Brotherhood. The movement, which previously had conducted sermons and meetings in schools, mosques, houses, and coffeehouses, now faced a new environment by moving to the capital and evolved into a state where political, economic, and social aspects were also prominently added to the religious dimension (Zeki, 1980, pp. 21–22). Thus, the Brotherhood had succeeded in transforming from a local movement into a national structure that appealed to all of Egypt.

The late 1930s witnessed various turning points in the history of the Muslim Brotherhood. The organization, which was previously described as being in the process of reform and preparation, had also reached a stage where a performance-centered approach could prevail at this meeting, which took place on the tenth anniversary of the movement (Mitchell, 1993, p. 15). The Brotherhood, which had accelerated the politicization process with the Fifth Congress and showed that Islamist thought would become meaningless without a presence in the political order, also faced its first serious crisis within the organization when a group separated from the structure.

Some members who had been disturbed by the contacts the Brotherhood had established with the government and different political segments due to its influence in Egyptian politics started to express their objections during this period. These people expressly conveyed their dissatisfaction with al-Banna's attitude by not approving of his political strategy. They were of the

view that the politics being followed – especially regarding the Palestinian issue – were insufficient, that a more active method should be adopted, and that the struggle should be carried out in the form of military action. Al-Banna created a secret military wing under the umbrella of the Muslim Brotherhood, both to contribute to turning this idea into action and to better motivate the young members of the organization. The Scout Units that were already located in the organization could easily form the basis of this new structuring. Al-Banna mentioned in his memoirs that the members of the organization were given military training in the scout camps (el-Benna, 2007, pp. 437–439). In this way, al-Banna, who brought the Muslim Brotherhood to a new dimension, also gave the message that he would take an active role in establishing all the institutions required for an Islamic political order. In addition, the circular Ali Mahir Pasha issued on the organization of military training and maneuvers for students in all schools at that time gives important clues about the depth of the relationship the Muslim Brotherhood had established with the Palace and their common goals (Lia, 2000, p. 226).

Al-Banna completely adopted the notions that they should occupy the political arena at any cost, and that active politics should not be abandoned. The decisions made in the 5th General Assembly of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1941 was that the time had come to participate in the elections and be actively involved henceforth in politics, and these helped the movement evolve (Mitchell, 1993, pp. 26–27). Although al-Banna's application to participate in the elections in 1942 with 17 other members was forcefully withdrawn, al-Banna joined the election race with five other members of the organization in 1945 (Mitchell, 1993, pp. 27, 33). Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood added a new dimension to the Islamic movement by showing that their primary method for achieving power would be by staying within the system through the elections. Al-Banna's sensitivity toward struggling while remaining on legitimate political grounds is a guide for the modern Islamic tradition. The fundamental distinction the anti-systemic and violent groups that emerged in Egypt in the following years had with the Muslim Brotherhood was the method al-Banna had established of struggling within the system. The Muslim Brotherhood, which considered being recognized by official institutions and obtaining legal status to be important, was officially defined as a political, social, and religious organization by the Egyptian state authorities as a result of the application made to the Ministry of Social Affairs under the Law No. 49 on the "Establishment of Charities," enacted in 1945 (al-Sabbagh, 1407 AH, pp. 76–77; Mitchell, 1993, pp. 34–35).

The accelerated growth of the organization in the second half of the 1940s and its ability to carry out armed action caused a great crisis to arise between the then-Prime Minister Mahmood en-Nukhrashi Pasha and the Brotherhood. On December 8, 1948, the Muslim Brotherhood and its branches, immovable properties, publications, companies, and all assets were banned in accordance with Military Instruction No. 63 issued by the Ministry of the Interior (Husaini, 1956, p. 21; Helbawy, 2010, p. 72). All support given to the movement's aid organization was additionally announced to have been cut. At that time, the number of hospitals, schools, and assistance centers registered to the relevant ministry was around 500 (el-Bişri, 2002, p. 117). The banning of the Brotherhood also shows the nature of the Islamist structure to change the status quo in an organized and political identity in Egypt to have been discovered by the regime, and action to have been immediately taken to prevent this.

The death of Hasan al-Banna caused a serious break for both the Brotherhood and the Islamist movement. The unexpected lack of a leader in the oppressed environment of the Brotherhood confronted the structure with the problem of survival. Taking into account the political conditions of the period, Hasan al-Hudaybi – as a leading legal figure in Egypt and a respectable name before the Palace – was persuaded to become the General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood as a result of the prominent members' search for a name that would also prevent the

dissolution of the organization (Mitchell, 1993, pp. 84–85). The success of a well-known statesman like al-Hudaybi was very important for the Muslim Brotherhood to not lose the political ground of the movement and to gain legitimacy in state authorities. The first response to this was clearly seen in the relationship between the Brotherhood and the Wafd Party after the Nahhas Pasha Government canceled the 1936 Agreement that had given privileges to the British.

The Brotherhood, having witnessed the crucial breaks in Egyptian political history during the al-Hudaybi period, did not hesitate to make different and sometimes conflicting decisions regarding political practices, even though they faced many crises in the process, especially in regard to the support given to the Free Officers Coup on July 23, 1952. Although al-Hudaybi was known to be close to the Palace, the Brotherhood's support for this coup, which ended the monarchy and established a new political order in the country, indicated that leaving the Islamist structure out of the political arena had been the wrong strategy. Although following the consolidation of power under Gamal Abdel Nasser, who had pioneered the coup, serious problems broke out after a while between the administration and the Brotherhood; the Brotherhood had demonstrated through its support for the Free Officers Coup that it was not closed to innovations in the political system and would not hesitate to take radical decisions regarding the administration when necessary.

The crossroads of Islamism in Egypt: *Ma'alim fi'l-Tariq* [signposts on the road] vs. *Du'at La Qudat* [preachers, not judges]

When addressing the 1960s and considering that 25 years had passed since the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood, a young and dynamic new generation understandably had emerged within the organization. Sayyid Qutb, who joined the institution at this time and quickly gained a privileged place within the Brotherhood with his ideas, managed to impress the members of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, the point where Qutb evolved from an intellectual point of view resulted in a sharp break that would reveal two different ways in which Islamist thought and the Islamist movement viewed the political system and would lead first to a separation and then a rupture within the Brotherhood. Shaping his thoughts within the framework of the Islamic order during his dungeon years, Qutb tried to develop a new Muslim political theory inspired in particular by the Pakistani scholar and thinker Abul A'la al-Mawdudi's conceptualization of ignorance. In Qutb's book *Ma'alim fi'l-Tariq* [*Signposts on the Road*], first published in November 1964 with great repercussions, Qutb interpreted his view of politics, society, and order in a new context on the axis of *jahilliyyah* [ignorance] and *hakimiyyah* [the sovereignty of God].[1] Making sharp distinctions regarding the political and social structure, Qutb brought Islamism to a dimension that is disconnected from social reality and context, using a style that is "inclusive and definite" and "closer to the language and judgments of the Externalists rather than the Sunni movement" (Nafi, 2012, p. 109).

With the increasing rejection of the order among the Brotherhood under the influence of the Qutb, ideologically different groups emerged within the organization. During this period, young members of the Muslim Brotherhood, who were heavily influenced by the works of Qutb, flocked to this new structure known as the 1965 Organization. Observing this situation, Qutb stated that he would support the new structure and presented a training program especially for young members (Zollner, 2009, p. 42). The fact that this group, which was prone to violence and radical tendencies, emerged was soon noticed by the Nasser administration, which resulted in a new start of troubled days for the Muslim Brotherhood. During this period, Nasser was struggling with various problems in domestic and foreign policies, and took advantage of this situation by implementing a new policy of arrest and repression against the Muslim

Brotherhood (Kepel, 2003, p. 32; Abd al-Halim, 1994, p. 469). Sayyid Qutb, who was arrested again during the process of intimidation against the Brotherhood, was executed on August 29, 1966 after his release as a result of pressure from Nasser (Kepel, 2003, p. 34). The execution of Qutb, who had had great influence on the Muslim Brotherhood during his nearly 15 years of membership, resulted in the emergence of two different branches in the movement. While the first of these was the mainstream Muslim Brotherhood gathered around General Guide Hasan al-Hudaybi, the second was the group that cut their contacts with the organization and radicalized.

Realizing the danger that Qutb's views could spread among the young members of the movement in particular, al-Hudaybi wrote the book *Du'at La Qudat* [*Preachers, Not Judges*] while three important figures from the Council of Delegation – Umar al-Tilmisani, Mustafa Mashhur, and Abdülaziz A'tiyya Liman – were in Tora prison. Upon publishing this work, al-Hudaybi and his close team presented a guiding text advising their members on how to act from the perspective of the Qur'an and Sunnah on very important issues such as action, doctrine, and views on political order. Although the book was a guide for Muslim Brotherhood members, the main purpose was to discuss the conceptual dimension of *Signposts on the Road* without mentioning Sayyid Qutb's name or showing the mistakes of the method he had presented in the book (Khatab, 2001, p. 452). In this context, the most important objection of the book was Qutb's interpretation of the conceptualizations of ignorance and sovereignty that differed from what was meant in the Qur'an and Sunnah (al-Hudaybi, 2012).

Al-Hudaybi expressed his objection to Mawdudi to draw attention to the misinterpretation of the concepts in the aforementioned work (Kepel, 2003, p. 63). Emphasizing the fallacy of Mawdudi's thesis that the terms divinity, subjection, divine will, and religion[2] had been previously known to Arabs and later took on other meanings during the period of *Jahiliyyah* [ignorance], al-Hudaybi said that many verses are found in the Qur'an that explain these words and that state these cannot be given different meanings (al-Hudaybi, 2012, pp. 32–33). Al-Hudaybi similarly approached the term sovereignty, which had often been used in Qutb's thinking in particular. Hudeybi, stating the concept of sovereignty to exist neither in the Qur'an nor in authentic hadiths, emphasized some researchers, scholars, or thinkers naturally make inferences from the concepts in the Qur'an, but that turning inferences into a decisive form is incorrect.

The statement "We think of a word in a verse in the Qur'an in a familiar sense, but when we see that this word is used in a more limited sense in the hadith, we understand the meaning of the verse is as it is in the hadith" reveals al-Hudaybi's (2012, p. 85) point of view regarding inferences from the Qur'an. The approach where "Religious provisions in verses and hadiths can only be deduced according to the principles and procedures specified in verses and hadiths" (al-Hudaybi, 2012, p. 87) indicates that inferences made from Qur'anic verses cannot be turned into definitive decrees.

One issue that al-Hudaybi emphasized in his work is the issue of *takfir* [declaring someone an unbeliever]. Al-Hudaybi, who cited from the Qur'an (2:8–10),[3] stated that people who are in denial in the sight of God but say with their tongues that they wholeheartedly believe are unbelievers. However, al-Hudaybi, again based on verses and hadiths, proved that no one can know what is in the heart of a person because of the attribute of humanity, and therefore no one can call a person an unbeliever who verbally says they believe (al-Hudaybi, 2012, pp. 65–66). At this very point, the title chosen for the book is quite meaningful in showing the importance of the doctrines and the correct understanding of the concepts against the conditions of the period and the different factions that had emerged within the Muslim Brotherhood.

The book *Preachers, Not Judges* has played an important role not only in Egypt, but also in consolidating the method of the Islamist movement in general. The takfirist manifestation

rejecting radical formations such as *et-Takfir ve'l Hijra* or *Tanzim'ul Jihad*[4] had manipulated the Islamist thought that envisioned the struggle by remaining within the political system. This can be described as the biggest existential crisis Islamism has ever faced. Islamism is essentially a movement centered around political order. In this context, radical formations have been both unrealistic and damaging as they have tried to transform Islamism into a judgmental, marginalizing, and rejecting form rather than one with an encompassing, introspective, and integrative character. Al-Hudaybi's attitude of interpreting concepts within their contexts and avoiding making definitive judgments enabled the Muslim Brotherhood to be purified from excesses and to act within a sound political framework. Thus, the movement decided to move away from radical swings and adopt a middle-way understanding defined as *vasatiyyah* [moderation] (Abd al-Halim, 1994, pp. 539–540).

As a matter of fact, the following words from General Master Umar al-Tilmisani, who succeeded al-Hudaybi, are a good example of the moderate political attitude being consistent with the order:

> If the movement is understood to be something that is deliberately confronting the regime through force and violence, then we believe that it is the use of people's energy for a futile effort that will not work for anyone but the enemies of this country.
>
> *(Kepel, 2003, p. 125)*

The middle-way attitude that al-Hudaybi and Tilmisani reinforced made acting within the system under all conditions and circumstances mandatory for the Muslim Brotherhood, and reasserted the approach that no political or social transformation can occur through illegitimate ways or means. Al-Hudaybi's words – "There is no secrecy in service in the way of Allah. There is no place for secrecy in the sacred invitation or for terror in religion" (as cited in Mitchell, 1993, p. 88) in the process of the abolition of the Secret Apparatus[5] – indicated that the struggle carried out by remaining on legitimate grounds is the basic rule that the Brotherhood should never renounce. In this context, while the Muslim Brotherhood kept Islamism in Egypt on its original basis, the groups that became radicalized under the influence of Qutb shifted to a basis disconnected from Islamic politics with an attitude prone to violence.

Expansion into the public sphere and Islamists' convergence with state channels

Mohammed Husni Mubarak, who took office after the murder of Anwar Sadat, acted with a more tolerant administrative approach in order to ease the tense atmosphere in the country. The Brotherhood's rapid appearance in the public sphere in different ways and their referring to the norms of democracy and human rights in a universal sense, especially from the mid-1980s onwards, was a harbinger of the movement's adoption of a new understanding. The frequent use of the discourse of democracy was an indication that reforms had taken place within the organization and that a pro-change team had increased its effectiveness within the structure (Wickham, 2013, p. 47). The political conjuncture in which this new team of pro-change came was very different from the political environment of the founding team of the order in Egypt in the 1930s and 1940s (El-Ghobashy, 2005, p. 374). Therefore, it is possible to claim that the Brotherhood and Egyptian Islamism moved to a new phase for gaining positions within the political system through new means and tactics.

The Brotherhood, which had increased its visibility in the field of politics with electoral alliances in the 1980s and seriously aspired to state administration, clearly demonstrated that

Islamism could not be considered independent of the political system and order. The Muslim Brotherhood, who also worked seriously on the establishment of a party in this period, pointed out that Islamism could only develop a vision of order by using legitimate means and on legitimate grounds, which was contrary to its understanding of the current order as an ignorant and blasphemous system. Et-Tilmisani (1985, p. 183) positioned the structure with respect to the conditions of a new era, stating, "If the most appropriate way to realize and implement the basic principles of the Muslim Brotherhood is through the formation of a political party, in this case the Brotherhood will never hesitate to establish a party." In addition, the Brotherhood, which saw the 1984 elections as a way out, tried to carry the movement's main slogan of *al-Islam huva Hallun* [the solution is in Islam] to the political arena.

In addition to the strategy of joining the parliament through alliance in the 1980s, the second strategy that increased the Brotherhood's visibility and effectiveness in the Egyptian political system was the takeover of union administrations by members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood managed to take a huge step toward full participation in the political process (Soage & Franganillo, 2010, pp. 44–45). Undoubtedly, the biggest share in this strategy belonged to Umar al-Tilmisani and the members of the 1970 generation university structure that he highly valued. Prominent new-generation Brotherhood activists such as Isam al-Aryan, Abdulmun im Ebu'l Futuh, and Abu'l Ala Madi began seriously struggling with problems such as corruption and mismanagement in their unions (Zahid, 2010, p. 112). With the support of members from other communities and movements that members of the organization also belonged to, the approaches and projects based on good governance of the people who form the Islamic Bloc enabled them to take over the management of many professional associations and trade unions, such as those for doctors, pharmacists, lawyers, and engineers. The strategy of the Islamic Bloc; the trustworthy, respectable, high moral, and religious identity of its candidates; and the fact that their names were never mentioned for corruption led to the support of the majority of union members (Wickham, 2002, p. 199).

Through its professional organizations, the Brotherhood strengthened its political presence through another state channel after the parliament. During the revolution that took place as an extension of the mass uprisings that started in the Arab world, the Muslim Brotherhood did not refrain from being involved in the process and tried to impersonate the universal political values it had adopted and the Islamist principles shaped by its own constants. The Brotherhood, which had been realize its dream of becoming a party for many years due to oppression from the system, quickly established the party in the post-Revolution period and achieved an important success in the elections. With the victory of leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, Mohammad Morsi, in the presidential elections, the movement achieved the most important success in its history – and at the same time also clearly showed the kind of method required for the Islamist movement to achieve its goal of reaching power. However, as a negative effect of having been the opposition, the Brotherhood – with its insufficient experience in state administration – had difficulty managing the process. As a result, the military, being the main pillar of the old regime, took advantage of the opportunity and gave a great blow to the civilian administration and the Brotherhood in the country by staging a coup. The Islamist movement in Egypt learned a hard lesson with the Morsi government.

Salafi movement in Egypt: Islamist or status-quoist?

The first Salafi structuring in Egypt during the early periods of the 20th century centered around main topics such as preaching, reviving the Sunnah, and expanding charity work (Fayd, 2014, p. 51). This shows that an understanding based on social issues rather than political

circumstances had been effective in the emergence of the Salafi structures within the country. When taking into account general approaches such as the struggle against colonialism in the generic Islamic narrative, the issue of political authority within the Islamic world, and the backlash against the sense of underdevelopment against the West, the political situation and notion of a new order within this context was clearly not a fundamental issue or motivating source during the development process of the Salafi movement.

Modern era Salafism is seen to display an outlook far removed from any alternative political stance and – to a large extent – has been subject to current status quos. *Al-Jam'iyya al-Shar'iyya*, considered as the first organized Salafi movement in Egypt, is described as a structure that emphasizes preaching, values charity work, prioritizes humanity, and avoids any conflict or dispute (al-Jam'iyye aş-Şar'iyyah, 2020). When Sheikh Mahmud al-Subki, the founder of the society, explained the fundamental priorities of the organization, he especially emphasized the importance of not getting involved in political activities and "never challenging the political affairs of the ruler" (as cited in Fayd, 2014, p. 52). This advice from al-Subki is actually the most important evidence for identifying the Salafi structure in Egypt to generally preserve the peace within the system. In this framework, although the organization declared its support for Muhammed Morsi in the second ballot of the presidential elections held in 2012, it announced having no connections with any political organization after the civil uprising, showing that the organization cannot afford to become at odds with the political administration (Çakmaktaş, 2016, p. 125).

Another organization that has kept clear of the idea of a political order and remained in favor of the continuation of the status quo is *al-Jam'iyya al-Ansar al-Sunnah al-Muhammadiyah*. The founder, Mohamed Hamed al-Fiqi, positioned against the 1919 Revolution started by the Egyptians in the face of the English colonialism, stating that the issues could only be resolved by returning to the Sunnah, not by demonstrating (Fayd, 2014, p. 54). This approach by Azhar Sheikh Fiqi laid the foundations for absolute loyalty to political authority, which the organization would adopt in the coming years.

When considering the general goals of the organization, its mentality is seen to involve fighting *bid'ah* [innovations] that are ingrained in society and advocating the practice of Islam in its purest form. In that sense, the general program of the organization can be classified as follows: (1) inviting people to *tawhid* in a way that is purged of all elements of shirk, (2) educating people by teaching them the religion from its pure source, (3) teaching people the explicit rules in the Qur'an and Sunnah, (4) inviting people to love the prophet of Allah with real love, v) educating people on the issue of ruling with a means other than those sent by Allah, and (5) staying away from *bid'ah* and fighting against anything that distorts or disrupts faith (Es-Sayyid, 2009, pp. 25–29).

The organization strictly clearly compartmentalizes political and social life, and hence strictly forbids any actual or verbal insurrection or criticism against the administration and preaches only to pray for them and advise them, commending absolute obedience to the ruler (Es-Sayyid, 2009, p. 279).

Although its structuring aligns with the status quo within the political order, the Alexandria-based al-Da'wa al-Salafia, one of the prominent Salafi movements in Egypt, relatively differs from the other Salafi communities by virtue of its entrance into the political scene by having formed a party following the Egyptian Revolution of 2011. Because its founder Muhammad Ismail al-Muqaddam, who studied medicine at the University of Alexandria, had been influenced by Saudi ulama and Jamaat Ansar al-Sunnah, al-Da'wa al-Salafia has a similar outlook with them on issues of faith (Fayd, 2014, p. 56). The Suud Salafism's influence on the formation dynamics of the organization in particular has played a crucial role in reinforcing the attitude in dealing with politics and political order based on getting along with the administration.

Although rejecting democracy as a blasphemous system, the organization is not opposed to political participation as a matter of principle (Fayd, 2014, p. 57).

After the January 25 Revolution, Hizb al-Nur [al-Nour Party], which was an extension of the doctrine that sanctions political participation, was founded by Yasir Burhami, who had a position of leadership in al-Da'wa al-Salafiyya. As a result of being the first Salafist party founded after the Revolution and of the support it received from the students, the al-Nour Party received a considerable number of votes in the first elections (Fayd, 2014, p. 64). The facts that Yasir Burhami avoided the Revolution process and asked the same from his followers and then changed strategies and joined the 2012 elections (al-Anani, 2012) show that the organization has undertaken a mission to ensure the continuation of Egypt's established order, but still takes actions that will not disrupt the status quo after a change as radical as a revolution. The most distinctive example of this strategy was when the Egyptian army ended the Mursi administration by seizing control of the government on July 3, 2013. Joining the Egyptian army and its established order in their criticism and condemnation of the Mursi administration during this phase, the al-Nour Party put serious distance between itself and the Muslim Brothers by taking the opposite side and openly supporting the coup d'état in 2013 (Kirkpatrick, 2013; McTighe, 2014).

The fact that the biggest Salafist power in the country sided with the coup is the most crucial evidence that the Salafist structure in Egypt has chosen a different path than that of the main Islamist vein. Unlike the Muslim Brothers, whose claim has been to bring an alternative order by remaining within the system, what seems to constitute the fundamental character of the Salafist movement in Egypt is individual piety and absolute loyalty to the established order.

Conclusion

Having emerged with the purpose of developing an alternative approach in the modern world order established through the nation-state formation phase, Islamism is generally accepted as having attempted to come up with a solution to the issue of representation in Muslim communities. Although the emergence of Islamist thought occurred at a time when the Ottoman Empire was still standing, it transitioned into a new phase after becoming an organized structure. The ideological debate based on the position or continuity of the Ottoman Empire (i.e., the caliphate) is seen to have evolved into a form centered around order and political power after World War I. Founded by Hassan al-Banna, the Muslim Brotherhood has played a major role in Islamism's transformation into a mainstream ideology all around the world, particularly after its political developments in Egypt.

While the Muslim Brotherhood's struggle within the political system and efforts to come into power by remaining within the system constitute a method that can be considered a fundamental rule for Islamist movements, it also reveals its main point of distinction from the other religious formations. Transforming Islamism from an opposing or objective structure into a subjective one that aims for the power, Muslim Brothers have also made not overstepping the legal boundaries a strict rule when constructing political order around Islamic principles. At this point, refraining from adopting a sense of order that falls outside the system or does not correspond to social reality, the Brotherhood has attempted to fulfil all the requirements of being a founding movement in a country that can be considered the heart of Islamism. Having experienced a rupture and a drift especially with the impact from Qutb, Islamism has since reinforced a form of ideological movement that remains within the political area and arms itself with al-Hudaybi's moderate approach, one that rejects arbitrary attitudes by using the legitimate tools of politics.

Unlike the strategies and practices the Muslim Brothers utilize, Salafist structures have displayed a different portrait within the course of Islamist thought in Egypt. The approach adopted by the Salafist structures in Egypt, which have been significantly influenced by Saudi Salafist thought, has developed to a large extent around loyalty to the general guidelines of the established order. In this context and differing from the main strategy practiced by the Muslim Brothers (i.e., fighting while remaining within the political area), the Salafist approach appeared to accept the established order as it is. Centered around the correct interpretation of religion and accurate performance of religious practices, this approach has ensured that Egyptian Salafism remains far removed from the political arena and political practices. Its indoctrination that forbids criticizing the administration and instills constant loyalty to the ruler has ensured that these structures have never gone beyond being charity organizations. Even with certain Qutb-influenced Salafist structures that – although based on Salafist tradition – differ from the administration of traditional Salafi movements, reject the political system and legitimize violence, they still remain unable bring an authentic perspective or interpretation into the political arena. While traditional Salafist structures have displayed an attitude in favor of the continuation of the status quo, extremist structures that reject the system have turned into marginal movements by losing their legitimacy altogether. In this context, the Muslim Brothers' strategy that involves fighting against the system by remaining within the system and their approach that always values social reality has played a leading role in the development of Islamist thought and movement in Egypt, and enabled the formation of a tradition that has been inherited from the similar movements around the Muslim world, interpreting Islamism from a system-based perspective.

Notes

1 For a detailed study on this conceptualization of Qutb, see Khatab (2002).
2 For Mawdudi's work on these four concepts, See el-Mevdudi (2005).
3 Qur'an 2: 8–10:

> And of the people are some who say, "We believe in Allah and the Last Day," but they are not believers. They [think to] deceive Allah and those who believe, but they deceive none but themselves and perceive [it] not. In their hearts is a disease, so Allah has increased their disease; and for them is a painful punishment because they [habitually] used to lie.

4 For a detailed study on both formations, see Kepel (2003).
5 The Secret Apparatus was founded by Hasan al Banna in early 1940s as branch of the Brotherhood. The body remained as underground organization with secret networking until al Hudaybi dissolved this secret branch.

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11

ISLAMISM AND POST-ISLAMISM IN IRAN

Yadullah Shahibzadeh

Introduction

Political concepts have had different implied meanings at different periods for different people. While for Maximillian Robespierre, democracy indicated a revolutionary vision of politics and governance (Dunn, 2005, p. 114), Edmund Burke understood democracy as a tyranny that in the name of the people and majority oppresss a minority but escape from punishment because people by definition that people "can never become the subject of punishment, by any human hand." (Burke, 1986, p. 191). While political concepts mark the before and after of particular historical situations, events, or processes, their meanings change throughout the course of these situations, events, and processes. When universally applied, political concepts create more confusion and misperceptions than clarity or intelligibility. Efforts on conceptualizing Islamism and post-Islamism, which have brought together ideological tendencies, politico-intellectual movements, organizations, and states with almost nothing in common, indicate how unstable concepts can become. One analyst (Roy, 2007, p. 57) defined Islamism as "the political ideologization of Islam on the model of the great political ideologies of the 20th century." However, for other analysts (Bayat, 1996, p. 44; Brown & Shahin, 2010, pp. 63–64), Islamism in Iran had been a nativist ideology constructed by the marginalized Muslim intelligentsia for overcoming their marginalization. But as they succeeded in building the Islamic Republic, they marginalized all non-Islamist forces (Asef Bayat, 2007, p. 7). Another analyst (Boroujerdi, 1996, pp. 18–19) claimed that Iranian Islamism had suppressed other voices because it saw "everything in the context of the binary opposition between the authentic and the alien." All this happened because Iranian Islamism has been the expression of the most epistemologically, ethically, and politically defective form of Iranian nativism. Hence, post-Islamism is presented as an effort to repair the political damage that Islamism had caused (Bayat, 1996, pp. 43–52), because post-Islamism is an attempt "to conceptualize and strategize rationale and modalities of transcending Islamism in social, political, and intellectual domains" (Bayat, 2013, p. 307). Furthermore, post-Islamism means an appreciation of "rights instead of duties, plurality in place of a singular authoritative voice, historicity rather than fixed scriptures, and the future instead of the past" (Bayat, 2007, p. 11). The question that remains unanswered is: How did the epistemologically, ethically, and politically flawed Islamism turn into democracy-oriented and forward-looking post-Islamism?

When looking for an answer, one should examine the growing enthusiasm for and fascination with the area studies focusing, since the early 1990s, on categorizing the barriers against democracy in the Middle East. Alongside this academic enthusiasm, we have witnessed the emergence of thousands of think-tanks and NGOs financed by Western governments to promote "peace and democracy" in this region. (Roy, 2007, pp. 33–36). Western governments' interest in democratizing the Middle East is explained by claiming that democracy is not only the summation of Western values but is in agreement with the interest of the United States and its European allies in the region (Roy, 2007, pp. 35–38). The democracy promotion in the Middle East has been a part of a more comprehensive argument: The nation-states are losing their relevance in the age of globalization, and there is an emerging global civil society ruled by Western governments and their non-governmental organizations (NGOs). What remains to be achieved is new legal international arrangements that enable Western governments and their NGOs to sponsor and protect the emerging democratic global government or cosmopolitan democracy (Steger, 2010, pp. 84–86). This cosmopolitan democracy has led some local advocates of democracy in the Middle East to ask Western governments to take the initial steps of democracy in the region. (Brown & Shahin, 2010, p. 24). This democratic project implies that the Middle East does not need independent public spheres and autonomous political subjects. It needs Western governments and their scholars and NGOs to tell them what to think and what to do to realize the democratic project. These local advocates of democracy repeat what the political anthropologists or cultural sociologists have been telling them since the 1990s – that their political culture is to blame for the absence of local public spheres and autonomous political subjects. According to this culturalist view of politics, there is a gap between Western democracies' advanced political cultures that result from a long and unconscious process of socialization and the underdeveloped political culture of Middle Eastern societies. While Islamism ignored its underdeveloped political culture, post-Islamism is recognizing this gap. Hence, post-Islamism signifies an improved political culture.

Ernest Renan used the term Islamism to signify the underdeveloped culture of the Islamic world and the inability of Muslims to reconcile themselves with modern science as a means of understanding the modern world. (Renan, 1883). Jamal ad-Din Al-Afghani's response to such claims was that Islamic civilization could adopt modern sciences and forms of social and political organization but encouraged Muslims to oppose colonial powers' interference in their internal affairs. Islam was, for Al-Afghani, the foundation of Muslim unity and solidarity against the colonization of their lands (Keddie, 1994, p. 23). For Nazemoleslam Kermani (1861–1918), the author of *Tarikh-e Bidari-ye Iranian* [*The History of Iranians' Awakening*], Al-Afghani was able to mediate his socio-political views to statesmen and religious leaders, as well as ordinary people. That is why many of Al-Afghani's disciples became staunch pro-constitutionalist figures. In the name of the unity of Muslim states and people, and by exposing the deficiencies of despotism and autocracy, Al-Afghani encouraged his disciples to promote republicanism and constitutionalism. However, the growing influence of Al-Afghani's ideas within the government circles led the Iranian government to expel him from Iran (Kermani, 1978, pp. 82–83). With his death before the Constitutional Revolution, Al-Afghani maintained a shadowy position in Iranian politico-intellectual life until Ayatollah Motahari and Shariati finally showed some degree of interest in him. Whereas for Motahari, Al-Afghani had been the founder of the movement for Muslim unity (Motahari, 1978, pp. 15–35), Shariati described him as the first prominent Muslim figure to make Islam an ideological fortress against colonialism. Shariati claimed that, although Al-Afghani had been an intellectual and political vanguard who inspired many Muslim nations to stand against colonialism and despotism, his insistence on making changes from above through diplomacy prevented him from formulating an enlightening and militant ideological system to mobilize Muslim masses. (Shariati, 2010).

By introducing Islam to the world as a source of resistance and political change, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 should be considered as the focal point for the conceptualization of Islamism (i.e., political Islam). But what is Islamism? Is it an effort to build a new society based on Islamic laws or the Sharia? Ali Shariati, the leading ideologue of the Iranian Revolution, did not imagine a state based on Islamic Law, nor has the Islamic Republic of Iran been the embodiment of Islamic laws. Iranian Islamism and post-Islamism are more connected to Iranian nationalist and socialist movements than any other movement outside Iran. Civilizational or cultural interpretations of Iranian Islamism and post-Islamism fail to contextualize these trends and movements within their specific politico-intellectual and historical contexts.

Exhausted nationalism and socialism

The Constitutional Revolution of 1906–1909 gave birth to Iranian nationalism and socialism, whose endless dispute paved the way for coups d'état in 1921 by Reza Shah against the constitutional government and in 1953 against Mohammad Mosaddeq. Whereas the nationalists advocated freedom and equality promised by the constitution for all citizens, socialists promised a social revolution exceeding the constitution's promises. The first major dispute between the Iranian socialists and nationalists resulted in the defeat of the Socialist Republic of Gilan in 1921. While the nationalists saw the Gilan Republic as the beginning of a national struggle to liberate the rest of Iran from British dominance, the socialists sought for a social revolution within the new Republic to encourage revolution in the rest of the country. (Shahibzadeh, 2019, p. 73). The Iranian communists who experienced the Second International's indifference toward the Constitutional Revolution while under attack by Russia and Britain embraced the new and less Eurocentric Third Communist International (1919–1945). They hoped that the new international would aid the nationalist movements against the colonial policies in the colonized and semi-colonized countries and integrate them into the international proletarian struggles against global capitalism (Shahibzadeh, 2019, pp. 66–68). This hope never materialized. As Reza Shah turned the Iranian constitutional government into a dictatorship, nationalists such as Mosaddeq stood against his violations of the Iranian constitution's main principles (Mosaddeq's speech in the Fifth Parliament, Session 211 on October 31, 1925). However, the promises of the constitution became the central referent of a political language that survived Reza Shah's brutalization of the public sphere and, after Reza Shah's abdication in 1941, enabled the Iranian intellectuals and politicians to advocate the restoration of democracy and constitutional government. This time, Iranian socialists realized the significance of the nationalist tendencies in the preparations for a socialist revolution, as long as the Iranian proletariat remained small and unorganized. The formation of the Tudeh Party in 1941 was the expression of this conviction, but the party's friendly relationship with the Soviet Union turned into blind obedience when in the mid-1940s, the Soviet Union demanded oil concessions from Iran. As the demand was rejected by the Mosaddeq-led Iranian nationalists, who were trying to reverse the old oil concessions to Britain, Ehsan Tabari, one of the founders of the party, claimed: "In the same way that we recognize Britain's legitimate interests in Iran and do not oppose those interests, we should recognize the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union in our country" (Shahibzadeh, 2019, p. 96).

New socialist forces and their lineage

The popularity of the party had reached its peak in the mid-1940s. However, its Soviet-oriented policies, especially its handling of the secessionist revolt in the Iranian Azerbaijan

(1945–1946), led many members to leave the party in 1947. The members of the breakaway faction were seeking the party's independent stance on national and international issues (Khamei, 1993, pp. 591–592). As the Tudeh Party leaders took refuge in the socialist countries after the 1953 coup, the party's political and organizational existence was terminated inside the country. In the new political climate, the secular and Muslim socialists who emerged in the 1960s were unanimous in their rejection of the party's blind obedience to the Soviet Union. Simultaneously, these secular and Muslim socialists denounced the nationalist political strategy to restore constitutional democracy; they were seeking a revolution. When considering the new Iranian left in the late 1960s and early 1970s, two organizations come to mind: the communist Fadaiyan-e Khalq and the Islamist Mojahedin-e Khalq. Both organizations concluded that the Shah's intolerance of political dissension had left no other way but an armed struggle to expose the myth of the regime's total control over society as a precondition for the revolutionary mass mobilization. The Fadaiyan blamed the Tudeh Pary's leadership that had left the country for betraying the political struggle and the party members who faced incarceration, torture, and execution after the coup. (Shahibzadeh, 2019, p. 143). Other charges against the Tudeh Party were its failure to distance itself from Azerbaijan's separatist movements and its disloyalty toward the movement for oil nationalization led by Mosaddeq (Jazani, n.d., pp. 22–25). The Fadaiyan was well aware that the absence of an independent international communist movement in the 1940s and 1950s allowed the Soviet Union to destroy any independent socialist organization (Jazani, n.d., p. 35). For Bijan Jazani, a Fadaiyan theorist, Mosaddeq was more than a nationalist and anti-imperialist political leader in Iran; he symbolized the global struggle against imperialism. This description indicates how indebted the new left in Iran was to the nationalist movement (Jazani, n.d., p. 86). Comparing Ayatollah Khomeini's militant and anti-colonialist posture to Mosaddeq's political stance, Jazani saw in Khomeini a likely leader of the coming revolution (Jazani, 1976, p. 32). For Jazani, Khomeini's political leadership had become a possibility because the Iranian comprador bourgeoisie's socio-cultural traits indicated that they were nothing but the representatives of neo-colonialism in Iran. Jazani argued that, while the national bourgeoisie led by Mosaddeq had educated the masses on the significance of cultural resistance against imperialism, the comprador bourgeoisie encouraged cultural obedience to imperialism (Jazani, 2003, pp. 71–72). Jazani concluded that since the Shah's regime answered any form of dissent with violence, the masses had the right to respond to the regime's violence with revolutionary violence (Jazani, 2002, pp. 6–7).

Islamism

Intellectuals such as Khalil Maleki and Jalal-e Al-e Ahmad, who impacted the young generation of political activists in the 1960s, were the leading members of the splinter group of the Tudeh Party. After leaving the party, Maleki rejected Stalinist communism and argued that, without democracy, socialism could not survive. From the 1950s until his death in the late 1960s, Maleki became the spokesman for democratic socialism in Iran (Maleki, 1998, pp. 18–20). In 1962, fifteen years after he left the party, Al-e Ahmad published his *West-toxification* to critique the intellectuals' impacts of cultural colonialism and neo-colonialism in Iran. While he always considered himself a disciple of Maleki, Al-e Ahmad became a source of inspiration for the younger political intellectuals such as Jazani and Shariati. Despite Maleki's rejection of the concept of *West-toxification* since it presented, in his view, the West as a unified whole without class contradictions, Al-e Ahmad believed that before anyone else, it was Maleki who conceptualized the third way between Soviet communism and Western imperialism (Pishdad & Katuzian, 2002,

p. 9). According to Al-e Ahmad, a lasting impact of the colonialist and neo-colonialist culture on the Iranian intellectual life has been that instead of reflecting on modern Western civilization and philosophy, Iranian intellectuals have consumed their final products (Al-e Ahmad, 1982, p. 7). In his *On the Service and the Treason of Intellectuals*, inspired by the Gramscian thesis on the formation of revolutionary organic intellectuals, Al-e Ahmad proposed an alliance between the intellectuals and the clergy to oppose cultural neo-colonialism and political despotism (Al-e Ahmad, 1978, p. 107). Despite his critique of the clergy's reluctance to recognize Iranian women's democratic rights, Al-e Ahmad invested his hope in the alliance between the intellectuals and the clergy. He claimed that whereas the initial coalitions between these two groups in the Constitutional Revolution and the oil nationalization movement strengthened these movements and produced a degree of success, their quarrels failed these movements (Al-e Ahmad, 1978, pp. 252, 431.). Before Al-e Ahmad, Mehdi Bazargan, a pro-Mosaddeq Islamist liberal who led the Freedom Movement in the 1960s, argued that constitutionalism had failed in Iran because religious leaders had abandoned political affairs (Chehabi, 1990, p. 53). Al-e Ahmad used the concept of *West-toxification* to describe the interplay between the confused approaches of the Iranian intellectuals to the modern discourses, the political domination of Western Imperialism, and Shah's dictatorship. Hence, his reflections on the *West-toxification* was a critique of the dominant ideology that justified Western political domination and dictatorship in Iran (Al-e Ahmad, 1978, p. 431).

One can recognize these intellectual elements in the Islamist ideology of Shariati, who synthesized these elements with the teachings of the *Theist Socialists*, and argued in the 1940 and 1950s that socialism based on Quranic teaching would generate a more humane and democratic society than Soviet socialism (Nakhshab, 2002, p. 341). The Theist Socialists found the Tudeh Party's explanations for why the intellectuals were engaged in the struggle for socialism inadequate. They claimed that humans' longing for spiritual experience is the main reason for their participation in this struggle. Mohammad Nakhshab, the ideologue of the Theist Socialists, argued that as the essence of Islam *tawheed* could be reached and experienced through fidelity to freedom and justice, and expressed in the struggle socialism. He concluded that socialism's success would be the same as Islam's victory (Nakhshab, 2002, pp. 303–304). The socialist kernel of Islam was emphasized by Ayatollah Mohamood Taleqani, who, although praising the communists' struggle for economic justice, criticized their justification of dictatorship in the Soviet Union (Taleqani, n.d., p. 225).

The suppression of the 1963 uprising instigated by Ayatollah Khomeini convinced the Freedom Movement's younger members to seek a new theory and method for political struggle and turn intellectual debates into a revolutionary political movement. The new generation of Muslim intellectuals and political activists found in the synthesis of Marxism and Islam a revolutionary theory. The founders of the *Mojahedin-e Khalq* claimed that while Islam is the expression of truth through revelation, Marxism demonstrates truth through the scientific understanding of history, society, and economics. "Although we worship God, we accept Marxism as the science of revolution. Revolutionary Marxists and we have the same ideal, the creation of a classless society, or as we call it, a *Touhidi Classless Society*" (Zibakalam, 1996, p. 242). They claimed that, while the Prophet had disseminated emancipatory consciousness to liberate humankind from class exploitation and political repression, traditional clergy had advocated false consciousness to justify the existing order (Abrahamian, 1989, p. 93). They assumed that equipped with their creative reading of the Quran they could lead the coming revolution in Iran in the same way that Lenin's creative reading of Marx enabled him to build a revolutionary political party and lead a victorious revolution in Russia.

Shariati's Islamist ideology

With the suppression of the insurrection that Ayatollah Khomeini had instigated, his exile to first Turkey then Iraq and the Mojahedin-e Khalq almost being annihilated in the early 1970s, Shariati's Islamist ideology became the most vocal expression of Islamism in Iran throughout the 1970s. One analyst interested in the pathology of Iranian society (Dabashi, 1993, p. 5) describes Shariati's discourse as the reflection of the "injured Self," the "Iranian psyche" that constructs the West as its imaginary and hostile Other. But the same analyst (Dabashi, 1993, p. 119) claims that Shariati's concept of *ommat* implies a form of universalism because the "boundaries of Islam are expanded to wherever that man is." For Shariati, the Islamist ideology was a universal theory of intellectual, esthetic, ethical (spiritual), political, and social emancipation (Shariati, 2011, p. 148). Shariati saw Islamist ideology as the necessary condition for the formations of an intellectual community to lead the masses toward a revolution and establish a transitional revolutionary government to prepare the ordinary people through political education for the coming of the classless society. Shariati never spoke of an Islamic state (i.e., a state based on Islamic laws). However, his vision did not prevent the majority of his disciples a few months after the Shah's overthrow to defend the Islamic Republic and its constitution, which had sanctioned a religious leader [*vali-ye faqih*] as its supreme leader.

Another analyst (Abrahamian, 1989, p. 108) claimed that Shariati's socialist tendencies came from Louis Massignon and the magazine *Esprit*, which propagated radical Catholicism. However, because giving credit to Christian sources would weaken his claim that Shia Islam was the only religion in quest of social justice and political revolution, Shariati never revealed that he had been indebted to these sources. Two facts are worth mentioning in response to this claim. First, Shariati had already been a dedicated Muslim socialist before moving to Paris. In 1956, he translated Abdel Hamid Jawdat Asahar's *Abuzar: The Theist Socialist* and wrote and a long introduction to the book. Second, both French radical Catholicism and Shariati's Islamist ideology relied profoundly on French Humanist Marxism. "It was likewise this humanist aspect of Marxism which rendered it attractive to Christian Socialist groups around Mounier and Esprit" (Lichtheim, 1966, p. 105). Shariati learned about Humanist Marxism and the concept of alienation as its central concept because Humanist Marxism was France's intellectual fashion in those years. During his stay in France from 1959–1963, Shariati became familiar with the intellectual tradition which began with Marx's early writings through Georg Lukacs, Henri Lefebvre, Georges Gurvitch, Roger Garaudy, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Jacques Berque, all of them associated with Humanist Marxism. In France, he discovered that the Communist Parties' deterministic Marxism was not the only Marxism in existence. He discovered a spiritual type of Marxism that was more preoccupied with human essence and its existing alienation and his de-alienation at the end of history. Shariati argued that the origin of man's alienation lies in the emergence of private property because private property paved the way for the domination of one class over another. However, with the abolition of private property humans' alienation from their essence will be reversed. With the abolition of private property, humans are reunited with their essence and with God as "perfected humans" (*Ensan-e Kamel*; Shariati, 2000c, p. 73). Shariati described *touhid* as a philosophy of history that reveals the direction of historical development (Shariati, 2000c, p. 73). However, since humans have mistaken religion, which is a path and an instrument, for being a goal in itself, they have misunderstood this principle (Shariati, 2000c, p. 180). Through Humanist Marxism, Shariati employed Marx's arguments in his *Early Writings* to demonstrate Islam's potential for formulating a revolutionary ideology. For Shariati, the Islamist ideology was both a meeting point between Islamic teachings and Western knowledge

and a critique of Western political and cultural domination. He invested his hope in forming a new intellectual bloc whose *raison d' être* was a rejection of the existing order, both nationally and internationally (Shariati, 2000c, p. 73). Similarly to Ale-Ahmad, Shariati criticized the Iranian intellectuals who uncritically espoused Western ideologies for overcoming the social, political, and cultural shortcomings in Iranian society. He was neither interested in Ale-Ahmad's project on making peace between the secular intellectuals and the clergy, nor did he yearn for democratic changes within the existing order. He sought a new intellectual community to lead a revolutionary struggle (Shariati, 2000a, pp. 208–209). Like Gramsci, Shariati searched for a modern prince to bridge "the gap between the *alta cultura* of the intellectuals and the *cultura populare* of the masses" (Fontana, 1993, p. 148). What made the participants fit in this community was not their class origin but their ideological orientations. Shariati claimed that Iranian Marxists had forgotten the simple truth that "Praxis is the fundamental concept upon which the Marxian conceptual framework lies" (Shariati, 2000d, p. 190). He blamed Iranian Marxists for reducing Marx's thought to a few dogmas such as base and superstructure. Shariati's response to Marx's critique of Feuerbach's criticism of religion is that Marx had mistaken corrupted institutionalized religion for true religion (Shariati, 2000d, p. 183). According to Shariati, vulgar Marxism has reduced humans to raw materials "shaped by objective and external circumstances, and, therefore, subject to causal relations" (Shariati, 2000d, p. 190). He claimed that the Islamist ideology could generate class-consciousness among the Iranian working class and transform them into a disinterested *ommat* (Shariati, 2011, p. 131). For Shariati, the Islamist ideology's ability to generate class-consciousness lay in the Biblical history of the conflict between Abel and Cain as the inception of the class struggle between the oppressed and the oppressors of the world (Shariati, 2000c, p. 62). He interpreted human history as the history of the struggle between two religions: the ruling religion justifying the unjust existing order and the religion of the ruled revolting against this order (Abrahamian, 1989. p. 111). In pursuing social justice, the religion of the ruled envisions a classless society [*Nazm-e Touhidi*]. Shariati did not include the clergy in the oppressed allies because, as the guardians of religion, they had reduced Islam's revolutionary character to an ideology that served their entrenched class interests in the existing socio-political order (Shariati, 1982, pp. 112–113). Shariati argued that Iranian intellectuals make great efforts to explain the masses' situation to the masses, but the problem is that they employ a conceptual framework that cannot reflect how the masses see themselves (Shariati, 2000d, p. 166). He reminded the Iranian intellectuals that dialogue with the masses regarding their situation and future strategies for social and political change is possible if they respect their religious sensibilities and understand their references (Abrahamian, 1989, p. 113).

Humanist Islamism and the return to the self

One of the most misunderstood subjects of Shariati's discourse is his conceptualization of "return to the self" [*Bazgasht be Khishtan*], interpreted as a discourse of authenticity against the Western Other. Shariati's concept of the return to the self is more than a repetition of "Fanon's discourse of 'the return of the oppressed' with a peculiarly Iranian twist," as an analyst has claimed (Boroujerdi, 1996, p. 112). Shariati's return to the self was not a response to the European denial of the colonized world's history, nor was it about Iran's unique history, culture, or civilization. For Shariati, the Europeans did not deny the history of the Iranian people but highlighted those aspects of their history that could divert their attention from their present situation because by paying attention to their existing situation, they could shape their future. The Europeans reinvented a past for Muslims to convince them that Islam belongs to the personal and otherworldly spheres (Shariati, 2000b, pp. 195–196). Shariati was not concerned

with the past, but with the future. His return to the self was a revolt against a past constructed by Western colonialism to dominate the colonized people's present and future. That is why he rejected the spiritual Islam promoted by scholars such as Henri Corbin – because this spiritual Islam deprives Islam of its critical and political potentials. When Shariati referred to a reformed Islam or a Renaissance of Islam (Shariati, 2000a, p. 11), his Islam was not the existing Islam, but an Islam that would be reinvented by revolutionary intellectuals, an Islam that would be capable of challenging the Western-oriented discourses that, in the name of humanitarianism, justified the existing relations of domination between the West and the rest of the world. In the same vein, Shariati rejected non-Westerners who participated in this humanitarianism as passive consumers or servants of the existing order (Shariati, 2000a, pp. 27–28). Shariati denounced nationalist movements in general, particularly the official Iranian nationalism, for its glorification of the pre-Islamic past that he saw as reactive, defensive, and exclusive. He argued that Shia Islam, as the dominant element of Iranian culture and people's consciousness, should be the starting point of any debate on revolutionary changes (Shariati, 2000a, p. 30). For Shariati, an Islam liberated from superficial rituals and institutionalizations would consider an act of worship any attempt aimed at human emancipation. Shariati's liberated and revolutionary Islam resembles the "true Marxism" of the anti-Stalinist, anti-Leninist, and anti-Soviet Marxists (Shariati, 2000a, p. 32). He argued that true Islam, similar to true Marxism, is preoccupied with humans' separation from their essence and have the same goal of reuniting them with their true essence through social revolution. Hence, he questioned the clergy's interpretation of the concept of blasphemy, since, for him, blasphemy does not refer to individuals' opinions but their unjust deeds (Shariati, 2000d, p. 156). Blasphemy is not about those who deny God, the soul, or the afterlife, but about those who refuse to take action that corresponds to truth and justice (Shariati, 2000b, pp. 170–172). Whenever Muslims stand against the Islam of imitation, prejudice, and submission, they act according to truth and justice (Shariati, 2000c, pp. 70–71). Shariati's Islamist ideology distinguishes the action-oriented Islam of truth and justice from the institutionalized Islam of imitation and obedience. Many influential religious scholars such as Ayatollah Morteza Motahhari, who became the Islamic Republic's chief ideologue after its foundation, made unsuccessful attempts to convince Khomeini to condemn Shariati to no avail (Rahnema, 2002, pp. 503–504).

Merleau-Ponty asserted once that "Revolutions inevitably pervert in their transformation from negativity to positivity, from critique and destruction to reconstruction. They are 'true as movements' but 'false as regime'" (Crossley, 1994, p. 94). Shariati seems to have played with the same idea when he said that concepts, religions, and ideologies emerge as active forces, events, and processes, but become static and reactive once institutionalized. He referred to institutionalized Christianity, Islam, Marxism, and the French Revolution that produced political regimes that played reactionary roles in Algeria (Shariati, 2000d, p. 63). A revolutionary ideology that gives birth to a revolution that overthrows the existing order will justify the post-revolutionary existing order as soon as it is transformed into culture and civilization (Shariati, 2000c, p. 358). For Shariati, whereas words and ideas that encourage revolutionary actions belong to the domain of becoming, the words and ideas that rationalize the existing order express the realm of being (Shariati, 2000d, pp. 264–265). The paradox of Shariati's Islamist ideology is that while considering Islam as a system in crisis that needs the aid of Humanist Marxism to reinvent itself, he expects Islam to preserve its authenticity: "In order to understand the truth of Islam, we should understand and reflect on the intellectual, philosophical, and ideological positions of the day. The current intellectual positions, philosophical schools, and ideological persuasions are introductory to an understanding of Islam" (Shariati, 2000e, p. 239). Shariati's Islamist ideology resembles that of the 18th-century French ideologues, such as Destutt de Tracy, who

had defined ideology as "the knowledge of all knowledge" (Foucault, 1994, p. 241). Shariati's intellectual intervention responded to the Iranian intellectuals' rejection of religion in general and Islam in particular for being politically indifferent (Shariati, 2000d, p. 175). For Shariati, as the reality of Iranian society, Islam had to be the object of any ontological approach and critical analysis of the Iranian society's existing reality. He understood the Islamist ideology as the rediscovery of those ideas, meanings, and concepts that have lost their true meaning throughout Islam's history (Shariati, 2002, pp. 11–13).

Islamist Leninism

One problem with Shariati's arguments was his attempt to make the *virtuous city* [*Madinah Fazeleh*] and *perfect* or *ideal man* [*Ensan-e Kamel*] of Islamic philosophy and mysticism equivalent to Marxism's total society and total man (Shariati, 2002, pp. 31–32). Following Plato, Farabi's virtuous city has a hierarchical order in which citizens occupy defined places according to their capacities because the virtuous city reflects the order of the universe and the hierarchy of beings. (Erdakani, 1995, p. 157). In his 1970 lecture entitled *Ommat va Emamat* [*Community and Leadership*], Shariati introduced a Leninist conception of the revolutionary vanguard according to which after seizing political power, the main task of the revolutionary intellectuals is to explain to the masses that their revolution was not about a better economy, individual liberty, or liberal democracy, but for moving toward human perfection (Shariati, 2000a, p. 290). The lecture was held at almost the same time as Ayatollah Khomeini held his lectures on Islamic government [*Hokumat Eslami*] and coincided with the formation of the Marxist *Fadaiyan* and the Islamist *Mojahedin*. All of these attempts focused on the question of political or revolutionary leadership. In many respects, the Islamic Republic of Iran is more liberal than what Shariati had envisioned in his lecture. Shariati's *ommat* needed an *imam* [leader] who demanded total obedience from the members of the *ommat* as long as the *imam* upheld his revolutionary promises. Shariati did not specify the criteria through which people could judge whether their leader had upheld his promises or not (Shariati, 2014, p. 342). By disarming the Marxist discourse and the discourse of the Mojahedin, Shariati's ideology paved the way for the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini in the 1979 Revolution that led to the establishment of the Islamic Republic. A decade later, the same young revolutionaries who had been enchanted by the Islamist ideology and had succumbed to the revolutionary leader's will began to evaluate the post-revolutionary social and political reality and criticized the ideological foundation of the Republic and its domestic policies.

Post-Islamism

Equipped with political experience and critical knowledge, the Islamist ideology's former advocates realized that politics is not about truth but freedom, equality, and democracy. The intellectual transformation of Iranian Islamists in the late 1980s and early 1990s coincided with the discourse of the *end of history*, also known as the final triumph of liberal democracy over socialist totalitarianism. The end of history implied a privileged epistemological position for Western experts to reinterpret the relationship between the West and the rest, and argue that there is a historical gap between the West's political culture and the rest of the world. It assumed that the rest of the world could overcome the existing gap if they listened carefully to what Western governments, experts, and NGOs were telling them. Since the early 1990s, this epistemological position has labeled any critical approach, political movement, or state that opposed Western governments' hegemony theorized by their scholars and operationalized by their NGOs in

different parts of the world as essentialist, nativist, authoritarian, and totalitarian. A significant number of studies on the Iranian Revolution and its ideological foundations have described post-Islamism in Iran as an attempt to overcome this gap intellectually, ethically, esthetically, and politically. Let us examine what Iranian post-Islamists have to say. Abdolkarim Soroush was a prominent figure in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution in 1980. The Cultural Revolution resulted in the expelling of many dissident scholars and students from Iranian universities. In the early years of post-revolutionary Iran, Soroush was known for his critique of the Marxist philosophy of history and the rejection of the epistemological relevance of the concept of class struggle that had resulted in the assumption that there existed two types of sciences; the proletarian and bourgeois sciences (Soroush, 1996, p. 25). In his series of essays in 1988 entitled *Theoretical Expansion and Contraction of Sharia* [*Qabz va Bast-e Teorik-e Shariat*], he argued that the Quran and the Hadith, which constitute the Islamic tenets, are sacred but that their interpretations are not. He claimed that different intellectual backgrounds would produce different interpretations of the same texts and argued that religious knowledge as an interpretation of religious texts will always remain distinct from religion's essence. Unlike Shariati, Soroush does not search for true Islam or its emancipatory effects. He intends to reveal how contemporary religious knowledge results from infinite approaches, perspectives, and interpretations of the religious texts (Shahibzadeh, 2016, pp. 121–122). Soroush investigates the conditions legitimizing specific questions and excluding others. He argues that contemporary theories construct contemporary humans in the same way that past theories constructed past humans (Soroush, 1995, p. 96). The instability of the concept of human being calls into question the idea that humans have lost their real essence in the process of alienation but will regain it in the future. Although Soroush has attempted to demonstrate religious knowledge's historicity and constant transformation, he has not claimed that all interpretations of Islam have the same value. "The point is not that everything changes, but that our understanding of everything changes . . . Relative understanding is different from relative truth, and the transient and epoch-dependent understanding is not the same as transitive and epoch-dependent truth" (Soroush, 1995, p. 332).

By describing Shariati's Islamist ideology as historically conditioned religious knowledge, Soroush rejects almost all aspects of his ideology. While Shariati rejected liberal democracy as a form that masks social oppression and economic exploitation, Soroush considers liberalism as the denunciation of the monopoly of a particular ideology or political regime on truth and the rejection of any authority that aims to make humans perfect beings. Whereas Shariati praised Existentialism in his Islamist ideology, Soroush accused Existentialist thinkers of being fascist collaborators (Soroush, 1998, pp. 148–149). Supplementing Soroush's post-Islamist discourse, Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari has focused on whether *iman* [faith] relies on an existential experience or philosophical knowledge of religion. Referring to Shariati's and Ayatollah Motahari's different approaches to faith, Shabestari argues that while religious faith is an existential experience for the former, for the latter, philosophical knowledge of Islam constitutes faith. Hence, Shariati's and Motahari's different ways of being Muslim resulted in different interpretations of religious texts and constructions of different religious knowledge (Shabestari, 2000a, pp. 166–167). Shabestari argues that, while pre-modern humans had searched for an Archimedean point to explain the world in its totality and as a means toward eternal salvation, modern humans seek spiritual salvation in this world (Shabestari, 2000a, p. 189). For Shabestari, modern spirituality is a consequence of the critiques of Christianity. Hence, Feuerbach's description of Christianity's theology as anthropology in reverse and Marx's critique of religion as an ideology have forced faithful Christians to reconsider and renew their faith (Shabestari, 2000a, p. 202). While criticism of religion intends to get rid of religion, it also creates an opportunity for religious people to revisit their religion and enables them to rediscover the content of their

faith (Shabestari, 2000a, p. 196). Shabestari considers the content of faith to be a conversation between the faithful and God through which God's absoluteness reminds the faithful of the limits of his or her independence, knowledge, and actions. The realization of these limits leads the faithful to recognize the equality of all humankind, regardless of belief. Otherwise, the faithful use religious knowledge to build religious institutions and formulate dogma that prevents the experience of God's absoluteness. By making God the object of theology and the guardian of law, tradition, and customs, institutionalized religion denies the faithful of the experience of God's absoluteness. As institutionalized religion uses its power to protect particular social groups' interests, ordinary religious people experience God as the absence of freedom (Shabestari, 1997, p. 29). Regarding the idea of Islam's encounter with modernity, Shabestari argues that, unlike Christianity, the Islamic faith is not based on the continuity of tradition but its discontinuity: "Neither the history of salvation nor the church [exist] as the transmitter of salvation in Islam because God has never appeared in any historical event" (Shabestari, 1997, p. 29). To be Muslim does not require preserving religious traditions when encountering modernity, for the simple reason that modernity is not the antithesis of tradition in Islamic societies. Thus, the encounter between tradition and modernity does not appear to Muslims as a problem that needs solving. Accordingly, Shabestari does not consider Islamic movements as the expressions of Islamic revivalism, bur as anti-colonial and anti-dictatorial socio-political movements that seek justice in their societies (Shabestari, 1997, p. 122).

In contrast to Soroush, Shabestari is not convinced that epistemological uncertainty and religious pluralism can bring about democracy because the Sophists, as the earliest advocates of epistemological uncertainty, sentenced Socrates, who believed in epistemological certainty, to death. Thus, while democracy and political pluralism can protect religious pluralism, religious pluralism cannot generate democracy (Shabestari, 2000b, pp. 389–390). This brought Shabestari to argue that governance is a secular question free from any religion (Razavi, 2000, pp. 139–141). In response to the conservative religious authorities who perceive democracy as a danger against Islam and the word of God, Shebestari argues that if the Iranian people decide to relinquish Islam and vote against the word of God, no power in the world can force them to change their mind (Razavi, 2000, p. 145). Post-Islamists focused on the inconsistency between the Islamic Republic's promises and its practices regarding democracy and freedom of expression. The post-Islamists were well aware that they were a product of the Islamic Republic because it had created the space for their political experience and constituted the condition of their theoretical reflections on politics. Political theorists such as Mohsen Kadivar focused on the meaning and implications of the principle of *velayat-e faqih* and sought an alternative political theory within the Islamic Republic's formal structure. Shabestari and Kadivar's different approach does not lie in their different use of the hermeneutic method to conceptualize faith and freedom or harmonize reason [*aql*] and revelation through Islamic categories (Vahdat, 2000). The difference is that, unlike Shabestari, who deals with theological questions, Kadivar is interested in political theory. While Shabestari sees democracy as the proper condition for freedom of religion and the faithful to practice their religion, Kadivar is interested in making Islamic *fiqh* compatible with political pluralism (Shahibzadeh, 2016, pp. 168–170). Kadivar claims that since "*Velayat-e Faqih* is an invention, a result of a theoretical construct, a new type of conceptualization," is possible. (Shahibzadeh, 2016, p. 170). Accordingly, if the conservative interpretation of *velayat-e faqih* deprives Iranian citizens of their constitutional rights, the conservatives must change their interpretation (Kadivar, 1998, p. 207).

What helped integrate these separated islands of intellectual debates into the post-Islamist politico-intellectual movement in Iran was the emergence of the Islamist leftists who had been a part of the political establishment but had been marginalized. The Islamist filmmaker Mohsen

Makhmalbaf reflected on this marginalization caused by the discrepancy between the revolution's promises and the post-revolutionary order. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Guardian Council disqualified many Islamist leftists from standing as candidates for the Iranian parliament. This political marginalization led the Islamist leftists to examine the constitution's wording and the Islamic Republic's practices and argued that the Iranian constitution as a social contract would be the final judge in all disputes within the Iranian political system (Hajjarian, 2000, p. 21). The election of Mohammad Khatami as President in 1997 made the Islamist leftists the core of the post-Islamist reform movement and enabled them to argue that the supreme leader's legitimacy depends on freely and fairly elected Assembly of Experts (Hajjarian, 2000, pp. 54–55). Hence, they not only called the legality of the Guardian Council of the Constitution into question, but disputed the authority of the leader to appoint members of the Council (Hajjarian, 2000, p. 81). The post-Islamists claimed that the problem was not the inconsistency between the constitution and its interpretations, but the denial of the constitution's legal status in political disputes. While the constitution states that the Assembly of Experts is a democratically elected body for appointing and ousting the leader, the Guardian Council's members, appointed by the leader, decide who can and cannot be a candidate for the Assembly. The post-Islamists did not see any contradictions between the authority of a leader who is elected by a popularly elected Assembly of Experts, a president, a parliament, and city councils who are directly elected by popular vote, as long as they are elected in free and fair elections as the expressions of popular sovereignty as declared by the constitution (Hajjarian, 2000, p. 81).

Conclusion

Iranian Islamism and post-Islamism are two interconnected politico-intellectual movements within a particular historical context created by Iranian nationalism and socialism. More than a decade after the 1979 Revolution, Iranian Islamists denied their genealogy and rejected a significant part of the Iranian intellectual and political tradition as un-Islamic or secular. However, as they were transformed into post-Islamists since the 1990s, they began to remove the religious-secular dichotomy in the intellectual and political life. In contemporary Iran, like everywhere in Western societies, the intelligentsia use politics to keep their privileges or acquire privileges they do not possess; however, the people, regardless of how we conceptualize them, struggle for their rights. Moreover, just like everywhere, the Iranian intelligentsia and people try to use each other to achieve their own political goals in the public sphere, in public debates, in political disputes, in elections, in worker strikes, and in street protests.

While the emergence of Islamism in Iran in the 1960s coincided with the emergence of new socialist forces critical of the Soviet Union, the transformation of Islamism into post-Islamism coincided with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the claim of *the end of history*, globalization, and the global public sphere. Shariati's Islamist ideology shared the Iranian nationalist concern for the Iranian state's sovereignty and independence from world powers. But the fascination of some post-Islamists with globalization theories has led them to question the foundations of Iran's state sovereignty and its independent national and foreign policies from Western powers' dictates. These post-Islamists do not see the logical contradiction between the universality of democratic principles and the particularity of Western interests. They seem reluctant to recognize that the history of Iran's democratic struggles and the rest of the world has demonstrated this contradiction. They fail to realize that Iranians, in particular, have paid a heavy price whenever Western governments, as the share-holders of the particular interests in the region, consider the democratic practices of the Iranian people expressed in defense of their state sovereignty to be a threat to Western interests. No nation can achieve anything remotely democratic

without paying the price. No democracy is possible without an independent and autonomous public sphere as a site of real intellectual debates and political contestations, a public sphere free from world powers' intervention. The leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood – who toured European capitals in 2012 to convince European scholars, NGOs, and policymakers that they would remain faithful to the rules of democracy if elected and step down if not re-elected in the coming elections – realized this truth after they were overthrown by the brutal 2013 coup and deserted by all those governments, scholars, and NGOs. If the Muslim Brotherhood has learned any lesson from the way it was treated, it is that these governments, scholars, and NGOs have never been interested in whether Egyptian Islamists could *make Islam democratic* or not; they were interested in the extent to which the Brotherhood could *help them implement their strategies in the region*. The tragedy of the democratic struggle in Egypt that ended in the 2013 military coup was that in contrast to the Islamists who relied on Qatar to make Islam democratic, the secular forces welcomed Saudi Arabia's intervention in their internal political affairs to defeat their Islamist rivals. The comical side of the Qatari and Saudi Arabian intervention in the Egyptian political struggle for democracy was that politics as the affair of people struggling for their political rights have never existed in these countries.

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12

ISLAM IN THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO PAKISTAN

Abdul Rashid Moten

Introduction

The Indian subcontinent is a part of the continent of Asia inhabited by heterogeneous populations. It is a peninsula, almost triangular in shape, extending south of the Asian mainland. The base of the triangle is formed by the mountain ranges of the Himalayas, while the apex runs far out into the Indian Ocean. In 1947, the subcontinent was partitioned into two countries: India, with a majority of Hindus, and Pakistan, with a predominantly Muslim population. Another upheaval in 1971 resulted in the secession of the eastern wing of Pakistan, then known as East Pakistan, which emerged as the independent country of Bangladesh. As such, the three independent sovereign republics of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh now form the Indian subcontinent.

Islam played a dominant role in the Indian subcontinent, which ultimately culminated in the establishment of Pakistan. The vitality of Islam in the late 19th-century India was closely associated with the response of Muslim scholars [*úlamā'*] to the colonial dominance of the British and the collapse of Muslim political power. In particular, it began with the renowned verdict [*fatwa*] of Shah Abdul Aziz of Delhi in 1803 that declared India to be an "abode of war" [*Dār al-ḥarb*], called upon the *úlamā'* to come forward, and at the least be directed on issues such as civil behavior, trade, family relations, and inheritance (Metcalf, 1982, pp. 51–52). Based upon primary and secondary sources, this study analyzes the role of the *úlamā'* in the fight for Pakistan and in the struggle to make Pakistan an Islamic republic.

Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and the *úlamā'* of Deoband

The fatwa from Shah Abdul Aziz was followed by the major but ultimately unsuccessful Indian Rebellion of 1857 in which the Sepoy rose up until 1858 against the British East India Company, which was functioning as a sovereign power on behalf of the British Crown. Sir Syed Ahmed Taqvi bin Syed Muhammad Muttaqi, commonly known as Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1817–1898) and a former employee of East India Company, along with many other Muslims, took this as a defeat of Muslim society. Analyzing the Indian revolt in 1859, Sir Syed published

the booklet *Asbab-e-Baghawat-e-Hind* [*Causes of the Indian Revolt*] (Khan, 1972), in which he blamed the East India Company for its aggressive expansion as well as the ignorance of British politicians regarding Indian culture.

Sir Syed, however, figured out that the animosity between the British and Muslims would further marginalize Muslim communities across India for many generations. To secure the socio-economic future of Muslims, he advised his co-religionists to be loyal to the British Empire. Sir Syed was very loyal to the British Crown, for which he was knighted by the British government in the 1888 New Year Honours as a Knight Commander of the Order of the Star of India (KCSI). Sir Syed reinterpreted Muslim ideology to reconcile tradition with Western education and advised Muslims to get rid of the influence of traditional dogma and religious orthodoxy, which had made most Indian Muslims suspicious of British influences, and to acquire modern science and technology. His major preoccupation was to make the modern knowledge of science available to Muslims.

In the beginning, Sir Syed considered both Hindus and Muslims as one nation, arguing that the word nation "is used for the inhabitants of a country, even though they have characteristics of their own" (as cited in Malik, 1980, p. 244). However, he also harbored a Muslim nationalist strand. He considered Islam to be a culture-building and nation-building force. Hence, out of a sense of threat from spearheading Hindu dominance in education and administration, he urged his co-religionists not to join the Indian National Congress (INC). The love of the Muslim nation was what had inspired him to undertake a comprehensive program of the educational, cultural, social, and political uplift of Muslims.

He spent most of his energy on education for Muslims. He is best known for the Aligarh Movement, which was launched to reform the social, political, and educational aspects of the Muslim community. He established schools in Muradabad in 1858 and Ghazipur in 1863. He founded the Scientific Society in 1863 to translate major works from the sciences and modern arts into Urdu. His most notable contribution in the field of education was the establishment of the Madarsatul Ulum in Aligarh in 1875, which emulates the Oxford and Cambridge University models and is now known as the Aligarh Muslim University. He wanted to create a network of educational institutions managed by Muslims and founded the All India Muhammadan Educational Conference. According to Robinson (1974, p. 126), "The chief importance of the [Aligarh] College was that it was the base from which a UP [Uttar Pradesh] Muslim elite group led a Muslim political party in the province and in India as a whole." To Kraemer (1931, p. 158),

> Aligarh, with all the forces it organized, was the starting point of a slow awakening of the Moslem community out of its listlessness. It has been the most potent factor in the breaking down of the crushing feeling of backwardness and despondency.

The *úlamā'* ideologically opposed Sir Syed, who sought only the secular improvement of Indian Muslims. They opposed disarming Islam through Western-oriented modernism. They thought of alternative measures to save Muslims in British India. Unlike Sir Syed, they thought of educating Muslims about Islam, leading to the foundation of a Madrasah [religious school] at Deoband for the revitalization of Muslim society in India (Faroqi, 1963, p. 27). The *úlamā'* of Deoband realized the grave consequences of the British occupation of India and were involved in the movement for India's independence. For a time, they supported the political stance of the INC, founded in 1885 for the protection and civil rights of Indians and the promotion of better understanding and cooperation with the British administration.

However, most of the prominent *úlamā'* stayed away from the INC. Instead, they formed their own political organization, the *Jamiat Úlamā'-i-Hind*, in November 1919. Maulana Abdul Bari presided over the first meeting. It was formed, among other reasons, to protect Islam and its way of life, to struggle for the complete freedom and independence of India, to struggle to achieve national rights for the Muslims in India, and to promote and establish good sibling relations with the other non-Muslim indigenous communities in India (Robinson, 2014, p. 92). They were of the opinion that all communities on the Indian subcontinent must unite to overthrow the British government. Prominent *úlamā'* like Maulana Abul Kalam Azad (1888–1958) and Mawlana Syed Husain Ahmad Madani (1879–1957) argued for composite nationalism. Syed Madani, the principal of the Darul Uloom Deoband (1927–1957), argued that Muslims were part of a united India and that Hindu-Muslim unity was necessary for the country's freedom. He worked closely with the INC until the partition of India was carried out. Madani championed composite nationalism. He argued that a nation was not essentially constituted by the bonds and ties of faith, belief, and religion, nor did it necessarily need similarity in religion or faith (Madani, n.d.). He referred to the state of Madinah established by Prophet Muhammad in which Muslims, Jews, and Christians had lived side by side. Likewise, Indian Muslims must form a nation inclusive of other religious entities and communities within India while striving for freedom from the British rule (Zaman, 2004, p. 33).

Syed Madani's stand for composite nationalism was criticized by other *úlamā'*, including Ashraf Ali Thanvi, who stated categorically that the only way to preserve Islamic identity and Islamic culture in India was a separate state for the Muslims. To him, the INC, dominated by non-Muslims, was a severe threat to the preservation of Muslim identity and culture in India (Usmani, n.d., pp. 60–62). He therefore supported the All-India Muslim League's struggle for a separate Muslim state. Another important religious figure, Maulana Zafar Ahmad Usmani, also criticized the concept of composite nationalism, arguing that such a concept is acceptable from an Islamic perspective only if Muslims constitute the majority and if *sharī'ah'* constitutes the law of the land. Subscribing to a nationhood where Muslims are in minority is bound to result in the destruction of their way of life (Zaman, 2004, pp. 42–47). Many *úlamā'* in Darul Ulum Deoband were found who felt strongly that the INC was a Hindu-majority organization catering exclusively to the Hindus in India with no regard for Muslims. Maulana Shabir Ahmad Uthmani (1887–1949) was much more vocal than others in pointing at the Congress' anti-Muslim attitudes. He subsequently resigned from the *Jamiat Úlamā'-i-Hind* and issued fatwas [religious decrees] declaring cooperation with Congress as *haram* [unlawful in Islam], as well as other fatwas.

Iqbal and Jinnah

The Muslim League leaders who were mobilizing Muslims for the division of British India severely criticized Madani and the concept of composite nationalism. Muslim leaders such as Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938) and Muhammad 'Ali Jinnah (1876–1948), who earned the title *Quaid-e-Azam* [Great Leader], were apprehensive about living as a minority in a predominantly Hindu India. They perceived Islam as: (1) a faith and religious and moral system whose cardinal beliefs mark its adherents as Muslims; (2) a culture and way of life that would integrate Muslims into a nation-state; and (3) a political ideological system with a set of values that could socialize Muslims into a viable and distinct political community. They advised Muslims to refrain from joining the INC, focusing instead on protecting and furthering the cause of Muslims in India.

According to the poet-philosopher Sir Muhammad Iqbal, known as Allama Iqbal, Islam alone provides the base for Muslim nationhood.

> According to the Qur'ān, it is the religion of Islam alone that sustains a nation and its true cultural or political sense. It is for this reason that the Qur'ān openly declares that any system other than that of Islam must be deprecated and rejected.
>
> *(Sherwani, 1977, pp. 251–263)*

Iqbal's philosophy was based on the teachings of the Qur'ān, and he believed the Qur'ān to have the most appropriate solutions for all of humanity's problems. He also realized that his co-religionists were ignorant of the true teachings of Islam and, hence, blindly following rituals and even adopting some features of Hindu culture. He evaluated the traditional Islamic doctrines and jurisprudence and found the prevailing interpretation of Islamic principles to be conservative and in need readdressing so as to be made relevant to the period he lived in. Iqbal desired to awaken Muslims to face the challenges of the time and to understand the true message of Islam. He invoked their glorious past and conjured the images of a sovereign homeland while highlighting their current deprivations (Qazi, 2013). He used poetry as a medium to spread his ideas and to awaken Muslims from their centuries-long slumber. His poetry and activism stimulated and mobilized Indian Muslims' anti-colonial struggle against British colonialism on the Indian subcontinent.

Iqbal did not approve of Indian Muslims living under Hindu domination, and hence demanded that they should be allowed to be dominant in certain parts of India. This was expressed during the 25th Session of the All-India Muslim League in 1930 that called for the creation of a separate state for Indian Muslims. He argued in his book *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* that, for the Muslims of India, the main formative force through history has been Islam, which united the Muslims into well-defined people (Iqbal, 1934). To Iqbal, Indians did not have a common racial conscience and hence could not function in unity. This alone justified the Muslim demand for the creation of a Muslim India within India. To him, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State was the final destiny for Indian Muslims. However, Iqbal was against a nationalism based on territory and alerted Muslims not to be carried away by the false claims of Muslims being able to prosper only if they had an independent state of their own. Iqbal as a poet-philosopher was very much concerned with the intellectual and cultural reconstruction of the Muslim world. Hence, he demanded that Muslims as a group be entitled to free development on their own terms. Iqbal had a federated India in mind with a consolidated Muslim state as its constituent unit.

Iqbal greatly influenced Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the secular and Westernized leader once hailed as the ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity. Subsequently, Jinnah took up Iqbal's notion of a separate Muslim homeland and enunciated what became known as the two-nation theory. He talked of Islam and Hinduism as two "different and distinct social orders" whose adherents can never evolve a "common nationality," adding, "Musalmans are a nation according to any definition of a nation, and they must have their homelands, their territory and their state" (Ahmad, 1974, pp. 178, 180). Accordingly, the Muslim League during its annual session in Lahore on March 23, 1940 adopted the Lahore Resolution, which stated:

> no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principle, namely that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such

> territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and Eastern Zones of India, should be grouped or constitute "Independent States" in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.
>
> *(Sherwani, 1985, p. 21)*

The Resolution called for the creation of independent Muslim states in the northwestern and eastern zones of the subcontinent, where Muslims constituted the majority of the population. The Lahore Resolution also signified the irrevocable transformation of Muhammad Ali Jinnah from a proponent of Hindu-Muslim unity to "the leader of the fight for an independent Pakistan" (Wolpert, 1984, p. 182).

The leaders of the All-India Congress Committee vehemently criticized the Lahore Resolution, dubbing it the Pakistan Resolution, since which the Resolution has come to be known as the Pakistan Resolution. As expected, religious scholars – especially those of the Deoband school – rejected the demand for Pakistan and condemned the Muslim League leaders, especially Jinnah for his ignorance of the fundamentals of Islam; they opposed the creation of Pakistan and instead supported the INC.

Mawdudi and Indian nationalism

Syed Abul A'la Mawdudi (1903–1979) did not like the attitude of the Deoband School. He opposed the Indian nationalist stand of Syed Husain Ahmad Madani, and was equally critical of the secular-minded leadership of the All-India Muslim League. Syed Mawdudi had never been formally educated, either as an *alim* or as a Westernized student. He attained mastery of Islamic sciences outside of regular educational institutions. He was highly prolific, producing around 70 works, some of monumental length and depth, and editor for two journals.

Mawdudi was highly critical of certain practices from the Sufi elements in popular Islam. These Sufis "misled Muslims with amulets, intonations, and prayer beads . . . and sent them to tombs and Sufi societies so they would intercede for them and ensure for them eternal happiness" (Mawdudi, 1989, p. 50). Mawdudi blamed these Sufis for the deterioration of the Islamic fighting spirit. Apparently, he was promoting the *Wahabiyah* doctrine, but unlike the Wahabis, he was highly critical of the state of Islamic orthodoxy and blamed them for the atrophy of the Muslim spirit. They had distracted "the Muslims off the foundations of Islam and its general, total principles and busied them with questions concerning the details of Fiqh [religious jurisprudence] . . . until they forgot what they were created for and ignored the sublime purposes for which Islam stands" (Mawdudi, 1989, p. 50).

Syed Mawdudi was equally critical of the newly Westernized elite of Muslim India, such as Sir Sayid Ahmad Khan, the poet Shibli Nomani (1857–1914), and many similar graduates from the College at Aligarh. Their attempts to reconcile Islam with the West had led to the loss of its moral authority:

> Look at the leaders and chiefs and principals, who profess their belief in the Book of Allāh and in his Prophet but, regrettably, show nothing of the true code of the Book, or of the Shariah [religious law, The Way] given by the Prophet, in their own ways-apart from taking, sometimes, part in the Prophet's birthday festivities, or inviting the reciters of the Qur'ān to read it once or twice in their house to entertain their relatives, and, if they feel like it, give a speech extolling Islam and praising its teaching,

> much as one would lavishly praise a poet-but to act according to the Shari'ah, and struggle to carry it out in this world, of that they have no inkling.
>
> *(Mawdudi, 1989, p. 50)*

Mawdudi rejected the positive attitude taken by *Jamiat-i Úlamā'-i Hind* and its leader, Madani, toward Gandhi's liberation movement and his call for Indian unity; he seemed to have viewed this as another proof of the *úlamā"*s passivity. He was against Muslims joining the Congress, which tried to mobilize Muslims in the ethos of secular democracy and economic efficiency. The Congress called for "composite nationalism" based on Muslim-Hindu unity, which Mawdudi believed to be impossible to achieve. He argued that, if the Muslims accept this type of nationalism and join the Congress, they would be annihilated and absorbed into the Hindu majority. "What was uppermost in my mind," wrote Mawdudi (1976, p. 25), "was to keep alive in the Muslims a sense of their separate entity and prevent their absorption into a non-Muslim community." He discarded the notion of composite nationalism and nationhood, arguing that Islam believes in pan-Islamism. To Mawdudi, Muslims constituted a siblinghood entrusted with a comprehensive system of life to offer the world. Were they to practice Islam faithfully, Mawdudi said, the matter of a national homeland would become absolutely immaterial. He argued for the Muslim community to turn inward and revive the traditions that had once brought it power, glory, and prosperity. According to Mawdudi, for the leaders of religious seminaries in India to endorse composite nationalism was to knowingly betray the people. Mawdudi, in turn, was accused by traditional authorities as being the least qualified person to provide an interpretation of Islam. The *úlamā"*s critique of Mawdudi was, however, no more than a polemic, usually with unsubstantiated accusations (Afaqi, 1976).

However, his main criticism up until the very establishment of Pakistan had been directed against Westernized leaders such as Jinnah himself who sought to cover up their lack of true belief by turning Islam into a national identity. Westernized Muslims did not understand the meaning of Islam, even though they used terms like *ummah* and *khilafat*. They talked about an Islamic state, but in reality meant a nation-state. They used Islamic terminologies to impress upon Muslims that the religion of nationalism is Islamic. Such a new religion, he claimed, was in fact *shirk* [sin of polytheism] – "Jinnah's Pakistan would be pagan and its leaders Pharaohs and Nimrods, infidel tyrants," he wrote in 1942 (as cited in Ahmad, 1967, p. 374). Eventually, Mawdudi established his own political party, Jamaat-i Islami, in August 1941 avowedly to resist the demand for Pakistan that had been adopted by the Jinnah-led Muslim League in March 1940.

Mawdudi argued that, if India's Muslims were to survive as a community, they would have to treat Islam as their way of life, not merely as a system of faith and worship. They must merge their personalities and existences into Islam. They must subordinate all their roles to the one role of being Muslim. Mawdudi was trying to make Muslims cognizant of their identity and raise in them fervor to organize their polity over the principles of Islam. Under the circumstances, as is always the case, a clear conception of the human being, their purpose, and their destiny became of utmost significance. Interpreting Islam in a progressive manner, Mawdudi provided unambiguous answers to these questions. The human being is the vicegerent of Allāh, the Creator, the Ruler, and the Sovereign of the universe. The believers' responsibility as the *khalīfah* [vicegerent] of the Almighty Allāh is to transform the earth, to which he has been entrusted [*amānah*], in accordance with the values enshrined in the Qur'ān and the Sunnah of the last Prophet of Islam.

While opposed to Muslim nationalism and the demand for Pakistan, Mawdudi promoted the cause of the two-nation theory. He even presented a two-nation theory of his own, wherein he

proposed dividing India into two culturally autonomous democratic entities functioning either as a federation or as a loose confederation. The articles he wrote to that effect were collected and published in his three-volume Urdu book, *Musalman awr Mawjudah Siyasi Kashmakash* [*Muslims and the Current Political Crisis*]. His writings provided the Muslim League with much-needed intellectual ammunition to fight the nationalist movement. Mawdudi is therefore recognized as an intellectual force behind the two-nation theory and a front against united Indian nationalism. According to I. H. Qureshi (1974, p. 339):

> Mawdudi's rejoinder was . . . logical, authoritative, polite and devastating. It did not win him too many adherents and followers, but it did serve the purpose of turning sincere and intelligent Muslims away from the Congress who mostly swelled the ranks of the Muslim League as followers of the Quaid-e-Azam.

In opposing the Muslim League and its leadership, Mawdudi's main concern was Islam and the ability of those who sought to represent it. He spent the period between the founding of the Jamaat in 1941 and the advent of Pakistan in 1947 mobilizing public opinion for the propagation and adoption of an Islamic ideological concept with the view of transforming India into an abode of Islam.

Mawdudi argued that a national government based on secular or Muslim nationalism would be no different than the imperial government of India quantitatively. Nationalism was an alien concept imported by colonialists to break up the unity of the Muslim world. They likewise had injected Western currencies, influence, thought, and all sorts of heresies into the Islamic way of life. Being a divisive phenomenon, a nation-state could be of no help in bringing about the Islamic socio-political system. Mawdudi therefore rejected the existence of Muslim nationalism as incompatible with Islam, because Islam is universal. His interest was in *iqamat-i deen* [establishing the Islamic way of life]. Mawdudi argued the methodology for the establishment of Islam's ascendancy to not be through the nationalist struggle. He argued that a national struggle may produce a nation-state for Indian Muslims, but definitely not an Islamic state. He also mounted scathing criticism against the Muslim League for having accepted the West's supremacy in the realm of knowledge, culture, and philosophy. Thus, in advocating solutions to the problems faced by Muslims in India, Mawdudi and the Jamaat-e-Islami were advocating and struggling for the domination of pristine Islam as a complete way of life. Since the founding of the *Jama'at* in 1941, Mawdudi had mobilized public opinion for the propagation and adoption of an Islamic ideological concept with a view to transforming India into an abode of Islam. In contrast, Jinnah and the All-India Muslim League were passionately involved in a national struggle for independence, and in 1947 succeeded in establishing Pakistan.

Islam, modernity, and tradition

Mawdudi saw the need for enlightened Muslims if the Islamic revolution were to succeed. Unfortunately, Muslims were in retreat. "Their minds and souls have passed under the sway of the West. Their thinking is being molded by Western ideas and their intellectual powers are developing in accordance with the principles of Western thought" (Mawdudi, 1966, p. 10). This dangerous situation had given rise to two extreme reactions: the static and the defeatist. The static Muslim literature, opposing technology and scientific progress, demonstrated the moral failure of the West and asserted the validity of the Muslim heritage as a whole. These were essentially a reaction against Western criticism rather than a confident statement about Islam. Mawdudi reproached the static religious conservatives for rigorous formalism and for

their unwillingness "to comprehend the principles and essential features of the new civilization of the West . . . and to fit these new instruments of progress, in keeping with the principles of Islam, into the educational system and social life of the Muslims" (Mawdudi, 1966, p. 11). The defeatist reaction came from the modernist Muslims, the Westernized elite. They acknowledged the superiority of Western culture and values and tried to mold Islam along Western lines.

Over time, these two postures hardened, the former leading to dogmatism and the latter degenerating into the subordination of the Islamic values systems to the abstract values of science and reason. Least concerned with the existing socio-economic and political realities of the Muslims, they were rendered only marginally relevant to the welfare of the Muslim community and of the whole human race. The education system the modernists had adopted was an alien one and had caused incalculable damage to the Muslim *ummah*. This education system, Mawdudi lamented, has produced "brown Englishmen," "Anglo-Mohammedans," and "Anglo-Indians" (Mawdudi, 1966, p. 16). Thus, Mawdudi argued that allowing such an indiscriminate welcome to everything modern was the greatest danger to the *ummah* because it would subject the entire nation to psychological enfeeblement.

Many Muslim reformers in the past had tried to remedy this sickness. They believed that what the system needed was the addition of Western sciences to the existing curriculum of Islamic disciplines. Their view was based on the assumption that Western sciences were value-neutral and would do no harm to Islamic values. President Jamal 'Abd al-Nasser of Egypt put this idea into practice by changing the very character of al-Azhar, but without any fruitful results in the area of modern sciences and technology. Worse still, the traditional Islamic teachings, desperately in need of reform, remained as sterile as ever. The Westernizing Muslim modernists, even if they meant well in their desire to defend Islam, in effect presented a truncated and deformed Islam.

To Mawdudi, such educational reforms would prove to be unproductive, even counterproductive. According to him, what was needed was to reorient the system and Islamize knowledge. Mawdudi considered Islamizing to mean "to critically analyze the Western humanities and sciences and to bring them into line with the teachings of Islam" (Mawdudi, 1966, pp. 17–18). It is a process of critical evaluation and appreciation as opposed to blind imitation, a process of sifting, filtering, and reconstructing as opposed to the wholesale rejection of Western thought and destruction. The aim is to critically appreciate and reformulate social sciences within the framework of Islam. That Mawdudi's definition of the Islamization of knowledge and its characteristics, given in 1936, resembles that propounded in 1982 by the late Dr. Ismail Raji al-Faruqi (1346–1406 AH/1921–1986 CE) in his *Islamization of Knowledge* is interesting to note. According to al-Faruqi, "to recast knowledge as Islam relates to it is to Islamize it" (al Faruqi, 1982, p. 15). As conceived by Mawdudi, the Islamization of knowledge aims at ameliorating the crisis of the Muslim mind by addressing the problem of the body of Western knowledge through the heritage and legacy of Islam. Its aim is to provide the Muslim *ummah* with a vision and an ideologically oriented, sound methodology for confronting contemporary challenges and reclaiming its lost glory.

Emphasizing science and reason, Mawdudi urged critical evaluation and assessment of both the Muslim heritage and Western science. He urged the Muslim heritage to be analyzed against its historical background and against the terms of the divine status of the Qur'ān and the norms of the Sunnah if the legacy is found to be inadequate or erring; this should correct their relevance to the problems of the present. Attempts at molding society along Islamic lines would be all the poorer if it did not take its legacy into account nor benefit from ancestral insights. Extremes of rejection or wholesale glorification were due either to the inaccessibility of the legacy to the modern mind or of the inability of traditionally trained scholars to discover and

establish the relevance of the heritage to present-day problems. Mawdudi's call was to break this impasse so as to facilitate restructuring the world order. Likewise, Western civilization should be subjected to critical analysis from the standpoint of Islam. Its methodology, foundational principles, historical development, and achievements should be surveyed and analyzed. Thereafter, the healthy achievements of Western civilization in terms of its scientific and technological progress, in so far as they are value-free and conform with Islamic principles, should be appreciated, abstracted, and assimilated into the Islamic scheme of life.

As conceptualized by Mawdudi, the process of Islamizing knowledge must tackle the problem of education. He felt strongly that a genuine revival of the *ummah* would only be possible if the education system were revamped and its faults corrected. What was actually required was for the system to be formed anew. To this end, Mawdudi proposed educational reforms for secondary, higher secondary, and university-level schools. His emphasis, however, was on the university level, for which he spelled out the modality for implementing his reforms.

Mawdudi realized that the prevailing iniquitous dehumanizing order was not replaceable with a humane order unless a fundamental change occurred in attitudes and values. Mawdudi did not believe bringing about societal transformation overnight to be possible or even desirable. The social transformation Mawdudi advocated presupposed changes in people's minds and hearts; the social change he desired must be brought about through lawful and constitutional means, and never through the path of violating the law.

Islam in Pakistan

Following the Partition of India in 1947, Mawdudi – along with many party leaders – moved to Pakistan and established the headquarters of the *Jama'at-e-Islami* of Pakistan in Lahore. The multiple reinforcing cleavages, elite incoherence, and tortuous and complicated political maneuverings during the formative phase of Pakistan perhaps had influenced the Jamaat leaders to become active in Pakistani politics. Noticeably, the *Jama'at-e-Islami* was the only well-organized religious grouping in Pakistan. It offered a solid program and had even acquired an influential role in student circles. Its followers have constantly worked to introduce more Islamic measures into Pakistan's constitution.

In accordance with Israr Ahmad, the Jamaat adopted the following two-point program:

1 To embark upon a comprehensive movement for the implementation of Islamic ideology in order to convert to Islam the newly established State of Pakistan.
2 To bring about a revolutionary change in the political leadership of the country so that the resources of the state are harnessed in the service of Islam.

Israr Ahmad blamed Mawdudi for restricting the scope of the Jamaat's activities through its exclusive concern for Muslims to the exclusion of non-Muslims, and for transforming the Jamaat into a nationalist organization serving the cause of Islam in Pakistan (Ahmad, 1990, pp. 118–121). Mawdudi's reasons for subscribing to the thesis of Islam in Pakistan were twofold. First, for an ideology to be useful, it must have an empirical import and make reference to particular cases or examples, because building a pattern of life merely in the abstract is impossible. Second, for an ideology to attract worldwide attention, it must demonstrate its worth by evolving a happy and successful system of life and must present its theories and fundamental principles in operation. Consequently, Mawdudi thought having the Islamic state established in one country first so as to be emulated worldwide later was essential.

The *Jama'at-e-Islami* started an organized campaign to realize the first of the two objectives. On January 6 and February 19, 1948, Mawdudi delivered two lectures at the Law College in Lahore in which he demanded the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan to accept the following four demands:

1 That sovereignty belongs to Allāh alone and that the state shall exercise its authority as His agent.
2 That *sharī'ah* will be the basic law of the land.
3 That laws in conflict with *sharī'ah* will gradually be repealed and that no such laws shall be enacted in the future.
4 That the state in exercising its powers shall not transgress the limits prescribed by Islam.

The Lahore lectures were followed by a tour of Pakistan in April and May 1948, extensive lobbying with the members of the Constituent Assembly, and a concerted public campaign to press the leaders to incorporate the above points into the constitution of Pakistan. On March 7, 1949, the Constituent Assembly passed the Objectives Resolution embodying the four-point demand. The text of the Resolution is as follows (Government of Pakistan, 1949, pp. 101–102).

> In the name of Allāh, the Beneficent, the Merciful.
>
> Whereas sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to Allāh Almighty alone and the authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan, through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust;
>
> This Constituent Assembly representing the people of Pakistan resolves to frame a Constitution for the sovereign independent State of Pakistan;
>
> Wherein the State shall exercise its powers and authority through the chosen representatives of the people;
>
> Wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance, and social justice as enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed;
>
> Wherein Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Qur'ān and the Sunnah;
>
> Wherein adequate provision shall be made for the minorities to freely profess and practice their religions and develop their cultures;
>
> Wherein the territories now included in or in accession with Pakistan and such other territories as may hereafter be included in or accede to Pakistan shall form a Federation wherein the units will be autonomous with such boundaries and limitations on their powers and authority as may be prescribed;
>
> Wherein shall be guaranteed fundamental rights including equality of status, of opportunity, and before law, social, economic and political justice, and freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship, and association, subject to law and public morality;
>
> Wherein adequate provisions shall be made to safeguard the legitimate interests of minorities and backward and depressed classes;
>
> Wherein the independence of the Judiciary shall be fully secured;
>
> Wherein the integrity of the territories of the Federation, its independence, and all its rights including its sovereign rights on land, sea, and air shall be safeguarded;
>
> So that the people of Pakistan may prosper and attain their rightful and honored place amongst the nations of the World and make their full contribution towards international peace and progress and happiness of humanity.

According to Mawdudi, with the passage of the Resolution, Pakistan had in principle taken the shape of an Islamic state. Not the Resolution per se, but the fact that it had been adopted by the government in response to the unanimous demand of the people to lead an Islamic way of life, is what made Pakistan an Islamic state. Crediting Mawdudi and his organization exclusively for the success would be an exaggeration. However, the organized strength of the Jamaat under Mawdudi's leadership did play a major role.

The Resolution, setting forth ideals and values, acted as a guide for constitution makers in Pakistan in 1956, 1962, 1972, and 1973 in devising an Islamic order for the country. It has been incorporated with minor modifications into all of Pakistan's constitutions. The Objectives Resolution was made a substantive part of the constitution by President General Ziyaul Haq through a constitutional amendment promulgated on March 2, 1985.

The Objectives Resolution did not produce the desired result. Understandably, the institutionalization of Islam in Pakistan would have jeopardized the vested interests of the feudal and capitalist forces as well as that the of civil-military bureaucracy.

The Jamaat consequently intensified its efforts through public meetings, contacting members of parliament, and mobilizing strong public pressure to make Pakistan a truly Islamic republic. Mawdudi produced several treatises on Islamic political theory, Islamic law and constitution, Islamic judicial and legal structures, and the modalities for ushering in the Islamic political system in Pakistan. To Mawdudi's credit, he is the one who introduced Islamic idioms and concepts into the unfolding national political discourse and launched a vigorous campaign for the Islamization of Pakistan. Mawdudi coined or popularized concepts like Islamic ideology, Islamic politics, Islamic constitution, *iqamat-e-deen* [establish the religion], *nizam-e-Mustafa* [system of the Prophet Muhammed], and Islamic way of life. These concepts became key elements of the Islamist discourse in Pakistan.

Mawdudi's intensification of efforts for the Islamic system involved him in intense conflicts with authorities. The dispute took many forms: the 1953 riots against the minority Ahmadi community and the Report of the Court of Inquiry which followed, bringing into sharp focus the secularist view in polar opposition to the view of the positive Islamic state, and debate over the Constitution of 1956 preceded by the formulation of the basic principles of the Islamic State by 31 *úlamā'*. This was in response to the challenge thrown by the government to the *úlamā'* to produce a unanimous statement on the nature of the Islamic constitution. In the conference of the *úlamā'* gathered to produce an Islamic constitution, Mawdudi took the lead and laid the basis for the productive cooperative effort. "Mawdudi read his principles first, and these were supported with some additions by the members of the board" (Binder, 1963, p. 216). There was also heated debate over the Constitution of 1962, which initially erased the word "Islamic" from the country's nomenclature but was reinserted later on to read the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. "This was due largely to the advocacy of this idea by Mawdudi that the constitution was so amended" (Brohi, 1980, p. 301).

Although the Constitution of 1956 envisioned the law and administration of the state as "modern, even broadly secular," it endorsed the concept of an Islamic state and designated Pakistan as the Islamic Republic. It required the Head of State to be a Muslim, contained the preamble based upon the Objectives Resolution, and provided for the nullification of laws repugnant to the Qur'ān and the Sunnah. The Constitution of 1962 contained somewhat similar provisions, though it considerably watered down the Islamic character of the state. This had largely been due to the high-handed method of Ayub Khan's military regime.

Conclusion

Islam has played a dominant role on the Indian subcontinent, one that ultimately culminated in the establishment of Pakistan. The vitality of Islam is closely associated with the response of Muslim scholars [the *úlamā'*] to the Hindu-supported colonial dominance of the British. Islam was self-aware of its distinct and often exclusionary identity from the onset. Local spiritual practices notwithstanding, most Muslim elites in South Asia were strongly aware of their unique cultural identity separate from the Hindus, even if they were not particularly religious, and even if they got along well with Hindus. Leading Muslim religious scholars played an active role in determining and affirming Muslim identity according to their understanding of Islam. The process of modernization, expanded literacy, and urbanization led to the movement of ideology from the elite to the masses. After passing through a series of upheavals, the Muslim community shed its minority complex and declared itself a nation, asserting its separateness.

One option for the Indian subcontinent was to have two sets of symbols and mottos, for two major religious groups to exist in two different areas. However, India's two largest groups, Hindus and Muslims, articulated different visions of the future. Among the Muslims were found two dominant visions, pan-Islamism and Pakistani nationalism, that were hard to reconcile in the context of the development of modern identities and nation-states. Eventually, Pakistani nationalism triumphed and the country gained independence.

Interestingly, those who had opposed Pakistani nationalism owing to its being led by secular and Westernized elites later migrated to Pakistan, the first modern state to be founded in the name of Islam. Traditionalist scholars and their institutions, as well as proponents and practitioners of modernity, Islamism, and Sufism vied to give shape to the newly emerged state. Since its independence, Pakistan has witnessed important initiatives toward rethinking Islam's public place, meaning, and interpretation. Pakistan has become a site of intense contestation among its elites with regard to the extent to which the rules and regulations governing the state are Islamized. Equally, the elites emphasized the need for a rethinking on core Islamic texts and traditions in the interest of their compatibility with the imperatives of modern life. Eventually, Mawdudi's Jamaat-e-Islami triumphed and Pakistan came to be designated the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The Objective Resolution was passed in the parliament, which has become part and parcel for all its constitutions.

The Islamic provisions in these constitutions have undeniably been merely high-sounding phrases with no correspondence to the country's socio-political and legal set up. However, these provisions' importance as an index to the relevance of Islam within the framework of the state is hard to ignore.

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SECTION IV

Making of the nation-state and changing forms of nationalism

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THE EMERGENCE AND PROGRESS OF NATIONALISM IN TURKEY

From imperialism to the global age

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Introduction

One of the most controversial concepts of the past two centuries is nationalism. Benedict Anderson, who is known for his studies on nationalism, claimed, "It is hard to think of any political phenomenon which remains so puzzling and about which there is less analytic consensus" (Anderson, 2001, p. 11). This situation, which Anderson has uncovered with a bit of wonder, is actually the result of how nationalism has been experienced in different societies and in different historical and social contexts.

This differentiation in nationalism appears not only at the international level, but also in the understanding of nationalism within a country. These differences are shaped based on historical, international, and religious contexts. Within this context, claiming a consensus to exist on what Turkish nationalism means is difficult, as its different forms are still being debated. This is due to nationalism mostly being the result of political processes and being developed in parallel with a variety of political developments. Consequently, the two terms *ulusalcılık* and *milliyetçilik* in Turkish, while both corresponding to nationalism in Western languages, can be understood as two different ways of thinking that also indicate their differences in the political sphere. Rather than defining Turkish nationalism, this chapter explains Turkish nationalism by discussing how it has taken shape throughout history.

The birth of nationalism: the Ottoman millet system

The Turkish word *millet* derives from the Arabic *mille* and is defined as the "religion, sect, or all the people belonging to a religion or a sect, class, community, lineage, or category" (Devellioğlu, 1978). To the Ottomans, this concept referred to a religious differentiation (Eryılmaz, 1992, pp. 11–13). Thus, the millet system also marks a part of Islamic law (Barkey & Gavrilis, 2016, p. 26). While this differentiation had been more inclusive in the beginning, it turned into a more fragmental structure toward the 19th century.

Four millets [*milel-i erbaa*] can be mentioned that were generally accepted in the Ottoman period. These were the Muslim millet, Rumi millet, Armenian millet, and Jewish millet. *Millet-i sadıka* [loyal nation] was another name for the Armenian millet. For example, while Turks,

Arabs, Albanians, Bosnians, Pomaks, Berbers, and Abkhazians were included in the Muslim millet, Bulgarians and Serbians had been considered a part of the Rum Orthodox millet up until 1850. The term Rumi millet refers to Greeks, Bulgarians, Vlachs, Romanians, Orthodox Albanians, and Christian Arabs (Kenanoğlu, 2004, pp. 33–34). Another interesting example in this respect is the situation that surrounded the Armenian millet. The Catholic Armenians who emerged after the 18th century, Protestant Armenians who emerged after the 19th century, and Gregorian Armenians were separated from one another by strict boundaries within the Ottoman social construct (Adıyeke, 2000).

Aside from being autonomous in regulating religious matters and worship, millets were also permitted to implement their own rules in the areas of civil law (Barkey & Gavrilis, 2016, p. 31). A person called the *milletbaşı* [nation head] was appointed to each millet by the state for governance and regulation, and these *milletbaşı*s were responsible for the actions of the whole community (Küçük, 1999, pp. 210–211). The main reason behind the Ottoman state's division of society into compartments and isolating them from one another was that the multinational (i.e., multi-*millet*) empire state addressed the people not as individuals but as communities.

However, at the turn of the 19th century, this method of social organization was recognized as no longer fulfilling the many needs. The reforms by Mahmud II were mostly centered on creating an Ottoman nation organized around a single constitution as much as possible. Thus, the 1839 Edict of Gülhane was actually an outcome of the Tanzimat [Reformist] idea passing down from the previous periods (Findley, 2012, pp. 61–63). In this way, the Edict of Gülhane constituted the superstructure of the Tanzimat idea. The Ottomanist movement, which was developed within this atmosphere, aimed to reorganize the Ottoman social structure that had been fragmented by the millet system under the idea of one Ottoman nation (i.e., *millet*). Öğün (1995, p. 54) described this situation as the state's arrival at a point where it could rule only to the extent to which it was able to reunite what it had divided, while previously, it had been able to rule only to the extent it was able to divide the social structures. Therefore, Namık Kemal, one of the prominent figures of the period, should importantly be noted to have used the terms *Ottoman*, *homeland*, *ummah*, and *millet* synonymously in his texts (Mardin, 1985, p. 1701). Thus, the Ottomanism that had emerged in the Tanzimat period and developed during the period leading up to the Second Constitutional Era can be described as the type of nationalism that had emerged in Ottoman society (Eissenstat, 2015; Taglia, 2016a, 2016b). Similarly, Islamism during Abdulhamid II's period can be considered as proto-nationalism and Abdulhamid II himself as a proto-nationalist (Yavuz, 1993, p. 188). This idea, which gained support from the elite, was based mostly on weakening the influence of the millet system in Ottoman society. However, the reason behind its failure was that the communities that had been divided by the millet system were able to change the way they operated by means of the modern nationalist idea.

The Turkish literature in particular appears to have a rather affirmatory attitude toward the millet system.[1] In contrast, Benjamin Braude argued the millet system to have resurfaced just as it was about to disappear and to resemble the Owl of Minerva in this way (Braude, 2000). Indeed, the millet system seems to have become more prominent during the second half of the 19th century. This may have occurred due to the fact that the system had become more fragmented. The proposal, prepared as a result of the endeavors to reorganize the millet system that began in 1858, was approved and came into effect under the name Regulations for the Greek Patriarchate. On June 9 of the same year, the Mount Lebanon Mutasaffirate proposal was prepared and the region became somewhat autonomous under the administration of a Christian governor. The Regulation of the Armenian Nation was enacted on March 18, 1863 and the Regulation of Rabbinate on March 22, 1865 (Bozkurt, 1989, p. 170; Eryılmaz, 1990, p. 113). At the time, the demand for an independent Bulgarian church was widely debated; however, the

Greek Patriarch Gregory IV's offer to form an autonomous Bulgarian church within the Patriarchate was rejected by the Bulgarians, and the Bulgarian church was ultimately separated from the Greek church in 1870 through an edict by Sultan Abdulaziz (Güllü, 2018, pp. 353–354; Kalkandjieva, 2014). What the foundation and status of the Bulgarian Exarchy indicate is that the Ottoman millet system had been one of the main reasons behind the emergence of the form of nationalism in which religious and ethnic affiliations were intertwined. The Ottoman millet system worked like a nation-producing machine in the modern sense. The increase in the number of millets that were divided by strict boundaries within Ottoman society created a suitable environment for the development of nationalism. In this context, nationalism in Ottoman society can be said to have developed under three structures historically: (1) wars, changes in commercial relations. and the characteristics of the reforms; (2) newly emerging views in society on history, literature, and education; and (3) charitable organizations, secret societies, and the interactions within the organizational framework political parties had designed (Göçek, 2003).

The early period of Turkish nationalism

Some claim the first indicators of Turkish nationalism to have appeared in literature. Şinasi's attempt to use only Turkish words in his texts in 1849 and Ziya Paşa's claim that real Turkish poetry was to be found in the folklore literature form the basis for this argument (Eroğlu, 1992, p. 53).

Ahmed Vefik Pasha and Suleiman Pasha prepared wordbooks of the Turkish language. What accompanied these developments at that time in Turkey was the swift adaptation of the Turcology studies that had been rapidly progressing in Europe in the 19th century. The progress of Turcology brought along with it the development of a secular approach toward Turkishness. Sami Frashëri (Şemseddin Sami), who was born in Frashër in today's Albania, endeavored to demonstrate Turks to be a proper nation. Referring to the Ottoman state as the Turkish state, Sami advocated the unification of Eastern and Western Turkishness (Uzer, 2016, pp. 18–21). In 1897, Mehmed Emin Yurdakul published a compilation during Sami's lifetime which he titled *Turkish Poems* – not *Ottoman Poems*. Georgeon regarded this publication by Mehmed Emin as a small-scale revolution (Georgeon, 2006). This little literary revolution would later turn into a political revolution that would lead to the proclamation of the Republic.

However, regarding the idea of nationalism as a synthetic phenomenon within the Ottoman society is incorrect. Georgeon held the opinion that the merchants and itinerants within the Ottoman Turks were conscious of their ethnicity because these people could sense their differences through particulars such as the garments they wore wherever they went or the practices in their everyday lives (Georgeon, 2006, p. 3). The parallel between the progress of nationalism among Turks and Russia's progress through Central Asia and Caucasia also need to be pointed out. In other words, the tendency in both the Tsardom of Russia and the Ottoman State to assign each other as "the other" in building their identities resulted in the appearance of the primitive forms of (Muscovite) nationalist ideas. This identity would first be envisioned as the Ottoman nation, followed by intensifying the emphasis on Turkishness. The impact of the ever-increasing Turkish/Muslim intellectuals of Russian origins on this matter should also be noted.

However, saying that the development of Turkish nationalism as a fully matured political project having taken place during the Second Constitutional Era would be more realistic. The foundation of the Turkish Society in 1908, the first publication of *Türk Yurdu* magazine in 1911, and the foundation of the Turkish Hearths [Türk Ocakları] were all developments that occurred after the 1908 Revolution. Turkish nationalism's emphasis on homeland during this period can be said to have encompassed a large geography where the Turks lived. Pan-Turkism appeared

as a cultural movement from the 19th century until the Balkan Wars. After the Balkan Wars, its political aspect became more apparent. Also of interest is the period when *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*[2] (Three Policies) became visible to the intellectual public eye, as it coincides with the time of the Balkan Wars (both leading up to it and afterward).

The Declaration of Freedom was the result of one of the few significant social movements in the world that had appeared at the beginning of the 20th century. The Young Turk Revolution had created a new and unstable internal political situation shaped by the delicate balance between the liberals,[3] palace, and the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) (Ahmad, 1968, p. 23). This delicate structure was the underbelly of constitutionalism and was constantly attacked, especially by the aggressive, unsatisfied Balkan nationalists; this caused the reaction to expand. The increasing emphasis on the ethnicity-based identity and the aggressive irredentist discourse of the unsatisfied Balkan nationalists paved the way for the Second Constitutional Era, which was declared in the high hopes of turning the Ottoman spring into the Ottoman winter. This was a time when the war drums were beginning to beat. At the center of the political agendas of the Balkan countries was the issue of Macedonia.

The issue of Macedonia played a significant role in various ways on the creation and development of nationalist engagements around the CUP or on being independent from them. As Akşin (2001, pp. 67, 96–97) accurately pointed out, the issue served as a lesson on nationalism for the young officers who would later play important roles within the CUP. The terrorist groups that were operating for the ethnic groups they belonged to in the region caused the term of Turk to carry a much bigger meaning in the minds of the young officers.

Turkish nationalism can be said to have become more crystalized after the Balkan Wars. This ideology was under the influence of a new intellectual class that had been created by the Tanzimat reforms and the educational reforms during the Abdulhamid II period. Many names such as Ömer Seyfettin, Ahmet Agayef,[4] and Necip Asım occurred in the shaping of the ideas of this new intellectual class to which Tekinalp also belonged, but two names come to the forefront when communicating the nationalist idea to the masses in terms of their capacity of representation is concerned: Akçuraoğlu Yusuf (After the Surname Law Yusuf Akçura) and Gökalp Ziya Bey (or Ziya Gökalp or Gökalp with the common usages).

Pan-Turkism of Gökalp and Akçura

Masami Arai and Georgeon agree that Yusuf Akçura's *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* was the "manifesto of pan-Turkism" (Arai, 2009, p. 181; Georgeon, 2002, pp. 505–514). Akçura's ideas drew attention when the idea of a secular nation had begun to take shape in the minds of Turkish intellectuals. Some analysts even suggest that Akçura had laid the intellectual foundations for the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic. According to Copeaux (2006, p. 42), for example, Akçura served as the bridge between Turkism and Kemalism. Akçura claimed that religions had lost their importance in the new era and that religions would only be able to preserve their political and social significance if they aided or even served the struggle by participating in it (Akçura, 1998, pp. 34–35). Within this framework, Akçura defined nation as "a community with a common social conscience that stems from the fundamental unity of race and language" (Akçura, 1981, p. 4). In this context, Akçura be said to have envisioned an Islam for Turks as opposed to a universal Islam as a result of his tendency to consider religion as a part of society.

The meaning Akçura attributed to language – Turkish in particular – in his conception of nationalism is interesting. One of the main reasons behind this is because he had been significantly influenced by İsmail Gaspıralı, who had developed a mostly language-based nationalist thought (Yavuz, 1993, pp. 192–193).

Akçura's idea of nationalism carried both modernist and primordialist undertones. Akçura suggested that, although the idea of nationalism had passed over to Muslims and Turks by way of Europeans, Turks had already possessed this notion even before it was developed in Europe when considering that nationalism's most basic meaning is "a nation acting in solidarity in order to protect its interests" (Akçura, 1981, p. 4). Being defeated by the West and a sense of being underdeveloped had allowed the idea of nationalism to take root in Muslim societies, along with other ideas. Akçura suggested that a suitable foundation existed for the nationalist idea to develop because tribalism was already found within Muslim cultures (Georgeon, 1996, pp. 171–172). As Berkes (1976) indicated,[5] the idea that Akçura had a more democratic understanding of nationalism stemmed from his belief that Ottomanism had collapsed.

When Akçura's understanding of nationalism expanded its domain, it brought along with it another topic of discussion to the Ottoman intellectual world. Ethnicity can be said to have not been strongly emphasized in the Turkish nationalism that had developed within the boundaries of the Ottoman state in touch with the Ottoman social and political world. The following statement from Süleyman Nazif, an Ottoman intellectual, is striking: "I am first Muslim, then Ottoman, and lastly Turkish. I would not marry my sister to a non-Muslim Turk, but I would marry her to a non-Turkish Muslim" (Öğün, 1995, p. 194). The visibility of the emphasis on ethnicity created a problem for which Ziya Gökalp came up with a quite functional composition, developing an understanding that based Turkish nationalism on a cultural foundation rather than an ethnic one, and which has maintained its influence to date.

Uriel Heyd suggested that, unlike Akçura, Gökalp had not actually adopted Ottomanism, Turkism, or Islamism but had picked the concepts he found suitable from all three and added them to his own Turkic theory. He was of the opinion that his composition of Turkification, Islamization, and modernization, which he had theorized with his statement, "I am of Turkish nation, Islamic *ummah*, and Western civilization," was not only harmonious but that its components also complemented one another (Gökalp, 2010, p. 17). Gökalp based this assumption on the distinction between national culture, religious community [*ummah*], and international civilization (Heyd, 1979, pp. 173–174). In this context, he defined Turkism as "neither a tribe, an *ummah* nor a community. Turkism means generating a Turkish culture within the European civilization" (Gökalp, 1977, pp. 113–114). With respect to Gökalp, the emphasis on Turkishness was as strong as the emphasis on Islamism.[6] Gökalp can be claimed to have considered Islam as the national religion of the Turks (Turner, 1977, p. 8).

Language was positioned quite centrally within Gökalp's concept of nationalism. He can be suggested to have considered the use of a common language as one of the first items on his itinerary. Özdoğan (2006, pp. 73–74) considered Gökalp to resemble Herder in his approach to and positioning of nationalism. Heyd (1979, p. 190), on the other hand, was of the opinion that Gökalp's concept of nationalism, which benefits a lot from French academia, resembled the nationalism of Central Europe and Germany.

One of the most stressed points about Gökalp was his pan-Turanism. However, Gökalp's Turanism also clearly did not refer to political unity. Gökalp himself stated that likening the Turanism of the Turks to Italian and German national unities would be a mistake and that the geographical conditions of such a political unity would be impossible to meet (Sarınay, 1994, pp. 182). What Gökalp advocated was a cultural Turanism rather than a political one.

Intellectuals from Russian-dominated regions and Kemalism

One issue ahead is the role of the intellectuals of Russian origin. When reviewing political history through a macro perspective, a parallel can be seen between the contact established

with the Turkish nationalism within Ottoman geography and Russia's progress through Central Asia. In particular, the claim that intellectuals such as Ağaoğlu Ahmet Bey, Hüseyinzade Ali, Akçuraoğlu Yusuf, and Zeli Velidi Togan, who came to the capital city on the eve of or right after the Young Turk Revolution, had been influential in introducing the rather secular and ethnicity-based nationalism to the Ottoman intelligentsia has been repeated almost unquestioningly in studies concerning nationalism and Turkish thought.[7]

The views of the Russian migrant Zeki Velidi Togan can be discussed within this context. Togan can also be a crucial indicator in terms of a healthier assessment of the relationship between Kemalism and the intellectuals of Russian origin. As a result of his relationship with his assistant Hüseyin Nihal Atsız, Togan was tried on grounds of Turkism/Turanism in 1944 and considered a representative of a tradition of thought that mostly focused on ethnicity and was fused with the Turan ideal.[8] However, although having acquired citizenship in the Republic of Turkey by invitation from the Kemalist regime, he had to live abroad for a while as a result of his harsh criticism of the ideas that were brought up during the First Turkish Historical Congress, and his return to the country was only possible after the death of Mustafa Kemal. Why the works of Togan – who was described by Karl Jahn as the last and distinctive member of the brilliant trio alongside Barthold and Minorsky in the survey of Turkish history because of his cultural and political goals – had gone unpublished for a long time in Turkey, and why the academia did not take interest in his studies, remain an unsolved mystery.

According to Togan, who gave importance to religion in his analysis, religion was an essential component of Turkish nationalism. What was clearly effective in his arriving at this conviction was his experience in Russia. According to Togan, including the intellectuals who had personally changed religion and converted to Christianity in the national cause was not possible, and furthermore, these kinds of people, although known to be nationalists for a time, could even contradict the national cause, as in the example of Muhammedcan Kulayev, who preferred the alias Mistilav Kulayev (Togan, 1999, pp. 214–216). The text where one may find a summary of Togan's views on Islam and Turkism is his work titled *Kur'an ve Türkler* [*Kuran and Turks*] (1971). Bringing harsh criticism about the topics of language and alphabet reform as well, Togan mentioned in this text that the Quran was helpful to Turks in developing a literary language. In other words, unlike those who were faithfully defending language and alphabet reform, he argued the holy book of Islam, which he considered the national religion of Turks, to have made a great contribution to the development of the Turkish language.

According to Togan, the national guide of Turkish nationalism was, and should remain, Ziya Gökalp. Togan's emphasis on Gökalp is important because Gökalp envisioned a national and historical unity when defining nation rather than stressing ethnicity (Togan, 1977, p. 39).

At this point, the claim that nationalists with Russian origins had influenced the Kemalist thought should be noted as a rather hasty and reductive argument. Of the intellectuals with Russian origins, Sadri Maksudi Arsal and Yusuf Akçura can be said to be the two who established the most explicit connection with Kemalism. Akçura in particular presented the most distinct instances of this connection with his works *Türk Yılı* [*Turkish Year*] and *Türkçülüğün Tarihi* [*History of Turkism*], both dated 1928. However, these should be considered as examples of how the heavy political atmosphere of the period had affected intellectuals with Russian origins, rather than as examples of these thinkers affecting Kemalist thought. One of the most important of the intellectuals with Russian origins, Zeki Velidi, failed to see eye to eye with the Kemalist regime and had to leave the country. Ayaz İshakî, who came to the country through the efforts of the Minister of Education Hamdullah Suphi in 1925, returned to Berlin in 1927 and was only able to come back to Turkey in 1940. Long story short, the belief that intellectuals

with Russian origins had played a huge role in the formation of Kemalist nationalism does not reflect the truth.[9]

The parentheses that narrowed the horizon of nationalism: Kemalism

Tanıl Bora mentions in his discussions about nationalism in his book *Cereyanlar* that this ideology had mainly been shaped by a concern for survival (Bora, 2017). This approach narrowed nationalism's social and political caliber of thought substantially. Truly, the dissolution of the empire had generated a reactionary and survival-centered vein within the nationalist thought, especially after the Balkan Wars and World War I; however, narrowing the course of Turkish nationalism down to this vein as a whole makes understanding this ideology difficult. Even more so, the same can very well be said about Islamism, Ottomanism, and (although yet premature) socialism during the dissolution period of the empire. Thus, attributing a general characteristic of this period from the Ottoman-Turkish world of thought solely to nationalism would be incorrect.

However, the concept of nationalism in Kemalist thought can be said to have used the discourse of survival for various reasons that stem from the fact that it had emerged from the ruins of a crumbled empire. This discourse both facilitated the creation of an integrated, opposition-free political and social mass and also provided the ideological fuel the new state required. On the other hand, the nationalism attached to the body of Kemalism had fallen far behind its ideational maturity during the Ottoman period and turned into a cold ideology of a one-dimensional and horizonless, authoritarian regime.

Heyd (1979, p. 176) argued the foundations of Kemalism to only be pan-Turkism and Westernism, and although pan-Turkism appeared to be the dominant element in Kemalism, its most important element was actually Westernism, which is the most important aspect of modern Turkish cultural life. Heyd's analysis regarding Kemalism in this context is a reductionist interpretation that oversimplifies the subject. In actuality, Kemalism is a rather eclectic political practice. In this framework, it seems to have acquired the required foundations from Ottomanism, Westernism, Turkism, and even Islamism to an extent.

At this point, the question arises of whether a connection or parallelism exists between the concept of nationalism in Kemalism and Gökalp's approach to Kemalism. As I mentioned before, Gökalp considered Islam to be an indispensable element and the national religion of the Turks. It shows a clear break from Kemalism on this point. Davison (1998, p. 105) explained this situation by arguing, "Gökalp's nationalism was less secular than that of Kemalism." The second issue is the Turanism within Gökalp's thought. Gökalp always remained loyal to the idea of Turan as an ideal. This nexus allowed Gökalp's idea to be aestheticized. In Kemalist nationalism, on the other hand, the idea of Turan is definitely non-existent. Thus, Gökalp's concept of nationalism and Kemalist nationalism can easily be argued to have certain fundamental differences.

Turkish nationalism during the post-1960 period

Toward the 1960s, the public face of Turkism was Nihal Atsız. While Togan, as well as other nationalists with Russian origins, were in search of cultural unity, Atsız was after political unity. According to Atsız, "There is only the Turkish nation and therefore, it is only necessary to define the Turkish nation; whether others subscribe to this definition or not is irrelevant" (Atsız, 1992, pp. 139–140). The political organization of this nation would be Turan, the Turkish unity – and this was also the ideal of Turks. According to Atsız, this ideal would be realized

through the following three stages: "Independence, liberation of our siblings who live as slaves, and conquest and imperialism" (Atsız, 1992, p. 133).

Nationalist thought in Turkey can be said to have taken a reflexive form of thought in the 1960s. One of the best examples of this phenomenon was Osman Turan. Interestingly, almost all his critical texts were written after his retirement from politics in 1969. Besides his most famous work, *Türk Cihan Hakimiyeti Mefkuresi* [*Turkish Ideal of World Domination*], he also caught the attention of Orientalists such as Claude Cohen and Irene Melikof with his studies on pre-Islamic Turks and their lifestyles.

Etienne Copeaux, in his work titled *Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk Islam Sentezine* [*From the Turkish History Thesis to the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis*] (2006, pp. 27–28) argued Ziya Gökalp's ideas to have been developed by Osman Turan and Ibrahim Kafesoğlu in the Republican Turkey. However, Copeaux's approach can be said to be very reductive and the result of a tendency to throw all the factors and data inside a single sack with a typical Western world-weary attitude. This is because Osman Turan and Ibrahim Kafesoğlu should be noted as having been considerably different in their ways of interpreting both nationalism and Turkish history. For instance, Osman Turan argued that a feudal social organization had existed among the Seljuks, while Kafesoğlu insisted that no such organization had existed within Seljuk society.[10]

As the 1960s came to an end, the self-weight of the polar axioms positioned first within the Democrat Party (DP) and then within the Justice Party (AP) against the Republican People's Party (CHP) were seen to have started to increase. Ali Bulaç (1988, pp. 236–238) also pointed out the twistedness of the fact that Islamic movements were positioned on the right in Turkey while being positioned outside the right wing because of their anti-system nature elsewhere in the world. In this context, although the polar axioms within the Justice Party gradually chose to separately organize in the second half of the 1960s, the fact that their historical leaders had tried their hands in politics within the Justice Party at first makes more sense.

Alparslan Türkeş, one of the most prominent figures of the 1960 Turkish coup d'état on May 27 and who had been tried for Turkism-Turanism in 1944, also investigated the conditions of parliamentary representation within the Justice Party when he first returned to Turkey. Upon seeing that it was impossible, he started to practice politics within the Republican Villagers Nation Party (CKMP) under the leadership of Osman Bölükbaşı (Landau, 1979, p. 290). In other words, the organization of Türkeş and his comrades within CKMP allowed them to rise up on a platform that was both removed from the DP-AP line while also remaining in their hinterland.

From this date onwards, the politically motivated aspect of nationalist thought can be suggested as having become more distinctive and its reflexes more conjunctural. In this sense, Darendelioğlu's comment, "Nationalism, which had an actionist attitude until May 27 in Turkey, became reactionary after 1960" (1968, p. 296), is notable. Apart from this, Tanıl Bora's comment regarding the National Movement Party (MHP) having combined Islam and nationalism within its body is also on point. He stated that he "considers Islam as a consolidating element for Turkism that reinforces national identity" (Bora & Can, 1991, p. 45). A similar comment can be made about the composition the *Millî Görüş* [National Vision] movement had envisaged for Islam and Turkism: Turkism was seen as a consolidating element that reinforced its national aspect.

Aydınlar Ocağı [Hearth of Intellectuals, or Hearth], founded in 1970 and initially presided over by Prof. Dr. Ibrahim Kafesoğlu, became one of the prominent platforms for the idea of Turkish-Islamic synthesis (Özcan, 2011). Abdurrahman Dilipak's following comment about the Hearth is eye-opening: "Influenced by neither the mason circles like the Justice Party, by religious circles like the National Salvation Party (MSP), nor by nationalist circles like Nationalist

Movement Party; it is close to every fraction, yet represents none " (as cited in Bora & Can, 1991, p. 131). Bora suggested this aspect of the Hearth to have been effective in highlighting its function as a bridge between the DP and MHP (Bora & Can, 1991, p. 131) because the Hearth circle was known to not be favorable toward the National Order Party (MNP) movement. This is largely due to the Hearth defining Turkish-Islamic synthesis as a Turkish-Islamic-Western synthesis. However, the victory of the Republican People's Party in the 1973 elections was unpreventable.

At that stage, the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation had taken place, which deeply affected both the intellectual and political atmosphere of Turkey and would continue to shape it in the following term. The military intervention, which took place during the CHP-MSP coalition, brought along the rise of nationalist jargon both in the intellectual and political spheres. In other words, nationalism became the dominant culture of the political scene after the Cyprus intervention. The increase in the Islamic emphasis in order to maintain ties with rural areas and the possibility of Islamism becoming organized within an autonomous structure showed the religious element inherent to (or completely surrounding) nationalism to have also become more visible. The 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution and discussions on the political principles of Islam that had started to take a severe turn in the intellectual sphere as a result of the revolution would later become the main culprits of much deeper ruptures after the 1980 Turkish coup d'état on September 12.

Discussions on the Turkish-Islamic synthesis and the 1980 Turkish coup d'état

The coup d'état that took place on September 12, 1980 aimed at flattening not only the political area but also the intellectual one up to the destruction of the smallest hill. This situation involved the state reproducing its ideology and injecting it into the capillaries of society without any intermediaries, just as had been done in the early Republican Period. The regime after the coup tried to ensure this by launching an effort to redefine Atatürkism. Meanwhile, the social reality that had emerged in the second half of the 1970s did not actually allow Atatürkism to leave out religion (or even be marginalized) this time as it had in the early Republican Period. Thus, Aydınlar Ocağı's Turkish-Islamic-Western synthesis was deemed useful and included in the agenda by the post-coup regime for its non-exclusive stance toward Westernism and its equal placement from every faction.

Another reason for Islam's inclusion in the formal ideology that was indirectly related to Turkey's social reality was the fracture the Iranian Revolution had caused in international relations. The Green Belt strategy the United States had implemented in the region in order to undermine Iran's regional influence eliminated the possibility of the post-coup regime, leaving religion outside of the ideology production, as the regime was inclined to repair Turkey's relations with the trans-Atlantic alliance and fix the formerly problematic Turkish-U.S. relations.

The aspect of religion that did remain outside of the formal ideology, on the other hand, continued to appear not only in Islamist circles but also within fractions of the nationalist movement that had used to constitute its personnel prior to the coup and were now in prison. During this process that was out of their control, the administration personnel within the nationalist flank had to open up a wider space for religion in order to restrain the base and prevent depression within the fractions that had been subjected to the torture of the post-coup regime.

This situation in the 1980s can be said to have generated the morale and motivation to facilitate an alliance in the 1991 elections between the Welfare Party of the National Vision movement and the National Task Party (MÇP) of the Idealist movement. However, as the criticism

from the cadres that had a heavy emphasis on religion toward Türkeş's leadership increased, the fragmentation of the movement became inevitable and the Grand Unity Party, which had an even stronger Islamic emphasis, came into the Turkish political scene under the leadership of Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu.

Nationalism in the 1990s can be said to have had a serious impact on the political sphere. Two main factors can be mentioned that caused this situation. First is the slogan that made a huge sensation after the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR): "Turkish world from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China." Suddenly, an authentic emphasis on Turkishness could encompass the political arena. However, the fact that this emphasis was partly synthetic would shortly be realized.

The possibility of realizing a monolithic Turkish world, which was considered unrealistic by nationalist thinkers such as Gaspıralı, Togan, Gökalp, and Arsal even at the beginning of the century when the USSR – which had been working like a nation-producing machine – had not yet been completely institutionalized, had drifted farther away after a century and only became possible when the Turkish republics who had gained their freedom from the USSR were revealed to be unable to envisage a future separate from the Russian Federation. At the very least, these young republics were not at all leaning toward the idea of a "Big Brother Turkey," as the nationalist wave in Turkey had envisioned. Ebulfez Elçibey's fall from power and replacement by Haydar Aliyev actually summed up this situation. By the middle of the 1990s, nationalist ideas regarding Central Asia had already given way to romantic dreams and were thus removed from the state's priority list, to which they had been partly included as a result of Turgut Özal's personal efforts. Actually, this situation prevented the development of a positive understanding of nationalism, which could also be called idealist nationalism.

Right at this point, a second factor needs to be mentioned that intensified the reactionary feature of nationalism in Turkey. According to formal sources from the state, the 1990s marked the most brutal period of the low-density war with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). The increased number of war scenes on printed and visual media, PKK's decision to relocate its terrorist actions to metropolises, Turkey's cross-border operations, and the attitudes within Europe and the United States that clearly intended to neutralize Turkey's war with the PKK all created a space to flourish for a nationalism whereby references to establishing power intensified and an emphasis on a state built upon the simple dialectic of "us" and "others" increased. The discourse of the 1997 Turkish military memorandum having been built on this foundation will become clear upon decoding it. The peak of this process occurred when Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the separatist terrorist organization PKK, was brought to Turkey in 1999. Bülent Ecevit, the president of the government shaped by the February 28, 1997 coup, did not hesitate to turn this development into votes, and the victors of the 1999 elections became the Democratic Left Party (DSP) under the leadership of Ecevit and the MHP, who relied on the nationalist reflex generated by the ruckus the Öcalan issue had made in their first election without their historical leader, Türkeş.

The excitement created by the Turkic republics within public opinion (and among international relations strategists such as Huntington) when they gained their independence after the dissolution of the USSR, combined with the derogatory attitude toward Turkey during its low-density war with the PKK and membership negotiations with the EU, makes clear that the ethnic sensitivity in Turkish nationalism had become much more visible. This attitude, which aimed to remove religion from nationalism as a founding element, would bring together the Kemalist intellectuals surrounding the 1997 coup with the idealist cadres of the Aydınlık group, which had defended the National Democratic Revolution and its derivatives in the 1960s and 1970s, and who were concretized in the person of Namık Kemal Zeybek into what would be

known as the Red Apple Coalition. While these discussions within the MHP were carried out during the early 2000s, the debates surrounding the doctrine within the framework of strict organizational discipline can be said to have stopped altogether after 2007.

Reviewal of Turkish nationalism during the 21st century

Turkish nationalism is a theory based on the period which Nairn (1997) referred to as the Era of Nationalism. All the compositions or ways of thinking Ottoman intellectuals had raised in order to save the empire from dissolution can be considered as types of nationalism. In this framework, Turkish nationalism can be regarded as the continuation of a pursuit that had been shaped in the second half of the 19th century. In this respect, three fundamental characteristics of Turkish nationalism can be mentioned.

The first thing to address should be the vagueness of the ethnic emphasis in Turkish nationalism. This situation is clearer in the texts of the early period in particular. The radius of the impact Atsız and his circle, which had gained public visibility after the rupture created by Kemalism, had on Turkish nationalism was quite narrow until the 1990s in particular. Although especially evident in thinkers such as Gökalp, Togan, and Arsal, Akçura can also be added to the group of people who have prioritized cultural emphasis in organizing a people.

The role of religion in the analysis can be mentioned as the second important characteristic. Since the early periods, this phenomenon has been easily observable in Turkish nationalism. The composition of Turkification, Islamization, and modernization as brought about by Gökalp and inspired by Ali Turan is the most beautiful and explanatory example of this phenomenon. The role attributed to Islam in the formation of the Turkish nation resulted from the consideration of nation as a cultural community rather than a racial one. Other factors that have brought about this situation are the integration of ethnic identity into religious identity and the consideration of the state as an extension of this integrated identity in both Krym-Kazan Turks and Ottoman Turks.

At this point, the position of the state as the third feature in Turkish nationalism takes clearer form. Turkish nationalism is revolutionary in that it has tended to transform into a national state rather than separating itself from the central state (Georgeon, 2006, p. 5). Both Islamism and Ottomanism as the antecedents of Turkish nationalism, as well as ideologies such as Westernism and socialism, had been fundamentally intended for rescuing the empire. For this reason, the state in these ideologies constitutes the central column. An envisagement of ideology without a state is out of the question. Of course, the impact that the Anatolian-Asian social-political thought, which had positioned the state at the center of society, had on this situation can be mentioned here.

Nationalism starting to separate itself from the right wing in the second half of the 1970s, coupled with Islamism showing a similar inclination, brought along a tension between ethnicity and religion. However, this tension was still not very tangible during the 1970s. The combination of the fracture the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution had created in religious identities with the 1980 Turkish coup d'état brought ideological identities into question, as well. Harsh debates regarding the social role of religion broke out, especially among the idealists in the Medrese-i Yusufiye [Josephian School], and certain nationalists in the 1970s went so far as to regard nationalism as blasphemy within the aura of the 1980s. The incident in which the tension between ethnicity and religion can be observed most clearly is the division of MÇP and the birth of the Great Unity Party (Büyük Birlik Partisi-BBP) under the leadership of Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu.

As can be seen, talking about thinkers with a representative capacity for Turkish nationalism gets increasingly harder after the 1970s. One of the reasons behind this – and perhaps the most

important – is that the reactionary aspect of nationalism has been at the forefront since 1970. Nationalism, which had had an actionist attitude (albeit partially) in previous periods, began to express itself within the mold of anti-communism under the influence of the atmosphere generated by the Cold War; this resulted in nationalism turning into a form of political struggle rather than a form of thought. Although nationalists' perception of threat changed with the low-density war in southeastern Turkey, which grew more violent in the second half of the 1980s, the tendencies within nationalism did not change.

The tight bonds established within the political arena seem to have created a desert effect on nationalistic thought. Contact with Kemalism has created an effect that dried up the intellectual development even more. This situation in turn has narrowed the horizons of the nation, which had been envisaged as infinitely encompassing at the beginning of the 20th century. In other words, after passing the first quarter of the 20th century, Turkish nationalism seemed to have been leaning toward become a synthetic discourse – or, more accurately, a reactive discourse disconnected from Turkey's sociological and geographical reality through its provocative political statements and tendencies.

Notes

1 So much so that it even has texts that consider the nation system as an alternative to the Westphalian state system. For an example, see Çiftçi (2018).
2 The text was published in the gazette titled *Türk* in Cairo in 1904. It began to be published in Istanbul in 1911, however.
3 What is meant by liberals is the groups in favor of freedom other than the Committee of Union and Progress.
4 Ahmet Agayef's previous ideology before he arrived at pan-Turkism was Iranianism. For this little-known anecdote in Agayef's journey of thought see Kalirad (2019).
5 Georgeon (1996, p. 2) found this article of Berkes "impressive."
6 Shaffer (2008, pp. 36–37) claimed that Gökalp borrowed his slogan "Turkification-Islamization-Modernization" from the Azerbaijani intellectual Hüseyinzade.
7 For a couple of eye-opening examples see Lewis (2004, pp. 345–334), Karakaş (2000, pp. 145–146), Georgeon (1996, pp. 69–71), Berkes (1976, pp. 194–203).
8 This situation is especially common among Kurdish nationalists. Togan is regarded as the author of a "racist" thought. For an interesting example of this, see Miroğlu (2010, p. 17).
9 For a more detailed discussion on this subject, see Eissenstat's article on intellectuals of Russian origins, see Eissenstat (2015).
10 It is necessary to point out that what further fueled these conflicts was the article about Seljuks in the *Islamic Encyclopedia*, which was also the subject of plagiarization claims.

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14
ARAB NATIONALISM
Emergence, development, and regression

Ismail Numan Telci

Introduction

The Arab community, although divided into many different sub-identities, carries its Arab lineage as the primary identity. This sense of belonging, which has a long history, has become particularly stronger since the 19th century. Arab nationalism, which started to carry a political meaning in the last years of the Ottoman Empire, became an ideology with mass followers in countries such as Egypt, Iraq, and Syria. During the period following the independence of the Arab states, Arab nationalism began to be used as an integrative tool by the political leaderships. While this situation caused an identity-based awakening in some Arab communities, it did not have the desired effect in others.

Although considered as a transnational idea, Arab nationalism is mostly identified with Egypt. This situation will be seen more clearly when discussed in a historical context. The idea of Arab nationalism emerged in the later periods of the Ottoman state in particular and was passed onto other countries in the region from there. If assessed within the context of Egypt specifically, nationalism is mostly defined through a sense of patriotism. The most prominent figure to have incorporated the patriotic dimension into nationalism is Rifa'a Al-Tahtawi. Tahtawi, who conveyed the ideas he adopted during his years in France between 1826 and 1931 through the book he wrote in 1934 for Arabic nations, attempted to place Egyptian patriotism in an Islamic perspective by taking a reformist approach (Tibi, 1990, p. 87). Meanwhile, some other thinkers argued that Egyptian nationalism should follow a secular line. Ahmed Lutfi Seyyid emphasized that religion should not be an important element of Egyptian identity, suggesting that the prominence of religion would harm the notion of nation (Kassab, 2010, p. 258).

Those who advocated the nationalist ideology in Egypt approached the Egyptian identity within the contexts of legacy, cultural values, and traditions on the one hand, while emphasizing its geographical position on the other hand. Therefore, the Pharaonic, Greco-Roman, Coptic, and Islamic civilizations, along with the Mediterranean, African, Middle Eastern, and Asian regions, are considered to have been the determining factors in Egyptian nationalism (Bozbaş, 2016, p. 109). Some prominent Egyptian thinkers have clashed over these subjects. For instance, Taha Hussein, who lived between 1889 and 1973, argued that pharaohs should have no place in Egyptian nationalism and that, on the contrary, Egypt should subsist on its Arab identity.

Meanwhile, Hussein considered the Arabic language to be more of a unifying factor for Arab nationalism than religion (Fazlıoğlu, 2010, pp. 377–378; Osman, 2016, pp. 123–124).

The Egyptian Revolution of 1952 made a substantial impact on the nationalist ideology in Egypt. While nationalism progressed in the context of ideas such as anti-colonialism and anti-elitism following 1952, the regimes that came into power also functionalized the army and religious institutions in the nationalist discourse (Dunne, 2015, pp. 4–5). Gamal Abdel Nasser's populist, patriotic, and anti-colonial statements glorifying the army caused nationalism to be identified with Nasserism for a while in Egypt. Following the revolution that took place in 2011, the nationalist idea was revived, the foundations of which had been laid during Nasser's regime. Among the actors of the revolution were those who used nationalist statements, while some of them also wanted to bring these views to the political arena. On the other hand, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who came to power after the military coup in 2013, has mostly attempted to use Nasser's methods and instruments with regard to nationalism.

Arab nationalist ideology, which had for the most part been associated with political leaders, entered into a period of decline following the 1952 coup due to the deaths of the leaders, defeats in wars, and economic problems. This situation has gotten worse since the 1990s; the concept of Arab nationalism has become a notion emptied of identity, politically dysfunctional, and unreciprocated at the social level.

This chapter discusses the transformation of Arab nationalism with a particular focus on Egypt. At this point, the study will take into consideration Egypt's central position in the emergence of Arab nationalism and how it became one of the most effective ideologies in the region for a time. Moreover, the process Arab nationalism's decline will again be studied using the case of Egypt.

Arab nationalism during the last period of the Ottoman Empire

Although Arab nationalism did not emerge until the 19th century, the idea of nationalism that had arisen globally after the French Revolution in the 18th century made way for this ideology to spread across the Arab world. Four developments that took place in the 19th century can be said to have had an impact on the formation of the idea of Arab nationalism, which found a basis for itself in countries such as Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. The first of these was the French invasion of Egypt in 1798 and the following French rule that lasted three years; the second was the emergence of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia; the third were the ideas of the elites in the Islamic world that advocated modernization; and finally, the Turkish nationalist ideas the Young Turks raised that had a counter-effect on the Arab world in terms of Arab nationalism (Özalkan, 2018, p. 2).

The first significant developments that played a role in the emergence of Arab nationalism took place in Egypt (Jankowski, 1991, pp. 243–264). The three-year administration by the French, who invaded Egypt in 1978, and the educational and cultural activities they conducted during this time, enabled Western ideas to spread across the educated class. After the French rule ended, this groundwork paved the way for Arab nationalist ideas to come up more frequently during the period of Kavalali Mehmed Ali Pasha (Muhammad Ali of Egypt; Ay, 2018, p. 36).

Another precipitating factor in this sense is the fact that, when the students and thinkers who the governor of Egypt Kavalali Mehmed Ali Pasha had sent to Europe for education returned, they had been influenced by the Western ideological movements and wanted to spread these ideologies throughout the Ottoman geography. One of the most prominent figures in this regard was Rifa'a Rafi al-Tahtawi. Al-Tahtawi, who introduced the concept of nation to the Arab geography, in a sense thus laid the foundations of Arab nationalism in Egypt (Addi, 2017,

p. 29). Missionary schools, Christian Arabs, encouragement from Western countries, reformist societies and associations, and reformist intellectuals who followed the liberal-secular ideology were also influential in the emergence of Arab nationalism in different regions under the rule of the Ottoman empire. Missionary schools were of special importance in this regard. Indeed, the Arab people in these schools received an education that allowed them to adopt Western values and ideologies, hence enabling the idea of Arab nationalism to spread rapidly across segments of the society

These kinds of activities carried out during the last era of the Ottoman Empire paved the way for the idea of Arab nationalism. Both the global and local actors who wanted to exploit this situation functionalized their anti-Ottoman statements to establish the ideology of Arab nationalism by citing the nationalist tendencies of the Committee of Union and Progress [Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti] as justification. In fact, an organization called the Young Arab Society, which had been founded in Istanbul by the followers of the ideology of Arab nationalism at the time, served as a platform where anti-Ottoman views were discussed and spread (Kurun, 2017, p. 15).

Figures such as Ibrahim al-Yazici from Syria condemned the presence of the Ottomans in Arab geography on the grounds that the Ottomans had steered the Arabs, who had been advanced in technical subjects towards religion, stating that Arabs should break free from the Ottoman oppression. The Great Arab Revolt that started in 1916 was triggered by the idea of Arab nationalism. As a result, Arab nationalism took the form of an ideology and paved the way for the verbalized demands for independence in many countries, from Egypt and Iraq to Syria and Lebanon.

Arab nationalism was also utilized by the foreign forces in their notorious plans for the Ottoman Empire after World War I. By encouraging the administrators of regions with weak ties to the Ottomans to gain their freedom, Western powers caused a permanent change in the politics of the region with their attempts to this end. For instance, famous English diplomat Thomas Edward Lawrence served in the organization called the Arab Bureau, which was founded in 1916 in Cairo for the purpose of organizing influential figures and people of the Arab world against the Ottoman Empire (Ay, 2018, p. 40).

However, the attempts by Western powers to exploit Arab nationalism got out of control after a while. The wave of nationalism reached a point where it threatened the presence of not only the Ottomans who had an influence on the Arab countries in the region, but that of the other foreign powers, as well. The Arab nationalist movements at that time were particularly prominent in Egypt. Figures such as Muhammad Farid Wajdi, Qasim Amin, Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, Mustafa Kamil, and Ahmed Ourabi represented the different forms of nationalist thought in Egypt (Okutan, 2001, p. 164). Among other nationalist figures, Saad Zaghloul paved the way against Western movements' raising their voices in the Arab world. Zaghloul's attitude towards the English in particular brought along a tendency in Egypt in this regard, which started to manifest itself in different areas later on.

In this way, the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in 1928, came to the fore among the movements that emerged on the social level. The movement came forth with the goals of putting an end to the English presence in the country and establishing an Islamic state; although not directly in line with Arab nationalism, the movement defended the need for protecting Arab lands from foreign influence in the region in general and Egypt in particular. The fact that the Muslim Brotherhood personally went to Palestine and aided the Palestinians in their fight during the establishment of Israel further clarifies their position in this sense (Obaid, 2017, p. 7). Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood can be said to have had a discourse that was a blend of *ummah* consciousness and nationalism.

Another central figure that played a role in transforming the idea of Arab nationalism into an ideological movement and found considerable audience in Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon in particular was the Ottoman bureaucrat Sati' al-Husri. Stressing the idea of the unity of Arabic speaking communities, al-Husri advocated a more secular Arab nationalism because he was against the idea of pan-Islamism (Ay, 2018, p. 38). Arab nationalists generally favored secularism over conservatism, and this continued to be the case during World War II and the subsequent period.

The most tangible result the nationalist ideology yielded in the Arab geography at a regional level was without a doubt establishment of the Arab League. The organization was established in Cairo in 1945 with the founding members of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Jordan. With the establishment of the Arab League, Arab nationalism took on an institutional form, while the leading position of Egypt in the region was further crystalized.

Gamal Abdel Nasser period and the role of Egypt as the bearer of Arab nationalism

During a period when the backlash against the monarchical regime was mounting, the Free Officers Movement, consisting of 300 or so top-ranking soldiers, seized power and took over all the government buildings in Egypt in June of 1952. Muhammad Naguib, the leader of the movement, was unable to hold out against Gamal Abdel Nasser. After Naguib resigned in February 1954, Nasser took over the administration. After an unsuccessful attempt on his life, Nasser began a campaign of severe pressure against the Muslim Brotherhood movement. Consolidating his political influence during this period, Nasser became the second president of Egypt in the 1956 elections.

The most remarkable feature of Nasser's statements during this period was his emphasis on Arab identity and nationalism (Gerges, 2018, p. 174). Terms such as Arab motherland, Arab nation, Arab unity, the unacceptability of Western intervention in Arab lands, and the necessity of fighting against imperialism, were constantly repeated in his speeches (Aburish, 2004; Dawisha, 2016). Nasser sought to functionalize Arab nationalism as an instrument in his desire to legitimize his oppression within the country, to be effective in the regional politics, and to become a powerful actor on the global scale. He succeeded, for the most part.

Gamal Abdel Nasser was seen to have utilized a number of instruments in the name of Arab nationalism during this time. One of the most important among these was a remarkable individual who come out of Egypt named Umm Kulthum. Umm Kulthum was a well-known Egyptian singer and actress, who become a transnational figure throughout the Middle East for representing the nationalist tendencies in the Arab world, particularly during the early Cold War years. The singer/actress considerably increased the influence Nasser had at the time by mobilizing every resource in her possession for Nasser's pan-Arab ideology (Hammond, 2005, p. 144; Dawisha, 2016, p. 148).

Another instrument employed by Nasser at the time was the Egypt-based broadcast channel Sawt al-Arab. The regime used this channel as a propaganda tool to legitimize its power while also using it to send messages to spread Arab nationalism as an ideology across different segments of society. These broadcasts condemned the presence of foreigners in Arab lands, while calling for a unified Arab front against Israel (Fandy, 2007, p. 41).

Nasser made use of every opportunity to spread Arab nationalism. To this end, he redesigned Al-Azhar University and ensured the inclusion of fields other than theology in the curriculum. On the other hand, he also aimed to convey his ideology to the public through the ulama and the religious leaders by having control over Al-Azhar (Hibbard, 2011, p. 89). Toward that end,

Nasser gave many impassioned speeches to large crowds in Al-Azhar's conference hall. Thus, Nasser can be said to have strived for Al-Azhar to be seen as a shared institution of Arabs rather through its Islamic aspects (Osman, 2013, pp. 47–75).

This discourse also secured Nasser support for his instruments and policies from political and social formations within the Arab world. Organizations such as the Baath movement, which had a similar position along the lines of Nasser's Arab nationalism and was led by Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar; the Arab nationalist movement, founded by George Habash in Palestine; the National Party in Syria; and the Socialist Nation Party in Iraq were among the regional groups that supported Nasser.

Several reasons exist behind the rise of Arab nationalism being centered in Egypt. The first of these is that Egypt stood out among the other countries in the region in a political sense. Unlike the Gulf countries, which had not yet met with the prosperity oil revenues would bring, Egypt stood apart with its large population, economic capacity, and military power. In addition to this, Gamal Abdel Nasser's emphasis on Arab nationalism in his speeches carried Egypt to a position of natural leadership in this regard (Awan, 2017, p. 116). Another reason on this point is that Egypt was seen as a regional actor both by the Western Bloc and the Soviet Union. Both blocs aimed at having a strong ally for their policies in the region by drawing Egypt toward their orbits. This led to the Gamal Abdel Nasser administration having a bigger influence than what appeared.

This influence was reflected in Gamal Abdel Nasser's policies. Nasser made unexpected decisions by functionalizing Arab nationalism in his foreign policies. The most crucial one among these was undoubtedly the nationalization of the Suez Canal. As not being able to sufficiently profit from the Suez Canal revenues, Egyptian government believed that it should have the full control over the canal both economically and politically. Considering the presence of the British in Suez as an insult and economic disadvantage for Arabs, especially Egypt, Nasser hardened his stance after 1954.

The attitudes of Western countries and Britain in particular toward Egypt were critical in Nasser's decision to nationalize Suez. Nasser, who could not accept Britain's view of Egypt as a state, started to take a severe position after the loan required for the construction of the Aswan Dam was not approved by the United States nor later by the United Kingdom (UK) or the World Bank (Truitt, 2010, p. 145). While these developments pushed Nasser to find local resources, the idea of nationalizing the Suez Canal also began to be seriously considered in this context. In a speech he made on December 26, 1956, Nasser declared the Suez Canal to be nationalized (Skardon, 2010, p. 186). The UK, France, and Israel – who had signed a secret agreement in France in October to remove Nasser from power in the following period – decided to open war against Egypt. The intervention, which started with Israel's attack on Gaza on October 29, continued with the bombardment by the French and British air forces on October 31. Not being able to make any progress in the operations, these countries eventually failed in their attempt to overthrow Nasser (Varble, 2009, pp. 19–83). Nasser's survival of the attacks reinforced his charisma and established him as a hero in the Arab world.

Egypt's resistance against imperial powers under the leadership of Nasser led to a further rise in the nationalist ideas that had already been spreading in the Arab world. Aware of this situation, Nasser continued his Arab nationalist discourse with a political pragmatism. Nasser, who wanted to take this one step further, found the closest political discourse in Syria. The Baathist movement, which always had a strong ideological approach toward Arab nationalism, aimed to protect its political position in Syria by establishing close ties with Egypt. This agreement and consensus gradually brought the governments of the two countries closer.

Due to Egypt's growing leadership position and Nasser's charisma, the Arab nationalist ruling class in Syria brought a proposal to merge with Egypt. When groups belonging to the socialist ideology in the country in particular gained power and started to pose a threat to the administration, Nasser started taking the idea of unification seriously. Although a possible unification would bring economic burden to Egypt, Nasser needed to proceed with it as part of the Arab solidarity, and so he did. A decision to establish the United Arab Republic was made during the meeting held in Cairo in 1958, and Nasser was elected as president (Jankowski, 2002).

These developments caused serious unease among the socialist and Baathist members, who were excluded from the political system in Syria and increasingly overshadowed by Arab nationalists. Although these groups were close to Arab nationalism, they reacted because they had lost their position in the Syrian political structure. A group of soldiers called the Military Committee declared that Syria was again a separate state by staging a coup in 1961. In a sense, this development was the end of the United Arab Republic.

Another development in this regard was Egypt's decision to intervene in Yemen. Nasser made this decision as part of Arab solidarity, as the republic that had been established after the overthrow of the monarchy in Yemen was under threat from the Zaydis in the north. Another reason for this intervention was that Nasser wanted to support the new republican administration established in Yemen. The Yemen intervention did not at all turn out as Nasser expected, who sent troops to the region in 1962. As a result of the Five-Year War, at least 10,000 Egyptian soldiers lost their lives, and this intervention cost Egypt billions of dollars (Ferris, 2015).

While the intervention was still ongoing, Nasser started a war against Israel by sending his army to the Sinai region in 1967. The Six-Day War, which came after the economic turmoil created by the Yemen war, left Egypt in an even more difficult situation. In this war, the Egyptian army suffered a heavy defeat, and this development prompted Nasser to withdraw all soldiers from Yemen. While Nasser suffered a serious loss of prestige within the country, Yemen also suffered a serious blow to its image in the Arab public with its defeat against the group being supported by Saudi Arabia.

The Yemeni intervention and the Six-Day War were in a sense the beginning of the end for Nasser, as well as for Arab nationalism (Machairas, 2017, p. 5). The masses that had relied on Nasser's charisma – and thought they could achieve victory with Nasser both against the West and against Israel – now lost their hopes as a result of the experienced fiasco. When Nasser died on September 28, 1970, Arab nationalism was left desolate.

The decline of Arab nationalism and the Hosni Mubarak era

The idea of Arab nationalism in a sense entered a period of decline after Nasser's death. Meanwhile, the coming into power of a pro-Western, secular, and non-Arab nationalist figure like Anwar Sadat in Egypt in 1970 was a negative turn for Arab nationalism. However, Sadat can be said to have assumed an Egyptian nationalist attitude in order to emphasize his break from Nasser and to base his own political tendency. Indeed, this approach pushed Sadat to a political line that prioritized Egypt, and he had a more nationalist perspective rather than one of pan-Arabism (Bozbaş, 2016, p. 111). Sadat's launching of another war against Israel in 1973 can be considered as another important development at this point because Egypt, who could not completely subjugate Israel in this war, had to accept the peace agreement. Although being able to take back the lands it had lost to Israel in the Six-Day War with the Camp David agreement, Egypt was guilty in the eyes of Arabs of betraying Palestine's cause, as this agreement meant permanent peace between Egypt and Israel. This betrayal led to a gradual decrease in the meaning and significance of the case that once had been their uniting force. Egypt's signing of a

peace agreement with Israel also led to the permanent recognition of pan-Arabism as a utopian ideology.

The peace agreement Sadat signed with Israel had political consequences, as well. The Arab League, which was regarded as a vital institution in terms of Arab nationalism and was centered in Cairo, had decided to expel Egypt. Following this decision, the institution's headquarters was moved to Tunisia, and for the first time, a non-Egyptian citizen was appointed as the general secretary. This development further damaged Egypt's reputation among the Arab masses (Wren, 1979).

The Iranian Revolution in 1979 was another development that played a role in the decline of Arab nationalism. Although the ideas spreading from Iran in the post-revolutionary period were not able to find an enthusiastic audience in the region, they still attracted attention in the Arab world. Therefore, the Iranian Revolution can be concluded to have had an intellectual effect. In practice, Iran had started making its presence felt more and more in the Arab world and carried more weight among the nearby political agents in this geography. This set the foundations for disunity among Arabs, where sectarian differences were effective.

Hosni Mubarak, who came to power following the assassination of Anwar Sadat on October 6, 1981, was unable to change the Arab world's attitude toward Arab nationalism in general and Egypt's in particular. One approach to nationalism that was on more of a micro-level was seen to have been functionalized for the sake of political interests during the Mubarak era. Factors such as the attacks by radical organizations, the economic deterioration, and the increasing social support for the Muslim Brotherhood had led the regime to use Egyptian nationalism and patriotism as a unifying element in their ideology. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, broadcasts were made on television and radio channels highlighting Egypt's governmental institutions, the army, and the Mubarak leadership.

Meanwhile, the idea of Arab nationalism had continued to shed blood at the regional level. One of the blows in this regard came from the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the Gulf War that followed. The decision of Saddam Hussein's administration in Iraq to occupy Kuwait had had a shocking effect on the Arab region. Upon this development, which had seriously hampered Arab solidarity, an international coalition led by the United States decided to intervene in Iraq. Support of this coalition from Saudi Arabia and Egypt, who were politically close to the United States, caused the divide in the Arab world to deepen.

The period following the Gulf War no longer saw figures defending nationalism as an idea in the Arab world, nor did any state or ruler prioritize Arab nationalist discourses anymore – so much so that during this period, some Arab intellectuals claimed that Arabic thought had become an idea that representatives of the diaspora were attempting to keep alive (Ajami, 1991). Instead, a political atmosphere emerged in which Islamic movements became more prominent and were adopted more widely at a social level. As for Egypt, a type of nationalism arose whereby military institutions and patriotic/nationalist ideas were advocated, as opposed to Arab nationalism.

During the Mubarak era, the idea of Arab nationalism diverged from the line Nasser had advocated. As a matter of fact, Mubarak had no serious claim on leadership among Arab countries, due in part to his close relations with Western countries and his approach that had brought Egypt to a more self-enclosed position in terms of foreign politics. Regaining membership in the Arab League was one of the rare steps taken to recover Egypt's effective position in the Arab world during the Mubarak era.

This situation in Egypt, which had been excluded from the Arab League after the Camp David Accords were signed with Israel, continued for more than ten years. Mubarak, who wanted to provide a respite to Egypt in this regard and whose influence in the Arab region had

gradually diminished, ensured that his country was re-admitted to the union. Thanks to his intense diplomacy, the Arab League's headquarters were relocated to Cairo in 1990. With this decision, the Arab League also moved for the first time to a country that had an Israeli embassy in its capital, which made the solution to the Palestine problem even more impossible (Cowell, 1990).

In addition to Hosni Mubarak's National Democratic party, which followed a liberal/secular line in relation to nationalism, patriotism, and ethnic-nationalism, political formations were also found that had adopted the ideology called Nasserism. As an ideology, Nasserism emerged with the aim of liberating Egypt from British occupation; it afterward developed with pan-Arab and Arab nationalist discourses and took on a hybrid form of ideology that included socialist tendencies. Indeed, Nasser's main goal had been to create an Arab nation under the leadership of Egypt. To that end, Nasser had wanted to expand welfare to wider masses by making land reforms, played a leading role in nationalizing banking and in many other sectors in Egypt, and envisaged a country with a capacity for self-sufficient production. Even though Arab nationalism in Egypt was in decline after Nasser's death, the Nasserist ideology, which prioritized Nasser's steps and views, found an audience in some political circles. This allowed the Nasserist parties to take part in the political scene during the Mubarak era (Ghanem, 2014, pp. 3–5).

The Arab Democratic Nasserist Party, the Al-Karama (Dignity) Party, and the Al-Wafd Party were among the Nasserist parties that had come to the fore during the Mubarak era. These parties had a political view that blended Arab nationalism and socialist ideology. The Al-Karama Party, founded by Hamdin Sabbahi in 1996, stood out with its harsh criticism of the Mubarak administration. Sabbahi, who also received the support of pan-Arab and Nasserist figures, tried to hold onto the political scene throughout the Mubarak administration. Supporting the revolutionary process in 2011, Sabbahi competed in the 2012 and 2014 presidential elections but lost.

Founded in 1984, the Arab Democratic Nasserist Party was represented in parliament with one deputy in the 1995 elections and three deputies in the elections of 2000. The Al-Wafd Party, re-established in 1978, is another political formation known for its nationalist views during the Mubarak era. The Al-Wafd Party also could not go beyond getting a few representatives in the parliamentary elections.

Finally, turning the army into a nationalist symbol is seen clearly in the case of Egypt. This approach is observed in the Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak administrations. Throughout the Mubarak administration, the army was constantly portrayed as the most important institution of Egypt and depicted as the defender of the country and determiner of its destiny. Depictions in which the army was exalted were found in almost every corner of the country, in television advertisements, and in radio broadcasts. All leaders since 1952, with the exception of Mohammad Morsi, who served from 2012–2013, had military backgrounds (Elbenni, 2017).

The period of Arab revolutions of 2011 and Arab nationalism

The process of the Arab revolutions of 2011 has not led to a new awakening of Arab nationalism in the region. Although some of the political formations characterized by this discourse had arisen in Egypt, they were not long term or permanent. The main reason for this is that the idea of Arab nationalism no longer had any legitimacy among the people. In fact, while foreign powers were seen as the reason as to why the Arabs had fallen behind the times when nationalism first emerged, today, the dictators who have been in power for years are considered as the culprits for this situation. Thus, the belief is widely accepted that the reason behind Arabs' underdeveloped state is the leaders elected from among them.

Meanwhile, no cause exists anymore for gathering the Arab communities around a nationalist discourse or for encouraging them to fight for a common goal. The question of Palestine has ceased to be an issue the Arabs embrace, react to, or unite around, having become a peripheral topic no longer in the center of regional politics. Regarding the independence of Palestine, neither the countries in the region nor organizations such as the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council seem to have made any serious efforts. On the contrary, instead of Arab countries, Turkey – led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan – and some Gulf countries – such as Kuwait and Qatar – can be termed as the sole remaining defenders regarding Palestine. Thus, the issue of Palestine can no longer be regarded as one of the unifying elements for Arab nationalism (Telci, 2018, 2019).

On the other hand, a common threat against which the Arab countries need to fight together no longer exists. Under normal circumstances, this threat would undoubtedly be Israel. However, Israel's policies, which have threatened Arab interests in the region since 1948, have been tolerated since the signing of the agreement between Egypt and Israel. More recently, various Arab states such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Sudan also normalized their relations with Israel (Anadolu Agency, 2020). Such developments further damaged the Arab unity toward the Palestinian cause. Israel reinforces its position as an occupying state by continuing its expansionist policies in the West Bank and increasing its attacks on Palestinians.

During this process, Arab leaders have preferred to cooperate with Israel rather than fight against it by developing close relations with this country. The leading Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, showed no serious reaction when then-U.S. President Donald Trump announced in December 2017 that the United States recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. These countries were again unresponsive to the Trump's acceptance as an Israeli territory of the Golan Heights, which is actually a territory of Syria but currently under Israeli occupation. Again, the harshest statements regarding this matter were made by Turkey, who stated the Israeli occupation and Trump's decision to be unacceptable.

The process of Arab revolutions met with a counter-revolution in Egypt, brought political instability to Libya, caused destruction that lasted for years in Syria, and turned Yemen into a field of great suffering, largely because of a military campaign led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. This very negative turn of events was a strong blow to the confidence of Arab masses and created a pessimistic atmosphere regarding the region's future. This has led to the suppression of nationalist feelings in Arab societies at a time when heartening and unifying events from the glorious days of Arab nationalism, such as the Suez victory or the establishment of the United Arab Republic, no longer take place. An example to the contrary was seen in Egypt in the period following the Muslim Brotherhood's victory in the 2012 elections. The public perception that the revolution had succeeded caused an increase in nationalist feelings in many parts of society and an emphasis on Arab identity had emerged. However, this situation came to an end with Sisi's coup in 2013 and the political atmosphere again turned pessimistic.

Increasing tensions among Arab countries also prevented a possible Arab nationalist wave in the region. The most remarkable development in this regard was the Gulf Crisis that took place in June 2017. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain launched a political and economic blockade against Qatar, ignoring long-standing cooperation and friendly relations among Gulf countries. This campaign was also explicitly supported by Egypt. These countries were not successful in their attempts toward Qatar and, on the contrary, received backlash from the Arab public for their aggressive attitudes that had weakened the sense of trust among the people of the region (Browning & Lewis, 2017; Telci, 2017).

The increasing interest and policies of foreign agents toward the Middle East following the Arab revolutions lead to the deepening of the divide among the countries in the region. Former

U.S. President Donald Trump had important countries such as Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Egypt under his thumb, provides unconditional and full support to Israel, and maintains U.S. influence in regional politics directly and indirectly, which in turn has led to an increase in in Arab communities' perceptions that rulers are directly under the control of foreign countries. A similar situation is observed in the context of Russia's influence on Syria. The influence of countries such as the UK, Germany, and France in Arab geography and the close relations they developed with problematic administrations while ignoring the will of the people have pushed the regional communities farther away from nationalist feelings.

Arab nationalism in Egypt today

The revolutionary movements of 2011, which succeeded in overthrowing longtime rulers including the Mubarak regime in Egypt, was a strong sign for the Arab people for a significant change in political leaderships. The people of the region, particularly those in Egypt, struggling with instability and managed by an administration under the heel of foreign powers, a regime that had not witnessed any success that would contribute to the Arab people and their cause for many years, believed that this ill fate would come to an end with the revolutions of 2011. The Arab nationalist and Nasserist groups who gathered at Tahrir Square while the revolutionary demonstrations were still going on believed the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 to be a turning point. In the months following Mubarak's overthrow, they maintained their presence in the square in order to prevent the old regime from regaining the administration (Adly, 2014). Another prominent factor in this process was that Egyptian nationalism, which has a liberal and secular approach compared to Arab nationalism, had gained more defenders. This situation was also reflected in the elections.

The New Wafd Party, characterized by its nationalist discourse in the first elections after the revolution, showed its important social base by receiving about 7.6% of the votes. In the 2012 presidential elections, the nationalist Hamdeen Sabahi received more than 20% of votes and revealed the presence of a nationalist, liberal, and secular mass.

The military coup in July 2013 led to the emergence of a negative environment for all ideologies in Egypt, especially for Islamic groups. The Sisi regime pushed Arab nationalism further aside and tried to functionalize a neo-nationalist Egyptian nationalism as a means of legitimacy, similar to that of the Mubarak era. The process that detracted Egypt's leadership from Arab nationalism, which started with Anwar Sadat, continued with Hosni Mubarak, and ended with Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. In this period, Egypt gradually drifted away from all the issues that Arab people had cared about and has become a regime fully dependent on the support of Western countries.

In this sense, the first remarkable development was Sisi's voting in favor of Israel at the United Nations. Although they had good relations with Israel behind the scenes, past Egyptian leaders often opted to abstain in such situations, fearing a negative reaction from the Arab public. However, Sisi broke from this tradition and endeavored to establish an open alliance with Israel (Nafi, 2015). This situation became quite apparent when the Egyptian army asked for help from the Israeli army in its operations in Sinai and they carried out an aerial bombardment together. Egypt, which had been the leader of Arab nationalism for a time, has eliminated the reason for the existence of Arab nationalism in a sense by revealing that Israel, the most important unifying motivation for Arab nationalists, can no longer be considered a threat.

Another decision that caused Sisi to completely terminate Egypt's leadership of Arab nationalism was his to conduct an intense policy of pressure against the Muslim Brotherhood movement, which had a broad social base not only in the country but also in other Arab countries.

Though not as bloody as the Baath regime in Syria, thousands of Muslim Brotherhood members have been killed by the Egyptian regime, and tens of thousands have been imprisoned under bad conditions for years (Telci, 2016). This brutal pressure on the movement has caused the loss of hope of a united Arab nation, not only among the Egyptians but across the Arab world in general. Western countries' full support of Sisi during this process, and the acceptance of the oppressive regime in Egypt by developed and democratic countries, increased resentment against both the regime and the West, and pessimism regarding the future of Arab nationalism.

Conclusion

Arab nationalism, which emerged in the late 19th and early 20th centuries when Middle Eastern politics took their current shape, had been the most important ideological movement in the region for some time. Nonetheless, today, it has been largely emptied of its values, the reason for its existence has disappeared, and it has become a thought that has lost its meaning. In this transformation, the regional policies of the foreign agents who had played an important role in the emergence of Arab nationalism were effective, along with the developments in the region. When evaluated from this point of view, the idea of Arab nationalism – which had a serious function in the beginning, particularly in wake of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and Arab countries' independence in the region – was especially supported by countries such as the UK and France. Arab nationalism in one sense had reached its aim with the fall of the Ottoman Empire after World War I and with the establishment of regimes under the direction of Western countries in the Arab world.

However, this movement has continued to be backed by certain intellectuals in the region, and has also started to be seen as an important instrument by some politicians. In this sense, the Egyptian ruler Gamal Abdel Nasser's success in reviving Arab nationalism and securing the support of large crowds was watched with concern by the same Western actors who had encouraged this idea. Indeed, Nasser's investment in Arab nationalism found a serious response and, as in the Suez Crisis, the UK and France incurred the wrath of the very ideology they had planted and then lost control of. However, in the following period, Nasser's political genius fell victim to the first flush of victory. First, the failure of the United Arab Republic project, and then the defeat against Israel in 1967, were the beginning of the end for Nasser. Nasser's death was, undoubtedly, a turning point in history for Arab nationalism.

The facts that Nasser's successor Anwar Sadat made no serious effort regarding Palestine, the most important element uniting Arabs, and that he had even signed a peace agreement with Israel, meant a serious decline haunted Arab nationalism. By speaking at the Israeli Parliament, Knesset, before the assassination attempt against him, Sadat had not only thrown Egypt into Israel's arms but had also declared with his actions that Egypt, the center of Arab nationalism, had forgone the most important issue that Arabs once united around. Hosni Mubarak, who took office after Sadat's assassination, adopted a similar attitude and even caused Egypt to lose its social and political weight in the Arab geography by getting close to the United States, as well.

On the other hand, even though the Baath regimes in Syria and Iraq continued to advocate Arab nationalism in the 1980s, attempts by Damascus and Baghdad attempts remained insufficient due to the absence of a strong and charismatic leader with influence over the other Arab countries. The brutal intervention of the Baath regime with the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Syria, the inability to fully demonstrate Arab solidarity during the Iraq-Iran War, and Saddam Hussein's attempt to invade Kuwait were major developments that had damaged the sense of unity and trust among Arabs. The 1990s and 2000s witnessed the political, cultural, and economic decline of the leading countries of the Arab world. Although Egypt has grown

economically, income disparities have deepened, public welfare policies remain absent, and problems such as poverty and unemployment remain unresolved. Syria and Iraq have also not been able to make any progress, as they are subjected to Western pressure and interference. Although Gulf region countries have made a significant leap in terms of economics, they have not taken any steps at preventing the decline of Arab nationalism due to their close relations with the West and their insensitivity to Arab affairs.

Finally, nationalism in Egypt as an idea can be said to be in a state far removed from its former grandeur, embraced only by a small group and mostly utilized by the regime as a means of legitimacy. Nationalism, which has lost its meaning in terms of Islamic movements, continues to be adopted by Copts, as well as by secular and socialist groups. For the larger masses, nationalism is considered as a propaganda tool rather than an ideology whereby the regime glorifies everything related to the army and instrumentalizes popular culture. When evaluated from this point of view, the idea of nationalism in Egypt can be said to have become an instrument with no social value, only a discursive function from the regime's perspective.

In such an environment, the process of the Arab revolutions that had started in Tunisia in December 2010, despite the promising developments at the beginning, have caused more destruction, division, insecurity, and hostility in the Arab world. This has further damaged the possible revival of the Arab nationalism as an ideology. In the wake of the century-long adventure it has gone through since its emergence and expansion, the idea of Arab nationalism will now remain a ghost of an ideology in the Arab world with no correspondence in real life and showing no promise of being realized at this point.

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15
NATIONALISM IN IRAN
Nation-state, nation-building, and the Iranian identity

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Introduction

The topic of nationalism has widely been addressed in contemporary literature. While some scholars define it as a product of modernism, others relate the emergence of nationalism to pre-modern times. For instance, Ernest Gellner, a leading scholar in nationalism studies, defined nationalism as a modern phenomenon that requires the compatibility of political and national units (Gellner, 1983, p. 1). Individuals educated by state institutions become citizens with the same nationality. In this regard, nationalism has emerged as a constructed ideology. Farideh Farhi (2011, p. 43) claimed that this constructed structure will stay as an imaginary desire as long as the harmony between political and national units is not empowered with a narrative that connects it to a history that can be adapted to every part of society. Within this context, the common cultural and historical identities as defined by Eric Hobsbawm have emerged as functional instruments among the ruling elites in creating a national identity/nation-state (Ozkırımlı, 2010, p. 94).

Similar to other nation-states, the Iranian national identity is also a figment of the imagination formed by ruling elites and nationalist intelligentsia. Although Iranian nationalism is a product of the modern era, its emergence is a result of national and international developments.

Iranian nationalism cannot be defined as a unified concept owing, to Iran's extremely diverse social structure. Nationalism was the driving force of popular movements in Iran in the 20th century. It emerged in the process of the Constitutional Revolution, increased its influence in the process of nationalizing oil in the 1950s, and reached the level of ideology with the Iranian Revolution in 1979 (Ansari, 2007, p. 18). Even though it emerged as a result of modernity and the reactions against the policies of imperialist powers, the leading elements of nationalism in Iran can be traced back in history.

Iranian national identity is based on three pillars: (1) Persian ethnicity and *Farsi*, the Persian Language [*iraniyat*];[1] (2) a narrative of the core region [*iranzemin*] that has existed since the historical Persian Empire, although its boundaries have varied; and (3) religion (Zoroastrianism in the pre-Islamic period, followed by Islam). As one of these pillars, *iranzemin* has preserved itself to a great extent. On the other hand, occasional tensions have occurred among Islam, Persian ethnicity, and the pre-Islamic Iranian religions. However, Islam,

Persian ethnicity, and the pre-Islamic Iranian culture are very important complements of the Iranian identity, contrary to the popular beliefs in contemporary research on Iran (Ahmedi, 2009, p. 60).

The main argument of the chapter is that the concept of the Iranian nation was created by Iranian intellectuals as a result of modernism, but this formation is based on *iranzemin* and *iraniyat*, both of which are considered parts of a common culture. Iranian nationalism, which emerged in this way, has become an instrument of the state and the ruling elite at certain times, and a symbol of opposition against these two actors at certain other times.

Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet (2018, p. 17) claimed a geographer who had lived much earlier than the French Revolution in 1789 to have depicted the borders of the world in different regions and differentiated among these regions on the basis of terrain, climate, religion, judicial system, and language. Studies by Iranians in the past centuries have provided similar examples of the world being divided into regions. For instance, al-Istakhri, an Iranian traveler and geographer who lived in the 10th century, designed a world map on which Iran was located right in the middle (Kashani-Sabet, 2018, p. 18). Similar to al-Istakhri, Hamdallah Mustawfi, an Iranian traveler and historian who lived in the 14th century, defined the region that today corresponds to Iranian geography as *iranzemin*. According to Mustawfi, *iranzemin* extends to Transoxiana and Kabul in the East; Pontus region in the West; to Ossetian, Russian, and Circassian lands in the North; and the Persian Gulf, Syria, and Najd Desert in the South. Although these borders do not show much compatibility with the territories under Iran's control today, clearly the current borders of Iran were not demarcated randomly (Kashani-Sabet, 2018, p. 19). In addition, Abbas Amanat (2012, p. 5) pointed to the Shu'ubiyya Movement, which emerged as a response to Arab supremacy during the Umayyad period. The Shu'ubiyya defined Arabs as backward and favored the Persian language and culture over Arabic.

Kashani-Sabet's and Amanat's arguments mark the origins of concepts such as land, language, and culture long before the emergence of nationalism itself. In other words, these concepts date back to the pre-modern period and were rediscovered and translated into a new context with nationalism as a product of modernity.

Nationalism in Iran can be divided into four periods (Mashayekhi, 1993, p. 86). According to Mashayekhi, the influence of nationalism with other ideologies on Iranian society led to the formation of different ideological and nationalist approaches in Iran. The first of these approaches is liberal nationalism, which emerged from the works of politicians such as Mirza Malkam Khan and Hassan Taqizadeh, and was reinvigorated in 1953 when Mohammad Mosaddegh was overthrown as a result of a coup d'état backed by the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States. The second is the Persian nationalism proposed by Mirza Aga Khan Kermani, Mirza Fath-Ali Akhundzade, Ahmad Kasravi, and Zayn al-Abidin Maraghi that identifies Iran though its pre-Islamic history and defines the post-Islamic period as the cause of all of Iran's social and economic problems. This type of nationalism became the official state ideology with the establishment of the Pahlavi Dynasty in 1925. The third is the nationalism put into practice by Hassan Modarres and Jamal al-Din Afghani, which considers Islam as the solution to all problems. It is an influential element of Ayatollah Khomeini's intellectual thought and the ideology behind the Revolution in 1979. The last among these is the socialist nationalism that intellectuals like Talibov Tabrizi and Ali Akbar Dehkhoda had theorized. It became a political practice in the Fedaian and Third-Worldist movements in the 1970s. It even contributed to the anti-imperialist dimension of the post-Revolutionary Iranian identity. This chapter will use an approach similar to Mashayekhi's, and will explain Iran's adventure with nationalism in the context of the periodical conditions.

Modernity and the emergence of nationalism in Iran

Even though Iran had witnessed external invasions throughout its history, it managed to adapt itself to the conditions of the time and carry the language and culture of the past civilizations to the present.

Iran's interactions with European powers can be argued to have resulted in three different consequences. First, these interactions revealed the state's weaknesses and difficulties in establishing its authority. Even though Iran was occupied several times, it never became a colony due to its unique location (Cottam, 1964, p. 158). On the other hand, the conflict in Iranian territories led the Qajar Dynasty to follow the politics of the balance of power between imperial powers. However, Iran was unsuccessful in this policy and suffered major land losses. As a result of these losses, the Qajar elites, who were aware of the weaknesses of the state, embarked upon modernization policies. Following the footsteps of the Ottoman Empire, the military was modernized, military experts were brought from Europe, and the national army was transformed from the traditional to a European style. Modernization policies were not limited to the military and included education, cultural life, and state institutions. However, the traditional forces in Iranian society did not adopt these policies. Feudal lords and the ulama opposed the modernization project.

Second, as a result of integrating the Iranian economy with international capitalist economies and the European interventions in Iran, the economic interests of the traditional classes of the *bazaaris* and the ulama were threatened. In the second half of the 19th century, the UK obtained several concessions for the railways in Iran, manufacturing and selling tobacco, and mining and using all minerals with the exception of gold and silver (Foran, 1993, pp. 109–110). Thus, this all paved the way to the Constitutional Revolution in Iranian society. *Bazaaris* and clergy were two of the active powers in this process together, with the intelligentsia, or *rushanfekran*.

Third, the Iranian intelligentsia [*rushanfekran*] met with modern ideologies such as liberalism, socialism, and nationalism as a result of their interactions with European powers. Modern ideologies entering into Iran had also transformed Iran's political language.

In this way, Iranian intelligentsia at the beginning of the 19th century provided a new window for politics into the society that had lived for a century under Qajar despotism. These intellectuals generally included Western-educated and Western-inspired people who had developed a new language of nationalism in order to establish a modern Iran with strong institutions and a consolidated society that could face the challenges of a transforming and changing world.

Constitutional Revolution and the post-Revolutionary period

The military and political dominance of Russia and the UK over the Iranian state and the concessions to which the state privileged them caused reactions from several segments of Iranian society against foreign powers (Keddie, 1981). The passiveness of the Qajar rulers against foreign threats resulted in the opposition movements being strengthened. These movements aimed to restrict the arbitrary rule of the Qajar Dynasty and to establish a constitutional regime. Within this context, they organized several uprisings. The Constitutional Movement, which was supported by a large group of people including the *bazaaris*, the urban, and the ulama, succeeded in forming a constitutional monarchy between 1906 and 1911, and provided the Iranian state with the vision to challenge the West (Yeganeh, 1993, p. 7).

According to Arıkan Sinkaya (2015, p. 102), nationalist opposition in a pre-modern state ruled by traditional authority emerges during the periods of dislocation when state-society relations are challenged. In the case of Iran, it corresponds to the events led by the

Constitutional Movement. These developments were influenced by the military and territorial losses, foreign economic interventions, and state reforms toward modernization and centralization. The alliance of the intelligentsia, ulama, and *bazaaris* had thus caused the birth and rise of nationalism.

Iran's occupation during World War I and the country's political dissolution had obliged the intellectuals, *bazaaris*, and some ulama to seek a "savior" who would preserve the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country, produce solutions for economic and political problems, and establish a powerful central government.

The Pahlavi period: the Iranian nation-state and Persian nationalism

After World War I, Reza Khan,[2] the commander of the Cossack Brigades, seized power after the 1921 Persian coup d'état supported by international forces. After seizing power, he first attempted to eliminate his opponents and rivals. Reza Khan appeared on the Iranian political scene neither as a nationalist hero nor as initiator of a movement who could receive the support of whole segments of Iranian society. However, in the context of the rapidly changing international situations, he had arrived at the center of power directly through a military coup d'état supported by the UK. As Atabaki and Zurcher (2003, p. 20) claimed, Reza Khan was "indispensable for ending the chaos" for the UK and was also "a bourgeois nationalist leader trying to put down feudal reactionaries, most of whom were also agents of imperialism" in the imagination of the Soviets.

Domestic and international dynamics had a great role in Reza Khan's coming to power and consolidating it. Reza Khan especially exploited the fear of the state being dissolved, which had become a dominant fear among the political elite after World War I. He presented the weakness of the central authority as a state of turmoil and fed this fear by citing the disintegration processes of the post-war Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires. The experience of the Constitutional Revolution was perceived as a well-intentioned but unsuccessful reform movement that had propelled Iran into disorder. Accordingly, internal turmoil increased during the Constitutional Revolution, which increased the risk of the country being occupied by a foreign power (Amanat, 2009, p. 25). Reza Khan's coming to power was believed to have ended all these processes and prevented Iran's disintegration.

Meanwhile, some people were found to believe that an ideal dictatorship that would preserve its power by restricting the press, dismissing parliament, limiting clergy power, and socially revolutionizing the country was the only way to modernization (Atabaki, 2008, p. 47). This debate reached its peak, especially in 1924, with the beginning of the secularization process after the declaration of the republic and elimination of traditional power centers such as the ulama. In this process, Reza Shah's attempts at nationalization were applied hand in hand with secularization. As he aimed to establish a modernized nation-state, the main requirements for this were seen as terminating foreign intervention in Iranian politics, ending colonial exploitation of Iranian resources, and eliminating the traditional classes, including the ulama (Arıkan Sinkaya, 2015, pp. 82–83). In this respect, the ruling elite aimed to modernize and westernize the Iranian state and society using nationalism and secularism. Emphasis on Islamic and Arabic history was reduced and downplayed while accentuating Iran's pre-Islamic past (Keyman & Yılmaz, 2006, p. 432).

After the declaration of the republic, there were reactions from most parts of Iranian society. Most importantly, ulama and *bazaaris* objected to the republic, which was believed to be non-religious. The Turkish example indisputably became very influential in their view as the prototype for a republic. A republic was perceived as a regime with no religion (as with secularism).

As a result, the ulama raised their voice: "We are the people of the Qur'an, we don't want a republic" (Ghods, 1991, p. 41).

Reza Khan, who knew the power of traditional institutions and actors in this process, cooperated with them during this period. In this respect, alcohol sales were restricted, and gambling was declared illegal. In this way, the Assembly passed a law in 1925 with the support of conservatives and ulama that marked an end to the Qajar Dynasty and declared Reza Khan as Shah (Atabaki, 2009).

In the following years, Reza Shah attempted to reduce the strength of the traditional power centers had. In 1927, the Ministry of Justice was restructured and European-trained personnel were assigned to replace the religious personnel. With a law enacted in 1929, the powers and duties of the sharia courts were slashed, and with an amendment in 1932, the task of issuing documents on the matters of marriage, divorce, and inheritance was assigned to secular state courts (Zirinsky, 2003, pp. 86–87). As a result, religious institutions lost both their power and a significant part of their income (Banani, 1961, p. 73). Furthermore, the state in this way managed to weaken the foci of power that had earlier been outside its authority.

Reza Shah also focused on foreign interventions and capitulations, which Iranians saw as the basis of their economic problems, and thence terminated its agreements with the UK in 1919, under which the British side was offered concessions. The Shah also agreed with the Soviet Union to withdraw all treaties that had been made with Russia during the Tsarist period, offering the Soviet Union several concessions. The United States was instrumental as a third party in balancing the British and the Soviets (Keddie, 2003, p. 84). Therefore, the *bazaaris* addressed Reza Shah as a savior: "The army had collapsed, the tribes were looting, the country was the laughing-stock of the world. Thanks to the army commander, we now travel without fear, admire our country and enjoy the fruits of law and order" (Ansari, 2007, p. 41).

Attempts to build an Iranian nation

Identifying the Iranian identity started first with identifying what being Iranian means. Iranians are believed to have had a magnificent and developed civilization, and the invasions of the Arabs and Turks, their incompetent administration, and the negative influence of Islam to have caused backwardness in the country and to have made it susceptible to foreign interventions. Iran could only recover from its external effects and backwardness by returning to its golden ages. In this way, determining those who had caused the country to lag behind and those who were keeping it moving ahead gave Iranian elite the opportunity to define the components of the Iranian national identity. Reza Shah and his inner circle, the modernist intellectuals and those who supported modernization policies appeared as progressive actors while the Qajar Dynasty, traditionalism, Islam, tribalism, Turks, and Arabs were named as the causes of backwardness of Iran.

Education is an important component of the nation-building process. The duty of education in Iran was to consolidate the people living there around a single nationality. In this respect, the Iranian state was defined as a pedagogue that would revise the cultural disability in Iran through education and military service (Marashi, 2008, pp. 91–93). State institutions published and standardized textbooks. The state opened many public schools in regions that had predominantly Turkish, Arab, and Baluch populations. In addition to these, the state aimed at both teaching the Iranians their past and reducing the influence of foreign languages on the Persian language by establishing national libraries, museums, and cultural and language academies, or *Ferhengestan* (Perry, 1985, p. 308; Abdi, 2001, pp. 58–59).

The Iranians were identified as Aryans and natural members of the historical Persian Empire whose borders had extended from India to Egypt. While the cultural, literary, and

religious life of pre-Islamic Iran was exalted, the post-Islamic period and the Arabic language were indicated as the reasons for Iran's social and cultural backwardness. Turks and Arabs, who had once invaded and ruled Iran, were identified as the main obstacles in returning to the magnificent periods of the Persian Empire and its culture and achievements. These discriminatory policies of the Pahlavis saw all kinds of national, religious, and cultural differences as threats and kept these differences under oppression. The Pahlavi monarchy, which ruled between 1925 and 1979, aimed to create a centralized secular nation and nation-state with a single language in the country. As the state perceived many people who spoke a language other than Persian as a threat to national integrity, many arrests were made and punishments imposed upon them during the Reza Shah Period between 1925 and 1941 (Mojab & Hassanpour, 1995, p. 231).

The Pahlavi Dynasty, aware that Persians constituted approximately half the population, aimed to establish a Persian nation-state and Persian-speaking nation through its discriminatory policies towards non-Persian groups. According to Mojab and Hassanpour (1995, p. 232), the Pahlavi state worked toward a racial, ethnic, and linguistic despotism for this purpose, especially during the rule of Reza Shah. Studies held in this period displayed the poverty and illiteracy rates to be very high among non-Persian groups, which were direct results of the modernization and nation-building policies (Mojab & Hassanpour, 1995, p. 234).

While the steps toward Westernization, modernization, and nation-building accelerated in this fashion, the hypothesis declaring Iranians and Europeans to have a common origin and the same descendants was used to legitimize these policies. In this context, historians applied the anthropological theories of the 19th century, claiming Iranians to be Aryans who had migrated to the Iranian plateau. Even, the official name of Iran at that time, Persia, was replaced in 1935 with the name Iran, which means the country of the Aryans (Yarshater, 1989, p. 1; Mojab & Hassanpour, 1995, p. 232). In this respect, and contrary to the hypothesis that Westernization and modernization frequently alienate the history in third world countries, Westernization was a means of returning to Iranians to their so-called real self in this case. With the Aryan hypothesis, the state differentiated itself not only from its neighbors but also from dynasties such as the Qajars and Safavids who had been their predecessors in Iran. At this point, Iran's emphasis on Aryan origin clearly was heavily related to the racist and nationalist movements in Europe in the 1930s and 1940s.

A dissident return: liberal nationalism

In the process leading up to World War II, Reza Shah, who had followed pro-German policies and could find no common ground with the Allied forces, was deposed from the throne in 1941. His son, Mohammad Reza, succeeded him. In the same year, the increased power of Hitler's Germany, the rising tensions in the international arena, and the increasing significance of oil for the countries as an important raw material brought Iran to the stage of international politics. The Soviets occupied Iran in the north and the British in the south, and the two countries established their spheres of influence in these regions.

Increased inflation, unemployment, and food shortages in Iran after the occupation provided the Iranian public with a political perspective for analyzing the developments. The relatively unconstrained political atmosphere that emerged after Reza Shah was deposed from the throne also affected this situation. As a result, the public began to appear in the political arena more. The parliament also came out of its passive position, and various political and social groups that had previously been suppressed by the Shah started to reappear; hence, an increase was observed in the number of newspapers and trade unions.

Meanwhile, in the international arena, the increasing rivalry of the United States and the UK with the Soviet Union had a direct influence on Iran. Troubled by the oil deals between Iran and the United States, the Soviet Union increased its influence on Iran's northern territories.

Ethnic movements, which had been empowered by taking advantage of the political vacuum in the absence of the Shah in domestic politics and by the support of foreign powers, increased their political pressure on the center. Various regions' demands for being autonomous from the center, being educated in their own languages, and sharing in the taxes collected from their areas resulted in the birth of republics such as Azerbaijan and Kurdistan in 1945 and 1946, respectively. The changing combination of events after the end of World War II in 1945 caused the Soviets to leave Iran; hence, the autonomous republics were left unsupported. Iran intervened in the region in 1946 and abolished these republics.

The unpleasant experience of World War II and the establishment of two autonomous entities within Iranian territories exposed the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of Iran in the face of the Soviets and British. Iran experienced a process of modernization. Even though Reza Shah had suppressed political movements during his reign, modernization and Westernization policies under his rule helped in politicizing society.

The modernist, secular, West-inspired, and Persian-oriented autocratic rule of the Pahlavi regime itself gave birth to its intellectual and political challengers (Siavoshi, 2014, p. 256). The discourse and rhetoric of the National Front led by Mohammad Mosaddegh caused a reappraisal of Iranian people's perceptions of the West, modernity, and Iranian identity. The West-supported coup d'état against Mosaddegh's government in 1953 cultivated skepticism among the Iranian people. Skepticism among the society originated from foreign interventions in Iranian sovereignty, with its peak being the 1953 Iranian coup d'état. Nationalist ideology rose in this period as a result of the allied forces' occupation of Iran; it concretized in the nationalization of oil.

Oil resources in Iran have a particular meaning in Iranian society. While oil was regarded as a means of achieving welfare for the state, it also caused problems for Iran's sovereignty because foreign powers had intervened in Iran's sovereignty and prevented Iran from following an independent policy in both the arenas of economy and politics. These problems the presence of oil had caused were at the center of Iranian daily life. Iran's small share from its oil revenues and low public expenditure disturbed Iranians and caused demonstrations. In this context, the National Front was established under the leadership of Mosaddegh to fight against the foreign influence in the country and the oppression from the monarchy. The National Front became popular and received support from the Iranian people. Mosaddegh's discourse on nationalism was based on three elements: independence, anti-imperialism, and anti-monarchy.

The period of Mohammad Reza Shah: dynastic Persian nationalism

While Mosaddegh had described the process of nationalizing oil as a war of independence, Mohammad Reza Shah defined that period as Iran being exposed to the foreign world. According to the Shah, the coup d'état that resulted in the fall of Mosaddegh in 1953 was the real struggle for liberation. Even, the day of the coup d'état was declared a national holiday (Pahlavi, 1961, p. 110). The Shah claimed two kinds of nationalism to exist, the first being malignant and harmful – to which Mosaddegh's nationalist movement was attributed. The other nationalism was the useful one, and the Shah's understanding of nationalism was associated with this group.

Mohammad Reza tried to rebuild the monarchy as a modern institution that could bring solutions to the problems of the modern world. He transformed the Aryan nationalism that had been produced by the state during his father's rule into dynastic nationalism. He

highlighted Iran's pre-Islamic history and rewrote the history of the Achaemenid Empire.[3] Royalty and the crown were treated as central elements of the Shah's narration of history. In this period, pre-Islamic Iranian culture continued to be reinvigorated as a continuation of Reza Shah's period. The monarchy and the Shah were referred to as the legacy of the past to the present. The Shah himself repeatedly mentioned that the monarchy was an integral part of Iranian culture and people, and was synonymous with the national identity (Ansari, 2012, pp. 173–175).

Mohammad Reza used nationalism for two goals: Westernization and legitimacy (Litvak, 2017, p. 14). On October 11, 1971, Mohammad Reza celebrated the 2,500th anniversary of the Persian Empire with guests participating from all over the world. Celebrations were held in the city of Persepolis, the historical capital of the Persian Empire. Mohammad Reza declared Cyrus the Great the founder of the Achaemenid Empire in his speech, and himself as his successor and the protector of Iran (Bill, 1988, p. 184).

Mohammad Reza embarked upon a secular nationalism that glorified Iran's pre-Islamic past and emphasized the ethnic-linguistic dimensions of Iranian identity. This form of nationalism was used as a justification tool to compensate for the regime's loss of religious legitimacy and to reduce the appeal of radical ideologies to the developing urban society.

While Iran in this way had transformed into a modern state, it had also attempted to regain its glorious past and great civilization [*temeddun-i bozorg*]. The purpose of these policies was to identify the monarchy with modernism/secularism and to create a special state-nation integrity against the Islamic past and traditional structures (Litvak, 2017, p. 15).

The Iranian Revolution in 1979 and nationalism

The Iranian Revolution in 1979, which supposedly resulted in the demise of a 2,500-year-old monarchy and the establishment of a theocratic regime based on the Shia-Islamic ideology, was an unexpected outcome for most researchers. Referred to as the expert in revolutions, Theda Skocpol stated that the Revolution was a surprise for her (Coyne & Mathers, 2011, p. 197). Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter described Iran as an "island of stability" in 1978 without hearing the footsteps of the Revolution (Thiessen, 2009, p. 43).

When the Islamic Republic of Iran was founded in 1979, it made a quick attempt to Islamize the Iranian identity. Similar to the pre-Revolutionary period, the newly established Islamic regime used its ideological and financial tools in order to create an identity appropriate for its purpose. Like the Pahlavi monarchy, elites of the Islamic Republic adopted education as one of the most important mediums to educate the public as members of an Islamic community and acceptable citizens (Siavoshi, 2014, p. 269). In the first years after the Iranian Revolution, the revolutionaries led by Khomeini attacked secular Persian nationalism, which had been at the center of the Shah's nationalist project, and defined Islam as the only component of national identity for Iranians. As Saleh and Worrall (2015, p. 86) claimed, Islamists used religious and educational institutions after the Revolution to broaden the influence of their ideology. They even kept universities closed to replace the education system they considered as Western and non-Islamic with Islamic ones. As Abrahamian (2008, p. 178) argued, the general purpose of these policies was to Islamize Iran.

According to Rogers Brubaker (2012, p. 9), religion not only set the boundaries of the nation and national identity, but on the contrary provided the myths and symbols necessary for the development of a nation and nationalism. When successfully combined with nationalism within the framework of the nation-state, politics becomes a religion, religion becomes politicized, and the nation-state becomes a "divine tool" (Friedland, 2002, p. 381). In this respect, the

Iranian nationalism built after the Revolution has a religious-nationalist dynamic that religionized politics through national identity, power struggles, and political transformations.

After the Iranian Revolution, the tensions between pre-Islamic and post-Islamic nationalisms partially disappeared, and a synthesis emerged in the form of religious nationalism. Islam and Shiism post-Revolution had become the basic elements in defining the Iranian national identity (Siavoshi, 2014, p. 257).

The synthesis of pre- and post-Islamic periods: descendants of Cyrus the Great and children of the Prophet Mohammad

Along with the new regime based on Shia-Islamic ideology, several continuities and shifts existed after the Revolution in Iran's nationalization process and domestic and international policies. After the Revolution, the new administration brought Islam to the fore again, which the Shah's regime had excluded from the social and public spheres. The Persian identity and its pre-Islamic roots that had been frequently emphasized during Shah's period were replaced by Ayatollah Khomeini's understanding of the *ummah* that was based on Islamic terms. Islam emerged as the most important component of Iranian identity. However, nationalism was not completely ignored. The new regime admitted Persian nationalism to be an important factor in forming Iranian identity. Therefore, the Iranian national identity was formed with the articulation of Persian nationalism and Islam.

During this period, Iranian identity emerged in the form of a national identity with two dimensions pointing both to Cyrus, the founder of the first Persian Empire, and the Prophet Mohammad (Farhi, 2011, p. 42). As a result of the complex relationship between religion and ethnicity, the presence of any distinction between them became blurred. In 19th-century Iran, Persian and Shia words had similar meanings and indicated similar subjects (Ansari, 2007, p. 17). For most Iranians, whether secular or not, religion is an integral part of the national identity.

The most important result of Persian nationalism, which had been inspired by the pre-Islamic history of Iran during the Pahlavi period and considered Iran the cradle of morality and civilizations that existed much earlier than the West, was the anti-imperialist, Third-Worldist, revolutionary discourse produced by the revolutionary elites. This discourse became one of the building blocks of Iranian identity. After the Revolution, Iran perceived the world through a two-dimension dialectical framework. According to this view, the world consists of a struggle between the oppressed (*mustad'afun*) and oppressors (*mustakbirun*). In this struggle, Iran acts as the protector of the oppressed against the oppressors. The Iranian constitution, prepared after the Revolution, confers responsibilities on Iran. The Iranian identity is defined within the framework of taking responsibility for all oppressed peoples in the world and supporting all liberation movements. The new regime had formed a national identity based on the Iranian territories, Persian language, ancient Persian myths, and Shiite traditions. The regime also associated nationalism with concepts such as anti-imperialism and standing up for the oppressed.

The policies, practices, and discourses of the Islamic Republic of Iran have been living documents of changes and continuities after the Revolution. The traces of these continuities and changes will be analyzed through the symbols on Iranian banknotes of Iran and its leaders' discourses.

In this context, the practices that followed the Pahlavi period, and that differed from that period in the policies of Iran in the post-Revolution period, will be discussed through these symbols and their relation with the Iranian identity.

Changes and continuities: symbolic manifestations

The visual reflection of the religion-dominated national identity settled in the public over time. In the first years of the Revolution, banknotes from the monarchical period were also used on the banknote designs. However, the symbols were Islamized in the following years.

The appearance of Imam Reza's shrine on the front sides of the banknotes in the series issued during 1980 and 1981, and the depictions of the Kaaba, Fatima Masumeh's shrine, and the Dome of the Rock on the series from 1981, 1985, and 1992, display the Islamization of images and symbols on banknotes (see Figure 15.1). In additional reference to the country's political situation, "Bank Markazi Iran" had been written on the banknotes. This was replaced in 1981 with "Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran".

The symbols related to pre-Islamic Persian culture and history that had been used during Pahlavi Period banknotes continued to be present on banknotes after the Iranian Revolution, hence reflecting the continuities in how the Revolutionary regime perceived the national identity. For instance, a photo from Pasargadae, the first capital of the Achaemenid Empire, and a photo from the Tomb of Hafez, an important character in Persian language and Iranian culture, appeared on the banknotes in both the Pahlavi and post-Revolutionary periods (see Figure 15.2).

Furthermore, direct connections to the country's pre-Islamic and Islamic cultural heritage also managed to find a place on the banknotes of the post-Revolution period. A photo of

Figure 15.1 Imam Reza's shrine (top-left), Dome of the Rock (top-right), Kaaba (bottom-left), and Fatima Masumeh's shrine (bottom-right)

Figure 15.2 Pasargadae (left) and Tomb of Hafez (right)

Figure 15.3 Mount Damavand



Figure 15.4 Banknotes Depicting Iran at the Centre

Mount Damavand, which has special importance in pre-Islamic Persian mythology, was issued on the banknotes (see Figure 15.3).[4]

Several banknotes issued after the Iranian Revolution show that *iranzemin* also continued to be on the agenda of Iran's new regime. Images on these banknotes locate Iran at the center of the world map (see Figure 15.4).

The national identity, which partially contains the characteristics of the Pahlavi period and partially contains new content from the Islamic narrative, is manifested in Iran's visual and discursive practices. These manifestations are perfectly universal in the range of meanings they intend to invoke (Elhan, 2016, p. 133).

Nationalism in Iranian politics today

Nationalism continues to be a part of Iran's current politics. While on the one hand it enables the regime to consolidate its influence over the public as an important instrument in foreign policy, nationalism on the other hand has become an umbrella ideology of the regime's opposition. Furthermore, economic depression in the country and Iran's transnational policies have also increased the emphasis on nationalism.

According to Uygur (2017), who pointed out that the current regime in Iran has had difficulties influencing the secular and urban segments of society, the regime turned away from its Islamist and sectarian discourses and has invested more on the pre-Islamic Persian culture. An increased number of Iranians think the regime's current nationalist approach does not respond to their economic, political, social, or cultural problems. Persian nationalism inspired by Iran's

pre-Islamic past has appeared as a solution. In this respect, the regime has been trying to mobilize the masses around Persian nationalism. In this context, a rise has occurred in visits to the symbolic places of pre-Islamic Iran, the activities carried out in these places, and the use of symbols from pre-Islamic Iranian history in daily life. In recent years, conservative politicians have highlighted the emphasis on Iran's ancient history. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a former president of Iran who had aimed to return to the ideals of the Revolutionary period, ran his political campaigns in places like Persepolis.

Qasem Soleimani, who had been the commander of Iran's Quds Force and led Iran's military operations in Syria until his assassination in January 2020, was depicted as an ancient Persian warrior. These examples embody the dominant role that nationalism plays in Iranian politics (Uygur, 2017). On the other hand, these practices are rejected by non-Persian Shiites and produce new fields of opposition against the regime. As a result, promoting pre-Islamic Persian nationalism has led to increased micro-nationalisms among the non-Persian communities living in Iran.

Recent developments such as the nuclear deal and the Syrian civil war have also influenced the rise of nationalism in Iran. The nuclear deal that reached its conclusion in 2015 then was brought into question once former US President Donald Trump took office in 2017, reviving the "foreign intervention syndrome" among the Iranian people. Within this framework, nationalism in Iran rose again as a result of the abolition of the nuclear deal that resulted in international embargoes against Iran.

Within the context of the civil war in Syria, an opposite situation exists. The involvement of Iran in the Syrian civil war and its military, logistical, and economic support for the Syrian government led by Bashar al-Assad have caused domestic unrest in Iran (Najad, 2018a). Moreover, the regime organizes no public mourning for the casualties, a traditional practice in the Islamic Republic's Shia mourning culture that is staged as a public display of stalwartness and resistance (Najad, 2018b). The regime is afraid of the nationalist reaction from within Iran, and attempts to cover up the deaths of those who have lost their lives in Syria.

After the Revolution, Iran's core policy became the defense of Iranian territories and national interests. Nationalism is being instrumentalized within this context. The new regime in Iran after the Revolution had melted religion and nationalism in a crucible, which has pushed Iranian foreign policy into a discourse composed of anti-imperialism, independence, and support for resistance movements (Akbarzadeh & Barry, 2016, pp. 618–619). While the new regime built an Iranian identity based on *iranzemin*, pre-Islamic Iranian myths, and Shiism, it has associated these concepts with the defense of those who are oppressed worldwide and with anti-imperialism. Although the universalist discourse of the Revolution had included a different dimension to this policy, it is based on a populist discourse and has not evolved into an irredentist political tool. The discourses on "War to victory" and "The road to Jerusalem passes through Baghdad", which had been emphasized during the war against Iraq, have no a concrete reference to a revisionist policy (Farhi, 2011, p. 46). These are mostly discursive expressions used to honor Islam. Even today, those who are concerned about Iran's increasing influence are not concerned about Iran's ambition for land (Farhi, 2011, p. 46).

Conclusion

The emergence of nationalism in Iran is a product of modernity and based on the combination of common historical narratives and religious values including *iranzemin* and *iraniyat*. In this respect, nationalism appears as a popular opposition movement or as an instrument in the policies of the state apparatus for designing society. From this point of view, this chapter argues

different aspects of nationalism to have existed in Iran, starting from the Constitutional Revolution to the Pahlevi Period, the National Front Government, and the Iranian Revolution. As this chapter states, Iranian nationalisms are built on a three-pillared body: *iraniyat*, *iranzemin*, and pre- and post-Islamic religion. Although *iraniyat* and *iranzemin* have generally preserved their existence, the role of religion has differed from time to time. Despite this, all the eras can be said to have continuities, even if they have had different motifs and baggage.

Nationalism was the central element of Reza Shah's secular modernization. In the Westernization of the state and secularization of state institutions and society, nationalism became an influential ideology. It maintained being a popular policy during the reign of Mohammad Reza. While it was still a main instrument of the ruling elite for transforming society and reinvigorating Iran's glorious Persian past, it was also well-known among the Iranian opposition led by Mosaddegh, which had targeted the Shah's relations with international powers and the schemed distribution of oil revenues. After the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Islam re-gained its power in the public sphere, and nationalism was still an integral part of the new regime. Even the post-Khomeini process showed religion and nationalism to compliment on another; the Persian past, which remained in the background but continued to be used, emerged as a popular discourse. On many occasions, Islamic symbols, Shia motifs, and rhetoric associated with secular nationalism and the pre-Islamic Persian past have been juxtaposed by the elites (Fozi, 2006, p. 228).

Finally, a general evaluation of the Iranian nationalisms will be useful for further studies. The approaches of the Green Movement led by Mir Hossein Mousavi during the 2009 elections have importance. The Green Movement pioneered the formation of a different kind of national identity and produced a nationalist discourse showing respect for Iran's ethnic and religious diversity. In addition to the Green Movement, the ethnic nationalism of minorities is also an important factor in Iran. Nationalism is quite common among the Turkish population, which constitutes approximately 30% of the Iranian population, as well as among the Kurds, who are densely populated along the border with Turkey and Iraq. These issues have not been included in this chapter, as they were considered to be beyond its scope. However, working on these in future studies will offer a significant contribution to arguing the effects of national and international influences on these nationalisms.

Notes

1 The word of *Farsi* etymologically comes from the word Persian. Since there is no "p" sound in Arabic, the "f" sound is used instead. The words *Farsi* and Persian are used interchangeably, which leads to terminological confusion. In this chapter, the word Persian will be used to describe the Iranian culture, history, and ethnicity, and to refer to topics related to these. The word *Farsi*, on the other hand, will be used while referring to Iran's official language. In this context, while the concept of Persian nationalism will be used in a non-Islamic framework in order to highlight Iran's pre-Islamic history, the concept of Iranian nationalism will meanwhile be used within a framework based on a combination of ancient Persian culture and Shiite motifs.

2 In this chapter, Reza Pahlavi will be referred as "Khan" between 1921, when he seized power, and 1925, when he declared the Pahlavi Dynasty. He will be referred as "Shah" post-1925 when he gained the title of "Shah" after the declaration of the Pahlavi monarchy.

3 The Achaemenid Empire is the first Persian empire in history. It was founded by Cyrus the Great in the 6th century BC. The empire's borders extended from the Balkans in the west to the Indus Valley in the east and from Egypt in the south to Caucasia in the north. It was larger than any previous empire in history.

4 Damavand, the highest mountain in Iran, has an important place in Persian mythology and pre-Islamic Iranian history. It symbolizes Iran's struggle against oppression. A three-headed dragon is believed in the Zoroastrian texts to be imprisoned in this mountain.

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16

THE TRANSITION OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT ON NATION-STATES ON THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT

Omair Anas

Introduction

"How did Islam spread in India?" "How did Muslim political life evolve in India?" "How did Muslims respond to the imminent decline of their political power?" These are questions that have been at the core of the discussions on Muslim political articulation on the Indian subcontinent. In fact, ideological narratives exist that have been employed by the Hindu and Muslim revivalist historians, while nationalist narratives also exist that were invariably employed by the Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi nationalists. The modern literature – produced by Orientalists as discussed by Ronald Inden (1986) and Michael Dodson (2007); by Hindu or Muslim revivalists as discussed by Sen (2001), Kokab (2011), and Metcalf (2016); and by nationalists as discussed by McLane (1977) – has conveniently appropriated India's encounter with religion and politics, particularly with Islam and Christianity. In today's nationalism discourse, the competition among various narratives of the Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi nation-states has changed the history of politics into the politics of history. These competitive narratives find concluding Muslims' religious understanding to favor the demand for a separate nation-state (Char, 1945) convenient. The project of separate national identities for India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh has made the nation-state acceptable to Muslim minds and even appropriated their national identities with that of their Islamic identity. Once known as Indian Muslims, now three different Islamic identities are being sought that should confirm their respective national identities, as well. To deconstruct the Muslim political imagination and crisis of South Asia's Muslim politics, the preceding questions need to be answered in the pre–nation-state period. The answer may be found by first locating the trajectory of Muslim political thought on the subcontinent, by second identifying the crisis that Muslim scholars had frequently referred to, and by third knowing the etymology of the Islamic idea of overcoming this crisis. This chapter delves into the subject by dividing the Indian subcontinent's politics into three phases: first the making of *Dar al Islam*; second, the crisis or decline of *Dar al Islam*; and finally, the appropriation of Islamic identities with that of their respective national identities.

The making of *Dar al Islam*

The Indian subcontinent has been defined as *Dar al Islam*[1] in most books on Islamic jurisprudence, and its decline from *Dar al Islam* has also been discussed by Islamic scholars in the late Mughal period to inquire into whether colonial control would change the status of *Dar al Islam* into *Dar al Harb*[2] (Usmani, 1937, pp. 372–373). Maulana Zafar Ahmad Usmani's compilation *I'la Al-Sunan* (1937) and Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi's thoughts support the view that the fatwa of Shah Abdul Aziz about India becoming *Dar al Harb* after British control over the Mughal rule. However, many scholars abstained from applying this fully in all Islamic rulings, such as in case of permitting the use of usury. But how India had become *Dar al Islam* was not a linear process, covering a rather difficult intellectual journey. Islam arrived in India in three ways, none of which had been directly approved by the central Umayyad or Abbasid caliphates, supposedly to expand the territory of Islam or convert India into Muslim society. The early Islamic references on Sindh and Hind suggest that the caliphate administration was not very willing to send a military operation to India. The trade relations between India and the Persian Gulf countries dated back to the pre-Islamic period, and the earliest introduction of Islam to India came along with these trade delegations. The historical accounts suggest that these delegations had used to stay for prolonged periods, mingling with the common people, priests, and statesmen of southern Indian states. Among the traders also used to be scholars/poets who would later on chronicle and document their experiences in learning Indian medicine, philosophy, and spiritual traditions. With the military conflicts in Central Asia, the Sufis started arriving in India from different regions. Their interaction with the Indian masses was far more expansive than that of the traders. They interacted with Hindu saints and sought common spiritual pursuits. This led to an Indian Sufi tradition more independent from the Arab and Central Asian Sufi traditions. The instability in Central Asia was already creating the conditions for a power struggle beyond the Central Asian Khanate (Chagatai Khanate). India had become the easiest escape for the Ghaznawi brothers' rivalries. None of these three Islamic encounters had originated from a single Islamic source; rather, some of them reached India in competition with one another. In these three types of Islamic encounters, India's non-Muslim but deeply divided linguistic, ethnic, religious, and regional identities had found a stranger, friend, ally, enemy, religious and spiritual salvation, business partner, neighbor, and new power. The ongoing class struggle, caste conflict, and power politics had become more complicated and more divided. For Muslims, India was a land of surprises, a land of opportunities, a land of immense knowledge, and a land of conflicting human values (Nadvi, 1970, p. 29).

The evolution of Muslim political discourse needs to be identified separately in all these different encounters. The Sufis left behind a vast literature dealing with the issues of spirituality and religiosity within the context of India. The visiting Islamic scholars and Sufis spent years understanding the Hindu religious traditions and learning the Sanskrit and Pali languages. Among these Sufis, Ali Hujwaeri (1009–1072), Moinuddin Chishti (1142–1236), Fareeduddin Ganj Shakr (1179–1266), Amir Khusro (1253–1325), Hazrat Nizamuddin Auliya (1238–1325), Sharfuddin Yahya Maneri (1263–1381), Hazrat Khawaja Baqi Billah (1564–1603), Shaikh Abdul Haq Muhaddith Dehlavi (1551–1642), Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi (1564–1624), Mazhar Jani-i-Janan, and Shah Kaleemullah Jahanabadi (1650–1729) are known to have deeply influenced Indian spiritual philosophy. The Bhakti movement is said to have started because of these new philosophical encounters. Travelers such as Suleyman (237 AH/852 AD), Abu Zaid Sairafi (264 AH/878 AD; as cited in Nadvi, 1970 AD),[3] Abu Dalf Misa'r bin Muhalhal Yanbui (331 AH/943 AD), Buzurg bin Shahryar (300 AH/913 AD), Abu Rehan Al Biruni (973–1048 AD), Al Masudi (893–956 AD), Ibn Batuta (1304–1368 AD), Ibn Hiraql (943–979 AD), Bashari

Maqdidi from Syria (1375 AD), and Abdul Razaq (1443 AD) have been frequently referred to by Islamic scholars with regard to India's Muslim history (Nadvi, 2010, pp. 19–33). The Arabic historical accounts from chronologists and travelers often documented under the genre of *Buldan* or *Futuhat* refer to both Sindh and Hind, respectively (Yasin Ibrahim, 2017). The diaries of statesmen such as Emperor Babur's *Babur Nama*, Emperor Akbar's *Ain-e- Akbari*, and many more are primary sources for understanding the evolution of Muslim political thought on the Indian subcontinent.

Modern narratives vs. historical narratives

With the arrival and consolidation of British rule in India, modern historiography started evolving and references to the Hindu, Muslim, and British histories (Naik, 2002) became more popular, both in colonial and Indian literature. As the colonial literature had started covering the Muslims, they often essentialized Islam and Muslims with fanaticism, such as the book published by *The Leisure Hour* in London in 1875 titled *Slavs and Turks* (1875) had done in depicting Turks and Muslims. Phrases such as "Islamic imperialism," "Islamic expansionism," "Islamic conquests," and the "Universal Caliphate" gradually became more popular in the communal nationalism of Hindus and Muslims. In the post-independence period, the nationalization, Islamization, Saffronization, or secularization of Indian history emerged as many competitive state projects on the Indian subcontinent (Asif, 2016; Goyal, 1991; Shaikh, 1989, 2018). For example, the first Arab attack on the Sindh region and Ghaznawi's attack on Gujarat were received with different nationalist and religious sentiments in India and Pakistan; Mannan Ahmad Asif, Pakistan's critical historian, has aptly underscored this competition.

Like Jinnah's nationalism, Hindu communalism also looked to the past, relying on historiography and also arguing numerically but with a radically different view of the past and the future. Hence in 1940, the conservative and militant proponents of Hindu supremacy such as Savarkar and Golwalkar would reinterpret the heroes and foes:

> "Ever since that evil day, when Moslems first landed in Hindusthan, right up to the present moment, the Hindu Nation has been gallantly fighting on to shake off the despoilers." For the Hindu Right, the "foreign" origins of Muslims in India demonstrated their "indigenous" struggle against conquest and domination: each new arrival of the Muslims was another war of attrition.
>
> *(Asif, 2016, p. 4)*

The narrative of nationalist history that overstates the "Islamic Conquest" (by Pakistani nationalist historians) or "Islamic Invasion" (by Indian nationalist historians) draws convenient conclusions for a nationalist identity from a political context that never functioned within the logic of the nation-state. The context of the shifting regional geostrategic landscape around the Indian subcontinent in the 6th century was shaped by the military conflicts that involved multiple power struggles among the Chinese, Indian, Central Asian, Persian, and Arab ruling elites. The role of an imploding Islamic Umayyad Caliphate, the only authentic Islamic rule, was already at its limits and unable to provide expansive military missions. The Islamic references in the Muslim histories of Persia, Central Asia and the Chinese, and the Indian subcontinent were not always actually about Islam, and the Hindus and Chinese confrontations with them were also not always Hindu or Buddhist, per se. The struggle for power among a variety of regional and local actors was not just determined by ideologically driven forces. Even after being invaded by Central Asian Muslim converts, India would never be able to be declared a Vilayat of the

Islamic Caliphate in the same sense as Egypt, Sham, or Iraq; these had been directly made part of the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates. Occasional conflicts between the Muslim invaders and the central caliphate had divided the Muslim jurisprudence into accepting these conquests as Islamic *Futuhat*. However, the caliphate's occasional recognition of these conquests was mostly to avoid conflicts between these rulers and the ever-weakening Abbasid Caliphate.

Before India, when Western Chinese regions had come under Arab-Turk control thanks to the weakened Chinese kingdoms (Hoyland, 2015, pp. 119–120) from 550–650 AD, the Western Turks were able to control the Eastern provinces of what is today Chinese controlled Kashghar or Xinjiang. By the year 650, the Chinese kings were able to push back the Turkish advance, only to be defeated by an emerging empire of Buddhists who ruled Tibet (Rehman, 1922, pp. 543–551). The Chagatai Khanate had started accepting Islam at a time when the Umayyad Caliphate's control over its Khorasan region had already weakened and the Abbasid Caliphate gradually lost its influence and control in the region. The Turks and Afghans, who until then had been fighting as non-Muslims against each other, had multiple fronts of internal and external power struggles. The Chagatai Khanate and Turks had found in Islam an opportunity to recover their declining control in the region. This was when India had already observed the decline of the Vedic era at the hand of the Buddhist kingdoms, and the decline of these Buddhist kingdoms had already started with some small Hindu Kings once again starting to rise (Sykes, 1841, p. 359).

Historical accounts are not very certain as to whether the Muslim armies had encountered the Buddhists or the Hindus, as some accounts suggest that Muhammad bin Qasim had fought against a Buddhist king, not a Hindu king. The less-mentioned subject in these discussions is what the conditions were that had brought the Muslim armies toward India. For example, Anjum (2007, p. 218) also underlined, "In spatial terms, the focus of the events leading to the establishment of Muslim rule in India remains confined to that country, and more specifically to northern and north-western India, as developments taking place elsewhere do not figure prominently." Anjum argued that pre-Islamic Turkish militarism was a reason for the Abbasid expansionism and that the developments that had taken place along the coastal regions of India such as Makran and Malabar have not been adequately discussed.

Both Muslim and Hindu nationalist historians have either called these events *Futuhat* [Islamic conquests], or Islamic invasions for spreading Islam and establishing the Islamic Empire. But the internal problems of the early Islamic Caliphate and the subsequent internal fighting among the Chagatai Khanate could be seen engulfing Asian kingdoms. By this time, a well–pre-planned strategy for conquering Hind or India did not appear to exist, and some accounts suggest Caliphs Umar and Usman to have even been reluctant to send military missions toward Sindh (Nadvi, 1970). After the assassination of Hussain, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, the Khorasan region remained in the hands of pro-Hussain people who refused to give their allegiance to the Damascus Caliphate. Later in the Abbasid time, as well, another commander, Abu Muslim, rebelled against his Abbasid Caliph M'amun and entered into an alliance with the Tibet rulers against M'amun. The events of Ghaznawi's invasion also may not have been a completely Islamic expansion, but rather an extension of the power struggle against his brother. However, the modern Islamic and Hindu histories, thanks to the British colonial historiography, have labeled these as Islamic expansion.

So-called Islamic military interventions in India

The much-used narrative of Islamic conquest that had fed the nationalization of history in Pakistan and India – and became the basis for their separate national identities – can be found

to a large extent to be an overstatement. Three main origins of Islamic military interventions in India originated from: the caliphate administration of the Umayyads, the Chagatai Khanate, and the Mughals. The only Islamic intervention authorized by the central caliphate administration was the attack on King Dahir of Sindh. Before the military operation, an Arab soldier, Mahmud Allafi from the Bani Asaar tribe, was given shelter by King Dahir when he fled Oman after killing one of his enemies, Abdul Rahman Al Ashaab. King Dahir, who was under attack from his enemy Ramil, was somehow rescued by the recently arrived Arab tribe, and he offered the tribe prolonged protection and hospitality in exchange. Mahmud Allafi and his tribe members, however, occasionally got caught up in small fights against Umayyad officers, in one fight killing the Umayyad tax collector Said bin Aslam, which angered the governor of Iraq Hajjaj bin Yusuf. He demanded Allafi's extradition from King Dahir, or the king would face the consequences. Later incidents suggested more encounters of such nature to have occurred that brought the two sides to a final military operation under the command of the young commander Muhammad bin Qasim. Nadvi (1970) stated that, when Mohammad bin Qasim arrived in Sindh, he found the Buddhist spiritual leaders to have already had contact with the Umayyad Caliphate, and the caliphate had indeed mediated their mutual differences.[4]

In the following years, the central caliphate's controls over Sindh would loosen, and independent rulers would even seek allegiance to the Fatimid Dynasty in Egypt instead of the Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad. The rulers of the Qaramatis and Ismailis of Makran (340–471 AH/951–1078 AD), and Multan (347–401 AH/958–1010/11 AD) had aligned themselves with the Cairo-based Fatimid caliphate, angering the Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad. In the rise of Mahmood Ghaznawi against his brother Ismail Subuktgin, the Abbasid Caliphate found an ally to act against the Qaramatis, identifying them as Shiites or non-Ahl-e-Sunnat. The Abbasid Caliph Al Qadir Billah conferred upon Ghaznawi the title of *Amin al Millat* and *Yameen al Daula* (Farishta, 2008, p. 61). Regardless of Ghaznawids' help for the Abbasids, the relations between the Abbasid headquarter and Gaznawids remained transactional and occasionally competitive in seeking more power and influence around the peripheries of the caliphate, including in Samarqand (Farishta, 2008, pp. 65–70). The advance of Ghaznawi and subsequent Islamic invasions cannot be analyzed in isolation from the power struggle among the Cairo-based Fatimid and Baghdad-based caliphates and their allies in Central and South Asia. Farhad Daftary has particularly discussed how this rivalry was central in the spread of Ismaili thoughts in the early Arab settlements in the regions of Sindh, Multan, and Badakhshan (Daftary, 1998, pp. 65–79).

The Sufi-sultan struggle

The Sufis, who had started coming from across the Islamic world, mainly from Central Asia, had constituted a key component of the Muslim public sphere independent from the ruling elites. They focused on learning local languages and interacting with local people, and in doing so, they became part of the daily life of India's changing public sphere. Religious scholars gradually happened to develop good relations with non-Muslim kings and scholars (Sabahuddin Abdul Rahman, 1949, pp. 1–24). At the same time, the relations between Sufis and sultans were not always good; in some cases, the Sufis faced repression from the sultans and emperors. The Sufi discourse, documented under the genre of *Malfoozat*, can be described as mostly non-political conversations. Their main topics were the spiritual reform of souls, ethics, and values. The Sufis' understanding of India and their apolitical socialization allowed a non-political Islamic discourse that had become more popular among the masses. As they remained away from politics, they limited themselves to offering their counsel to the sultans when they were approached. The first powerful intervention in politics by a Sufi came in the 15th century when Emperor Akbar

wanted to introduce a new religion, *Deen Ilahi*, and Imam Ahmad Sirhindi stood up against the decision and languished in jail for many years.

The introduction of the new *Deen Ilahi* religion was an experiment for new political questions such as how to accommodate the majority non-Muslim population within a minority ruled Islamic legal system and secondly how to define India within the strict categories of *Dar al Islam* and *Dar al Harb* when the majority of the residents were non-Muslims. Emperor Akbar wanted to have a new religion itself, the *Deen Ilahi*. At the religious level, the Sufis and Islamic scholars started studying Hindu philosophy, attempting to find out whether or not Hindus are *Ahl-e-Kitab* and whether the Hindu philosophy of *Wahdat al Wajood* was the same as the Islamic philosophy of *Whadat al Shuhud*. Most of the differences between Muslim Sufis and scholars had shaped the public discourse and put pressure on Islamic reformists to respond to these challenges. Hindu religious thought was also under pressure to respond to these debates, and a new spiritual movement known as the Bhakti movement started to reform the religious ideas of Hinduism, perhaps bringing Hinduism and Islam closer. At the center of these debates was an attempt to find an Islamically acceptable definition for India's non-Muslims, on whom the status of *Zimmis* was considered insulting and humiliating. Muslim scholars often criticized the emperors for attending Hindu festivals. Several emperors, including Aurangzeb, funded Hindu religious establishments and actively financed the repair and maintenance of old temples (Truschke, 2017). The idea of *Dar* (parallel to nation-state) and the people, however, could not find a philosophical middle ground, and the tension continued. Sheikh Ahmed Sirhindi emerged as the biggest opponent of the *Deen Ilahi* which the Mughal Emperor wanted to introduce. His letters written to Jahangir and his contemporaries mobilized Muslim public opinion, and in later centuries he would be considered as the *Mujaddid* who had identified the challenges, resisted them, and refreshed Islamic understanding.

By the time Sheikh Ahmed Sirhindi was engaged in a serious intellectual campaign, the East India Company of the United Kingdom (UK) was allowed by Jahangir to trade from Indian ports. The company soon was revealed as the face of British colonialism, which would threaten the political and economic survival of Indian kingdoms, both Muslim and non-Muslim.

The regional alliance system, as well as the balance of power, was being replaced with a new alliance system and a new balance of power under the tutelage of the East India Company. The Mughal Empire was on a steady decline, so much so that the heirs of Aurangzeb were not in a position to defend the capital of Delhi from both Muslim and non-Muslim enemies. This was the first time that Islamic scholars realized that Muslim rule had come under threat and they must intervene. The most revered Islamic scholar, Shah Waliullah Dehlavi, had returned from Hejaz and was closely observing the challenges to the Mughal Empire from the foreign forces (Siddiqui, 2002). His response, a "fundamentalist approach," as Ahmad (1990, p. 22) argues, resulted in two contradictory trends: revivalist traditionalism and rationalist modernity. In the wake of the imminent colonial challenge and decaying Islamic rule, Shah Waliullah and his school emerged as the most vocal on issues related to the political future of the Muslim empire. The call for jihad by Shah Abdul Aziz, son of Shah Waliullah Dehalvi, marked the turning point when the majority of Islamic scholars found the struggle against the British expansion as an Islamic duty and a jihad. In years to come, Syed Ahmed Shahid called for jihad and was killed on the battlefield in Balakot, now in Pakistan.

For many reasons, Shah Waliullah Mohaddis Dehalvi (1702–1762 AD) can be taken as the reference point for Indian Muslims' heightened interest in political affairs in the late 18th century. He explained in his books and letters why and how to respond to and stop the decline. His primary constituency was not political; he was instead focused on religion and the Sufi training

of his disciples, for which his father Shah Abdul Rahim had given permission [*Khilafat*]. But Shah Waliullah was also a keen observer of the failing political powers of Mughul Emperor Aurangzeb (1658–1707), Bahadur Shah I (1707–1712), Mozeddin Jahangir (1712–1713), Farrukh Seyr (1713–1719), Neku Seyr, Rafi al Adarajat, Rafi al Daula (1719), Mohammad Shah (1719–1748), Ahmad Shah (1748–1754), Alamgir Sani (1754–1759), and Shah Alam (1759–1806). He was in close and regular contact with the ministers of the Mughal Empire and ministers of other Muslim dynasties within and outside of India, including Ahmad Shah Abdali (d. 1737) of Iran. His identification of the Muslim political decline can be summarized as follows:

1 He saw Khilafat al Rashida's deviation to the monarchy as the main source of problems over successive centuries, and accordingly, a return to the Khilafat al Rashida as the only solution (Waliullah, [1911] 2014).
2 The contemporary Muslim thinking on the Indian subcontinent was too obsessed with deviant Sufi traditions, Greek philosophy, and the insignificance of the Quran and Hadith in Muslims' daily lives (al-Dihlawi, 1995).
3 His detailed critique of contemporary Muslim society and politics convinced the scholars and Sufis to engage in Islamic activism, including jihad against the infidels.
4 Shah Waliullah continued seeing Islamic politics through the categorization of *Dar al Islam* and *Dar al Harb*. For him, India was an Islamic state and to protect its Islamic character was more important than anything else. For that purpose, he even invited Ahmad Shah Abdali to rescue the Mughal Empire from the ongoing threats from Marathas and the Sikh kings.

However, he failed to establish any Islamic movement, per se, yet his son Shah Abdul Aziz would later on issue a comprehensive fatwa that declared that India under British rule had ceased to be *Dar al Islam*. As it had become *Dar al Harb*, waging a militant fight, or jihad, against the British presence became mandatory for all Muslims. In his letters written to several Muslim rulers, distinctions were made between Hindus, Sikhs, and Christians. In most of the letters, he abstained from calling Hindus infidels, mostly saving the term for British officials. His disciples Syed Ahmed and Ismail called for jihad against the Sikhs, who were trying to establish an independent state near Afghanistan. However, their militant movement failed, and they – along with their militants – were killed in the Battle of Balakot in 1831. The Muslim clerics continued their struggles; most of them failed, which resulted in more confrontations between Muslims and the British colonial administration. Then came the 1857 mutiny of Indian soldiers against British rule, which was supported by a large number of Hindu and Muslim leaders. However, this mutiny had divided the Indian Muslims. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1817–1898), a prominent scholar and founder of Aligarh Muslim University, saw the nation-state coming in its institutionalized form and the Muslim response to it to be misguided. He wrote a detailed analysis of the mutiny in *Asbab Baghawat-e-Hind* [*The Causes of the Indian Revolt*] (Khan, 1958) and later on also established the Patriotic Association in 1888. Through this, he opposed the Indian National Congress (INC) party's plan to introduce a parliamentary system in India similar to that of the UK, as it would be detrimental to the interests of Indian Muslims. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan had doubts about the genuineness of the fatwa attributed to Shah Abdul Aziz regarding jihad; he considered the fatwa to have probably been stated out of context (Khan, 1958, p. 37). In another book written in response to Dr. Willian Wilson Hunter, Sir Syed Ahmad gave the details of why India had not become *Dar al Harb* (Khan, [1871] 2009, pp. 50–55). In this book, he advised the British government on the steps to pacifying Muslims and Hindus of the country by showing more sensitivity towards their religious and traditional emotions. To Muslims as

well, he mentioned elsewhere that Muslims should not insist on living under the caliphate. He wrote the following about the Ottoman Caliphate:

> His (Sultan Abdul Majid 1839–1861) sovereignty does not extend over us. We are residents of India and subjects of the British Government, which has guaranteed us religious freedom. Our life and property are protected and our personal affairs – marriage, divorce, inheritance, endowments and wills- are administered according to the Sharia. In such matters, even Christian judges are forced to apply the Islamic laws to Muslim litigants.
>
> *(Malik, 1966, p. 393)*

His commentaries on the other political affairs of Indian Muslims suggest that he did not agree with the fatwa declaring India to have become *Dar al Harb*, as the Islamic Sharia remained implemented. Moreover, he also accepted the possibility of a modern state system governed by an institutionalized democracy. He remained critical of the way the caliphate of Rashidun had been made into a dynastic rule, and so was convinced that multiple Islamic rulers are allowed, as had been the case of the Umayyad Caliphate in Spain at the time of the Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad. In his editorials in his journal *Tahzeebul Akhlaq*, Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan had strongly criticized the rise of anti-British sentiments among Muslim scholars. Despite being criticized by a large number of Islamic scholars, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan had influenced another generation of religious scholars who then advocated a moderate path between Islamic traditions and science. Maulana Shibli Nomani, for example, initiated closing the gap between Deoband and Aligarh. Shibli's efforts facilitated the emergence of a new *Nadwa-tul-Ulama* movement in 1898 with the slogan "*Al Jadeed al Salih, wal Qadmeem al Nafe*" ["appropriately modern and useful traditional"], which meant to adopt what is useful from modernity and keep what is beneficial from tradition. The Nadwa-tul Ulama movement also gradually slid into the Deoband camp, which many in the Aligarh Movement had already predicted (Ahmad, 1990, pp. 166–167).

Their cooperation and active participation in the upcoming political parties opposed to British rule helped them become part of a developing format of the nation-state politics. Their participation in the INC made them recognize the principles of secular and plural political arrangements and leave behind the idea of Muslim rule. The INC had presented the vision of an inclusive Indian nation-state based on equality, liberty, and democracy. The 1857 mutiny had somehow unified India's Hindu and Muslim communities, and the INC later emerged as a platform for all communities. So far, the Muslim scholars, mostly from the school of Shah Wali-ullah Dehalvi, were active in an anti-colonial struggle. Among them were Muhammad Qasim Nanawtavi and Rasheed Ahmad Gangohavi, who later established the Islamic seminary of *Darul Uloom Deoband* in 1866. Now the main question was not the revival of the Mughal Sultanate or the revival of Islamic rule, but rather how to build relations between India's different communities. Hindu fundamentalist groups were successful in pressuring the INC to defend the interests of the country's Hindus; the Muslims started mistrusting the Congress as they saw many Hindu fundamentalist leaders such as Lala Lajpat Ray and Madan Mohan Malviya of Hindu Mahasabha join the INC.

Indian nationalism was a unifying factor among all communities, but how Muslims and Hindus could make one nation was the biggest challenge to be answered by the INC, as well as the Muslim leaders affiliated with the party. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan was among the first to become skeptical of the INC and its ability to forge equal relations among the Hindus and Muslims. In one of his articles he said, "Hindus and Muslims are like two eyes of the country India that is

like a bride. Her beauty is in keeping both eyes safe and equal" (Khan, 1898, p. 55). Sir Syed, however, was also skeptical of the INC's intentions toward Indian Muslims, and he occasionally advised that the parliamentary system alone could not ensure Muslims' political rights. The debate at his time was in its initial stages. Maulana Abul Kalam, who had just returned from his tour of Turkey, Syria, and Egypt, was deeply inspired by Arab nationalists. In his visit to the Arab world, he had been repeatedly asked why Indian Muslims were not taking part in the nationalist struggle against rooting out British colonialism. Upon his return in 1912, Maulana Azad started the magazine *Al Hilal* and then joined the INC. Maulana's understanding of Indian nationalism was shaped by three observations: first was his understanding of the rise of nationalism in the Middle East, where he met with the friends of Mustafa Kamal Atatürk and Egyptian leaders; second was his direct interaction with Bengali Hindu nationalists, of whom many had become extremely anti-Muslims; and third was by the absence of active Muslim participation in the "nationalist struggle" (Azad, 2003, pp. 19–20). So far, Muslims' main struggle had been limited to Muslims' religious rights under British rule, but Maulana Azad started explaining independence from British rule to be an article of Islamic faith, without which Muslims cannot preserve their *iman* [faith]. In the first issues of his magazine, Azad started targeting the Aligarh Muslim University and its support of British rule. Maulana Azad was perhaps the first and most powerful Muslim scholar to have spoken in favor of composite nationalism. In his most famous speech, he once said:

> If an angel were to descend from the high heavens and proclaim from the highest of the Qutub Minar, "Discard Hindu-Muslim unity and within 24 hours Swaraj is yours." I will refuse Swaraj but will not budge an inch from my stand. If Swaraj is delayed it will affect only India, while the end of our unity will be a loss to the entire human world.[5]

In support of composite nationalism, he cited the *Mithaq Madeena*, and believed that Hindus and Muslims should make a united *ummah* or *Ummat-e-Wahida* in the same way as Prophet Mohammad signed an agreement with the non-Muslims communities around Medina. In one of his speeches, he questioned the use of the term *Kafir* for non-Muslims in India, stating:

> I am proud of being an Indian. I am a part of the indivisible unity that is Indian nationality. I am indispensable to this noble edifice, and without me this splendid structure of India is incomplete. Fully 11 centuries have passed since then. Islam has now as great a claim on the soil of India as Hinduism. If Hinduism has been the religion of the people here for several thousands of years, Islam also has been their religion for a thousand years. Just as a Hindu can say with pride that he is an Indian and follows Hinduism, so too we can also say with equal pride that we are Indians and follow Islam. I shall enlarge this orbit still further. The Indian Christian is equally entitled to say with pride that he is an Indian and is following a religion of India, namely Christianity.
>
> This joint wealth is the heritage of our common nationality, and we do not want to leave it and go back to the times when this joint life had not begun. If there are any Hindus amongst us who desire to bring back the Hindu life of a thousand years ago and more, they dream, and such dreams are vain fantasies. So also, if there are any Muslims who wish to revive their past civilization and culture, which they brought a thousand years ago from Iran and Central Asia, they dream also, and the sooner they wake up the better. These are unnatural fancies which cannot take root in the soil of

> reality. I am one of those who believe that revival may be a necessity in religion but in social matters, it is a denial of progress.
>
> *(Zaidi, [1840] 1985)*

Most of the scholars who fought against British rule and faced the brunt of British reaction had come from the school of Shah Waliullah Dehalvi. On his return from exile in Malta, Maulana Mehmudul Hasan founded *Jamiat Ul Ulama*. Along with Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani, he actively participated in the Khilafat Movement and cooperated with the INC. His defense of composite nationalism was, however, mixed with both Islamic arguments of *azad* [freedom] and tactical arguments. In one of his earliest articles, he stated, "If nationalism is that much a cursed and bad thing that has destroyed the Ottoman and Muslim monarchs, let the Muslims also use it against Britain to uproot its rule from India" (Maududi, [1940] 1987, p. 37). Interestingly, Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, and Maulana Azad were all not just playing with religious sentiments but rather also were exercising realist politics. For Madani and Azad, not all Indian Muslims would be able to go to Pakistan, and the separation of Pakistan from India was to come at the cost of the decline of Muslim power. For Jinnah, the creation of a new Muslim nation-state would at least rescue the imminent collapse of Muslim power in South Asia, particularly when his negotiations with the INC for more concessions had no chance of acceptance.

Madani's defense of nationalism had drawn sharp criticism from Muhammad Iqbal, who famously stated a couplet that created huge controversy among the Islamic circles of India. To the defense of Muhammad Iqbal came Abul Ala Maududi, who published his famous article "Masla-e-Qaumiyat" in his monthly journal *Tarjuman al Quran* (Maududi, [1940] 1987). Maududi not only disapproved of Madani's definition of territorial nation-based nationality, but also argued that Madani had erroneously referred to the Quran and Hadith in his support. The terms *Qaum* and *Ummat*, Maududi argued, are used in the Quran in a different context than what the INC and Maulana Madani had used. Maududi also criticized Madani for believing the fundamental rights adopted by the INC to be equal to the declaration of Prophet Muhammad.[6] Maududi then explained why Muslims could not be considered as a nation. He argued that Muslims, being an ideological community, could not be a nation but rather were equal to what a party is in the modern sense. The world, being divided into two camps, Hizb Allah and Hizb al Shaitan (Quran 58:3), makes Muslims, despite their linguistic, geographical, and sectarian differences, one global community. In his definition of *ummah*, Maududi stated that *ummah* is meant to be an international party that believes in one mission and common principles. He goes on to define that any state cannot be called the Islamic State just because it is ruled by a Muslim ruler and that Muslim history is not always Islamic history (Maududi, [1940] 1987, pp. 165–175). A few years later, Maududi would establish Jamaat-e-Islami and would then propose his idea that an ideological state, not a nation-state, should be the objective of the new nation-state demanded by Mohammad Ali Jinnah. After India was partitioned in 1947, Maududi campaigned for drafting an Islamic constitution for Pakistan and wrote in detail the characteristics of the Islamic State. However, his definition of an Islamic State included all the key constituents of a nation-state that would be based on the sovereignty of Allah. He even proposed the possibility of more than one Islamic State in the world and these different Islamic States could form an Islamic confederation. His party, Jamaat-e-Islami, participated in Pakistan's electoral politics and established itself as the main coordinates of Pakistan's nationalism in which, according to Jamat Islami Mohammad bin Qasim, was the first citizen of Pakistan (Paracha, 2015). The result of the debate between the supporters of composite nationalism and

bi-nationalisms was that both sides found themselves agreeing on the centrality of the nation-state in their future political pursuits.

Re-territorializing the transnational identity

The reality of nation-states being nevertheless accepted, the region has yet to overcome the predicament of a distinct identity for each state and its imagination. Prof. Ashis Nandy perfectly captured the quest as:

> South Asia is the only region in the world where most states define themselves not by what they are, but by what they are not. Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Nepal try desperately not to be India; Bangladesh has taken up the more onerous responsibility of avoiding being both India and Pakistan.
>
> *(Nandy, 2005)*

He finds these states not only reluctant but also partly artificial, and consequently fragile in their perceptions of security. Nandy (2005) argued that this condition "has allowed the Indian state to hijack the right to the Indic civilisation, forcing other states in the region to seek new bases for their political cultures and disown crucial aspects of their cultural selves." The predicament is perhaps more serious among the Muslims of the subcontinent who had the burden of accepting the reality of the nation-state and the reality of Muslims living in rival nation-states as citizens. Once having lived in a civilizational India, in post-independence they had to discover two new, opposite, and competitive national identities: the Indian Muslim vs. Pakistani Muslim national identities.

In their search for new national identities, Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh have mostly gone through a process of re-territorializing their history, which had once been either a common or trans-local identity. The project of creating new identities was patronized by the respective states, and the Muslim thinkers in all three countries are not much known for resisting such attempts. Post-independence, Maulana Maududi mobilized massive public opinion in favor of an Islamic Constitution for Pakistan and to make Pakistan an ideal Islamic State (Ahmad, 1976). But this was not easy for Indian Muslims, as they had to discover an identity that should have confirmed the secular or Hindu identity of the Indian state. The assurances provided in India's secular constitution regarding Muslims' religious, ethnic, and linguistic rights helped them acknowledge the positive sides of secularism and democracy and appreciate the role of electoral democracy (Ahmad, 2009). The transformation of Jamaat-e-Islami Hind has been far more conspicuous in its intellectual departure from their common past, while Jamiat Ulama-I-Hind, which maintained a different view on nationalism than Jamaat-e-Islami Hind, had progressed to being more nationalist and more assertive in its advocacy of the nationalism of composure culture (Pathak, 2018). Bangladesh, after breaking away from Pakistan in 1971, trod the path of Bengali nationalism, underlining the Bangla language as the basis of new solidarity, different from what the dominance of the Urdu language had failed to offer. The creation of Bangladesh was a new challenge for members of the Islamic intellectual community who had initially opposed the Bangladeshi nationalist struggle. The crisis reached a breaking point when a top leader of Jamaat-e-Islami in Bangladesh resigned and accused the Jamaat of being non-responsive, calling for fundamental changes to the Jamaat's objectives, plans, and programs in view of the change in world politics and particularly in the upheavals in Muslim countries (Uttom & Rozario, 2019). Bangladesh Jamaat's failure to apologize for its position in the

Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971 has left many new generations of Islamists disenchanted (*The Daily Star*, April 28, 2019).

Aside from the national identities of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, the national identity of Jammu and Kashmir, of which a large population is Muslim but is administered by the three rival sovereign nation-states of Pakistan, India, and China, has become subject to the most complex identity crisis. Kashmir, aspiring to its own separate national identity, has had to resist both India and Pakistan without the choice to remain independent at the time of the British departure from the subcontinent. The Islamic response to the Kashmir issue remained non-responsive to the political realities in the same fashion as they had been non-responsive in the case of Bangladesh (Varshney, 1991). The post-independence Islamic deliberations on nation-state, nationalism, and national identity could easily been found divided in their struggle to re-territorialize Islamic identity by acknowledging the supremacy of the nation-state as the main framework of the new Muslim identity on the subcontinent.

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to give a perspective of the spread of Islam and the political discourses that originated from these Islamic encounters. The Islamic past of the Indian subcontinent has now become a contested space of national imagination for three sovereign nation-states and their Muslim populations. This chapter started by arguing that the arrival of Islam may not have necessarily been a project of Islamic conquest or "Islamic invasion," as is often argued by today's nationalized histories of India and Pakistan. The use of *Dar al Islam* for India in Islamic literature is not always an unchallengeable proposition, as was declaring India *Dar al Harb*. The use of *Dar al Islam* for India by Muslim jurisprudents of the Muslim rulers of India had not always confirmed any universally accepted definition. In the political conceptualization of Islam, Islamic clerics have differed on how and when a territory known as *Dar al Islam* can become *Dar al Harb*, and hence the fatwa attributed to Shah Abdul Aziz about India becoming *Dar al Harb* has been challenged by many. As the British administration started expanding its alliance with non-Muslim kingdoms, the Muslim regional kingdoms also started declining, and a sense of disappointment started seeping into the Indian Muslim political imagination.

The discursive transition that had taken place from *Dar al Islam* through British control to the nation-state should be identified within the following presumptions: first is whether the arrival of Islam to India was an act of Islamic invasion or Islamic conquest; second is how the Sufis, traders, and travelers had actually engaged with the non-Muslim societies of India, an unprecedented process for any Muslim community in the world; third is whether India's being *Dar al Islam* or *Dar al Harb* was actually in a literal and jurisprudential sense; and fourth is whether the response of Islamic intellectuals, Sufis, and clerics to the rise of English control and the rise of non-Muslim power was shaped by political realism or religious idealism. Both sides finally ended by accepting the centrality of the nation-state in their countries.

Notes

1 A territory where Muslims are either ruling or in position to practice Islam with freedom.
2 A territory governed by non-Muslims who restrict the practice of Islam for Muslims.
3 See the discussion on *Ahsan al Taqasim fi Ma'raft al Aqalim*. For the sake of accuracy, the Hijri year (AH) is referred to, as primary sources have used these. The approximate Gregorian year is also mentioned.

4 Nadvi notes that Blazri had related this incident to the third Caliph Usman.
5 Presidential speech delivered by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad at the INC in New Delhi in 1930.
6 Letter published in *Tarjuman al Quran* in the February 1939 issue, as quoted in Maududi (1987, pp. 82–100).

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SECTION V

The rise and demise of socialism

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17

THE ADVENTURE OF SOCIALISM IN TURKEY

Öner Buçukcu

> Socialism in Turkey is not an imported product. It does not resemble the examples in either the West or the East because Turkey is neither Western nor Eastern. Turkey is a country with unique circumstances.
>
> *(Aybar, 1968, pp. 8–9)*

Introduction

Tarık Zafer Tunaya (2004, p. 84) evaluated the Second Constitutional Era as the laboratory of Turkish politics and ideas. Although Zürcher (2010, p. 11) finds this consequence anachronistic, according to Tunaya, the templates for Western ideas in particular entered quickly through the gate opened by Young Turk Revolution in 1908 (Tunaya, 1988). Akçura's text "*Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*" ["Three Policies"] in *Türk Gazetesi* was first published in Cairo in 1904 and can be read as a good example of how these templates were discussed in Ottoman lands. However, what is striking among these thoughts was that socialism had been the most ineffective. Tunaya (1988, p. 12) also remarked that while all the ideologies had been fiercely discussed within the social and political agenda in the Ottoman Empire, socialism had not shown the same level of effectiveness.

However, this situation resembled an illusion in reality. The reason why researchers working on the thinking experiences of the Ottoman Empire's Second Constitutional Era could not identify socialism in the circles of thinkers with the clarity they looked for was due to a large extent to this movement having been developed among non-Muslim elements. After the Adana Events of 1909 in particular, when the bridges between Armenians and Turks were completely destroyed as a result of the efforts to redefine the Ottoman Empire's identity, the intellectual mobility of non-Muslim elements did not attract the necessary attention. This chapter will focus on the adventure of socialism in Turkey and investigate the forms of thought that developed in relation with it.

The transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey

Socialism quite obviously had been attributed to a wide range of definitions from the 18th through the 20th centuries and was understood in different ways. However, the way that this

concept was understood within the Ottoman Empire provides clues about the way it was evaluated in later years.

In this context, Şerif Mardin's argument that Marxist theoreticians in Turkey had probably been the most incompetent ones in contributing toward Marxism in the world must be given special attention. Mardin considered this lack of understanding to be irrelevant to the insufficiency of the Ottoman Empire's industrial infrastructure. As an example with respect to Mardin (2013, p. 183), this had been because the Chinese intellectuals who had been in Europe before World War I did not display such negligence toward Marx. Theorists such as M. N. Roy from India, which was less industrialized than the Ottoman Empire, and Sultan Galiyef from Russia's Muslim population were able to rise up from their communities.

The most important result of the development of Marxist thought that had occurred largely in the form of political reactions in Turkey was the inactivity experienced between roughly the first half of the 1920s and the 1960s. When the term socialism started to be increasingly employed after the May 27 Coup in 1960, the intellectual accumulation regarding socialism and Marxism was very inadequate. Socialist intellectuals tried to overcome the problem of disconnection or discontinuity marking the history of Turkish socialism by shaping and transforming Kemalism. As Güler (2015, p. 207) accurately observed, the domestic cadres were absent from politics in this period. Foreign cadres turned into a refugee group that continued broadcasting radio programs with the support of the the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

As Metin Çulhaoğlu (2012, p. 124) pointed out, socialist movements have constantly drifted away from political power in Turkey. The established interest of socialist ideas within Kemalism in Turkey and their alliance can be interpreted through this lack of power. Kemalism, which had been constructed along the lines of a unionism [*ittihatçılık*] open to some socialist emphasis, was used in an attempt to overcome this inherent weakness.[1]

When Nazım went to Russia because of a romantic interest, he learned about Marxism and Leninism. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir was confronted with Marxism while serving as a teacher in Caucasia in his research on Turan. Cevat Dursunoğlu adopted Marxism in Caucasia one year after the Erzurum Congress. Doğan Avcıoğlu pointed out that M. Suphi's quest of communism had been through Turkism/nationalism. Ahmet Bedevi Kuran said M. Suphi had told him about his ideas for establishing a national Masonry during their exile in Sinop. Zeki Velidi claimed that the Bolsheviks had been aware of M. Suphi's nationalism and was thus not very popular (Avcıoğlu, 2001, pp. 462–465). When taking all these into consideration, communism can be seen to have come to Turkey on the periphery of Russia and mainly through nationalist intellectuals.

In this respect, Murat Belge mentioning that the Communist Party of Turkey (TKP) had been established in Moscow in 1920 by Mustafa Suphi, expressed his opinion that this had led to a Leninist organization forming in Turkey first before anywhere else. However, the environment in which the TKP had been born (i.e., the success of Mustafa Kemal's independence movement) had also resulted in the stillbirth of this communist movement (Belge, 2013, p. 246).

According to Belge, the secular, modernist, and statist understanding of Kemalism that had founded the Republic had also disarmed early communists ideologically. This ideological disarmament accelerated the fall of the movement under the influence of Stalinism. Thus, an institutional submissiveness had formed among Turkish socialists. According to Belge (2013, p. 249), this was the reason why no Marxist analysis of the history of Turkey in the 1960s could be conducted.

According to Belge, the paradox that the Marxists in Turkey had to solve was that although Turkey was an economically underdeveloped country, it was relatively advanced politically. The

left could have led the way to a popular social transformation (Belge, 2013, p. 286). However, the left should be noted to have been unable to mobilize the masses, despite its relative popularity. This is because the left in Turkey was too overwhelmed by theoretical discussions.

The 1960s: the spring of Turkish socialism

The period between 1960 and 1980 marks a time when almost all aspects of socialism were discussed, represented by a range of large to small groups in Turkey. Located at the center of the socialism debates in the 1960s, the Workers' Party of Turkey (TIP) was founded by 12 trade unionists affiliated with the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions on February 13, 1961.

In the following period, a tendency to include intellectuals within the party appeared with the intent of dispelling the inertia in the party; Nadir Nadi, Ziyaeddin Fahri Fındıkoğlu, and M. Ali Aybar were offered the party's leadership. As Varuy pointed out (2010, p. 35), "Aybar became the leader of the TIP because there were no other bidders for this job." TIP gained momentum after a while and became more and more effective with time.

A distinctive figure in Turkish socialism: M. Ali Aybar

Mehmet Ali Aybar was born in 1908 in Istanbul. He was the grandson of Hüseyin Hüsnü Pasha, one of the commanders of the Movement Army. While he was an associate professor of international law at Istanbul University Faculty of Law, he had been expelled from the university for his article "Democracy on Paper," in which he criticized the İsmet İnönü regime in the newspaper *Vatan*. He was sentenced to prison on grounds of insulting İsmet İnönü in the "Open Letter" he wrote in 1949 and remained behind bars until he received amnesty in 1950. Focusing on intellectual activities throughout the 1950s, Aybar became the president of TIP in 1962 (Ünlü, 2002). In 1967, he was invited to the delegation also known as Russell Court, as it had been formed at the initiative of Bertrand Russell, that declared the activities of the United States in Vietnam as war crimes (Aybar, 2012). With this aspect, Aybar transformed into an international figure in a short time. When reviewing Aybar's intellectual and political adventures, he was clearly quite a distinct character within the Turkish left. The theses Aybar developed against superficial Marxism were seen as deviations from or even betrayals of socialism, especially by the opposition that had gathered against him within TIP.

Sadun Aren would later claim Aybar to have diverged from socialism with the theses he developed toward the events in Czechoslovakia and other similar outbursts of his and to be pursuing intellectual fantasies. Behice Boran (1969, pp. 6–7) similarly dismissed Aybar's understanding of socialism as vote hunting. Boran argued that although history consists of class struggles, Aybar's emphasis on freedom puts individuality in the foreground and that borrowing such a concept from the bourgeois democracies amounts to a betrayal because freedom is already inherent in socialism (Aren, 2006, pp. 139–140). Despite being a very controversial figure of the period, Aybar was ignored until the early 1990s due to the increasing influence of Maoism and Stalinism on the Turkish left; he was rediscovered after this period and his reputation was restored in a sense after the dissolution of the USSR.

Aybar insisted that socialism should be built from the bottom up, which is why he believed in parliamentarism. Although his work *Marksizm'de Örgüt Sorunu: Leninist Parti Burjuva Modelinde Bir Örgüttür* [*The Organization Problem in Marxism: The Leninist Party as an Organization in the Bourgeois Model*] (1979) was a critique of Leninism, Aybar himself administered TIP similar to a Leninist party. Aybar, in pursuit of socialism, thought that the experience of socialism in Turkey would of course be different from its experience in other countries.

The fact that youth movements after 1968 started to have quite determinative roles within the socialist left plays a big part in the way this situation unfolded. Aware of the plasticization of the socialist political spectrum that recklessly followed the youth movements, Aybar tried to protect his party from the same fate. However, he was accused of driving the intermediate layers away from the party and of not taking youths seriously enough, and thus of betraying the revolutionary movement in Turkey as I mentioned before.

The 1960 Turkish Coup and Kemalism

Aybar is seen to have preferred the concept of communitarianism to socialism between 1960 and 1965. This was both a way to get around Articles 141 and 142 of the Turkish Penal Code, which prohibit communist propaganda, and to avoid unsettling the petty bourgeois, who were demanding development and reform. However, besides having the previously mentioned advantages, one should not overlook the fact that the concept of communitarianism also facilitated and consolidated the communication established with Kemalism.

In the beginning, Kemalism was one of the main reference points for TIP leader Aybar. Even though he took a more critical position later on, Kemalism at least remained an important ally in this period. As the quote at the beginning of this chapter makes clear, Aybar sees Turkish socialism as unique. According to Aybar, socialism would be realized step by step in Turkey, and the step to be taken in 1963 was to fight for the rights granted by the 1961 Constitution because what needed to be done at this stage according to Aybar was to bring a new essence to Kemalism in accordance with the realities of the time (Aybar, 1963, p. 8).

May 27, 1960 marks the day when Turkish social democracy gained legitimacy. Social movements started to develop at a greater speed after that day. The voices of the workers, peasants, and intellectuals in favor of labor grew stronger. The diversification of debates within the socialist left brought along a critical approach to Kemalism after May 27. Heated debates such as revolution strategies and discussions on TIP and Turkey's social structure would affect the perspective toward Kemalism and the 1960 Turkish Coup. In addition to these debates, the fractured left-of-center approach of the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi [CHP]) had created in the socialist left is also worth noting.

CHP, TIP, and the left of center

In his interview with *Yön* magazine before the 1965 elections, Aybar stated having considered the CHP-TIP collaboration to be necessary. Although he thought CHP had lost its revolutionary potential, he regarded CHP and TIP as two different movements from the same root. He considered TIP as a continuation of CHP, which he saw as the leader and an unspoiled extension of the War of Independence. After the 1965 elections, however, both Aybar and the TIP circle in general started to develop a more critical attitude towards CHP. This attitude was shaped in relation to CHP's class structure and within the framework of the debates on revolution strategies, at the center of which was the role of the intermediate layers in the socialist revolution.

The ambiguity of the role CHP had in the revolution, its conflict with TIP, and the fact that the mass support behind the CHP was considerably stronger compared to TIP, which had received only 3% of the votes in the 1965 elections, created questions about TIP. The TIP discussions that started in *Yön* magazine and paved the way for a turbulent period in socialist segments were shaped around Avcıoğlu's (1966, p. 3) argument that stated "The best of the socialists

and not the calloused handed, clumsy ones" to be ones who should get into parliament. The implication that the main reason behind the failure of the socialism was improper application can be read as the object of the theoretical debate that would ensue in the subsequent period. The most controversial part of this division that Aybar, Divitçioğlu, and Küçükömer urged upon was the criticism that the intellectuals had been detached from the people since the Ottoman Empire and had no revolutionary potential.

This debate, which continued within CHP and the intelligentsia, also caused the debates on the socialist left to harshen and turn into serious divisions over time. The ideas from Behice Boran, an important socialist figure of the period, can also be easily traced to this discussion. Boran, who was prosecuted and investigated several times because of her connection to communism, joined TIP in 1962 (Atılgan, 2007, 2015, pp. 291–299). She drew attention with her harsh criticisms about the place and role of both CHP and the intermediate layers, especially after CHP's expansion into the left of center. She also reflected upon the role of bureaucracy in the process of revolution in Turkey.

In the discussion of the role of bureaucracy in revolutionary processes, views can be categorized roughly into two groups. This view also provides a view into the rough essence of the revolution strategy debate in Turkey. The first group includes the National Democratic Revolution (MDD) thesis and *Yön* magazine's line. According to the MDD thesis, progressive military-civilian bureaucracy could bring Turkey to the threshold of socialism in general. *Yön* magazine's line believed that the bureaucracy, especially the military bureaucracy, could cross the threshold and establish socialism. According to Boran (1968, pp. 10–11), the second opinion had been shaped by Küçükömer and Aybar. Among these two, Aybar had the tendency to see bureaucracy as a social class, while Küçükömer did not consider the bureaucracy as a class. However, because the bureaucracy had seized surplus value during the period between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic and afterward despite never having been a productive power, both of these views became the bearers of a despotic and oppressive regime and were therefore lumped together with *ağalık* [landownership]. In this framework, the bureaucracy would be the most dangerous class for the working people if it were to seize power; it would continue its top-down, hard-core policies and attitudes toward the people.

Boran (1968, pp. 10–11) placed her own opinion in the middle of these two views. According to Boran, the bureaucracy should not be given any important role in reaching socialism, nor should the bureaucracy be positioned in parallel with landownership. Both points are sharp and extreme. The petty bourgeois root of the bureaucracy should not be forgotten, but socialists must defend the transition from sultanate and caliphate to a republic, secular judiciary and education, as well as to other revolutions, even though it had not changed its social structure but remained exclusive to the superstructure.

Aybar's criticisms of the leadership of the civil-military bureaucracy can be said to have become more severe after the TIP discussions and the CHP's emergence as an alternative to TIP. Explaining the characteristics of Turkish socialism at the party meeting of TIP in Istanbul, Aybar, referring to the second article of the TIP charter, emphasized that Turkish socialism was talking about democratic leadership, not the leadership of the working class. The second feature of Turkish socialism, according to Aybar, is that it was a bottom-up movement and it absolutely rejected top-downism because, according to Aybar, "top down" means the rejection and denial of socialism (Aybar, 1967, p. 5). This approach of Aybar can be evaluated as an expression of the theoretical differences of opinion that are exacerbated within the TIP.

Hikmet Kıvılcımlı: history, revolution, and Kemalism

The most important aspect of the debate about the role of bureaucracy and the period terms of the petty bourgeoisie in revolutionary processes is, of course, the network of relations that had been established with the military bureaucracy. In the 1960s, countries ruled by military dictatorships were found to describe their system as socialism; the experiences these countries underwent must be kept in mind while addressing this issue.

The person with the most interesting ideas about the role of the army in that period can be said to have been Hikmet Kıvılcımlı. Kıvılcımlı is a symbolic name in Turkish socialism. Kıvılcımlı, born in Pristina in 1902, graduated with a degree in military medicine and got involved in the communist movement early on. Kıvılcımlı, elected to the Central Committee in the Third Congress of the TKP in 1925, founded a publishing house called Marxism Bibliotic in 1935 and published Marxist translations and copyrights; in 1954 he founded the Vatan Partisi [Patriotic Party] (VP), which performed politics on legal grounds with a group of friends. In the 1960s, although he wrote in various socialist newspapers and magazines, he joined a movement distinct from TKP and TIP around a line he called İkinci Kuvayi Milliyecilik [The Second Turkish Revolutionaries].

Kıvılcımlı's approach toward the army will also be a good guide in understanding his ideas. By considering the army as a kind of strike force, Kıvılcımlı's approach to Kemalism would transform in parallel with the history thesis he developed over many years.[2] Nevertheless, Kıvılcımlı differed from other intellectuals who held the army in high esteem by taking it way before Mustafa Kemal and the War of Independence to the founding years of the Ottoman Empire. He explains this in his work *The Thesis of History* (Kıvılcımlı, 1974b, p. 46): "To understand present-day Turkey, one must go back to the Ottoman past from which it emerged (or rather, from which it could not seem to emerge)."

According to Kıvılcımlı, armed veterans and Turkish raiders had founded the Ottoman Empire. The fact that the Ottoman state had been founded by an army is its most original feature, and this tradition still continues (Kıvılcımlı, 1974a, pp. 164–166). According to Kivilcimli, every society has its own way of making a revolution (Kivilcimli, 1970b). Turkey in this way has been shaped largely by the army and the youth, two major traditions that have outweighed the practical tactics of the revolution in terms of originality in turkey.

Young people and militaries exist all over the world, but nowhere else in the world is social revolution with youth, and especially the military, anything like it has been in Turkey. In any other part of the world, whether Asia, Africa, the United States, or Europe, civilian-military people are seen who are desperate to move forward; everybody calls them Young Turks without thinking (Kıvılcımlı, 1970a).

In this context, Kıvılcımlı suggested the youth and the army to have been inseparable within Turkey's revolutionary process. By considering the army as the "army youth," Kıvılcımlı placed the group he calls the "army fossils" against this progressive tradition, which has nothing to do with the revolutionary tradition he mentions (Kıvılcımlı, 1970a). He expected young officers to adopt this revolutionary anti-imperialist role in the army in accordance with the equation he had established. Using this perspective, Kıvılcımlı described the army (more precisely, the young officers in the army) as the strike force of the Turkish nation. With the revolutionary strategy debates, the role of the army is seen to have begun being discussed and criticized more seriously. In the Open Session on Revolution held at Istanbul University, Boran argued that coups occur in countries with insufficient working classes, but those who commit the coup later on have to rely on a social base (Devrim Stratejisi Üzerine Açık Oturum, 1968, pp 10–11).

The 1971 Turkish Military Memorandum (12 Mart Muhtirasi) and Turkish socialism

The incident that functioned as a litmus test in discussions on the role of the army was the 1971 Turkish Military Memorandum of March 12. Dev-Genç Chairman Ertuğrul Kürkçü, led by the Teachers' Union of Turkey (TÖS), came together at a meeting in Ankara where representatives from TÖS and the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (DISK) issued a statement affirming the March 12 Memorandum. The Turkish Revolutionary Organization [Türk Devrim Ocakları], Istanbul branch of TÖS, health personnel, and the Maliye İş Union jointly published the memorandum of the commanders and evaluated it as "a revolutionary and appropriate step of the Mustafa Kemal Army" (*Cumhuriyet*, March 14, 1971). Mihri Belli, the leader of the Milli Demokratik Devrim [National Democratic Revolution] (MDD), also supported the Memorandum and considered the military intervention a positive step taken against the reactionary feudalists and the comprador bourgeoisie (as cited in Sargın, 2001, p. 1051).

Hikmet Kıvılcımlı was also in support of the Memorandum. Kıvılcımlı, with the famous headline "The Army Has Thrown Down Its Sword" in the *Sosyalist* newspaper, revealed that the intervention was an expected development (Kıvılcımlı, 1971b).[3]

An overview of the post-1980 socialist left

The post-1980 period is generally evaluated by the diffraction from the coup on September 12, 1980. This approach may be correct to some extent, but certainly a much different atmosphere existed globally in the 1980s compared to the 1960s. First of all, the criticism of the socialist thought that developed under the influence and so-called patronage of the USSR after the 1968 Prague Spring should be underlined as having had a much wider framework in the 1980s from the point of view of the socialist left. The state-sponsored Marxism that had developed with the entry of the USSR began to be replaced by the basic texts of Western Marxism. Of course, this transformation process should be considered in parallel with the Cold War and the process of questioning the macro-scale ideologies that had crystallized in the 1968 university events in the West, as well as the identities created and imposed by these ideologies. On the other hand, Aydınoğlu (2011, p. 32) focused on the internal leftist discussions and thought that the leaders of TIP and MDD had played a very important role in the decomposition of the left. In this framework, Aydınoğlu claimed that the 1968 generation and its movements had been important in terms of making sense of this decomposition, but they have no significance beyond that.

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the collapse of the Shah regime in Iran, which had been the U.S. outpost in the region, the end of the detente period, the escalating tension between the poles, and the form that capitalism took in the 1980s must all be taken into account in this context. At this point, the great transformation that China went through after Mao and its integration into the system should not be forgotten. When the United States and the USSR tried to escalate tensions with the jargon of the 1960s in the second phase of the Cold War in the 1980s, the reason behind the failure of the USSR is that it had lost its monopoly on socialism. In the 1980s, the agenda of socialist parties and socialist movements in Europe had become quite different. Considered as the elements of bourgeois radicalism and deviation of the right in the 1960s, concepts such as civil society, democracy, differences, ethnic and sexual identities, and pluralism came to the agenda of socialism on a global scale (Kaynar, 2005, pp. 177–201).

Birikim [*Accumulations*] magazine, which began publishing in 1974, can be regarded as a pioneer in this regard. Perhaps the situation can be summarized as follows: while TIP Leader Aybar had been accused of revisionism for saying "Read Althusser" in 1967, by the 1980s, the Althusser threshold seems to have already been passed.

The important names and texts of Western Marxism started to be evaluated and discussed by the intellectual group gathered around *Birikim* in the 1970s. Although *Birikim* was shut down with the 1980 Military Coup, saying that the intellectual activity of the *Birikim* community had ended would be incorrect. On the contrary, the cleansing carried out in the political sphere by the 1980 Military Coup had created an important foundation for *Birikim*'s environment. This situation's clearest expression can be found in the response Murat Belge gave: The inability to criticize due to the atmosphere of the 1960s was understood to have not allowed the socialist left to criticize, which is why it waited until 1977 to criticize Stalin and Stalinism in *Birikim* (Çandar, 2007, p. 185).

Resuming the party debate in the post-September 12 socialist left can be said to have been delayed until 1984. The legendary leader of TIP, M. Ali Aybar, initiated the debate on the scale of the socialist left becoming a party. After Aybar's article in *Somut* magazine in which he claimed the Constitution to be open to socialism, content on establishing the Socialist Party was heavily discussed in *Gün* [*The Day*] magazine (known for its close ties to TIP) and were also led by Behice Boran in the *Saçak* [*Fringe*] journal (known for its closeness to the Doğu Perinçek group), and in journals such as *İlk Adım* [*The First Step*], *11. Tez* [*11th Thesis*], *Zemin* [*Foundation*], and *Yarın* [*Tomorrow*] written by socialists of various types (Aytemur, 1996, p. 1281).

Doğu Perinçek and the socialists around him worked to establish a unified Socialist Party between 1985 and 1988. However, when all the socialist movements were unable to be gathered around Perinçek's group, the Socialist Party was established on February 1, 1988, and 70% of its founding members were workers and peasants (Aykol, 2010, p. 108). The first Chairman of the Party was Ferit İlsever. The party is important in that it was the first legal Socialist Party established after September 12, 1980. However, opposition against Perinçek emerged in the Party before long, and this opposition group started to publish a magazine called *The Socialist Union* (Ballı, 1989, p. 22).

As the main topic of discussion in the 1960s and 1970s, Kemalism continued to be an element of distinction between leftist movements in this period, as well. The *Birikim* community also had a radical critical approach towards Kemalism in the 1990s. Beyond the historical axis of *Birikim*, whose publication continued for a while after the magazine restarted publication in 1989, it now had a section titled "The Illustrated Unofficial History," which contained quotations from Kemalist period memoirs, and was important in terms of crystallizing the approach of the magazine environment. After the discussions in the 1960s and 1970s, this attitude toward Kemalism can be said to have actually been more reactive than critical. The attempt and effort to redefine Kemalism through the policies of the September 12th Regime made the criticism toward Kemalism become reactive, and this situation also laid the groundwork for different ideological segments such as Islamists and liberals to come together. Reactivity was replaced by another reactivity around *Birikim* (and some liberal communities) after the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) government, and the critical attitude towards Kemalism was reconsidered under the name of the post-post-Kemalism debate, although some Kemalist practices and principles were annotated.

As stated previously, the Military Coup of 1980 opened doors for the Turkish left that had appeared in the second half of 1970 in Turkey, distinguished the stereotypes precisely, and started the process that would lead to a degree of permanence. While the critical attitude toward the historical leaders of Bolshevism had been much more limited among the socialist left in the

1970s, this attitude became much more radical in the 1980s and began to manifest itself in the form of a rapid departure from the theses of Bolshevism and radical aspects of Western Marxism. In this context, the identity issue can be said to have started becoming the most important issue in Turkish socialism as a result of the impact of the British School of Cultural Studies and the shock caused by the low-intensity war in the Southeastern Anatolia region, which had become increasingly more difficult in the second half of the 1980s. This situation can actually be understood as a reaction to the identity allegedly imposed by Kemalism.

At this point, common and deep divisions began to appear between Kurdish nationalist movements and socialist movements. On the one hand, a positive attitude towards Kurdish nationalism emerged on the basis of determining identity policies, while on the other hand, a reactive approach affirming Turkish nationalism that was associated with a socialist approach and whose fascist tendencies were evident from time to time had also emerged, as could be seen in the Turkish magazine *soL* [Left]. At this point, the political positions of Doğu Perinçek, the leader of the Aydınlık environment, which had continually wavered up and down from the 1970s to the present, are eye-opening. Perinçek, who had a much more positive position towards the Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partîya Karkerên Kurdistanê – PKK) in the second half of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, took a radical turn towards Turkish nationalism and the role of the military bureaucracy in the second half of the 1990s as a result of the drift caused by the fundamental analysis unit of class in the 1970s, which had completely lost all importance after 1980 (Pala, 2008, pp. 16–22).

Along the way to the 1994 local elections in Turkey, and as a result of the meetings with different groups on behalf of the left union, an initiative called the United Socialist Alternative was developed with the participation of the following parties: Kurtuluş Partisi [Liberation Party], Emek Partisi [Labor Party], Yeni Yol Partisi [The New Way Party], and Sosyalist Birlik Partisi [Socialist Unity Party] (SBP). After the elections, these organizations joined the SBP and the party was renamed the United Socialist Party (BSP) (Grand National Assembly of Turkey [TBMM], 2019). Meanwhile, the leadership of the group known as Devrimci Yol [Revolutionary Road] in the 1970s reformed in the early 1990s as the Geleceği Birlikte Kuralım Partisi [Let's Build the Future Together Party] (GBKP), an initiative resulting from the debates on establishing a socialist, pluralist party for the masses. M. Ali Aybar, Canan Bıçakçı, Uğur Cankoçak, Kemal Nebioğlu and those around them also joined the GBKP Initiative, and then the initiative started negotiations with the BSP. BSP, which joined the GBKP Initiative after six months of negotiations, dissolved itself, and the Freedom and Solidarity Party (ÖDP) was established. The first Chairman of the Party was Ufuk Uras (TBMM, 2019). The main constituents of the ÖDP were the following socialist groups: Devrimci Yol [The Reformist Way], Kurtuluş Hareketi [Liberation Movement], Emek ve Demokrosi [The Labor and Democracy] Group, Emek ve Gül [Labor and Rose] Platform, Sosyalist Eylem [Socialist Movement] Platform, Sosyalist Politika [Socialist Politics], Yeni Yol [The New Way], Toplumsal Özgürlük [Social Freedom], Sosyalist Emek [Social Labor] initiative, Devrimci Marksist [Reformist Marxist] Collective, and Sosyalist Alternatif [Socialist Alternative] (Pala, 2008, pp. 16–22).

Factors such as the end of the Cold War, the closer communications among socialist intellectuals who had to spend parts of their lives abroad as a result of the September 12 regime had with Western Marxism (and the universalist, humanist, and liberal discourses of Europe); the war conditions that made the Kurdish identity more difficult in certain parts of Turkey in particular; and the fluctuations generated by political Islam, which was beginning to present a more urban outlook, all played a role in the shaping of the socialist left's adventure in Turkey after 1980. The steel-mold class analysis into which almost all social and political developments and attitudes had been poured in the 1960s and 1970s now melted completely and the more flexible

mold of identity politics took its place. The dynamics at the point of initiating the Post-Post Kemalism debate, which can be summarized as the possibility that some hues of the socialist left can have common ground where the progressive (i.e., humanist, secular, or democratic depending on the political positioning) elements of Kemalism can be encountered, becomes more clear (Aytürk, 2016a, pp. 34–48; Bora, 2017a).

Conclusion

Socialism was not widespread among mainstream intellectuals during the Ottoman period and developed mostly among non-Muslim elements. Socialism was considered important in receiving support from the Bolsheviks who had overthrown the Tsarist power during the National Struggle period, and Mustafa Kemal Pasha himself formed a Communist Party. However, following the declaration of the Treaty of Lausanne, the new state's attitude toward socialism became more hostile: communist-socialist movements were prosecuted and their activities restricted, and these movements were largely kept underground. Under the political and intellectual conditions that the 1961 Constitution created and the impact of the earth-shattering decolonization processes and the ongoing Cold War during the 1960s, socialism made a rapid and fierce entry into the intellectual sphere in Turkey.

Socialism's adventure in Turkey has a very interesting point: Both in the Ottoman Empire and in the 1960s, socialism and nationalism collaborated from time to time in an overlapping discourse. The socialist paradigm being position as an element of the nationalization process in the Armenian community and in Bulgarian, Macedonian, and Greek elements due to the Macedonian problem should not be overlooked. The nationalist emphasis of the socialist-communist movement that developed around Mustafa Suphi that was accredited to the Bolshevik Party can also be said to have been essential. In other words, socialism in Turkey was a phenomenon that was poured into the casting pot of nationalism and took shape. This situation may also be observed in the intellectual engagements of the Kadro movement located between the historical TKP and Kemalism.

The main issues discussed here can be said to have been shaped along this axis in the 1960s. However, the areas of discussion diversified, and the perspectives began to show serious differences. This situation can be said to be the reason behind the perception that Kemalism and leftist ideas in Turkey overlap. The socialist intellectuals who wanted to make a place for themselves in the intellectual and political sphere that was reshaped after the 1960 Coup on May 27 under the conditions of the Cold War started to talk about an approach whereby Kemalism coincided with socialism; in this way, they both protected themselves from the anger of the state, which had targeted them frequently in the past, and asserted a position that was fortified in terms of moral motivation from where they could participate in politics.

On the other hand, the established contact with Kemalism led to fierce debates within the Turkish socialist sphere that were enriched by translations of foreign socialist works. Three very basic issues can be said to have been discussed on this point within the previously mentioned framework: (1) a debate on whether the Kemalist movement was anti-capitalist; (2) the role of the intermediate layers, especially the military bureaucracy, in the revolutionary processes; and (3) how to determine the distance between socialism and nationalism (i.e., how to shape the nationalistic paradigm of Turkish socialism). Here, the issue that raised all three problems and crystallized the perspectives was the question of what role the military bureaucracy would have; this constituted the core of the revolution strategy discussions. While in the first half of the 1960s, the socialist left as a whole had a positive aspect regarding the role of the army, in the second half of the 1960s, the trend was in the opposite direction. In the socialist left, three main events can be mentioned as the turning points in the emergence of a distant and critical

attitude toward the army: (1) the Cemal Tural incident; (2) the 1967 Greek Coup; and (3) the transformation of the third-world experiences of socialism into dictatorial state capitalisms.

However, after the 1971 Turkish Military Memorandum of March 12, which stated that the army could assume a progressive role, an air of expectation was observed even among those who were critical of the army. However, the fact that March 12 came down like a sledgehammer, especially after the kidnapping of Consul General of Israel Efraim Elrom in Istanbul by the THKP-C (The People's Liberation Party-Front of Turkey) led by Mahir Çayan put an end to most of the left's hopes. The previously influential names that had spoken for the leading role of the army lost their effect after March 12, and the left of the 1970s mostly went under the control and direction of marginal youth movements. In this respect, March 12 had created a clamping effect that integrated the three elements mentioned previously.

Radical drifts and ruptures within the socialist left were observed after March 12. The traditional left, namely the TKP line, arguably went through this rupture more carefully and meticulously (Çulhaoğlu, 2012, p. 134). Meanwhile, the new socialist movements tried to overcome the trauma March 12 had caused by internalizing or transforming the concepts of democracy and civil society. The interesting point at this stage was the blurring of the anti-imperialist emphasis, which had been considered one of the most fundamental reference points of the Turkish socialist left.

In the post-1980 period, the discussions on the agenda of the socialist left began to change with the influence of national and international developments and theoretical engagements diversified. The shocking effect of the September 12 regime can be stated as the reason for the emergence of this situation on the national level. This effect was two-dimensional. The first dimension was the unification of the anti-democratic practices of the September 12 regime by reinterpreting Kemalism as a response to the search for a new identity for Turkish society. This response intensified the reactivity in the critical debates on Kemalism on the socialist left.

The second dimension of the effect was that the September 12th Regime carried out a serious purge and paved the way for discussing issues that had previously been kept clearly within the left by taking measures in the political sphere and nationalizing interest in Western Marxism. Nationalizing the interest in Western Marxism led to replacing the class that had been the socialist left's historic but synthetic analysis unit by substituting identities; this, in turn, determined the composition of the relationships Kemalism would establish both with the right wing-conservative segments and the Kurdish nationalists.

Notes

1 Today's follow up to post-Kemalism discussions behave in line with this context (Aytürk, 2016b, pp. 323–346; Bora, 2017b).

2 In his eight-volume text entitled *Yol* [*The Way*], which Kıvılcımlı wrote while imprisoned in Elazig in 1929 and was published posthumously, he defined Kemalism as a bourgeois revolution and was very critical – again in this text, he made interesting findings on Kurdishness and the events of 1915. (Bora, 2016).

3 In his later writings, Kıvılcımlı argued that the March 12 intervention was more instructive than the centuries-old furniture lessons pls in that it makes parliamentarists ridiculous by breaking up the veil of parliamentarism at the tip of the soldier's barrel, which "the Hacivats and Beberuhis have struggled in vain" (see Kıvılcımlı, 1971a).

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18

THE LEFT AND WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENT IN EGYPT

A review using the 2011 uprising lens and thereafter

Heba F. El-Shazli

First: who and what are the leftist political ideological movements in Egypt?

Before identifying the political left, one has to define and explore political authoritarianism since Egypt after all is governed by an authoritarian military regime. According to the Freedom House 2019 report – "*Freedom in the World* has recorded global declines in political rights and civil liberties for an alarming 13 consecutive years, from 2005 to 2018" (Freedom House, 2019a, p. 4). Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who first took power in a July 2013 coup, continues to govern Egypt in an increasingly authoritarian manner. Most recently (April 2019) he proposed, and it was approved by Parliament via constitutional amendments to ensure that he serves as President until 2030, plus significant changes affecting the independence of the judiciary were made to bring it under presidential control. Meaningful political opposition is virtually non-existent, as both liberal and Islamist activists face criminal prosecution and imprisonment. Terrorism persists in the Sinai Peninsula and has also struck the Egyptian mainland, despite the government's use of aggressive and often abusive tactics to combat it (Freedom House, 2019b). Egypt continues to regress politically under the current regime with a focus on control rather than on promoting vibrant political discourse, hence is building more prisons for political prisoners rather than schools (Al Masry Al Youm Newspaper, 2016). In 2016, the Arabic Network for Human Rights Information (ANHRI) reported that 19 new prisons have been built since 2011 (https://egyptindependent.com/nineteen-new-prisons-built-egypt-2011-rights-group/).

Political authoritarianism, as defined by the renowned political scientist Juan Linz (first published in 1964) is

> political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism: without elaborate and guiding ideology (but with distinctive mentalities); without intensive nor extensive political mobilization (except at some points in their development), and in which a leader (or occasionally a small group) exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones.
>
> *(Purcell, 1973, p. 302)*

Linz explains that authoritarian regimes typically rely on a small set of key groups and prevent the expression of certain interest groups such as labour, leftists, and religious groups – any groups that represent large grassroots following, thus, a limited political pluralism, if one can even use the term pluralism. Authoritarian regimes use a corporatist strategy to organize "interest groups" [*fi'a* in Arabic] especially relating to workers' organizations such as trade unions (a system of interest representation licensed by the state).

In authoritarian regimes (unlike totalitarian regimes), the state maintains some distance and allows for some private organizations to organize and function "freely" such as professional, cultural and religious ones. One could describe this behaviour or mentality as "window dressing" giving the impression of liberalism and of even freedom of expression, freedom of association, etc. Daniel Brumberg describes this behaviour as "the trap of liberalized autocracy" (Brumberg, 2002). Authoritarian regimes have "mentalities" rather than ideologies – mentalities are ways of thinking; an attitude while an ideology is intellectual content. Mentality allows for flexibility in switching sides from left to right on the political spectrum. So, an authoritarian regime can be flexible yet limiting in its ability to mobilize people for extended periods of time or even fail to create a strong emotional and psychological identification with the regime. The regime's goal is to de-politicize citizens, which facilitates stability and limits political pluralism; and mobilization becomes difficult to sustain without a move towards real participation, i.e. democratic participation. Authoritarian regimes reduce politics to the safe areas such as the administration of public interest. They are also often characterized by single, dominant or privileged one-party rule (Linz, 2000).

Authoritarianism stunts the growth and controls the development of independent political parties, so independent secular political parties since 1952 never really had an opportunity to develop and grow in Egypt; thus, the left political movement became a movement with ideas yet never became a political deciding force within Egyptian politics. It never really garnered the needed support and development to affect public policy, let alone the support of the working class. It is not useful to categorize or even describe political parties by their political ideology since frankly it does not matter in Egypt – it is more accurate to describe or categorize them by their relationship to the regime: pro-state, co-opted, and in opposition to the state (Dunne & Hamzawy, 2017). The labour movement, which is generally allied with the leftist politics and political parties, in Egypt is allied with the state – or, better stated, has been co-opted by the state. So, you have two political actors: leftist secular political parties and the working class, both effectively co-opted and controlled by the state.

Dunne and Hamzawy (2017) provide the following main summary points: The state has been undermining secular political parties with campaigns to discredit, co-opt, corrupt, or internally divide them. In addition, the state controls registration and recognition of new political parties. Today, secular parties that supported the 2013 coup and President el-Sisi have come under attack after trying to preserve some modicum of independence. Many of these secular parties did have the initial intention of being true political competitors, but lost their independence as they developed and were co-opted or at worse were shut down, etc.; and in classifying Egypt's secular political parties – the usual right-to-left classification is not particularly useful. It is more instructive to arrange parties based on their relationship with the state (Figure 18.1) – those formed to be cheer leaders for the state to those who truly oppose state policies and behaviour hence are stymied in every step they take (Dunne & Hamzawy, 2017).

Andrea Teti (2011) addresses the 2011 uprisings, their important actors, and various impacts. Teti divides the Egyptian political movements into Islamist, leftist, and liberal types in context of their mission, methodology, and primary players. The left and the independent trade union movement is likely to retain its stronghold within the industrial heartlands of Egypt,



Figure 18.1 Taxonomy of Egyptian secular parties
Source: Dunne and Hamzawy (2017)

e.g. Helwan and El-Mahalla al-Kubra. Left-wing parties, which ideologically naturally represent the working-class Egyptians, have lagged behind the much-better funded liberal and Islamist parties, and have had difficulties in attracting support particularly beyond their core constituencies. The Tagammu (PNUP) party remains the largest leftist party (Teti, 2011, p. 12). Who or what is the Tagammu party? Teti writes:

> Established in 1976 by leftists including Khaled Moheiddin, one of the Free Officers who carried out the coup of 1952, the Progressive Nationalist Unionist Party (PNUP, or Tagammu) attracted Nasserists, Marxists and Arab nationalists. It once had strong support from the working class, unions, universities and intellectuals, but its influence waned as critics accused it of selling out to Mubarak's regime. Nonetheless, it was the first group to withdraw from dialogue with Vice President Omar Suleiman during the anti-Mubarak uprising, and has since become an outspoken critic of the [Muslim] Brotherhood. Controversially, Tagammu rejects banning candidates running as independents and then joining parties, which is one-way former National Democratic Party (NDP) members could return to parliament.
>
> *(Teti, 2011, p. 13)*

NDP is Mubarak's supporter and official "government political party" which is trying to regain its legitimacy following the 011 uprising.

The Egyptian working class embodied in the Egyptian labour movement

The Egyptian labour movement's main organization, the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF), was officially established by the Nasser regime in 1957 and was born as a corporatist entity i.e. loyal to the state and used by the state to implement and support its economic policies via the working class. It was not created to defend or advocate workers' rights as generally is the role of a trade union. It was a mouthpiece for the regime to control the working class and keep stability in the economic sphere using a nationalist-socialist agenda of a large public

sector whereby the working class was primarily employed by the state. An independent workers' movement did develop in 2004–2006 which behaved as a true advocate for the workers' rights and political interests. This movement played an important role leading up to the January 2011 uprisings yet has been dismantled/banned, or better stated, subdued into submission or fearful behaviour, following the 2013 military coup.

The relationship between the left and the working class was stunted from the beginning and continues in an odd unrecognizable pattern whereby leftist politics are weak and subservient to the state (not influential) and the working class is beholden to the state for its survival. The majority of workers are in the public sector, which is controlled by the state, thus making it very difficult for them to "rebel" against their "employer" – i.e. the state – which holds all the power. Despite an increase in privatization, the private employers thrive under an environment loyal to the regime. The political left and the working class have an unbalanced, unhealthy, and dysfunctional relationship, so expecting any change or true political discourse, development, and growth after the events of 2011 and 2013 is a fool's errand.

The perception of workers in Egypt leading up to the Egyptian uprising in 2011

Some background explanation of how workers are viewed and regarded in Egypt is needed at this point. Workers are referred to as a *fi'a* in Arabic [meaning a group — or specifically, a special interest group]. These workers led a movement that contributed to the downfall of the regime in 2011, yet they were generally perceived as a special interest group with no real power. The use of the term was meant to belittle the demands and grievances of the workers. The workers are placed into a special interest group, and hence cease to represent the larger whole, the masses, and the people.[1] Sallam (2011) points to workers' inability to affect the political agenda or to get their demands met in post-Mubarak Egypt, especially in an environment of weak political parties, emphasizing that if there were strong and well-organized workers' organizations, then they could have championed the workers' cause. Also, there is an environment of disdain vis-à-vis the working class – workers are perceived to work for the state, and thus should be thankful and not complain.

The wildcat strikes that took place in many economic sectors pre-2011 (starting in 2004) were influenced greatly by El-Mahalla al-Kubra workers and Real Estate Tax Authority (RETA) employees. They gave them the needed "push" to make their grievances heard and the needed "courage". The garment and textile workers and the RETA employees helped the rest of the workers shed away their fear of reprisal by the regime. These workers were protesting not only against the ETUF that was interested in protecting the status quo, but against the economic measures and changes in their benefits that were taking place as a result of widespread neoliberal economic reforms. Ahmed Shokr (2012) wrote,

> Between 1998 and 2010, well over 2 million workers participated in strikes, sit-ins and other collective actions. These mobilizations operated on two fronts: The majority protested for improved living conditions and against privatization, while a smaller group of activists fought to establish more lasting forms of independent worker organization.

The independent workers' social movement initially began with using an economic discourse which quickly evolved into a political one recognizing that affecting policy — and thus, politics – was the only way to bring reform.

The tsunami of labour protests and mobilization touched a wide range of economic activities and have included textile, cement, railway, shipyard, poultry, mill, postal, and public utility workers; train, truck, tram, and minibus drivers; tax collectors, justice and education ministry employees, and other civil servants; doctors, nurses, pharmacists, professors, students, and other professionals. Even Cairo circus workers staged sit-ins to protest low salaries and proposed the privatization of the National Circus (Shehata, 2010).

The government from 2005 until the end of 2010 faced an uphill battle of contentious collective mobilization by millions of Egyptian workers. The protests were not particularly "political", yet were main social movement making regular claims and demands while political parties and the Muslim Brotherhood were relatively silent.

> Labour protests have been locally organized and executed and there has been limited contact or coordination between workers across factories. There has also been virtually no involvement by the established political parties or the Muslim Brotherhood, despite the regime's allegations otherwise.
>
> *(Shehata, 2010, p. 268)*

Egypt's politico-economic conditions were changing and deteriorating, and thus were directly felt by workers and their families – accelerating neoliberal economic reforms, rapidly rising inflation, and stagnant wages. This forced workers to use their only weapon against the employers, which were still primarily the public sector owned by the government.

The wave of workers' protests that erupted was the largest social movement Egypt had witnessed in more than half a century. Workers' collective protest and independent organizations threatened the regime which aspires to tightly control labour and its organizations. These labour actions were amplified politically because they coincided with a campaign for democracy organized by Kefaya [Enough], The Egyptian Movement for Change, and other groups comprised mainly of the urban middle classes and skilled educated workers. However, there are only weak links between the workers and these movements (Beinin, 2010, p. 14). The strike movement started in the centre and heart of Egypt's prized El Mahalla al-Kubra factory and spread into practically every sector of the economy, including professional white-collar professions such as teachers, higher education professors, doctors, etc. Even though the activism of civil servants and government employees such as real estate tax collectors and teachers was not considered as a strong impact of "militant workers", they were able to force the government's hand by their position within the apparatus. They were able to use their position to make their demands heard on the national level. However, the increase in workers' protests was not organized on a national or regional scale. They were initiated on a local level with some copycat actions following large nationally publicized strikes. The Egyptian government was facing a serious legitimacy and credibility crisis. It was not able to deliver the promise of improved benefits to a great majority of the people and at the same time, the much-advertised democratic reforms were mostly "window dressing". Beinin wrote in 2010: "The workers movement offers the government an opportunity to listen to the voice of its people and implement long-overdue political and economic policy changes. Failure to do so may well undermine Egypt's internal security, prosperity, and regional influence" (Beinin, 2010, p. 15). This is quite a prophetic statement that in 2010 foretold the unfolding events that took place later in January 2011. As Sallam (2011) states, labour strikes in the last week of the uprising were the tipping point that forced Mubarak's resignation.

The post-Mubarak government still struggled with and against the labour movement. One of the January 2011 uprising's benefits was the creation of two independent trade union

federations and de facto acceptance of independent unions (Sallam, 2011). There has even been even more egregious government behaviour against workers in the post-Mubarak government, giving credence to the idea that in the post-revolution stage, one does not get a more enlightened regime, at first.

Shadi Hamid (2014) presents further evidence about political parties, especially the secular leftist ones, which were weak and like cardboard, i.e. lifeless and without influence: "despite a solid showing in the 1984 elections, it subsequently descended into irrelevance, demonstrating the impossibility of developing healthy party politics in an authoritarian context" (Hamid, 2014, p. 132). Egyptians can yearn for tradition and past glories in terms of political parties during the short-lived "liberal era" of the 1930s. Yet, in actuality today, such independence belongs to history and not to the present.

Historical development of the left and the working class

While Nasser established the Arab Socialist Union as the ruling party, Sadat took on a different approach – he nurtured the Islamists under the Muslim Brotherhood banner. In addition, he tried to balance out the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood with encouraging another brand of Islamist movement, Salafism. Salafis were originally active in charity and advocacy, yet kept away from political involvement while supporting obedience to the ruler (Hamid, 2014, pp. 131–151).

Then, Mubarak inherited a sham multiparty system with a reinvigorated Islamist movement that President Sadat had revived to fight the secular opposition – an appeal to religion was what he thought would be the key to his success. There was already an Islamic revival in the aftermath of the disastrous 1967 military defeat in the Six-Day War with Israel. During the 1970s, the "secularist camp, attached to the separation of political and religious spaces, also believed in the supremacy of civilian authority over the military, an unacceptable principle for the July regime" (Awad, 2013, p. 276). In the typical authoritarian manner, Mubarak continued to systematically debilitate the liberals and the left political movements, he removed pluralism or legitimate participative substance from these movements, and he stood in the way of setting up effective political parties through security infiltrating these organizations and preventing their communication with potential audiences.

The development of independent political thought whether left, right, or centrist is highly regulated under authoritarian regimes. These authoritarian regimes have frequently ruled Egypt, especially post-1952 following its 1920–1930s "liberal experiment". The constitutional rule in the country was also short-lived, owing to the peculiar political factors succumbing to corruption and disillusionment (Jankowski, 1978).

Finally, due to Egypt lacking a truly independent political discourse and competition, the organizations that gravitated to that role were civil society organizations such as advocacy non-governmental organizations (NGOs). "A key trend in many Arab liberalizing regimes over the past decade [in the 1990s] has been the rise of advocacy non-governmental organizations to the position of primary opposition to authoritarianism against the almost complete marginalization of opposition parties" (Langohr, 2004, p. 181). Liberalizing regimes in the 1990s (including Egypt) were seeking more aid and economic support from the Western world, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), so they had to appear to be more politically liberal. Unfortunately, civil society organizations' role is not a political one and they cannot take over the role of political parties and their work, so what we find is that within these NGOs, much politics took place that was inappropriate to their true goals and mission, thus, corrupting civil society into political entities fighting the ideological battles within and not in the appropriate political arena.

Second: who is the working class in Egypt?

Historical highlights of the Egyptian labour movement

A discussion of the history of trade unions in modern Egypt cannot begin without a brief overview of the relevant literature and scholarship on labour, the economy, and their political role, starting with the work of Joel Beinin and Zachary Lockman titled *Workers on the Nile*, a history of the Egyptian workers from 1882–1952 (Beinin & Lockman, 1987).[2] They presented and explained the history from a Marxist class struggle perspective, especially with the change in Egypt's economy: moving from an agrarian-based to an industrial one and then becoming a member of the world's commercial trade market. In addition, one cannot neglect Ellis Goldberg's (1986) work on the social history of labour and the history of the garment and textile workers. Posusney wrote *Labour and the State in Egypt – Workers, Unions, and Economic Restructuring* (1997) which explored the official trade union structure and its organization, and the effect of the neoliberal economic restructuring on Egyptian workers. Bianchi (1986) wrote about the "unruly" corporatist nature of the Egyptian labour movement and associational life in 20th-century Egypt while Vitalis (1995) gave us a glimpse into the business/capital class starting in the 1920s up until a few years after the Free Officers' coup d'état in 1952.

The Egyptian labour movement began in the late 1880s with its formal organization mainly in the railroad sector and sugar production industry. By 1919, the labour movement had an important role as the supporter of the Al-Wafd Party and the uprising led by Ahmed Orabi that led to Egypt becoming nominally (on paper) independent from the British in 1922. The Banque Misr group, as discussed in Vitalis' book, was one of the main investors groups to begin investing in Egypt's economy despite British objections. Marxist and communist influences travelled across the seas to make some inroads into the labour movement. By the early 1950s, Egypt's blue-collar workforce had increased, and formal trade unions were established.

The Banque Misr group was "the centrepiece of both triumphalist (nationalist) and exceptionalism (neo-Marxist) accounts of Egyptian economic history . . . and the industrial investment group was led by its outspoken nationalist chairman, Tal'at Harb" (Vitalis, 1995, p. 7). Harb and his associates symbolized the partnership of an aspiring Egyptian industrial bourgeoisie whose mission was to create a purely Egyptian-owned industrial sector (Beinin & Lockman, 1987, pp. 10–11), quite to the dismay of the British, who wanted to keep Egypt as a primarily agricultural country with resources to boost their industrial needs. This nationalist Bank Misr group of investors had an ever-lasting impact of emphasizing the local nationalist fervour even in the 1960s and 1970s. This concept collided headlong in conflict with the privatization efforts that began in the mid-1970s and later into Mubarak's era. However, the Misr group had to engage in partnerships with foreign capital in order to survive primarily with British corporations in the later 1930s at which point the "Misr group ceased to be 'national in character'" (Beinin & Lockman, 1987, pp. 10–11). Vitalis helps give context to the radical opposition currents and discourses of the late 1940s and early 1950s, "including the writings of Rashid al-Barrawi and Muhamad Maza 'Ulaysh (1945) and Shudi 'Atiya al-Shafi' (1957), among others" (Vitalis, 1995, p. 8). Until 1952, the business community held a privileged position within Egyptian government policies and society.

> The power of capitalists as a class in the decades before the 1952 free officers' coup d'état resembles Gramsci's concept of hegemony, [it] is centrally concerned with the contemporary functioning of advanced capitalist democracies, systems where a stable,

> highly nondemocratic relationship of shared authority between corporate capitalists and government officials is not an issue around which political forces struggle.
>
> *(Vitalis, 1995, p. 8)*

Egypt, in contrast, had difficulties reconciling business privileges after the 1952 coup; however, government always had the option to refuse such privileges if dissatisfied with the business performance (Vitalis, 1995, pp. 11–12). That is precisely what then took place at the beginning of the Nasser regime, in 1954, when the new government elites began to challenge the main institutions of the private market-based economy (Vitalis, 1995, p. 12).

However, after 1952, the labour movement was transformed into a corporatist structure with the creation of a national federation by the government and the increased control of its activities all to serve the national goals and not necessarily workers' needs and demands. Herein begins the quest for labour's place within society and within the political realm. Labour's post-1952 period baggage of compromises and "social contract" deeply undermined labour's political role in Egypt.

So, who is the Egyptian worker?

For the response to this question, one needs to go back to the early 19th century (1805) and to Muhammed Ali, the ruler of Egypt under the Ottoman Empire who is considered to be the father of modern Egypt. Industrialization began under his rule that moved Egypt from having a primarily feudal crafts workforce to factory capitalism with an industrial workforce in one leap.

> His foundries turned out arms, machine tools, and even steam engines. His factories produced cloth, paper, glass, oil, sugar, etc. . . . However, these industries were mainly developed for the military's consumption. They were not protected from the onslaught by foreign products encouraged by the Anglo-Turkish Commercial Convention of 1838. So Egyptian industry fell into ruin and had to wait until around the 1920's for another industrial renaissance with the end of both the Ottoman Empire and British colonial rule.
>
> *(Issawi, 1947, p. 16)*

Who was an Egyptian worker? Urban male Egyptians who spoke Egyptian Arabic dialect, worked with their hands, and got them dirty vs. those who worked with machines and those who did not. In the 1930s and 1940s, those who spoke Egyptian Arabic dialect confirmed their national outlook and were not international in their outlook. In the early part of the century, many of the skilled workers in Egypt were foreigners – Europeans in addition to Turks and Arabs from the Levant who spoke Arabic yet in a different dialect that was easy to recognize as non-Egyptian. Europeans in particular tended to hold management positions and were also the skilled labour, thus having experience and authority (Goldberg, 1986, p. 21). Workers used popular culture in the form of songs and the type of poetry called *zajal* – not so formal or the classical *qasidah* – to express the challenges they faced at the workplace and solidarity. Fathallah Mahrous, a retired garment and textile worker in Alexandria, recounted several of these poems and songs that workers used to recite or sing.[3] "Hardly a major union function or an issue of a union newspaper failed to include at least one poem from a worker in this form" (Goldberg, 1986, p. 22). This tradition continues until the present day, and shows expressions of workers' nationalist tendency and fervour. Poetry in the folk form of *zajal* told of workers' daily lives

and hardships so it was translated into nationalist fervour against the colonial rulers and owners. "The textile workers union had a poet laureate in Fathi Al-Magrabi, who published an entire volume of *zajal* under the title *I Am a Worker*" (Goldberg, 1986, p. 22). This type of poetry is quite informative to learn about workers' political and social beliefs and convictions. In addition, it reflects the difference between workers' classes, statuses, and their economic conditions – between those who work with their hands and those who do not (Goldberg, 1986, p. 22). Such *zajal* poetry by Al-Magrabi, Bayram Al-Tunis, and Sayyid Darwish also reflected the workers' political beliefs. You will note that being a Muslim was not a readily used characteristic by workers, since many workers – like many Egyptians – were Copts. To be Arabic speaking and Egyptian was paramount in the pre-1952 era, particularly in the 1930s when unions began to be formed.

Lockman's research study presents the various views and research on who is the Egyptian worker (Lockman, 1994). It is fascinating to read the varying views, and particularly those of Joseph Nahas and Jean Vallet published in 1911. Vallet adds to previous works and focuses on the worker in the big industry who had been neglected in earlier studies. He provided several reasons for this neglect, among them the fact that "for many people no big industry exists in Egypt" (Lockman, 1994, p. 98). He defines big industry as those operations that employ substantial capital and a numerous and divided personnel; hence, big industry exists in Egypt (Lockman, 1994, p. 99).

In 1911, Jean Vallet published *Contribution a l'etude de la condition des ouvriers de la grande industrie au Caire* (*A Contribution to the Study of the Workers' Condition in the Large Industries in Cairo*), in which he insists that workers in big industry need to be differentiated from artisans and crafts workers in small workshops. "He insists that the state must take this 'new class' seriously by promptly enacting labour and social legislation that will ameliorate the terrible conditions these workers endure" (Lockman, 1994, p. 99). Collective action with a mission, i.e. a commitment, worthiness, unity and numbers is distinctively a social movement as per Tilly's (2004, pp. 3–4) definition.

The transition to the urban wage workers as discussed in Joseph Nahas' book, *Situation économique et sociale du fellah égyptien 1901*, comes about as less lucrative work is found in the fields and more industrial factory jobs become available. Yet for Nahas, Egypt essentially is still an agricultural land, and is likely to remain so during that time period. Hence, it confirms the importance of studying the economic and social situation of the *fellahs* [peasants] and of seeking ways to ameliorate their condition. For Nahas, however, the term fallah applies not only to the agricultural population, the peasants in the villages, "but also to the artisans and the lowly [bas peuple] in the cities and . . . equally to Muslims and Copts" (Lockman, 1994, p. 95). However, "Nahas cites the Egyptian worker's 'marvelous' capacity for emulation, his endurance and his strength; this would soon make him a serious competitor for the European worker" (Lockman, 1994, p. 95). There continues to be a disagreement on who is the Egyptian worker since the *fallah* characteristics are still carried on to the urban wage worker, since many – if not all – were and still are *fallah* peasants in their sheer essence of being and psyche.

The nature and character of the Egyptian worker evolved as Egypt's economy developed. Egypt evolved from primarily being an agricultural products–based economy to a more industrialized products–based economy starting in the 19th century. Egypt was a primarily agricultural nation for such a long period of time, and so its main workforce was composed of peasants living off the land and in rural areas growing agricultural crops for their consumption. A conversion under Mohammad Ali (1805–1849) then took place from peasants to workers due to the economic development policies and to meet the demand of production. As Issawi (1961, p. 5)

states he failed convert Egypt into a "modern" complex economy, but instead started "the road leading to an export-oriented economy" (Issawi, 1961, p. 5). Cotton planting was started on a commercial scale in 1821 and it found ready markets in Europe. Cotton, particularly the highly priced long-thread cotton, became synonymous with Egypt.

Egypt's economy leading up to 1952 and the development of working class

Egypt went from feudalism to capitalism from 1798–1882, then moved towards a period of nationalism from 1882–1952 with its first protests against colonial powers.

> In the early part of the 20th century urban workers began to cohere into a new social class which, by the end of the WWII, was a highly visible and politically significant force in Egyptian society. As a result of their collective participation in both economic struggles in the workplace and in the nationalist political movement, many of these workers eventually came to see the working class as a distinct and independent political force in society.
>
> *(Beinin & Lockman, 1987, p. 448)*

A social movement was created that was respected and had a significant place within the Egyptian political, economic, and social context. The development of capitalism in Egypt was encouraged by her assimilation into the world market through the export of cotton and other agricultural products to Europe. There was an increase in foreign capital invested mainly in the agricultural sector, and *mutamassir* [Egyptianized] capital that spurred investment in other sectors such as transport, some industry, and in services. Investment made possible in the first half of the 20th century – the creation of private enterprises and national industries – airlines, shipping lines, chemical plants, agro-industries, and spinning and weaving mills, which are a part of Egypt's beleaguered public sector today (Vitalis, 1995). Capital was available thanks to the agricultural bourgeoisie that funded other economic ventures.

The Misr Group or Banque Misr group had a competitor – a contractor named Ahmad 'Abbud who "joined forces with an international consortium seeking new export markets in the competitive, interwar heavy-electrical-goods industry" (Vitalis, 1995, p. 56). 'Abbud championed a project to provide electricity through a new dam in Aswan for the whole country. The basic defining features of local capitalist organization in Egypt between 1880 and 1960 were the reliance on public resources, cooperation with foreign capital, and holdings in multiple economic sectors (Vitalis, 1995, p. 57).

The development of peasants into workers

Between World War II and Free Officer's Coup of 1952 was a time period of much political, economic, and social tumult.

> The resurgence of urban labour and student protests in 1945–1946, the mounting of a sporadic if still ominous campaign of political assassinations and bombings of European and Jewish institutions, the agitation over the Palestine crisis, etc. . . . can all be read as signs that relatively broad strata of Egyptians were intent on reshaping the political agenda.
>
> *(Vitalis, 1995, p. 228)*

There was a deep structural crisis in the Egyptian society between a backward form of colonial capitalism and a feudalized bourgeoisie that offered stagnant and unrealistic solutions. Land reform was on the minds of many Egyptians as being the solution to many of the country's economic ills and to provide a better life for peasants. Unfortunately, the much-needed far-reaching land reform did not take place in Egypt – "one of the many tragedies of modern Egyptian economic history", according to Alan Richards (1992, p. 2). Vitalis concludes with placing both Harb and 'Abbud as figures who fought to protect Egypt from the external control by foreign investment while pressing for more power and influence. "In the 1940s and 1950s, economic nationalism was being re-inscribed with a radical, indeed anti-capitalist content and deployed in a struggle with the oligarchs" (Vitalis, 1995, p. 230). This set the stage for the introduction of a nationalist-socialist system with the creation of a large public sector and justified the en masse nationalization of private business sector.

Egypt's working class and labour movement have been historically shaped by several factors. First, the government or occupying armies have often been the largest employer of non-agricultural wage labour. The government determines the standards for wages and working conditions. Second, European capital dominated the Egyptian economy from the mid-19th century to the 1950s. Foreign supervisors reined in Egyptian workers and treated them with contempt. Third, during the British occupation, the nationalist and labour movements became closely intertwined. Strikes and other workers' collective actions were often understood as part of the political struggle against European economic dominance and British occupation (Beinin, 2010, p. 5).

The shortage of skilled workers unfortunately hampered Egypt's drive towards industrial expansion. Egypt was considered a poor country and could not hope to produce for its domestic market, let alone for an export market. Industrialization could not absorb the increase in population by providing more jobs. "Since the beginning of [20th] century, labour has been attempting to improve its lot. Unrepresented in parliament and faced with an indifferent or hostile public opinion, the only course open to [workers] was through strikes" (Issawi, 1961, p. 95). Issawi wrote in 1947 that the main problems that Egypt was facing were a fiscal/state revenue crisis, in addition to growth in population with a government not able to manage this increase with providing more jobs, for example.

In the latter part of the 19th century, a large part of labour still worked in small craft workshops, and hence could not react in the same way as workers in big factories. Those urban Egyptians engaged in production, commerce, and service activities were organized into guilds (Beinin & Lockman, 1987, p. 32). They were spread out geographically, and thus, getting information and organizing workers into collective action was more arduous. In addition, there were skilled upper stratum natural leaders who were foreigners, and it was not always easy for them to cooperate with Egyptian workers – language, customs, and traditions got in the way. These foreign workers were mainly Greeks, Italians, Armenians, and Levantine Arabs. Another difficulty was illiteracy, which in 1911 was estimated at being over 90% among workers (Issawi, 1961, pp. 95–96). Foreign workers came to Egypt as technicians for the new factory machinery, as well as for supervisory positions. They usually had higher wages than the Egyptian workers. However, these foreign workers brought along them ideas of socialism and workers' right to improve their wages through collective action. As a result, many of the initial leaders of Egypt's independent unions were foreigners. The first trade union, organized in 1899 at the Eastern Cigarette Company, was led by a Greek who organized a major strike for two months starting in December 1899. Greek workers taught Egyptians the details of what is a strike and how to use this tool to get their rights.[4]

After 1890, trade unions began to form in the following industries: cigarettes, transport, and metallurgy. World War I (1914–1918) stimulated labour activity, and by 1919, labour was

very active in the nationalist Orabi movement against the British colonial power in Egypt. Then, labour fell into a "quiet mode" of political activity until the 1930s, after which labour, for a period of six to seven years, was politically active. The number of trade unions increased and they established closer relations with each other (Issawi, 1961, p. 96) – more solidarity was developed. A Federation of Trade Unions was established, yet was not legally recognized until 1942 with the help of the Wafd political party and Prince Halim Abbas. This political involvement with labour was not a positive experience. After 1937, the unions were reorganized, this time without the assistance of politicians.

The year 1938 witnessed violent strikes due to an increase in wheat prices and El Mahalla Spinning and Weaving company's 1,100 workers going on strike, occupying the factory. In 1942, more strikes took place, again due to an increase in the cost of living. The government at the time reacted harshly to such worker activism and protests with imprisonment of the workers' leaders, yet they did ultimately give them raises in wages.

Trade unions were not legally recognized, yet they were tolerated by the government. However, the lack of funds available to these unions limited their activities to primarily passing resolutions. In 1942, trade unions were legalized, excluding state employees and agricultural workers, yet unions were forbidden by law to engage in political or religious activities (Issawi, 1961, p. 97). Issawi writes eloquently that

> clearly the struggle of the workers to obtain recognition of their rights is far from ended. And unless the government shows much more wisdom than in the past in its dealings with the working class there is a great danger of this struggle taking a violent form.
>
> *(Issawi, 1961, p. 97)*

Issawi's prescriptive conclusions written in 1947 were truly prophetic, and are still relevant today.

The nationalists and their relationship with the Egyptian working class

After 1906, nationalist leaders and activists began for the first time to grasp manifestations of discontent among urban workers, and their apparent capacity for collective action and for organization – not as a bad disorderly movement, but as one that could serve the nationalist movement to bring it cohesion and collective action (Lockman, 1994, p. 100). This marks the beginning of organized labour and a social movement based on consistent demonstration of discontent and grievances – consistent claims with worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment (per Tilly's [2004, pp. 3–4] definition).

The nationalists were instrumental in how they saw nations with borders and their new conception of society as composed of a mass of persons into a *tabaqa* [a class]. So of all who work with their hands – *ummaal* [i.e. workers and urban then created a new category of political actors], Lockman writes:

> workers deemed to constitute in their collectivity a working class that encompassed most of the urban population and that could be represented as possessing a distinct consciousness of itself as a class that was at the same time entirely harmonious with the larger – a large segment of the urban population was categorized as workers and then placed in the European-derived narrative of working-class identity.
>
> *(Lockman, 1994, p. 101)*

Ellis Goldberg examined the problem of "why workers do what they do in terms of the worker-owner relation within productive enterprises as well as through historical sociology, macroeconomics, or political culture" (Goldberg, 1994, p. 111). Goldberg is interested in the perceptions of workers and their workplaces as well as their relationship with capitalists (owners). He determines that by looking at relations between workers and owners in this manner takes the reader to a different path than the Marxist, Weberian, Durkheimian, or Foucauldian approaches (Goldberg, 1994, p. 111). Goldberg's (1994, p. 115) analysis includes his belief that Marxist, Weberian and Durkheimian modernization theories are fundamentally flawed: "capitalists do not appear to be more rational than other people nor do workers appear to be less so. Capitalists . . . turn out to not be fully rational". They may not use the best mix of labour and capital, or may not necessarily use labour efficiently, nor does a purely market mechanism force them to do so. Goldberg tries to convince the reader that trade unions are attempts to create a monopoly over labour supply for firms/companies. "We should expect to see many attempts to 'free riding' as all workers prefer that other workers pay the costs of union formation . . . moral purpose or even heroic endeavour" (Goldberg, 1994, p. 114). Trade unions are a form of collective action for a unified goal and mission to advocate for worker rights and to defend and protect those rights when in jeopardy. I do not agree with Goldberg's analysis about the reasons behind the formation of unions; as Marsha Posusney explains in the same volume, there are aspects of labour organization that defy rationality and are based on a strong sense of mission, moral purpose, and dedication to the protection of worker rights (Goldberg, 1994, p. 114).

Ellis Goldberg sketched out the different worldviews and characteristics of the Egyptian worker. He identifies three strategies to deal with workers' organizations and their demands – three schools of thought. In the early industrialization of colonized Egypt, one group was linked to the Leninist model, which believed in the creation of formal organizations that demanded unlimited rights for workers against the exploitative capitalist owners. Another group believed that workers relied on social associations and participated in certain spontaneous mass protests to replace one elite group with another. This second group presumes a culturally specific leaning with religious overtones. A third group – similar to the second, but secular – believes in the creation of social associations with political patrons to help ease the tensions and social antagonisms. These three groups help in understanding the perception of workers' organizations as unions or mutual aid societies or a combination of both (Goldberg, 1986, p. 38).

Concluding remarks

The 1952 coup d'état in Egypt began a nationalist-socialist era lasting for about 30 years. The labour movement began as a diverse, pluralist, organized, and independent movement that advocated as effectively as possible for workers' rights. However, "the evolving structure of the working class reflected the uneven development of Egyptian capitalism" (Beinin & Lockman, 1987, p. 449). Initially, the Nasser regime used those of the working class in the nationalist-socialist discourse to placate their demands. He placed them with the peasants in the parliament, Majlis el Shaab [Peoples' Assembly], giving them the "legislative" power while their fundamental rights to bargain collectively, strike, and even organize were muted – even forbidden. Why do they need such rights when they can legislate everything that they need?

Prior to the 1952 Free Officer's coup, the ideological composition and the development of left-wing politics was similar and parallel to other traditional relationships between ideology and left-wing politics. However, post-1952, due to the limits placed on freedom of expression, association, and the regime's authoritarian behaviour, all in the name of socialist state development, this relationship became dysfunctional, with the state occupying the centre stage without

a particular ideology, per se – just one aspect of control over all matters of civic and political life while convincing citizens that it is for their own welfare. Ideological discussion, development, and advancement ceased to continue, thus crippling the left wing's politics.

Historically, Egyptian workers did participate in trade unions, including those who were employed in small un-mechanized workplaces. Workers in the large mechanized industries such as transport and manufacturing eventually became most active in the labour movement. "The early concentration of large numbers of workers in transport, public utilities, and service enterprises was largely the result of European capital's primary interest in the extraction of cotton from Egypt" (Beinin & Lockman, 1987, p. 449). As the mechanized industry grew, thanks to investment by locally owned Bank Misr in the large El-Mahalla al-Kubra spinning and weaving company; and workers in the textile sector became quite the militant activist leaders. By the advent of World War II, the numbers of industrial workers increased in different sectors including oil and tobacco production and in the Suez Canal operations. It is this activist political history that is still being followed by the older leaders in Egypt's independent labour movement.

This history of struggle and activism needs to be remembered to support today's independent workers' organizations and networks. Egypt's governance system has to change for an honest discussion about the relationship between the political left and the working class to take place. There was an early young "marriage" between the political left and the working class yet, the authoritarian environment and regime of governance has put this relationship in jeopardy of a "divorce" – under the best of circumstances, they are "separated". Authoritarianism does not promote independent institutions, whether in the political, civic, or workers' arena; it promotes allegiance and control above all else. So, in such a dysfunctional relationship, we can only hope for change in the future through planting seeds of ideas with the younger generations to remind them of the liberal, political experiment of the 1920s and 1930s, independent trade unionism and its importance, and the true working class not created by government institutions.

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank my undergraduate teaching assistant, Abigail Loughlin (2019 graduate with a degree in global affairs from George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia) for her excellent research and support in writing this chapter.

Notes

1 Further explanation of the use and proliferation of the term *fi'awi* was well explained by Sallam (2011).
2 Beinin and Lockman (1987) document the details of the regime's response to a violent strike and demonstration at Kafr al-Dawwar, a textile center 15 miles south of Alexandria.
3 During our 12-hour meeting over two days: June 22–23, 2013.
4 Fathallah Mahrous, personal communication, June 22–23, 2013.

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19

THE HISTORICAL TRAJECTORY OF THE LEFT IN 20TH-CENTURY IRAN

Trends, debates, and groups

Agah Hazir

Introduction

All political histories are constructions to some extent. They are constructed from historical facts that have been selected, framed, and interpreted by political historians who meanwhile are influenced by their own group identities and loyalties. Everyone knows the famous saying, "History is written by the victors." However, exceptions are found to this universal wisdom, and the political history of 20th-century Iran is one of these. As Ali Ansari aptly puts it in the introduction of his seminal work, *Modern Iran Since 1921: The Pahlavis and After* (2003), most histories of Iran have been written by the Iranian emigrants who escaped the Revolution. As a result, "Far from history being written by the victors . . . it was overwhelmingly the victims who determined its direction" (Ansari, 2003, p. 11). This victim-based historiography has made great contributions to our understanding of Iran, but has also over-politicized our understanding of it to a great extent. With this over-politicization, most histories of the Iranian left are stuck in a specific period and remain focused on the age-old debate of why the Iranian left failed to seize power in 1979. This chapter aims to go beyond this debate and in so doing will critically explores the trajectory of the Iranian left from its origins at the beginning of the 20th century to the end of the 1980s. Only in this way can the limitations put forward by works focusing on a single period be avoided and a more analytical perspective be established.

This chapter follows a chronological narrative by examining the structure and ideology of the Iranian left starting from its origins up until the 1990s. It focuses on three main periods: the period from its origins at the beginning of the 20th century to the end of Reza Shah Pahlavi's rule (1900–1941), the period of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (1941–1979), and the first decade of the Islamic Republic (1980s). In particular, emphasis has been placed on major trends and debates, as well as actors by analyzing the continuities, discontinuities, and transformations across these eras. This chapter thus aims at exploring the tensions among the Iranian masses, the leftist movements, and the state in 20th-century Iranian politics.

The origins: the radicals vs. moderates debate

This section discusses the history of organized socialist thought in Iran up to 1940. The primary actor of socialism in Iran in this period was the Iranian Communist Party (ICP). The ICP was

the predecessor of the Tudeh Party, generally considered as the oldest political party in Iran and the first organized communist movement of the Middle East (Jahanpour, 1984, p. 153), as well as the first communist party of Asia (Halliday, 1980). Although not as popular as the Tudeh Party would later be, the ICP played some particularly important roles in Iranian political history. Most importantly, it played a key role in establishing the first Soviet Republic in the Middle East, the Soviet Republic of Gilan (officially the Persian Socialist Soviet Republic) in 1920. This section will review the main debates related to socialism in Iran in this era, after briefly discussing the history of the ICP.

In the beginning, the idea of socialism in Iran largely developed in connection with the development of Russian social democracy. Iran's geographical proximity to Russia, as well as the transnational labor movements between these two countries, had led socialist ideas to infiltrate Iran earlier than most other Middle Eastern countries. This was particularly due to the Iranian seasonal laborers working in the oil industry in Baku. They were among the first groups to be influenced by socialist ideas in Iran, and they established several semi-legal political organizations in various parts of Iran, which were concentrated in Tabriz and Mashhad, in particular as well as Baku. These organizations would later actively take part in the Persian Constitutional Revolution in 1905. As their political influence grew, these organizations came together and established the Justice Party (Adalat Party) during World War I. This party, which would later become the core of the ICP, had developed a close relationship with the Russian Bolsheviks. Although it was an Iranian party seeking a socialist revolution for the Iranian territory, one must keep in mind that its members were largely non-Persian, mostly comprised of ethnic Azerbaijanis. Thus, it was more of a regional organization concentrated in northern Iran than a national organization. To establish a base among the Iranian working class, the party published magazines and newspapers both in Persian and Azerbaijani Turkish. During this era, the party headquarters were based in Baku, which at the time was inside Soviet territory.

An important turning point for the Justice Party was its involvement in the Jangal Rebellion. The Justice Party formed an alliance in 1920 with the Jangali movement, led by Iranian nationalist Mirza Kuchik Khan. The Jangalis had been fighting Iran's central government since the Persian Constitutional Revolution of 1905. With the support of Russian troops, this cooperation between socialists and Jangalis led to the creation of the short-lived, Soviet-backed Gilan Republic in 1920.[1] Within this republic, the Justice Party held its first congress in Iran and changed its name to the Iranian Communist Party. In its first congress, the ICP declared its four main objectives: (1) the end of imperialist oppression in Iran; (2) the expropriation of foreign capital; (3) land reform; and (4) alliance with the Soviet Union (Javadzadeh, 2007, p. 161). These objectives, particularly land reform, caused a rift between the Jangalis and the ICP, with the Jangalis seeing this as a prelude to the Sovietization of Iran. This rife eventually resulted in the disintegration of the coalition between the ICP and Kuchik Khan.

In this era, the ICP tried to extend its revolutionary ideas beyond Gilan. Their troops started to march into Tehran. Although they had gained some territory in the beginning, their forces were eventually defeated. This era also marked an agreement between Iran and the Soviet Union that resulted in the withdrawal of Russian troops from Gilan. As Gilan lost its Soviet backing, it also lost its Soviet support and protection. The Gilan Republic would not withstand long without that support. In October 1921, Reza Khan's forces reoccupied Gilan, and the first socialist republic in the Middle East collapsed after 16 months of being born.

After the collapse of the Republic of Gilan, some members of the party's central committee were imprisoned, some killed, and others had to leave Iran. However, the majority managed to flee to Tehran. During this era, the Iranian state was weak and vulnerable. Most of the country was in political turmoil, and the central authority was weak. Separatist movements flourished,

and tribal as well as other local sources of power became active. The central government had lost its control outside the capital. The country was in a period of long-term turmoil and chaos (Katouzian, 2000). Taking advantage of the power vacuum, the ICP started to participate in semi-legal activities. In this era, the ICP determined its main policy to be the promotion and expansion of democratic life in Iran as much as possible. For this purpose, party activists took part in the creation of various cultural groups, youth associations, women's groups, and art associations. Between 1920 and 1921, the ICP also tried to influence worker movements in Tehran. This included taking part in workers' unions, as well as organizing strikes. A printers' strike had been especially successful and played a major role in lifting the government's ban on progressive newspapers (Pirnazar, 1980, p. 101). During this era, the ICP focused on propaganda activities and started publishing first weekly and then daily newspapers.

This period of relative freedom did not last long. The new monarch, Reza Shah, consolidated his power gradually inside Iran. Starting in 1924, party newspapers began facing closures. New newspapers were opened in their place, but these were also shut down. This opening-closing-reopening game continued until 1925. In that year, the editor of the last party newspaper was murdered in front of the Iranian Assembly. This event marked the end of the semi-legal propaganda activities of the ICP (Pirnazar, 1980, p. 103).

In 1931, Reza Shah passed a new national security law. According to this law, members of organizations that propagated a collectivist ideology could be given prison sentences of up to ten years. This law was followed by widespread arrests. Party membership dropped drastically, and those who remained in the party went fully underground. This ended the life of the ICP in Iran. An ICP branch working with Iranian students abroad remained active in Germany, but it was closed after the Nazis came to power there, marking the official end of the party.

In the 1930s, Reza Shah tolerated no collective political activity in Iran, and communism was no exception. Therefore, instead of organized collective actions in this era, individual intellectuals came forward in the political arena. The most prominent intellectual of the era was Taqi Arani. He was a chemist who had been educated in Germany. While studying in Berlin, he had become involved in left-wing politics. In 1928, he returned to Iran and formed some secret discussion groups. He also began publishing a journal by the name of *Donya* [*World*]. *Donya* was the first theoretical Marxist journal in Iran, and was highly influential. Arani used overly complicated academic language in the articles. In fact, the intellectual level of these articles was so high that, according to Abrahamian (1982), the secret police had not understood them as communist materials and hence deemed them safe. That did not last long. In 1938, Arani and 52 of his friends – known as "The Fifty-Three" – were arrested for violating the law restricting socialist propaganda. They all received long prison sentences; Arani died in prison 16 months later under suspicious conditions. With his death, the communist movement had suffered a major blow. The left was unable to re-emerge until the fall of Reza Shah. After his forced abdication in 1941, the remaining members of The Fifty-Three were freed. This group would later become the core of the Tudeh Party, the most important movement of Iranian socialism.

As discussed previously, a widespread socialist movement being present in Iran during Reza Shah's rule is hard to claim. Socialist ideas found supporters mostly among intellectuals, students, and, in part, workers' circles. The influence of socialist ideology was marginal at this time, although lively discussions did occur inside the socialist circles. The most influential of these discussions was the debate between radicals and moderates. This was not just an intellectual debate; it also caused practical problems.

This debate revolved around the question of how a socialist program in Iran should be organized. The main issue was whether socialists should ally with nationalist demands and

nationalist movements, or follow a pure socialist program. This issue was also related to socialists' relations with Muslims and Reza Shah.

The ideological roots of the debate between radicals and moderates can be traced back to the 1920s. At the first party congress of the ICP, two sides were revealed, one of which was the moderates. They identified the British as their main enemy and argued that the party should collaborate with tribal chiefs and landowners, as well as the national segments of the bourgeoisie, in its struggle against the British. According to Haydar Khan Amughli, a veteran constitutionalist who had emerged as the leader of the moderate faction in the ICP, "The Persian revolution cannot call for the liberation of the laborious masses without first fighting foreign exploitation. . . . The nationalist revolution must have time to transform itself into a social revolution" (Borougerdi, 2006, p. 96). On the other hand, the radicals were represented by Avetis Sultanzadeh, an Armenian intellectual who had been working for the Soviet government since 1917. According to Sultanzadeh, Iran had already experienced the nationalist revolution. Therefore, the immediate aim of the party had to be a socialist revolution. Iran had to be Sovietized by the party, like the Bolsheviks had done in Central Asia. Obviously, this program would involve a struggle against the bourgeoise, as well as tribal chiefs and landlords. He also adamantly opposed the "nationalist leaders of the East" (Chaqueri, 1984, p. 218).

The split inside the party affected the party's alliance with the Jangalis. The first to gain power inside the ICP were the radicals led by Sultanzadeh. They immediately proposed a program consisting of land reforms, anti-imperialism, and support for the Bolshevik revolution. As discussed previously, this program was seen as a prelude to the Sovietization of Iran. Adopting this program had caused serious friction in Gilan. Although a coalition government existed between the Jangalis and the ICP, problems soon arose. Kuchik Khan and his supporters withdrew from the revolutionary government, leaving the radicals in the ICP in complete control of Gilan. The radicals immediately launched a series of radical activities such as anti-religious propaganda and land reforms. Anti-religious propaganda in particular contributed to the party's declining reputation in Gilan and weakened its public support. As a result, the Russians increased their pressure and supported the moderates. The new leadership, headed by Haydar Khan'Amughli, suspended the radical land reform program and attempted to come to an agreement with Mirza Kuchik Khan, but these attempts failed. Mirza Kuchik Khan broke again from the ICP and eventually killed the party's leader, Haydar Khan. This murder marked the end of the first alliance of the Iranian left with a different political movement, and the debate between the radicals and moderates came to an end with the collapse of the Gilan Republic.

The Iranian left during the reign of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (1941–1979)

This section explores the history of the left during Muhammad Reza Shah's rule in two separate phases. The first phase consists of the period between 1941 and 1953. During this era, the main socialist actor was the Tudeh Party, and the debates related to socialism revolved around it. The second phase consists of the period between 1953 and 1979. In this era, various socialist organizations and schools of thoughts were active in Iran. The second part reviews the major actors and related debates of the era.

Tudeh party: regionalism vs. centralism debate (1941–1953)

With the forced abdication of Reza Shah, the political atmosphere of Iran enjoyed some relief. During Reza Shah's rule, the state had tightly controlled society, and his abdication was

followed by the breakdown of this tight state control over society. This social climate increased the number of politically active people, and numerous political organizations were formed throughout the country. One of the most influential of these was the Tudeh Party. It played an important role on at least two political occasions during the period. The first was the short-lived Azerbaijan People's Government (1945–1946). The Azerbaijan branch of the Tudeh Party, which later split from it and formed the Azerbaijan Democratic Party [Ferqa-ye demokrāt-e Āḏarbāyjān], headed this unrecognized government. Second, the Tudeh Party was influential during Mohammed Mosaddegh's rise to power as the first democratically elected prime minister of Iran. This section will discuss the role the Tudeh Party played in these times in relation to the political debates of the period.

The Tudeh Party was founded in the environment of relative freedom induced by Reza Shah's abdication. Among the political prisoners released during this period were a group of former socialists called The Fifty-Three. These political prisoners merged with past ICP members and announced the founding of the party in 1941. When the party was first founded, it was more of a united anti-fascist front than an independent socialist movement. They chose the name Tudeh, which means "the masses" in Persian, instead of a more convenient leftist name such as The Communist Party or Workers Party. According to Javadzadeh (2007, p. 163), three reasons were behind this decision:

1 Since communist activity had become illegal in 1931, any name making a communist distinction appeared unwise, especially because the members did not perceive this as an underground or subversive organization.
2 Any name referring to Marxism or communism would undoubtedly repel clerics and religious individuals, as well as many politically radical Muslims.
3 Tudeh, meaning "mass of people," would also attract and appeal to all sects and divisions of society, not just the working class.

The party members chose Mirza Eskandari, a former Qajar prince, as their first leader. The party began organizing itself around the working class right after its foundation, particularly within the trade unions. In this period, the main discourses of struggle that the party utilized in order to expand its base were: the right to strike, an eight-hour work day, and workers' health and housing security. Tudeh became largely successful in trade unionism. During this era, a significant segment of the working class had become attracted to the party. By 1944, when the party's first congress was held, its membership was over 25,000. Tudeh had managed to establish local branches in several Iranian cities, mostly in the north (Abrahamian, 1970).

The party's founders generally came from a Persian urban background, and most of them were based in Tehran. As socialists, they believed in orthodox Marxism and hence analyzed Iranian politics through class conflict. As modernists, they considered centralization as the remedy to be applied to Iran. Party elites were underestimating the tension between the center and the periphery. The Tudeh Party's program appealed directly to five social categories: the proletariat, white-collar workers, tradesmen, peasants, and women. It obviously did not pay attention to the local and linguistic differences present in Iranian politics. These modernist and centralist policies were successful at first, and Tudeh's sphere of influence expanded deeper into the working class. The Central Council of United Trade Unions (CCUTU), a party-controlled organization, claimed an enrollment of 355,000 in 1946 (Abrahamian, 1970). This was an unprecedented expansion in the history of the Iranian left. With this expansion came participation in the party

not only from Iran's center but also from its periphery. As Abrahamian (1970, p. 301) aptly described:

> This rapid success in mobilizing diverse groups into one organization did not herald the victory of class consciousness over communal consciousness. It merely brought communal antagonisms into the ranks of the C.C.U.T.U. and the Tudah Party, forcing them to take notice of the problem. The C.C.U.T.U. began to suffer from communal conflicts as it recruited workers of different linguistic groups employed in the same factories.

For the first time in Iranian history, a political party had been widely organized beyond the center. This expansion resulted in a split between the central and peripheral branches of the Tudeh Party. The peripheral branches accused the center of disregarding Iran's ethnic and linguistic diversity. This tension reached such a point that the Azerbaijan branch of the Tudeh Party left en masse and founded a new socialist party, the Azerbaijani Democratic Party (ADP).

This debate between regionalism and centralism was the second major split in the Iranian left, following the debate between radicals and moderates. The conflict had both theoretical and practical backgrounds. Practically, the two sides of the debate were coming from different social bases. The Tudeh wing mainly comprised Persian and urban intellectuals. This group had learned Marxism in Western Europe. The latter were formed of the Azerbaijanis who had learned Marxism through the Bolshevik Party and the Soviets. The first group mainly resided in Tehran and disregarded the linguistic conflicts, as well as underestimating the regional grievances of the provinces against the center. The second group had fought in the Jangali revolt and had nationalistic tendencies. In short, Tudeh was a class-based party comprised of the Persian intelligentsia and working class, while the ADP was a communal organization appealing exclusively to Azerbaijanis (Abrahamian, 1970).

One practical outcome of this split was that Iranian politics experienced the rare phenomenon of simultaneously having two pro-Soviet communist parties, the Tudeh Party and the ADP.[2] In 1945 and 1946, the ADP attempted to establish an autonomous government in northwestern Iran, but it was quickly crushed by the central government.

Despite this destruction suffered by Tudeh's sister party, the Tudeh Party itself did not lose power in Iranian politics. The party played an important role in the process that resulted in the overthrow of Mohammed Mossadegh's government in 1953. Tudeh reached its zenith during this period. According to a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimate, the party had 20,000 members in 1952, 8,000 of whom lived in the capital (Abrahamian, 1982). Although Tudeh's ranks predominantly was comprised of workers, it had a network of loyal supporters among the officer corps of the imperial armed forces. As Behrooz (2001, pp. 363–364) stated, these supporters were well aware of the impending coup. Despite all this, the party did not resist the U.S.-backed coup d'état, Operation Ajax; neither did it organize a countercoup. The dismissal of Mohammed Mossadegh by this coup was a great blow to the party. By 1958, the Tudeh network in Iran was decimated, and much of its cadre had been arrested, executed, or forced to flee the country. The party could not regain its strength from then until the end of the 1970s.

On the road to revolution: guerrillas, Maoists, and the Islamist left (1953–1979)

Between 1960 and 1979, the Iranian left became a strong visible movement, with many new organizations and actors joining it in this era. Some of these movements and actors came out

of the Tudeh Party, while others were established in completely new dynamics. During this period, the currents within international socialism were also reflected in the Iranian left, with the newly formed socialist movements being affected by those trends at varying levels.

A detailed analysis of the Iranian left in all its diversity in this 20-year period would be far beyond the scope of a book chapter. Therefore, only the main actors and debates of the period will be summarized here. Three main currents can be said to have been dominant among the left in Iran during this period. First were the Marxist-Leninist guerrilla movements. After the White Revolution in 1963 in particular, increased police repression of political opposition pushed young people to go beyond the traditional forms of opposition. During this period, the youth began to translate the books of Che Guevara and Frantz Fanon, and learn from the recent experiences of China, Vietnam, Cuba, and Algeria. They then carried out a series of armed actions. Although these movements faced serious reactions from the regime, they did manage to remain active at various levels until the Iranian Revolution in 1979. The strongest representative of these was the Organization of Iranian People's Fedai Guerrillas, or the Sazman-e Cherik-ha-ye Feda'-ye Khalq-e Iran (Fadaiyan-e-Khalq). This group was also known as the Marxist Fedayeen.

Second were the Maoist organizations. These organizations were diverse, and hence are difficult to categorize. Although some of them used guerrilla warfare techniques against the Shah regime, the main point that distinguished them from the Marxist-Leninist guerrilla movement was that they sided with China when the Sino-Soviet dispute split the ranks of international socialism. These Maoist groups played an important role in Iranian politics between 1960 and 1979. I will briefly discuss two of them: the Revolutionary Organisation of the Tudeh Party of Iran or Sazman-e Enqelabi-ye Hezb-e Tudeh-ye Iran (ROTPI) and the Organization of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, or Peykar der Rah-Azadiyi Tabakayı Karger (abbreviated as Peykar [Struggle]).

Third were the Islamic leftists. Although this group was partially influenced by the popular ideology of the time of Third Worldism, it was largely local. This ideology also played an important role in Iranian politics during this period. Beyond their own influence, Islamic leftists provided both ideological and discursive support to the Iranian Revolution. I will discuss the most important of these groups, the People's Mujahedin Organization of Iran, or the Mujahedin-e Khalq.

Guerrilla movements among the Iranian left

The Organization of Iranian People's Fedai Guerrillas, or Fedayeen, was established in 1971. Its founders came from various backgrounds, including the Tudeh Party and the National Front. Ideologically, the group embraced armed propaganda as a method against the Iranian regime. From its very beginning, the group had been inspired by the Latin American guerrilla movements, as well as the experiences of the struggles in China, Vietnam, and Algeria.

The group criticized both the Tudeh Party and the National Front on the grounds that they were ineffective. They dismissed the National Front as a "petty bourgeois" and "anachronistic" paper organization still preaching the "false hope of free elections;" they also accused Tudeh of "blindly following" the the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and of underestimating the "nationality problem especially in Azerbaijan and Kurdestan" (Abrahamian, 1985, p. 157). More importantly, they asserted that the Tudeh Party's peaceful political methods of infiltrating government unions, organizing strikes in factories, and distributing anti-regime pamphlets did not work. The Shah regime could not be brought down by denouncing violence (Zabih, 1986, p. 125). As part of their armed resistance strategy, they organized a guerrilla operation against

the Iranian military. Their militants attacked a gendarmerie post in Siahkal, Gilan and killed three gendarmeries. This attack, known as the Siahkal Incident, marked a new era in Iranian leftist politics. It was a failure in the sense that most of their militants involved in the attack were caught and killed, but it signaled the beginning of a new militant anti-Shah opposition, the Iranian guerrilla movement. Soon after the Siahkal Incident, various leftist groups in Iran took up armed opposition (Behrooz, 1999, p. 52).

The Shah regime's response to the Siahkal Incident was twofold. On one hand, it managed to arrest and kill almost all founding members of the organization. The organization lost many dedicated and experienced members because of these state operations. On the other hand, the regime also waged a propaganda war against the socialist opposition. The regime accused the Fedayeen of being atheistic terrorists, agents of the Tudeh Party, and tools for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Baghdad, and Arab imperialism. Such propaganda was successful to an extent, yet the organization managed to survive. It found new recruits and carried out a new series of operations. They attacked police headquarters and assassinated an industrial businessman and a military prosecutor. They also bombed the embassies of Oman, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Abrahamian, 1985).

The Fedayeen was the most powerful guerrilla organization in Iran between 1971 and 1979. It inspired many political groups, including Marxists and Islamists, both theoretically and operationally. One of the members of the People's Mujahedin Organization of Iran described the impact of the Fedayeen as follows:

> in 1971, the Siyahkal guerrillas went into operation. This event forced the Mujahedeen, in 1971, into action and to introduce themselves to society against their will and before they were ready. If [the Mujahedeen] had not come into action, the People's Fedayi would have been left as the sole vanguard organisation.
>
> *(Behrooz, 1999, p. 61)*

The organization was divided in 1980. The minority faction opposed Khomeini and considered his supporters to be reactionary. It also condemned the Tudeh Party, which was working cooperatively with the Islamist regime. The majority faction established closer links with the Tudeh Party and supported the regime, believing it to be anti-imperialist. Their support for the regime continued until 1982, when the government turned against them (Alaolmolki, 1987, p. 224).

Maoist groups on the Iranian left

The first Maoist organization in Iranian politics was established in 1964 when a group from the Tudeh Party criticized the party leadership and announced that they had adopted a Maoist political line. This group, which later took the name of the Revolutionary Organization of the Tudeh Party (ROTPI), largely consisted of members from the Western European Iranian Students Confederation, where Tudeh Party sympathizers constituted the majority.[3] It was one of the biggest divides along party lines and resulted in most of the Tudeh Party's European cadre joining this new organization. This split had both international and domestic causes. Among the domestic causes, the most serious was the Tudeh Party's performance in the early 1950s. Young members of the party were especially disillusioned by the party's stance during the 1953 coup. This group cited the Tudeh Party's persistent subordination to the USSR as the main reason for its passiveness during the coup (Vaghafi, 2016). In place of the Soviet Revolution of 1917, the Chinese Revolution had come to be the quintessential example of the anti-imperialist struggle. The ROTPI not only had an ideological closeness to the People's Republic of China

(PRC), but had also developed close political relations. It sent militants to the PRC for political and military training, as well as receiving $20,000 annually from the PRC (Behrooz, 1999, p. 88). Despite all its international ties, however, the organization could not be popularized inside Iran. Members sent from Europe to the country to establish an operational base were quickly discovered. They could not find an opportunity to develop the organization and gain mass support. By the early 1970s, the organization had largely been dissolved.

Despite the failure of the Iranian ROTPI, Maoism grew in popularity in Iran in the 1970s (Matin-Asgari, 2014). During this period, new Maoist organizations entered the Iranian political scene. The most important of these was the Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, or Peykar, which split off from the People's Mujahedin Organization of Iran. In the mid-1970s, this group criticized the Islamist-socialist line of the Mujahedin and declared that it was adopting the Marxist-Leninist line. It became one of the most important organizations of the Iranian left over time, and carried out several assassinations, mostly of U.S. military personnel inside Iran. Peykar's foreign policy discourse was strictly in line with the foreign policy of the PRC, as was that of the ROTPI. However, unlike the ROTPI, Peykar's relations with the PRC remained at a more ideological level, and the organization did not enter organic relations with the PRC like its predecessor had. The group played an active role in the revolutionary period and afterwards. With the exception of a brief period in early 1980s, it did not support the Islamist regime. Peykar remained active until the mid-1980s.

The Islamic left in Iran

Another important debate within the Iranian left during this period was the debate about Islam and socialism. This debate particularly affected the political movements of the 1970s, with a two-sided influence. On one hand, various leftist organizations used Islamic themes, while on the other hand, the clergy – including Khomeini – added various leftist themes to their discourses. This hybrid discourse uniting the left and Islam played an important role in the success of the Iranian Revolution in 1979.

Movements that adopted this hybrid discourse had been present at every stage of Iranian politics in the 20th century. For example, as discussed previously, the Jangali movement allied itself with the ICP. This movement had both Islamic and socialist emphases. Movements such as the National Front [Jebhe-ye Melli] of Muhammed Mossadegh had also used socialist and Islamic discourses from time to time. However, the main organization representing the unity of Islam and socialism in Iranian politics in this period was the People's Mujahedin Organization of Iran or the Mujahedin-e Khalq (abbreviated as MKO). The main intellectual who was able to influence the masses in this direction was Ali Shariati.

The MKO was founded in 1965 by leftist Iranian students who were affiliated with the Liberation Movement. Most of the early leaders of the MKO were university-educated middle-class youth hailing from religious families. Their main target was to end the foreign control over Iran and suspend America's support for the Iranian regime. After the 1953 coup in particular, the United States had become the main foreign supporter of the Pahlavi regime. Hence, to undermine the power of the Shah, the MKO decided to target U.S. personnel in Iran. The MKO used terrorism as its main method of political activism. In the 1970s, it murdered several U.S. personnel, as well as military and civilian contractors.

As discussed previously, the MKO had undergone a schism by the mid-1970s. The newly emerged Marxist-Leninist group had denounced Islam and adopted a more secular ideology. This infighting within the organization eroded the MKO's political power. This was also

followed by a series of police operations. During this era, security services imprisoned and executed a large number of MKO activists. These two blows in the 1970s practically wiped the organization out, although a small group under the leadership of Massoud Rajavi survived and expanded its ranks in prison. This group later re-emerged after the Iranian Revolution (Abrahamian, 1989).

From the very beginning, the MKO's intellectual background was a combination of Marxist ideology and Islam. To understand their ideology, one can look at the study lists that were given to party members. According to Javadzadeh (2007, p. 149), party members studied both Marxist and Islamic classics together, including an amalgam of Marxist books by Mao, Lenin, Che Guevara, Frantz Fanon, and Regis Debray, among others, together with the Koran, Ali's Nahj al-Balagha, and other religious texts.

In addition to the authors of these works, the single most important intellectual that affected MKO members was Ali Shariati. Shariati developed a new interpretation of Islam, reformulating Shia Islam into a revolutionary ideology. Shariati claimed Islam to be a dynamic ideology aiming to transform the *ummah* [Muslim community] into a classless society. By the same token, Islamic concepts such as *tawhid* and jihad were to be understood as representations of political stances, with *tawhid* corresponding to social solidarity and jihad to liberation struggle. Furthermore, religious figures were to be understood as political actors. Ali and Hussein were not only religious men; they were also revolutionary heroes. They exemplified Muslims' right to resist. The War of Karbala to them was the quintessential metaphor of the revolutionary struggle between the oppressed and the oppressors (Ostovar, 2009).

Shariati's interpretation of Islam and politics greatly inspired the Iranian masses during the 1960s and 1970s. He was certainly the most popular intellectual of the era. His talks were widely circulated, and his books widely distributed. His slogans were shouted at demonstrations during the revolutionary period. He was imprisoned several times in the 1970s and finally released in 1976. He then went to Europe, where he was murdered by SAVAK, the Iranian intelligence service, in 1977. Although he was dead before the Revolution, according to Abrahamian (1982, p. 28), "His ideas were far better known than those of Ayatollah Khomeini. Shari'ati, therefore, [he] can truly be characterized as the ideologue of the Islamic Revolution."

The Iranian left after 1979: what happened?

The role of the left in the Iranian Revolution in 1979 has been widely debated over the last 40 years. Most of the works on this issue argue that the left played a significant and determining role in the Revolution. An important part of Iranian society joined the Revolution with a socialist perspective. The strong leftist sentiments were apparent in the slogans of the revolutionary era. Anti-imperialism, and rejecting the exploitation of man by man and dependency on capitalism, were the main themes that dominated this era. Armed militants of leftist organizations, especially the Fedayeen and Mujahedin, played a major and active role by attacking regime strongholds during the Revolution. Non-armed groups like the Tudeh Party organized strikes among oil workers, which limited the regime's access to revenues. These activities also rapidly diminished state power and weakened the regime's capacity to survive. This significant role the leftists played during the Revolution raises the question of the responsibility of the left in establishing the Islamic Republic. Why did the left fail in Iran? What factors had contributed to establishing a "dictatorship of the mullatariat" (Abrahamian, 2004, p. 272) instead of the "dictatorship of the proletariat"? These have been the most popular questions for the political historians of the era.

This section discusses the main factors behind the failure of the left in the post-1979 era. It also surveys the historical trajectory of post-revolutionary political developments, with a brief focus on leftist organizations.

The failure

Historians of the Iranian Revolution usually fail to note that it was not an Islamic revolution from the beginning. The Iranian masses were united by their hatred for the Shah, whose policies had adversely affected different segments of the society. The Revolution occurred because a broad coalition of different segments of society had come together to overthrow a despotic regime. In this era, the denunciation of the old regime was more important than the exaltation of Khomeini. "For every slogan for Khomeini, there were probably more than two slogans against the Shah" (Arjomand, 1988, p. 103).

However, this coalition between the left and the clergy had been unbalanced from the beginning. Nearly all leftist political organizations had suffered a major blow as a result of their struggle with the Shah regime. The Shah was particularly harsh to the left, which he saw as a threat to his rule. "Whereas the clergy were permitted to go to the poor, the opposition parties were constantly prevented from establishing any form of labor union, local club, or neighborhood organization" (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 536). As a result of the Shah's repressive policies, both the Tudeh Party and the Fedayeen, Mujahedin, and Maoist organizations were unable to build the social bases or resources they required. Moghadam and Ashtiani (1991) gave a brief review of the Iranian left during this era. They interviewed important figures from the Iranian left and found that on the eve of the Revolution, most of the high-level individuals within the Iranian left were either in exile or in prison. A Peykar leader told them that the organization had only 50 members in 1977, while a Fedayeen activist estimated that, at that time, they only had 25 active members. However, this does not mean the left had not been a significant political force in 1979. In the revolutionary era between 1977 and 1979, the left expanded as it never had before. It managed to attract large numbers of intellectuals and young people. By 1979, it had already emerged as a mass force. This rapid expansion was very much tied to the specific conditions of the revolutionary era. It was not a result of years of political organizing and mobilizing. Hence, the leftist movements mostly lacked long-term programs and perspectives. As a result of this sudden expansion, the organizational structure and functions of the left became incapacitated. This made the left weaker compared to the organized Islamist movement.

This unbalanced coalition between the different opposition segments of Iranian society weakened over time. The first major turning point in 1979 was related to the regime type. When the idea of an Islamic government based on Ayatollah Khomeini's *vilayat-e faqih* was proposed in 1979, the first split within this coalition occurred. The leftists, secular nationalists, and moderate members of the clergy all resisted this proposal. In 1979, a left-leaning organization, the Democratic National Front, tried to form a group to fight against pro-Khomeini forces, but this attempt failed after the U.S. Embassy hostage crisis of November 1979. This crisis allowed the Khomeini front to mobilize the masses in the name of anti-imperialism and outwit the left. Most of those who had strong reservations about Khomeini's ideas abandoned their reservations and rallied behind the government in the name of anti-imperialism. The war with Iraq, like the hostage crisis, also provided the regime with the opportunity to mobilize Iranians in the name of patriotism.

These events also created a split within the left. The Fedayeen and the Tudeh Party continued to support Khomeini in the name of anti-imperialism. On the other hand, the Mujahedin

and Peykar went underground and fought the new Islamic government. This created a violent civil war between the Islamist regime and the oppositional left. The Islamic Republic did not hesitate to unleash a reign of terror. Especially after the Hafte Tir bombing of June 1981 in which the Mujahedin assassinated 73 prominent figures of the regime in the headquarters of the Islamic Republic Party (IRP) in Tehran, this reign of terror intensified. In retaliation for the bombing, the Islamic regime further increased political executions. The Iranian government executed 497 political opponents between February 1979 and June 1981. In the next four years, from June 1981 until June 1985, revolutionary courts executed more than 8,000 opponents (Abrahamian, 2008, p. 181). Although the target of these executions were mainly the Mujahedin militants, the victims were not limited to them. They included Fedayeen and Tudeh Party supporters, as well as liberal nationalists like members of the National Front. Many Tudeh leaders were forced to appear on television and recant their previous views. Like many others, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 had, as stated in the famous dictum from the French Revolution, "devoured its own children."

Conclusion

This chapter has provided a review of the history of the Iranian left in 20th-century Iran. Following a chronological narrative, this chapter has identified and discussed the major debates and groups within this historical trajectory.

Since the period analyzed in this chapter, Iran has undergone major political and social transformations. The Islamic regime has gradually consolidated itself. The 1980s became a decade of violent repression for the secular Iranian left. Members and supporters of the secular left were either arrested, executed, or forced to exile. They mainly relocated to Europe and the United States. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc in the 1990s, most of these groups were dissolved. Those that remained active turned into small intellectual circles. They mostly continued with theoretical works and publication activities among the Iranian diaspora (Matin-Asgari, 2004). However, a substantial fraction of the Islamist left, apart from the Mujahedin, have survived. They pledged loyalty and exerted some influence within the Iranian regime during the 1980s. With time, most of them gradually changed their radical positions and adopted a more reformist stance. They again played a substantial role in the Reform Movement of the late 1990s. The Mujahidin underwent a drastic transformation. They first founded a safe base in Iraq under the protection of Saddam Hussein. There, they developed a leadership cult centered on Massoud Rajavi. Their authoritarian tendencies, as well as their cooperation with the Iraqi government, led to a sharp decrease in their popularity within Iran, as well as isolation from the diaspora. Following the U.S. occupation of Iraq, they were forced out of Iraq. With the help of the United Nations Refugee agency, they were relocated to Albania.

To conclude, this chapter briefly addresses two challenges that prospective histories of the Iranian left may face. First, as discussed in the chapter's introduction, one must bear in mind that the political history of Iran is very likely to remain over-politicized when compared to its Western counterparts. Together with studies covering the issues of ethnicity and religion-state relations, the history of the left is overly politicized in the Iranian context. Comparative works with the potential to go beyond this over-politicization are important to note, so further emphasis may be given to comparative political histories. Comparing the historical experiences of the Iranian left with similar histories such as those of Turkey and Egypt can significantly contribute to our knowledge of the political history of the Middle East.

Second, most of the works on Iranian political history have confined their discussions entirely to the Iranian context. However, even a basic look at this history shows the key features of Iranian politics to have been deeply influenced by the international environment. The Iranian left was obviously affected by the developments in the international communist movement during the 20th century. From the very beginning, the impact of the Bolshevik Revolution, Maoism, and Latin American guerrilla movements influenced the Iranian left to varying extents. Prospective studies should recognize that international processes had not only influenced Iran's foreign affairs, but also shaped and structured its very national and seemingly isolated developments. Future political histories of the Iranian left would benefit much from such international insight.

Notes

1 The Jangalis were a nationalist group with strong pan-Islamist elements. Hence, this cooperation can be seen as the first instance of Marxist-Muslim cooperation in Iranian history.
2 These two parties remained separated until they remerged in the 1960s.
3 Nearly half of Iran's university students were in either Western Europe or the United States during the 1960s.

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20

THE PLACE OF SOCIALISM IN MUSLIM THOUGHT IN SOUTH ASIA

Muhammad Reza Kazimi

Introduction

The rapacity of the English East India Company was basically what had made the people of South Asia receptive to socialism. The East India Company had caused a famine in Bengal through its depredations and, as such, capitalism lacked appeal as a system. Indeed, awareness that capitalism was a distinct economic system was slow to evolve, as the Indian economy was basically rural. It had been self-sufficient in terms of food ever since Sultan Feroz Shah Tughluq laid down a canal system in the Punjab region. India produced the finest cotton, Dacca muslin being the finest in the world, and Mysore had begun silk farming and weaving at the initiative of Tipu Sultan; thus, it had all agriculture-based industries. As a result, the milieu was quite feudal where (as in England) the trader, despite being richer, was socially inferior.

The East India Company destroyed both agriculture and industry by forcing farmers to cultivate indigo rather than food crops; it then went about systematically ruining industry by cutting artisans' thumbs off. The East India Company also destroyed the educational system. Madrasas in Mughal times had made vocational education compulsory. This prevented the ulama from being forced to adopt the imamate of a mosque or become a muezzin as a profession so as to seek their livelihood elsewhere, from book-binding to carpentry, as well as leather foot ware, which was taboo for some Hindu castes. When the Madrasa re-asserted itself during the colonial period, this facility, or this faculty, had lapsed.

Thus, when trying to recount how Muslims in South Asia had coped with socialism, the inquiry must be separated into three categories: socialism as a political concept, socialism as a literary ideal, and socialism as the ideology of student bodies. Since Sultan Iltutmish had appointed a Sheikh-ul-Islam to oversee matters pertaining to religion, a practical difference between empire and church beginning to take root needs to be remembered. The reformers under the Mughals, such as Mujadid Alf Thani (1564–1624) and Shah Waliullah (1703–1762), appeared as more eclectic reformers, prescribing puritanism as a means of reforming the economy.

What made South Asian Muslims receptive to socialism was, in fact, religion. When seeking guidance from the Holy Quran, no political system, monarchical, presidential, or parliamentary system is seen to be prescribed. In terms of economic matters, quite the opposite is found. Usury, gambling, hoarding, and cheating on weights and measures are clearly prohibited. This

made Muslims consider socialism economically as a system, apart from its political and ideological content.

The East India Company had created the conditions, and Karl Marx commented upon its effects on the Indian economy in two articles.

> It was the British intruder who broke up the Indian handloom and destroyed the spinning wheel. England began by driving the Indian cottons from the European market; it then introduced twist into Hindostan and in the end inundated the mother country of cotton with others' cotton. From 1818 to 1836 the export of twist from Great Britain to India rose in the proportion of 1 to 5,200. In 1824 the export of British muslins to India had hardly amounted to 1,000,000 yards, while in 1837 it surpassed 64,000,000 yards. But at the same time, the population of Dacca decreased from 150,000 inhabitants to 20,000. This decline of Indian towns celebrated for their fabrics was by no means the worst consequence. British steam and science uprooted, over the whole surface of Hindostan the union between agriculture and manufacturing industry.
>
> *(Marx, 1853a)*

However, the conclusion drawn by Karl Marx is the most operative part of his discourse:

> England, it is true, in causing a social revolution in Hindostan, was actuated only by the vilest interests, and was stupid in her manner of enforcing them. But that is not the question. The question is, can mankind fulfil its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia? If not, whatever may have been the crimes of England, she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about that Revolution.
>
> *(Marx, 1853a)*

In a follow-up article, Karl Marx emphasized how the social structure of India stood to benefit from British innovations such as the railway:

> It is notorious that the productive powers of India are paralyzed by the utter want of the means for conveying and exchanging its various produce. Nowhere, more than in India, do we meet with social destitution in the midst of natural plenty, for want of the means of exchange. . . . The village isolation produced the absence of roads in India, and the absence of roads perpetuated the village isolation. . . . All the English bourgeoisie may be forced to do will neither emancipate nor materially mend the social condition of the mass of the people, depending not only on the development of the productive powers, but on their appropriation by the people. But what they will not fail to do is to lay down the material premises for both.
>
> *(Marx, 1853b)*

In 1857, less than five years later, India erupted. The insurrection was put down because the British controlled the seas, the ports, the railways, and the telegraphs. The Indians who had risen up had neglected to cut the telegraph wires, which proved one of their handicaps. After 1858, military resistance took a back seat to political resistance. The resistance created space for socialism. The Muslim response to socialism must be categorized because of their differing levels of effects under the headings of political responses, literary responses, and student responses, because student bodies were found to be more radical than the political response and both were being fed by the literary response.

Political response

Naturally, with British rule came British education, and with British education came European political thought. The first phase can be discerned between the conflagration of 1857 and the Russian Revolution of 1917. Despite Karl Marx's remarks on religion, in which he listed its moral effects and called it the opium of the masses, socialism should be noted to have not been considered so much a challenge as an opportunity in the initial phase. Only after the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) had re-established its hold over the Central Asian Muslim states, which had previously been under the yoke of the Czarist regime, would its ideology be viewed with hostility. Evidence is found showing socialism to have permeated political consciousness before the Russian Revolution. The publication of Mushir Hosain Kidwai's (1913) *Islam and Socialism* is one indicator.

Because this was a pioneering work that reduced notions into well-defined concepts, it is an important step towards explaining how Muslims had engaged with the idea of socialism. Kidwai (1913) traced the origins of socialism to the slogans from the French Revolution of 1789 of liberty, equality, and fraternity, and applied them to both Islam and socialism. Equating the egalitarianism of Islam to socialism, he drew upon the Holy Quran and Hadith to show socialism to be inherent in the message of Islam. A quintessential passage from this work follows:

> The policy of the great Legislator was to divide wealth and property in the country as evenly as possible and thus create equality between all citizens in social status and to afford to all equal opportunities. With this objective in view, Islam also made it legally incumbent upon the rich to give over to the national fund or to deserving people at least 1/40th part of their annual income. Socialism in Islam has gone even to this extent that when a man leaves his field fallow for some time his neighbour acquires a right to cultivate it as public property. On the principle that all human beings are brothers and should help each other in need, Islam interdicted usury or interest of any kind. This interdiction stimulates the spirit of commerce, industry, labour and thrift, discourages the hoarding of money in banks and makes the existence of Shylocks, which has always been baneful to the happiness of society, an impossibility.
>
> *(Kidwai, 1913, p. 23)*

By the time World War I had apparently drawn to a close, the promises the British had made with regard to the caliphate, especially to Indian Muslims, were quite clearly not going to be kept. This gave rise to the Hijrat Movement. They migrated to Afghanistan, and many crossed the border to enter Soviet territory. Here is where Muslims came into contact with the Russians and since the triumph of the Bolsheviks in 1917 had been exposed to their creed. Two brothers, Abdul Jabbar Khairi (d. 1955) and Abdul Sattar Khairi (d. 1944), addressed the Socialist International at Stockholm in 1917, and in the following year, they addressed the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Moscow on November 25, 1918, pleading for "Russia to hold out to us the hand of help that we gain freedom" (Ansari, 2015, p. 22) by dividing India into Muslim and Hindu majority areas. Maulana Azad Subhani (1873–1957) went so far as to say that in India itself, "Bolshevism and Islam were one and the same thing and that it was fortunate for Islam that the Bolshevist Movement existed" (Ansari, 2015, p. 57). That Muslim socialists ignored the incompatibility between atheism and Islam was quite understandable under the circumstances. Not only was it tactical in nature, it was also supported. Khizar Humayun Ansari (2015, p. 48) cited a 1919 British Intelligence Report to the effect that Bolsheviks had been trying to prove that "Bolshevism was not contrary to the teachings of the Quran."

The Hijrat Movement and the sympathy King Amanullah of Afghanistan had for the *immigrants* with a view to containing British influence led to their being able to communicate with the Soviet Union and its Communist Party. In particular, Abdul Rab Peshawari's visit to Moscow paved the way for later contact between the Indian immigrants and the Bolsheviks. In some instances, some freedom fighters like Maulana Barkatullah Bhopali were able to advance the cause of Indian liberation from outside Indian soil. What impelled Barkatullah Bhopali to seek liberation was mainly the famine that had been caused by the British in which 20 million people had died. Bhopali's list of grievances show that direct rule of the crown had not ended exploitation, and the situation was not much different from what Karl Marx had described in 1853. Bhopali's main complaint was with regard to unequal trade. Unilateral customs duties existed of 70–80% on goods imported from India, with few or no customs duties occurred on British exports to India. Not only did this undercut the price of Indian manufactured goods, it enabled Europeans to re-export Indian goods at higher prices. Bhopali complained that Indian resources were being utilized to repay loans to millionaires and provide pensions to the British (Rizvi, 2007, p. 54).

What made Bhopali reach out to the Bolsheviks was that, although he was very well received by Vladimir Lenin, he told *Isvestia* that he was neither a communist nor a socialist, and that the sole purpose of his life was to eject the British from India (Rizvi, 2007, p. 200).

Other staunch Muslims were found alongside them, but it was not made clear whether or not they felt attracted to socialism because of its egalitarianism which they thought to be closer to Islam than the capitalism that had enslaved them. Ubaydullah Sindhi (1872–1944) was quite convinced that merely adapting socialism would not be the answer (Ahmad, 1967, p. 198). Ubaydullah Sindhi appears to be the only anti-British freedom fighter to warn that adapting the communist ideology would not provide salvation except as a strategic counterpoise to colonization.

This was an important development. Converts to a system are mostly isolated. Only such Muslims sympathetic to ideologies could create space for socialism and communism in the hearts of Muslims. Overlapping these developments were the two poet politicians Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938) and Maulana Hasrat Mohani (1881–1951). Indeed, Barkatullah Bhopali had been inspired by Hasrat Mohani and had contributed to the latter's journal *Urdu-i-Mualla*.

Iqbal had the greater influence because he had the greater engagement. While Iqbal was in complete agreement with the economic principles of socialism, the atheism inherent in the communist ideology was not something he could just shrug away. As far as capitalism was concerned, Iqbal, in his "Saqi Nama," clearly stated (Iqbal, 1999, p. 451):

> The old order is fallen and trampled
> The world is weary of lords and kings
> The era of Capitalism has gone,
> The juggler after his performance has gone.

In another long poem, "Khizr-i-Rah," Iqbal writes:

> By his cunning the capitalist has succeeded
> Because of his extreme simplicity, the worker has lost
> *(Iqbal, 1999, p. 293)*

Then there are those poems from Iqbal that have explicit communist themes. The first such poem is from *Bal-i-Jibril* called "Lenin in the Presence of God." In the opening lines of this

poem, Lenin concedes the signs of the existence and eternalness of God to be manifest. But then he offers an excuse: "How could I understand whether or not You existed as philosophical views kept on changing?" It is toward the end of this poem that Lenin complains:

> This erudition, this wisdom, this statecraft, this polity
> They drink blood but preach the equality of men
> You are almighty and just but in Your world
> The laborer's travails are very bitter
> *(Iqbal, 1999, pp. 111–112)*

Iqbal seeks sentimentally in order to reconcile social justice with theism. In *Zarb-i-Kaleem*, two poems are found together, the first called "Communism" and the second "Karl Marx's Voice." In "Communism," Iqbal writes:

> From the manner of nations I have come to learn
> The march of Russia is not without gain
> Go deep in the Quran o Muslim
> May God grant you some freshness of outlook.
> *(Iqbal, 1999, p. 648)*

What Iqbal appears to be saying here is that, while Communism is just a desert compared to unbridled capitalism, without spiritual fulfilment, it is un-satisfying.

> This checkmating of knowledge and wisdom, this display of argument
> The world does not care for the display of outmoded thoughts
> O doctor of economy, after all what is in your books
> The display of curves and angularity
> In the temples, churches, and schools of the West
> The depredations of ambition hide the machinations of an evil mind
> *(Iqbal, 1999, p. 649)*

Are these the actual representations of Karl Marx? They are a symbolic representation. What Marx had said is worth recalling at this point:

> Religious suffering is, at one and the same time, the expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of the heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the masses.
> *(Marx, 1970)*

It is by detaching the last line from the preceding lines that a war between faith and want broke out. Iqbal wrote in his prose summary to Sir Francis Younghusband, "Since Bolshevism plus God is almost identical with Islam" (Personal correspondence in *Civil and Military Gazette*, 1931, July 30).

Perhaps this formulation from Iqbal had encouraged a religious scholar to stress Islamic socialism as a solution. Hifz -al-Rahman Siharwi (1901–1962) formulated this as:

> Islamic socialism is a pincer movement of hard self-denying generosity by the rich and ceaseless effort and work by the poor to bridge the gulf which divides the classes. . . . Industry can be privately owned, but the economic relationship between the Capitalist

> and the working classes should be firmly controlled by the state to eliminate all chances of exploitation and to ensure labor welfare.
>
> *(Ahmad, 1967, p. 203)*

This remark from Carlo Coppola (2017, p. 17) is worth recalling here: "Iqbal appeals to the world's workers to unite in rejecting the soporific glitter of the West, which he equates with Capitalism, and accept the responsibility of guiding the East to its own destiny." When Iqbal engaged with Bolshevism and Hasrat Mohani engaged with communism, they found more receptivity as poets than they would have otherwise. Abdul Shakur, in his Introduction to *Kulliyat-i-Hasrat Mohani* [*The Complete Works of Hasrat Mohani*], writes that the 1925 Cawnpore Communist Party of India Conference had been held due to the efforts of Hasrat Mohani.

Hasrat Mohani's prescription for dealing with the atheism of the communist ideology was simple. He did not feel the need to engage with atheism as Iqbal had.

> Some of our Muslim leaders needlessly say that Communism is contrary to Islam, although the opposite is the reality. For example, the edict of Islam against Capitalism is even more severe than the Communist persuasion, and the obligation of Zakat is for this purpose, that if among the creatures of God, if even one person remains hungry, till that time a rich man has no right to a luxurious life.
>
> *(Shakur, 1964, p. 22)*

Professor Mujtaba Husain, who had seen Hasrat Mohani up close, cited the following verse to show how deep had been Hasrat's faith in communism:

> It is determined that we shall see the Soviet constitution adopted here
> If not in one or two years then in ten or twenty years.
>
> *(Husain, 1959, p. 226)*

The example from Hasrat is there to show socialism can be found in the unlikeliest of persons. A legal luminary, Sir Sultan Ahmed (1880–1963), Law Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, presented a treatise in 1944 titled *A Treaty between India and the United Kingdom* (Ahmed, 1944), wherein he advocated socialism as a solution to the world's economic problems and, even more so, buttressed his argument by giving the example of the Soviet Union.

In the same year (1944), Mohammad Ali Jinnah voiced his preference for socialism. To a representative from the American Press Association, Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah defined Pakistan in the following terms. Pakistan would consist of six provinces: "Sindh, Punjab, N.W.F.P. [North-West Frontier Province], Balochistan, Bengal and Assam. *Politically, Pakistan would be a democracy. Economically, Mr. Jinnah personally hoped that industries and services would be socialized*" (Ahmad, 1976, p. 231, emphasis added).

Jinnah should be noted to have been voicing his personal preference. Regarding the nature of the constitution, he had also said that it would be framed by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, not by him in his capacity as Founder or Governor General. As Governor General Mohammad Ali Jinnah said, speaking at Chittagong on March 26, 1948:

> You are only voicing my sentiments and the sentiments of millions of Musalmans when you say that Pakistan should be based on sure foundations of social justice and Islamic socialism which emphasizes equality and brotherhood of man.
>
> *(Jinnah, 2000, p. 166)*

There the expression was out; what Islamic socialism was needed to be explained. For the moment, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was seen to be more empathetic. Addressing a mass meeting in Lahore in August 1949, the first Prime Minister said:

> For us there is only one "ism" – Islamic socialism, which in a nutshell means that every person in this land has equal rights to be provided with food, shelter, clothing, education, and medical facilities. Countries which cannot ensure these for their people can never progress. The economic program drawn up some 1,350 years back is still the best for us.
>
> *(Symonds, 1989, p. 182)*

The Raja of Mahmudabad (1914–1973), addressing the audience at Katrak Hall, argued forcefully for Islamic socialism in 1967. He was the only high-ranking leader of the Pakistan Movement to favor an Islamic state in Pakistan. Twenty years later, he favored the concept of Islamic socialism (Siddiqui, 1998, p. 18). Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah, the leader's sister, also subscribed to Islamic socialism (Khan, 1976, pp. 25–26).

Were the leaders of the Pakistan Movement committed to a hybrid notion, or to an ideological compromise? Apart from having an impeccable Middle East pedigree, this concept had its origin in the so-called fundamentalist scholars: Syed Qutb Shaheed said in 1948 that Islamic socialism avoided both the pitfalls of Christianity's separation of religion and society and those of communist atheism (Esposito, 2002, p. 57).

Underscoring the commitment of Pakistan's leaders, Dr. Khalifa Abdul Hakim (1893–1959) attempted to buttress it doctrinally:

> The record of its civilization bears witness to the capability of evolving a golden mean. If Marxism is the anti- thesis of the Capitalist thesis, then Islam stands in relation to both as the dialectical synthesis.
>
> *(Ahmad, 1967, p. 206)*

On this, Aziz Ahmad (1967, p. 106) inquired, "If this synthesis is Islamic socialism, what then is the premise of its sociological development?" He considered Khalifa Abdul Hakim's answer of *taqdir* [fate] to be inadequate. Still, because the Communist Party of India had initially supported the Pakistan Movement on the basis of the principle of self-determination, it had a worse time in India than in Pakistan.

Another academic contribution was made by Syed Shahabuddin Ahmad. Ideologically, he was quite hostile to the Communist ideologues but insistent that Islam provided a socialism of its own. His contention partly parallels, but does not draw upon Mushir Hosain Kidwai's book: "The intellectual trio of Marx, Hegel, and Lenin built up a ventilator-less house . . . liberty was a word of the fable" (Ahmad, 1952, p. 73). Sir Syed Ahmad stressed the humanist angle more than he did the ideological angle: "Islam unlike Communism does not send the rich to the gallows simply because they are rich. The entire social structure of Islam is based on human equality in every walk of life" (Ahmad, 1952, p. 73).

In March 1948, the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru banned the Communist Party of India (Ahmar, 1991, p. 102). This party had supported partition on the principle of self-determination and was consequently punished. On April 12, 1948, the Pakistan Cabinet under Liaqaut Ali Khan rejected a proposal to ban the Communist Party of Pakistan (*Dawn*, 1948). Apparently, the Indian ban was brief because the Communist Party of India met in Calcutta and decided to send Syed Sajjad Zaheer to Pakistan to organize a Communist Party there.

The disquieting term of Islamic socialism remained intriguing. An American audience wanted to know the meaning of this term. Liaquat Ali Khan replied:

> I can do it in one sentence. A man goes out to distribute charity in the street and finds no one to receive charity. . . . Islam believes in the right of private ownership and individual enterprise, but it does not encourage the concentration of unearned wealth in the hands of the few.
>
> *(Afzal, 1967, p. 374)*

Although the Communist Party of Pakistan, as well as the Progressive Writers Association, had come under stress due to the Rawalpindi Conspiracy of 1951, it was not until 1954, much after Liaquat's assassination on October 16, 1951, that the Communist Party of Pakistan was banned. Why the Communist Party of Pakistan had tried through the Rawalpindi Conspiracy to overthrow the civilian government and install a military regime remained a puzzle to one of the defendants, Zafar Ullah Poshni:

> The Left is innately suspicious of the army, whom it regards as conservative if not right-wing organization. It is, therefore, a mystery why the Communist Party of Pakistan decided to support Major General Akbar Khan and his military group in their plan to stage a coup d'état.
>
> *(Poshni, 2019, p. xv)*

The coup attempt was a precursor of many developments to come, but ideologically, it was only a diversion. Islamic socialism remained the state policy under Liaquat. Some suffixes are valid, while other suffixes are not. Islamic sculpture would become invalid, but Islamic banking became an accepted and current term. Despite Islamic socialism being championed by the founders of Pakistan, this concept was never sought to be popularized and, during the decade of Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan's (1908–1974) military rule (1958–1969), it disappeared from Pakistan's political vocabulary. It resurfaced in 1967 when Maulana Abdul Hameed Khan Bhashani (1885–1976) in the Eastern wing and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1928–1979) in the Western wing made the term a part of their vocabulary. Once in early 1969 at Dhaka, former Secretary of the United Bengal Muslim League Abul Hashim asked Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in my presence: "What is Islamic socialism?" Z. A. Bhutto replied, "Islamic socialism is that part of socialism which is not inconsistent with Islam." From being a doctrinal term earlier, Islamic socialism had become a counter in practical politics.

In a May 1968 speech to the Pakistan Management Association, the eminent economist Dr Mahbubul Haq stated, "The wealth of Pakistan is held by 22 families" (*Pakistan Observer*, 1968). This revealed that, as the decade of Ayub Khan's rule began, while all the economic indicators were positive, all the political indicators were negative. When the Pakistan People's Party first came into power after Pakistan was partitioned on December 16, 1971, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto undertook the nationalization of industries, banks, insurance companies, and educational institutions. This proved to be harmful for the economy, but most of the negative impact was symbolic and psychological. Anwar Husain Syed revealed in his study of Z.A. Bhutto that:

> The large-scale industrial sector, of which the nationalized units were a part, was by itself rather small. It accounted for no more than 12.8 percent of the gross domestic product, 3.4 percent of the labour force, and 8.3 percent of Pakistan's exports.
>
> *(Syed 1992, p. 121)*

The land given to landless peasants, 349,069 acres, was for the most part un-irrigated: "This would be less than one percent of the cultivated land in Pakistan" (Syed 1992, p. 130).

A word about the effectiveness of the reforms. Agricultural reforms could not be implemented because the stranglehold of the landlord was socially inescapable. Industrial reform took place because the ethnic identities of the capitalist and the workers were different. This caused a setback to investment. Even when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was overthrown and executed, the investment climate did not improve; instead of de-nationalization, General M. Ziaul Haq resorted to privatization. In other words, instead of returning the property to the owners, they were sold to the highest bidder.

To begin with, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had made powerful enemies. Had the emancipated workers displayed any sense of responsibility, the reforms could have been salvaged. When elections took place in 1988, Benazir Bhutto, though elected, had become politically more vulnerable. She called nationalization old fashioned, and that was the end of socialism in Pakistan's political history.

Literary response

The greatest influence of communism or socialism has been on literature. Just as on politics, British rule had prepared the groundwork for Russian influence on literature. Urdu poetry, though sublime and versatile, was nevertheless bound with conventions. The only poet to stand apart from the literary society of Urdu by shunning the patronage of rulers and lords as well as distancing himself from poetic recitals was Nazeer Akbarabadi (1740–1830). He mixed with the people, described festivals and fairs, and was quite eclectic in outlook. One of his popular poems was "An Ode to Bread." Because Nazeer Akbarabadi had neither refinement nor a high intellectual caliber, he remained out of the mainstream. However, once the Progressive Writers Association was formed, Nazeer had a grand resurrection.

Afterward, the British started promoting modernity in the Urdu literature, which meant first introducing the conventions of English literature and then trying to bypass the *ghazal*, the most common form of Urdu poetry in which the verses are unified on the basis of rhyme and meter, each *ghazal* having unrelated or even contradictory themes. They favored the *nazm*, which is simply a poem united by a theme. The only predecessor for this form had been Nazeer Akbarabadi.

A Colonel Holroyd oversaw such poetry recitals and publications, which later merged into the Aligarh Movement. The leading exponent of the poetry was Altaf Husain Hali (1873–1914), who in his long but popular poem "The Ebb and Tide of Islam" put forth the dignity and value of labor in a society that was still feudal, praising the worker as follows:

> God's earth is a garden because of them
> Time speeds on due to their fervour
> We have received all signs of prosperity through them
> The secrets of divinity have been revealed through them
> Only these are the cause of pride, if anyone feels it
> Only these are the cause of mankind's glory.
>
> *(Hali, 2005, p. 136)*

Iqbal and Hasrat Mohani have already been discussed. In 1929, they came together as Honorary Secretary and Assistant Secretary of the All-India Muslim League (AIML) when first the Honorary Secretary Dr. Saifuddin Kitchlew (1884–1963) and then M.A. Jinnah created another faction of the AIML over the issue of cooperation with the (Sir John) Simon Commission that had been formed to recommend a new basic law for British India.

The next poet after Iqbal and Hasrat was Josh Malihabadi (1995–1982), known as the Poet of Revolution. He wrote anti-British poems on topics ranging from satirizing them for the 1919 Jalianwala Bagh massacre to casting doubts on the intentions of the British Cabinet Mission in 1946. He wrote the "Ode to the Peasant" in as grand a manner as poets were accustomed to writing panegyrics for their royal or semi-royal patrons:

> This scene and a mighty man that is a peasant
> The leader of Evolution and the sustainer of civilization. . .
> He walks home thinking of his bare-headed wife
> And the downcast faces of his hungry children.
> *(Malihabadi, 1936, pp. 29, 30)*

Malihabadi also wrote a poem on Karl Marx equally as loud and grand:

> Because of you the Rights of Labour are established on earth
> Because of you the warm sweat of the worker is the Fountain of youth . . .
> *(Malihabadi, 1944, pp. 185–190)*

A profusion of such poems is found seeking dignity for labor, the overthrow of the capital, and the defeat of the British. Jameel Mazhari (1904–1980) was anti-British, had suffered imprisonment in the 1942 Quit India Movement, and was equally progressive. He wrote a poem called "The Voice of the Worker" (1927, included in Mazhari, 1953, pp. 241–244):

> This field has been watered with the sweat of my labour
> All the movements in the world are due to the worker's existence

This chapter has not enough room here to give more examples of his many revolutionary and progressive poems. Muhammad Iqbal, Hasrat Mohani, Josh Malihabadi, and Jameel Mazhari were the vanguard of the Progressive Writers Movement in April 1936.

But before the Progressive Writers Movement of April 1936 was formally launched, its future founders had published an anthology of Urdu short stories called *Angare* [*Embers*] from Lucknow in 1932. *Angare* consisted of five stories by Syed Sajjad Zaheer (1905–1973), two by Ahmed Ali (1908–1994), two by Rasheed Jahan (1905–1952) and one by her husband, Mahmud-uz-Zafar (1908–1956). Sajjad Zaheer's stories in particular were not only anti-clerical; they were widely seen as both blasphemous and obscene. Rasheed Jahan wrote about the misogynist and insensitive attitudes of husbands and mothers-in-laws, but as the only female contributor, she received her share of notoriety. Ahmed Ali went on to become a bilingual novelist, the author of *Twilight in Delhi* (1940) and *Ocean of Night* (1964). Altogether, *Angare* had been a false start for the Progressive Writers Movement.

The real launch came from an article titled "Literature and Life" written in Aurangabad in July 1935 by Akhtar Husain Raipuri (1912–1992) and published in Urdu. After setting 1857 as the year dividing old Urdu literature from the new, Raipuri (1989, p. 18) describes the incentive for creating literature by drawing a parallel with industry:

> To understand why a mill has to be set up, it is not enough to see how full is the purse of the investor, or how neat is the blueprint presented by the engineer, rather one has to look at the economic imperatives being obtained.

Dismissing the theory of art for art's sake as banal, Raipuri summarized his conclusions as: (1) literature is a department of life and speaks for the environ; and (2) the purpose of life and literature are the same.

Raipuri rejected classical Urdu literature on the grounds that: (1) Its themes are constricted and outmoded; (2) the objective and the theme are sacrificed for the allure of style and exaggeration; and (3) people take up literature as a profession. All these charges were true of the majority because the majority is mediocre and only outstanding writers are original.

Because the attachment to and pride in classical Urdu literature was sentimental, Raipuri's essay proved shocking; still, apart from causing outrage, Raipuri gave readers pause by underlining the criticism of Marxist intrusion into Urdu literature. Still, Raipuri also had a period of introspection. Five years later, in his second book, *Sang-i-Meel* (Raipuri, 1949, p. 81) written while in Bombay, he added:

> It is true that the literature of every age is bound by the demand of its time, but when we sit down to study the conditions of that era, then we face perplexity and difficulty; because the eyes that see the conditions are that of an artist, and the heart that beats for it is also that of an artist. In the first place, the Creative process is very involved and then, nothing is more enigmatic and insoluble as the personality of a writer. The connection between the outward appearance of a society and the innermost recess of a writer is the greatest problem in literature.

Although Raipuri went to Deccan and had his literary criticism published there, his mind had been conditioned in Calcutta. In Calcutta during the Khilafat Conference on January 9, 1936 was where the next ideological step toward Progressive Literature was taken. Jameel Mazhari, the Chairman of the Reception Committee, did not stop at favouring art for life's sake, but proclaimed literature to be the greatest strength of life. Mazhari held that the crowns of the Bourbons and the Romanovs had not been removed at the point of a sword but at the point of a pen, and their heads had been cast before the feet of the masses. Mazhari said Communism had come to Russia more because of the fiction of Leo Tolstoy than because of political struggle.

Mazhari went on to list the decadent features of Urdu literature, both past and present, saying in conclusion, "If literature cannot flourish without the decadent features that we have lamented, then it is better to sacrifice literature for the sake of the country" (*Asr-i-Jadeed*, January 12, 1936, p. 12).

Five years later, Jameel Mazhari said in a speech at Calcutta:

> The purpose of literature should be the purification of the soul and the regulation of social attitudes. If this duty is not performed by literature or littérateurs, then remember neither Democracy will be successful in attaining its purpose, nor will Communism be able to benefit mankind . . . Political theories can only change the system of government, but a writer can transform public taste, human nature, and appeal.
>
> (Asr-i-Jadeed, *February 13, 1940, p. 5)*

Thus, the limits of communism had been set by a principled socialist poet who may have exaggerated the power of literature but did not fail to give literature high purpose. In between these two speeches from Jameel Mazhari, the foundational session of the Society of Progressive Writers occurred in Lucknow in April 1936.

Presiding over the Conference was Munshi Premchand (1880–1936), the eminent writer of Urdu fiction, who ended his address with the following words:

> On our touchstone, only that literature will be judged genuine which embodies thought, the desire for freedom, the essence of beauty, the spirit of progress, the light of reality; the literature that will produce movement, restlessness and a tumult within us, that will not put us to sleep – because any more sleep can only be the precursor of death.
>
> *(Zaheer, 2006, p. 65)*

To this, Syed Sajjad Zaheer (2006, p. 65) added in his book, "I still think that possibly nothing that has been written in our country is a better description of the purpose and aims of the Movement for Progressive Literature."

The theoretical basis of the Progressive Writers Movement would be debated time and again by Majnun Gorakhpuri (1904–1988), Faiz Ahmed Faiz (1911–1984), and Akhtar Ansari (1909–1988), but neither the theoretical aspect of the Progressive Writers Movement nor even the critical part of the Progressive Writers Movement are what created a deep impression – its poetry and fiction did. This left an impression on those who were conservative by nature, or even reactionary but sworn to the literary excellence of the literature produced by the Progressive Writers Movement.

The most popular writers were Asararul Haq Mazaj (1911–1955), Faiz Ahmed Faiz (1912–1984), Ali Sardar Jafri (1912–2000), Sahir Ludhianvi (1921–1980), and Pervez Shahidi (1910–1968). Majaz, in his most famous poem "Awara," gave the most eloquent expression to personal, social, and national frustrations, the outpourings of what would be called an angry young man. His lyrical poetry was also very popular, as it embraced both the themes of love and revolution. Faiz Ahmed Faiz was the most popular Urdu poet outside the Urdu-speaking world, as well as within. His languorous melodic style and ability to present images in slow motion like slides enabled him to use pastel images to his advantage as well as to rise to a crescendo; his works would become very popular slogans.

Ali Sardar Jafri wrote mainly declamatory poetry, but these were sincere and therefore effective. His sojourn within the Bombay film industry had enabled him to write lyrics that had the effect of war songs sung on the behalf of laborers and boatmen for the film *Zalzala* [*Earthquake*]. In one film, *Footpath*, produced by socialist Zia Sarhadi, Jafri wrote the immortal soft-love lyrics for "Sham-i-Gham ki Qasam." The greatest progressive poet associated with the Bombay film industry was Sahir Ludhianvi, perhaps the most popular Urdu poet of his age among the generations who could not read Urdu. He wrote lyrics to music, but his diction was not musical. Sahir Ludhianvi's poems had neither adornment nor embellishments, but he achieved the literary miracle of writing using the plain words of his surroundings in a straightforward manner. Jafri and Sahir sometimes wrote poetry that was atheistic, but theirs was a pro forma atheism, as they had not become atheist due to personal reflection but only because Lenin was an atheist.

Pervez Shahidi was isolated from the others because he had remained in Calcutta while the film industry migrated to Bombay. A part of his poetry was lyrical with a devotion to the forbidden brew, which was one of his metaphors. The other part of his poetry was clearly declamatory, openly denouncing Chinese nationalist leader Chiang Kai-Shek and U.S. President Harry Truman. But he did this to attain a purpose. Pervez Shahidi remained popular more among mill workers than literary critics. Many other poets are found, some perhaps of equal caliber, but this chapter only has enough room to touch upon the high spots.

The most momentous Progressive Writers Movement contribution to Urdu literature had been fiction, both short stories and novels (Ahmad, 1992, pp. 132–133). In fiction, unlike in poetry, one cannot project a thought directly. Though Urdu fiction had been the most effective and influential means of projecting socialist thought in fiction, the content of the ideas was not easily reducible. The most outstanding Muslim fiction writer, Sa'adat Hasan Manto (1911–1955), was expelled – along with many other Urdu writers of all faiths – for being reactionary at the Bhimri 1949 Progressive Writers Conference. The organizers were responsible for imposing the strict writ of the Communist Party, to which most delegates did not fully subscribe.

Manto, for his part, wrote the article "The Red Revolution" in *Manto ke Mazamin* in Lahore in 1942 and wrote a play on Karl Marx in *Talkh, Tursh, Shireen* in Lahore in 1954; thus, no cogent reason is found for expelling him. This excommunication is another reason for passing over fiction without much comment, because fiction writers had ended up promoting humanism instead of socialism.

Another incident occurred when the first Progressive Writers Conference was being held in Pakistan. Faiz Ahmed Faiz had drafted a resolution calling for the Kashmir dispute to be settled by an impartial plebiscite. Syed Sajjad Zaheer would not let Faiz table the resolution. Contrarily, Syed Sajjad Zaheer, standing on Pakistani soil, proclaimed, "Every honest person will want Kashmir to accede to India" (Akhtar, 1978, p. 316).

No wonder that the Progressive Writers Association came under the scrutiny of Pakistani Intelligence. In the 1960s, a counter movement called the Modernist Movement became dominant, pleading about the improperness of being wedded to a particular political ideology. Only literary criticism remained to defend and champion the left during the Progressive Writers Association's decline as an organization. Mumtaz Husain (1918–1992) and Mujtaba Husain (1922–1989) were the two critics fighting a rear-guard action. Mujataba Husain had written an essay about those who have little taste for songs in which he stressed that literary excellence would have to take precedence over doctrinal purity (Husain, 1953).

Earlier in 1950, Mumtaz Husain had tried to find the balance between art and ideology:

> Marxism is not concerned only with how the forces and the means of production can be made to progress, although it is basic, but a consideration more necessary for a writer, that is how to establish a society where there is no exploitative relation between man and man.
>
> *(Husain, 1950, p. 36)*

This needed greater engagement with art, specifically style. To this purpose, he wrote the essay titled "Epistle on the Awareness of the Metaphor."

> A simile circumscribes and limits meaning, while a metaphor can at the same time be abstract and concrete. When a metaphor gathers the total values of different objectives, this process becomes abstraction, and when an author tries to give substantial shape to common values, then the writer's endeavor is to render abstract language concrete. Only language that can express abstract thoughts in defined words is considered strong and effective.
>
> *(Husain, 1992, p. 32)*

Finally, Mumtaz Husain in his final book *Marxi Jamaliyat* [*Marxist Aesthetics*] tried to find the magic formula that would have a transformative effect:

> Awareness (sha'ur) is not merely a reflection or a mirror of reality. It is a creative energy as well, which affects reality in the sense that it helps in transforming it. Without it neither the active nature of literature can emerge nor its revolutionary vigor.
>
> *(Husain, 2012, p. 36)*

Such sagacity is a sign that socialism as a driving force had been both creative and effective in literature more than in politics.

Student response

Students have been the most active arm of socialism in South Asia. Before the Partition, only the Muslim Students Federation – a subsidiary body of the Muslim League initially headed by the Raja of Mahmudabad, who considered himself a socialist – had also wanted Pakistan to be an Islamic State. The Raja explained to Muhammad Ali Jinnah that "he did not mean a Muslim State" (M. A. A. Khan, personal communication, July 28, 1940).

After 1947, the students frequenting the Communist Party of Pakistan's Students' Circle founded the Democratic Students Federation (DSF), first at Gordon College in Rawalpindi in 1949, then at Dow Medical College, Karachi, in 1950, with Muhammad Sarwar (d. 2009) as president. At first, the DSF concerned itself solely with students' welfare. An Inter-College Board was formed, and its demands led to the first demonstration on January 7, 1953.

The procession headed towards the office of the Education Minister and was met with police brutality. The next day, police opened fire, killing 27 people, including a few schoolboys and passersby. The procession was even larger on the third day, with Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin receiving the delegation and accepting all demands (Javed & Zulfiqar, 2017, p. 37).

The DSF was banned along with the Communist Party of Pakistan in 1954. As a stratagem, its members started filling the ranks of the pro-government National Students Federation (NSF) and took it over by 1958. In fact, the eastern wing of the NSF remained loyal to Ayub Khan until 1969. The next and most momentous protest led by the NSF was in 1956 in opposition to the Pakistani policy of siding with the invaders from Britain, France, and Israel against Muslim Egypt during the Suez Crisis. This established the students and the Lashkar-e-Taiba group as the leaders of public opinion. In 1959, the NSF demonstrated against the Education Ordinance. In March 1961, the NSF demonstrated against the murder of Patrick Lumumba. Next, the NSF demonstrated against the killing of Muslims in Jabalpur, India. Kamran Asdar Ali (2015, p. 385) commented, "This was a very controversial move and was the first time that the Left had involved itself in a non-secular pro-Pakistan demonstration against the Indian State."

In 1965, the NSF was at its peak, winning elections to student unions in the majority of colleges in Karachi. However, the NSF split in 1965 into a pro-Russia faction led by Amir Hyder Kazimi (1941–2013) and a pro-China faction led initially by Mairaj Muhammad Khan (1938–2016) and later by Rashid Hasan Khan (1939–2016). After 1967, the pro-China faction campaigned for the Pakistan People's Party during the 1970 elections. In the eastern wing, the National Awami Party was led by Maulana Bhashani and the East Pakistan Student's Union was led by Rashid Khan Menon.

How the Indo-Pakistani War had been conducted is what led to the demonstrations by the NSF, especially the pro-China faction. Subsequently, de-classified documents confirm what the NSF had suspected. President Ayub Khan had aborted the March to Akhnur at the behest of Western powers (Khan, 1999, p. 44), as well as disregarded the plea of General Headquarters to delay the ceasefire by three days (Ahmad, 1979, pp. 7, 17).

The terms of the Tashkent Declaration signed on January 10, 1966 caused further outrage when whispers spread that Pakistan had adamantly refused Chinese help. These demonstrations would not die down; by 1968, student demonstrations in Pakistan coincided with the demonstrations led by Daniel Cohn-Bendit in France. Both Charles de Gaulle and Ayub Khan were forced to resign.

The fantasy of the non-Bengali population in the east wing, who rightly feared decimation in case of victory by the Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, was that the like-minded parties of the Pakistan People's Party led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the National Awami Party led by Maulana Bhashani would form a coalition, thus avoiding a division of Pakistan. This hope was dashed when the National Awami Party boycotted the 1970 elections.

After Pakistan lost the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 on December 16, the Office of Chief Martial Law Administrator and President was transferred to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto on December 20. The next day, NSF President Rashid Hasan Khan disassociated the NSF from the Pakistan People's Party. Despite the sacrifices and courageous acts during the Ziaul Haq Era (1977–1988), socialist student bodies have been removed as a factor in Pakistan's politics.

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SECTION VI

Liberalism and Muslim liberal thought

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LIBERALISM IN TURKEY
An incomplete story

Hamit Emrah Beriş

Introduction

Liberalism has no rich intellectual history in Turkey. Depending on the individual, liberalism has never become a strong alternative to the collectivist ideologies in Turkey such as socialism, nationalism, and Kemalism. The number of thinkers and political trends describing themselves as liberal has been remarkably limited in Turkey for long decades. In addition, these liberal thinkers in Turkey have shared very little common ground regarding politics. This gap among the liberal thinkers in Turkey may be attributed to the deep differentiation between political and economic liberalism in Turkey, this distinction probably being more evident than in any other country. One thinker who advocated political freedom suggested protectionist economic methods for Turkey. In the same vein, another person who defended economic freedoms suggested that the government should not make compromises from its dominant role during the modernization process. Liberal groups in Turkey have had deep differences of opinions and dissidence.

During the late Ottoman period, there existed a political environment conducive to promoting liberal ideas. In this process, the intellectuals defended freedom against the authoritarian administration. This paved the way for the liberal discourse to serve as a good instrument for the opposition. The opposing intellectuals had close relations with the West. Therefore, these intellectuals did not position themselves against economic liberalism. This being the case, nationalism started to play a dominant role in the political arena in the early 20th century. Nationalism was the core of the new regime when the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) came to power during the Second Constitutional Era. Harsh authoritarian policies were increasingly followed during this process. Due to the pressure over the people, the CUP directly manipulated the 1912 elections, notoriously known as the "election with the stick" (Zürcher, 2017, p. 100). The CUP mostly rejected the economic aspects of liberalism by taking the initiative to create a national bourgeoisie. To sum up, this process was never that bright for the intellectuals who suggested political freedoms and a market economy.

Among other political ideologies, liberalism was also affected by the dominant attitudes of Kemalism, which had emerged as the official ideology in the aftermath of the promulgation of the Turkish Republic. As was the case in other countries around the world, liberal political movements gained strength during certain periods in Turkey, as in the era following the 1946 elections. The destiny of liberalism was determined mostly by the military coups that

interrupted democracy in the country. The individualist and libertarian thoughts promoted by liberalism were considered to be unnational during the periods when the army had strong influence over the politics. Hence, liberalism had a limited political influence over intellectuals until the 1980s. Though the 1990s experienced developments that may have been in favor of liberalism, they were not that effective. Put clearly, liberalism may still not be considered a favored ideology in Turkish political thought.

The Young Turks and liberalism: Mehmet Sabahaddin Bey

The late Ottoman period was extremely dynamic with respect to the political thought. The weakening of the regime led to the development of various approaches for saving the country from an invasion. In the meantime, the government faced serious financial crises. Different ethnicities had declared independence due to the nationalist trend, which had great impact on the administrative structure of the Ottoman Empire. This was an era when the government had to deal with simultaneous challenges to ensure the survival of the empire.

Prince Mehmet Sabahaddin Bey is the first major figure in the history of liberalism in Turkey. He was son to the sister of the Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid II and used the title of prince due to his connection to the royal family. Fleeing the country at a young age due to the dissidence his father had with the sultan, Sabahaddin Bey joined the Young Turks in Paris. He provided funds to organize the First Young Turks Congress in 1902. In his speech delivered during this Congress, Prince Sabahaddin emphasized the regime of Sultan Abdülhamid II to be based on tyranny, and argued that an order based on freedom had to be established in the Ottoman Empire (Hanioğlu, 1995, p. 191). The Congress led to the division of the Young Turks into two different groups. The group led by Sabahaddin Bey remained as a minority. One of the hot topics that led to the division was the British intervention. The liberals led by Prince Sabahaddin defended the British intervention to turn the system into a constitutional monarchy. The group led by the CUP members advocated nationalist policies. Sabahaddin Bey decided to found the Teşebbüs-ü Şahsi ve Adem-i Merkeziyet Cemiyeti [League of Private Initiative and Decentralization] (LPID) (Ahmad, 2014, p. 6). The LPID served as the first liberal organization in Turkey.

Sabahaddin Bey advocated for a parliamentarian monarchy. Though an initiative had occurred in the Ottoman era for a parliamentarian monarchy in 1876, the first parliament was shut down by the Ottoman sultan in 1877. Sabahaddin Bey thought disbanding parliament would hamper social progress. He defended that individuals who could not wield their freedom would not have the opportunity to display their individual creative skills. This was the reason why Sabahaddin Bey asked for parliament to be reopened. Yet he thought this model alone would be insufficient for initiating social progress. Therefore, he argued that social transformation was also needed. He suggested that the Western world could set an example for this transformation. Therefore, Sabahaddin took a pro-Western approach within the Turkish modernization process.

Edmond Demolins from the Le Play school had major impacts on Prince Sabahaddin's political thoughts (Zürcher, 2010, p. 114). In his memoirs, Sabahaddin Bey mentioned that he had followed the method from Demolins's (1880/2010) book *Anglo-Saxons Superiority: To What It is Due*. He intended to apply the method of the natural sciences to the social sciences. He developed a new program for this purpose. The program featured a model based on decentralization (Sabahaddin, 2002, p. 38; 2008, p. 302). This preference was not a coincidence. Demolins attributed the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon system to the importance attached to decentralization (Hanioğlu, 1995, p. 209). Demolins suggested the education system in Anglo-Saxon countries to be focused on promoting individual talents. This helped individuals behave independently and take bold initiatives, leading them to be aware of the fact that they are

responsible for their actions but may set their own individual preferences. The decentralization model is the reflection of this situation onto state governance. Centralized societies were not built on strengthening the individual. This led individuals to be more attached to society; however, these individuals were unable to use their talents and turned into public servants only.

Sabahaddin Bey adopted the approach of the Le Play school toward the individual and society by giving examples from the Ottoman Empire (Mardin, 1996, p. 202). He argued that public servants wielded their power over Ottoman society. This hindered both private entrepreneurialism and criticisms toward government policies. The elites who were supposed to be the pioneers of change were all attached to the government due to their personal interests. In countries with strong private entrepreneurialism, the elites can have conflicts of interest with the government. This tension and clash among actors lead to social progress. However, in countries dominated by public servants, people may only be promoted through nepotism.

Historical Analysis of Turkish Progress, Sabahaddin Bey's first work focusing on this subject in particular, was published in 1905. The theme of this work was the modernization of a society by a Westernized elite who followed decentralization methods (Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 83). This shows that the elitist approach did not waver here. Focusing on the fact that society should absolutely be trained, he attributed vital importance to education. Interestingly, efforts to merge this sharp positivism with political liberalism did exist. He also advocated that decentralization was the assurance of political unity in the Ottoman Empire. He held the opinion that the calls for independence by the various ethnicities may only be answered by sharing the power with local elements. He suggested that this method would prevent the actions of the Armenian, Arabic, Kurdish, and Albanian separatist movements (Kadıoğlu, 2007, p. 177). However, the developments showed his approach to have been unrealistic, because nationalist movements among different minorities in the Ottoman Empire were strengthened. The CUP followed increasingly authoritarian methods to break this separatist wave.

He started to publish a newspaper in Paris to explain his views on these issues. The newspaper's primary objective was to tell the society about the social sciences approach and ensure that certain regulations were introduced in this vein (Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 82). Sabahaddin Bey pinned all his hopes on this method to ensure political unity. He returned to Istanbul in 1908 following the declaration of the second constitution. However, as the CUP ascended to power, he was forced to remain in opposition. The CUP held a perspective other than liberalism with respect to both politics and economics. The CUP adopted statist economic policies and attempted to take all political life under its control. The CUP, therefore, did not favor decentralization or free enterprise. This led Sabahaddin Bey to flee the country once again. Though he returned to Turkey in 1924 after the promulgation of the Republic, he was deported the same year, as he was a member of the Ottoman royal family. These losses in the life of Sabahaddin Bey are a synopsis of the history of liberalism in Turkey (for some of his works, see Reyhan, 2008, pp. 145–376).

Sabahaddin Bey and his followers defended liberal views during the late Ottoman period. The fact that he advocated political freedoms and associated them with Social Darwinism prevented him from displaying a consistent approach. Also, he remained distant from the political realities of his time. For this reason, he could not predict the rise of Turkish nationalism or other ethnic nationalisms inside the empire. This led him to remain distant from the spirit of the time. Sabahaddin Bey was concentrated mostly on social rather than political issues. Furthermore, he was an eclectic thinker. He therefore did not hesitate to make simultaneous use of different ideologies by neglecting the contradictions among them. However, many other people at that time had also adopted an eclectic approach. These thinkers shared a common goal: saving a declining empire. Therefore, political thoughts were considered valuable only if they were related to this

goal at that time. Therefore, being a liberal did not mean anything, per se. He adopted liberalism for pragmatic reasons more than for principled views. As mentioned in this chapter, Sabahaddin Bey considered decentralization as the means of uniting different ethnicities. In brief, his opinion was that usefulness mattered more than consistency.

From the Ottoman Empire to the Republic: Ahmet Ağaoğlu

Another important representative of liberalism in Turkey is Ahmet Ağaoğlu. Naming Sabahaddin Bey and Ağaoğlu as two major liberal figures is a good indication how liberal thought had different versions in Turkey. This is because Ahmet Ağaoğlu was a member of the CUP, to which Prince Sabahaddin was strongly opposed. As mentioned previously, the movement spearheaded by Sabahaddin Bey and the CUP had differing views at that time on various subjects. Ağaoğlu, as a member of the CUP, was a true nationalist and pro-Western figure. In his book *Üç Medeniyet* [*The Three Civilizations*], Ağaoğlu compared Western civilization to Islamic and Chinese civilizations (Berkes, 1998, p. 465). He concluded the West to have supremacy in the competition among the civilizations (Ağaoğlu, 1972, pp. 8–9). Ağaoğlu is also known for his pan-Turkist ideas, but this is not in contrast with his pro-Western views. The liberal themes in Ağaoğlu's thought became evident particularly after the Republican era. During this time, Ağaoğlu's nationalist and pro-Western views did not change (Shissler, 2002, p. 185). He also adopted the Kemalist ideology, in addition to his previous political thoughts (Özavcı, 2013, p. 22). Ahmet Ağaoğlu was therefore an outstanding ideologist of the early Republican era in Turkey. His goal was to interpret Kemalism using a liberal and nationalist perspective.

The democratic system was suspended in Turkey a short while after the promulgation of the Turkish Republic. The Law on Maintenance of Order was enacted in 1925 to quell the Sheikh Said rebellion that had broken out and spread across Eastern Anatolia (Shaw & Kural-Shaw, 1977, p. 381). Martial law was declared under this law, and the government was granted wide-ranging authorities to restrict political freedoms. During this time, the Progressive Republican Party (PRP) and several media outlets were closed. The single-party system was established in Turkey in 1925, and the country started being ruled by the Republican People's Party (RPP). Though Turkey tried to transition to democracy in 1930, this initiative soon failed, and the political figures ruling the country decided to cease the democratization process. Kemalism became the state's official ideology at that time, and any political alternatives were heavily suppressed. The 1930s was an era when the state was directly associated with the party and thus an era of a party state. Because of these reasons, the impacts of liberalism on political life were remarkably restricted.

In 1930, Ağaoğlu published a utopian work *Serbest İnsanlar Ülkesinde* [*In the Land of the Free People*]. The book tells the story of a person who had been lost in a desert and then came to a turnoff. The person saw a signboard at the turnoff. The signboard said that if you go left, you will go to freedom, while the way to the right is the way to serfdom. The person headed towards the left and soon arrived at the land of the free people. Given the authoritarian conditions of the time, writing such a book was a very bold initiative (Barkçin, 2000, p. 82). Ağaoğlu described "the way free men should behave in a republic" (Ağaoğlu, 1930, p. 2). He also stated that people in a free land would tolerate any dissident ideas and would be more honest. Otherwise, people would behave in a manner incommensurate with their nature and would easily report opponents to the authoritarian rulers. However, Ağaoğlu thought that being a slave was easier than being a free individual because slave would not assume any responsibility whatsoever or wield their own free will. On the other hand, a free person would not hesitate to take initiatives to resolve the problems of the society in which they live (Ağaoğlu, 1930, p. 30). This would

eventually lead to paying a certain price. This book was not only a critique of the regime but also a reflection of the feelings Ağaoğlu was experiencing internally (Kadıoğlu, 2007, p. 183).

As an outstanding ideologist of the early Republican era, he lost his prestigious position due to his political and economic thoughts being based on liberalism. Ağaoğlu ran for politics in 1930 when Atatürk ordered the establishment of a new political party. He was therefore one of the founders of the Free Republican Party (FRP). As the party had received substantial support from the people in a rather short time, the Kemalist leadership was deeply annoyed. This led the FRP to wrap itself up, which ended Ağaoğlu's political career (Weiker, 1973, p. 128).

Ağaoğlu's views on market economy and free enterprise were the reasons he had been excluded from the single-party regime. The Kemalist regime preferred protectionist policies after the promulgation of the Republic. In other words, the CUP policy of founding a national bourgeoisie had been revived during the Republican era (Beriş, 2015, p. 147). Statist policies increased in the aftermath of the world economic crisis in 1929. Ağaoğlu was absolutely against the statist approach (Özavcı, 2015, p. 134). An evident example of this was the intellectual discussion of 1933 he was involved in against the authors of the *Kadro* journal which was a leftist interpretation of Kemalism. The authors of this journal defended state socialism for economic growth (Hale, 1980). Ağaoğlu advocated individual-centered economic growth based on a free market economy (Ağaoğlu, 1933, p. 35). The most important argument Ağaoğlu defended was that Western economies were both developed and had individual freedoms. As may be understood, he considered both political and economic freedoms.

He was also disappointed by the Kemalist approach, which excluded democracy. Like many other intellectuals of the time, Ağaoğlu was one of those who considered the abolition of the sultanate and promulgation of the Republic as an instrument for more freedom in Turkey. However, a short time after the promulgation of the Republic, the opposition was suppressed and the regime became more authoritarian. One important point must be underlined here: like many other intellectuals of the time, Ağaoğlu had an elitist and positivist approach towards these matters. Therefore, he did not remain distant to the idea of reformation in the Western context for modernizing society (Özavcı, 2015, p. 157). He had always defended this argument since the Second Constitutional Era. He also considered the contemporary conditions and being an "Oriental society" to have their own peculiar challenges. Ağaoğlu defended the idea that Oriental societies did not allow the emergence of the free individual. Therefore, altruist intellectuals were needed to make sure that people would become more conscious and realize their worth. In other words, mentioning freedom was insufficient; society had to learn freedom, as well. He may not be considered a classical liberal, as he defended the idea that freedom should be implemented within the boundaries of public order. After leaving active politics, Ağaoğlu did not hesitate to publish an opposition newspaper called *Akın* in 1933 (Uyar, 2005). He lost his academic position at the university that same year. This newspaper was ineffective, as his views had been lost inside an authoritarian governmental model.

Liberal voices in the transition to democracy: Ali Fuad Başgil

The outcomes from World War II had deep impacts on several countries, including Turkey. Siding with the Allies at the end of the war, Turkey faced the need to transition into a democracy in order to remain part of the "free world." The regime allowed new political parties to be established in 1945, and the first multi-party democratic elections were announced to be held in 1946. Transitioning into a democracy also brought along an intellectual revival. The Democratic Party founded during this era adopted and used the liberal themes against the single-party rule. Civil society organizations based on liberal thought were also founded during this time.

Ali Fuad Başgil was the most outstanding liberal figure of the 1940s. A professor of constitutional law, Başgil received his entire higher education in France, including his doctorate, and then returned to Turkey. Having worked for several years in the Faculty of Law at Ankara and Istanbul universities, Başgil's critical position became more evident after Turkey's transition to democracy. Together with Ahmet Emin Yalman, Başgil founded Hür Fikirleri Yayma Cemiyeti [The Society for the Dissemination of Free Ideas] (SDFI) in 1947 (Haklı, 2018, p. 141). The SDFI advocated liberalism and also published the journal *Hür Fikirler* [*Free Ideas*]. However, soon after the founding of the SDFI, differences sprung up between Başgil and Yalman. These differences were based on the issue of secularism. Başgil argued that the single-party regime in Turkey exercised control over religious freedoms and thus prevented the implementation of genuine secularism. On the other hand, Yalman supported the religious policies of the RPP, although he was against several of their policies, including restrictions on press freedom. This difference of opinion led to the closure of the association, but both Başgil and Yalman continued to defend liberal themes.

Başgil's liberal approach was founded on political freedoms and liberal democracy, in the defense of which he used to write articles. However, Başgil never addressed the case of Turkey while discussing the issues of rule of law, democracy, and human rights in his articles. He even defended the statism of the single-party regime for a while (Başgil, 1996b, p. 83). Once Turkey decided to transition into a democracy, his criticisms were no more theoretical, and their focus turned to Turkey. Başgil thought that the single-party era in Turkey had been a hindrance to the exercise of political freedoms. He advocated that Western societies owed their progress to allowing the free expression of ideas. The RPP's modernization project was aimed at creating a uniform human being. Başgil suggested that this modernization neglected social dynamics. He was therefore not totally against modernization as a concept, but rejected the government's active role in modernizing society by exercising control and power over it.

Başgil advocated that the most evident example of the restrictions on freedom in Turkey was the restriction on religious freedom. Başgil argued secularism to be misunderstood and misinterpreted in Turkey. He held secularism to be the government's comprehensive recognition of individual freedoms (Parslow, 2018, p. 52). Thus, he suggested the government not play a role with respect to individuals' faith. Başgil was of the view that secularism should conform with the freedom of religion and conscience. He thought that secularism was used in Turkey as an instrument by the government to control religion (Başgil, 1996a, p. 73). The reason for this was that the government considered religion as a barrier to modernization. The government also had concerns about the threat it could have faced had opposition used a religious discourse. This is the reason why the religious sphere was entirely taken under state control and why the government wielded power over religious people. Başgil was not only a pioneer of liberal thought with these arguments; he was also considered an important opinion leader by the conservatives. Right-wing parties declared him their presidential candidate in 1961. His election to the post of president was highly probable, as the right-wing parties dominated in the parliament at that time. However, although democracy had been reinstituted after a coup d'état at that time, the military junta prevented his candidacy, and he was forced to flee the country.

Başgil can also be said to have played the role of teacher during the country's transition into democracy. As an academic, he knew democracy both theoretically and practically, and hence tried to guide Turkey on its journey toward democracy (e.g., Başgil, 1960, pp. 19, 27). He believed that, once settled properly, the system would function properly (Başgil, 1957, p. 171). This is why Başgil strongly defended the separation of powers in a democratic system of governance. He also argued the bicameral parliamentary system to be necessary for protecting individual freedoms. Başgil additionally stated that constitutional principles should be built

in a way to ensure the survival of democracy. With the new constitution adopted after the May 27, 1960 coup d'état, some elements – such as the bicameral system he had proposed – were implemented.

The Democratic Party and the implementation of liberal policies

1950 is a historic year in Turkish democracy. The Democratic Party (DP) came to power following the election of May 14, 1950. This result ended the RPP's rule in Turkey. The DP was founded by previous RPP members. Founded by a group of parliament members including Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes, the DP – after making the decision to transition into a democracy – took part in the 1946 election. The results from this election were quite suspicious, as the rules of democracy had not been abided by. However, the 1950 election was a fairer election and led to the change of rule. The DP adopted a liberal program while in power. This liberal attitude of the DP was deeply felt in its reliance on democracy. The DP underlined the virtues of democracy, which had played a major role in bringing the party into power. Alongside this, the scope of political freedoms was broadened. The DP declared a comprehensive pardon and ensured that political prisoners were released. An intellectual revival prevailed during the early years of the DP government. This era also coincided with the early years of the Cold War (Simpson, 1965, p. 142). Therefore, socialists in particular faced more pressure, but the DP government was not as oppressive as the RPP had been.

The most evident liberal notion was national will. The DP had associated itself with political freedoms and the popular will. Popular will was against the authoritarian policies of the single-party regime. The notion of national will was later used by right-wing political parties. The DP was overthrown by a military coup d'état, which led the liberal parties to oppose the establishment, namely the tutelage (Aytaç & Elçi, 2019, p. 92). This approach stated that certain civilian and military tutelage institutions had hindered the popular will. This is also referred to as the bureaucratic oligarchy. The right-wing parties also believed that certain bureaucratic institutions had hindered a genuine democracy just to preserve the status quo. Therefore, liberalism's perspective on freedom was used intensively by politicians, together with other discourses like the fight against tutelage.

The DP government was a starting point for liberal economic policies. Efforts to integrate with the global economy were merged with industrialization initiatives (Zürcher, 2017, p. 226). This first led to a rapid increase in urbanization. Population mobility had actually been restricted during the single-party era. By following a development model based on agricultural development, the authoritarian regime had implemented policies to prevent migration from rural areas to urban areas. However, a rapid economic and social change was witnessed during the DP era. The same applies to the expansion of the scope of religious freedoms. As the DP came to power, the pressures on religious freedoms were remarkably relieved. The secularist understanding Başgil expressed, as described previously, was deeply altered. However, the Kemalist circles and DP were caught up in a row. This intellectual distance would turn into support of the military coup in the future. After that, a new era started for liberal thought. The strongest liberal thought movement of the time had emerged against the DP government.

Liberal opposition during the DP era: the *Forum* journal

The most important liberal opposition of the 1950s emanated from the DP. A group of parliament members resigned from the DP in 1955, citing the authoritarian policies of the regime, and founded the Freedom Party. The Freedom Party was not every effective in the Turkish

political arena, and did not last long. The Freedom Party decided to end its political activities in 1958. No other liberal movement emerged during that time (Karpat, 1959, p. 437). In other words, the DP was the party that had mostly defended liberal policies during the 1950s.

The intellectual opposition during the DP era came from the intellectuals who had published a journal called *Forum* in 1954. The journal was led by Aydın Yalçın, who had studied in the United States and then joined the Faculty of Political Sciences. Several intellectuals and authors wrote articles in the *Forum*. *Forum* advocated the rule of law, whereby fundamental rights and liberties are exercised at the maximum level. The authors in *Forum* also argued the DP to be distancing itself from Kemalist policies. Liberal economic policies were the foci of the criticisms. Though the journal advocated political liberalism, it had adopted a statist approach with respect to economic policies; therefore, the theme that defined *Forum* was a synthesis of political liberalism and Kemalism (Beriş, 2005). *Forum* did not accept the idea that the single-party regime was authoritarian (Örnek, 2015, p. 283). On the contrary, the authors of the journal affirmed the Kemalist modernization project that had resorted to authoritarian methods. The authors of *Forum* also suggested that the DP had distanced Turkey from the modernization project on various issues including religious policies. The notion of reactionism that emerged in Turkish politics at certain periods was frequently used in the journal. The opposition held that the DP's policies had encouraged reactionaries who in the end had caused harm to the Kemalist revolution. This approach displays the elitist standpoint, as well as the distrust in the people.

On the other hand, the dissident position of *Forum* was evidently felt not only with respect to the relationship between religion and politics. The authors in *Forum* also called for a change in the election system that had provided great advantages to the ruling party. The majoritarian winner-take-all election system was actually developed and implemented by the single-party regime. The authors of *Forum* did not criticize that era, and instead suggested that a proportional representation system be implemented. The journal also had proposals regarding the preparations for a new constitution. One of the most outstanding points here is the fact that some *Forum* writers were among those who had provided intellectual support to the military junta after the coup in 1960. These authors helped legitimize the military coup. As the leftist movements gained more strength after 1960s, a large number of *Forum* authors positioned themselves as socialists or social democrats.

1960s and 1970s: dark years for liberal thought in Turkey

A military coup on May 27, 1960 interrupted democracy in Turkey. The military junta assumed full control of the country, and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and two ministers from his cabinet were sentenced to death and executed. The process for drafting a new constitution began at that time (Ahmad, 2003, p. 127). The constitution, drafted with the contributions of major academicians and jurists in Turkey, came into effect in 1961. Democratic order was reinstituted by the elections held that same year. However, both the new constitution and traces of the military coup led to a tutelage over politics. The Justice Party (JP), as followers of the DP tradition, represented liberal policies. Süleyman Demirel, the chairman of the party, defended the expansion of trade and economy. JP's and Demirel's discourses were based mostly on national will. This was actually a reaction against the military, which had ended the DP rule and installed the mechanisms for tutelage over the democratic system.

Political instabilities were deeply felt in Turkey in the 1960s, and parties started to establish coalitions (Ahmad, 2003, p. 132). Liberalism was also on a decline in many parts of the world in the 1960s. The government increased its influence and played further roles in the economy during this time when the Keynesian policies were in effect. The notion of freedom was cautiously

used during this time due to the communism threat. As mentioned previously, the right-wing parties mainly focused on the notion of national will, which was mostly associated with respecting the election results. No liberal discourse regarding the expansion of the scope of freedoms was witnessed during this time.

The 1970s also marked strong political conflicts in Turkey. The competition between the socialist left and nationalist right was deeply felt on the streets. Liberal thought was weakened during this time, as politics had adopted a harsh language and society was polarized. Finding a political or intellectual movement during this time that directly defined itself as liberal was impossible. But liberal themes were able to be found in some of the policies implemented by the JP from the 1960s onward. The strength of marginal groups openly hindered the defense of freedom of thought. The climate of conflict in the Cold War era was also a major hindrance in defending freedom of thought; therefore, liberalism remained weak in the struggle between right and left ideologies for hegemony.

Turgut Özal and the liberal revival

One of the most important milestones in the revival of liberalism in Turkey was the Turgut Özal era that started in 1983. The military coup of September 12, 1980 interrupted Turkish democracy for a while. Not until 1983 was the decision made to hold elections and open parliament. However, only the political parties and the political figures approved by the junta could participate in the elections. One of these approved political figures was Turgut Özal, who had founded the Motherland Party (MP) with the participation and efforts of these new political figures who had no previous party affiliations. The MP came to power in 1983 with Turgut Özal as the prime minister. Liberal politics in Turkey are always argued to have started with Özal (Yayla, 2005, p. 585) because Özal, unlike other politicians of the past, did not hesitate a single moment to state that he would follow a liberal economic and political program. To these ends, radical change was experienced in the economic policies that Turkey followed. The Turkish lira became a convertible currency, customs duties were reduced, and import restrictions were lifted, clearing the way for international trade (Öniş, 2004, p. 122). The most important indication of liberalism during the Özal era was his insistence on free enterprise. Turkey's integration with the international economy led Turkey to give up on its statist policies. He insisted that the private sector could assume production in several areas. Economic initiatives were granted to the business world, and the process of privatizing public enterprises was initiated during this time. This all led to a substantial revival of the economy.

The Özal era is also important in terms of the transition from a military administration to a democracy. This is why Özal frequently used the liberal notion of political freedoms. Freedom of religion, having been the bedrock of the rightist tradition in Turkey since the DP era, was essential in his discourse. Apart from that, the scope of freedoms was arguably expanded during this era, particularly in the context of all political movements. He used the argument of ending military tutelage during this time and used a new framework to refer to the relationship between the government and citizens. This relationship was devised as a relationship between the servant and the recipients of the service in line with the liberal state approach.

The intellectual presence of liberalism was extremely limited in the 1980s. Although the government expressed liberal tendencies, almost no intellectual is found at that time who defined themselves as liberal (Arat & Pamuk, 2019, p. 68). However, this does not mean that liberal ideas were not spread at that time. Different liberal approaches were displayed, ranging from the pluralist aspects of democracy to the expansion of political freedoms. This environment of freedom was largely built by the decriminalization of social and religious propaganda under the

relevant amendments in the Turkish Penal Code. This led to different segments of society freely expressing themselves (Ataman, 2002, p. 135). This positive atmosphere led the liberal thought to define itself in a stronger manner in the following decade.

Liberalism in the 1990s: the Second Republicans and the association for liberal thought

The 1990s marked a notable dynamism in liberal thought. The traumatic effects of the disintegration of the Soviet Union on leftist politics had urged certain socialist intellectuals to adopt a more liberal democratic approach. The problems emanating from the coup d'etat of September 12, 1980 were deeply and sharply felt throughout the 1990s. The intellectual agenda of the country was centered more on problems like the Kurdish issue, secularism, and human rights. The focal point of the discussions on liberalism was the notion of a "Second Republic" during this time. Developments in the 1990s urged the former socialists, Islamists, and nationalists to find a common ground within the framework of freedoms and democracy. This initiative, launched by former leftist intellectuals including Etyen Mahçupyan, Murat Belge, Ali Bayramoğlu, and Mehmet Altan, widened its scope by including different social groups, primarily the Islamists. The Second Republicans, however, could not reach a consensus on economic freedoms. The intellectuals of the left in particular adopted the political aspects of liberalism, yet took an economic position close to social democratic thought (Bora, 2017, p. 556). These intellectuals founded a party called the New Democracy Movement (NDM). However, the NDM did not survive for long. The Second Republicans had split due to difference of opinion. As the political face of liberalism in Turkish politics, the Liberal Party, which currently carries out political activities under the name of the Liberal Democrat Party (LDP),[1] was founded in 1994. The LDP came to the fore with the attention-grabbing and interesting statements of its founder and leader, Besim Tibuk, but it could never play an effective role in Turkish politics.

During the same period, the first civil society organization using liberal in its name was apparently founded; it was named Liberal Düşünce Topluluğu [Association for Liberal Thinking] (ALT). Informally founded by a few academics and intellectuals including Atilla Yayla, Mustafa Erdoğan, İhsan Dağı, and Kazım Berzeg, the organization attained its legal structure in 1996. The association advocated classical liberalism. The ALT did not distinguish between political and economic liberalism, but considered liberalism as a whole with its political and economic aspects (Coşar, 2004, p. 79). In this respect, the ALT insistently favored libertarianism and therefore took a different position than several other ideological movements in Turkey (Yayla, 2018; Demirel, 2018). The ALT suggested that several people who were known as liberals in the media and politics actually did not deserve that type of description. The ALT remained distant from politics for many years. Starting its activities with a group of few people, the ALT raised its number of members over time. This association assumed the role of promoting liberalism to the masses at large by means of the various organizations and publishing houses it founded. However, like many other think-tanks, the ALT clearly played a limited role in convincing society. The ALT was also affected by intellectual differences related to the policies of the ruling Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his political movement.

The liberal tradition from the first decade of the 2000s to the present

The Justice and Development Party (JDP) has been the dominant political actor in Turkish politics since the turn of the century. Coming to power after the elections of November 3, 2002, the JDP defined its ideological position as conservative democrat. This term was

deliberately preferred to distinguish the JDP from the Islamist "national outlook" tradition from which the party had originated (Axiarlis, 2014, p. 33). The JDP wanted to show it had embraced the democratic system with this ideological preference. Attempting to define the party with a conservative democrat label could easily be understood, as several previous parties of the Islamist tradition had been banned by the Constitutional Court on the grounds of adopting "anti-secular" policies. The JDP considered liberal thought and freedom of expression as the bases of its political identity. Another reason for using the term of conservative democracy was to place the policies of the party at a consistent and permanent level (Scheneier, 2016, p. 154). The JDP's economic policies were aimed at ensuring harmony with the global system. Therefore, finding several other liberal themes with the same policies is possible. For instance, the privatization efforts launched by previous governments were maintained during the JDP governments, and bans on imports and exports were lifted. However, the JDP adopted a protectionist approach with regards to social security and health issues, not to mention various other domains.

The JDP's founding leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has insistently emphasized his "anti-establishment" position from day one (Hale & Özbudun, 2010, p. 149). This is based on the discourse of fighting the civilian and military bureaucratic tutelage in Turkey. The JDP's anti-establishment approach was supported by the liberal segments in Turkey. Erdoğan's discourse on widening the scope of political freedoms and deepening and consolidating democracy in Turkey was consistent with the general political principles of liberalism. The wide-ranging democratization reforms led the liberals to back the JDP affirmatively. However, as time elapsed, a split occurred among the liberals. The Gezi Park protests that broke out in 2013 led some liberals to distance themselves from the JDP. This process also led to various splits among the liberal cycles. The culminating point of the splits was the coup d'état attempt of July 15, 2016. In the aftermath of the coup d'état attempt, liberals were divided into two groups: those supporting the government against the coup attempt and those who remained impartial. The same split was experienced in the leftist liberal tradition. Those intellectuals who defended political liberalism but adopted a leftist economic position had previously supported the JDP government on several occasions. These intellectuals criticized the government as having assumed a more authoritarian position since 2011.

Conclusion

The appearance of liberalism has been closely linked with the birth of the bourgeoisie, the rise of capitalism, and the radical transformation of political relations. Liberalism is the ideology of capitalism with respect to its analysis of the government and society. The late development of capitalism in Turkey hampered the strengthening of liberalism. Turkey's implementation of the modernization process with the help of the state was contrary to the individual and liberalist notions of freedom. On the other hand, this modernizing approach also led to a reactionary attitude in Turkey regarding society. The large social elements in Turkey reacted against modernization by embracing traditional values. For this reason, the conservative and Islamic themes can be said to still be the determining factors with regard to the political behaviors in Turkish society. The strongest actors have been the political parties of the conservative right that played the pivotal role after Turkey's transition into democracy. This was later challenged by social democratic and socialist oppositions. Declaring liberalism as a midway between these two political positions with the ability of still being incorporated into the social fabric of Turkey is too difficult. Liberalism with a framework based on individual freedoms does not have the ability to be influential in a country like Turkey, where society is the utmost priority.

Without a doubt, asserting liberalism as an entirely impeccable ideology is impossible in Turkey. Liberal policies were partially implemented beginning with the DP government in the 1950s. However, liberalism gained actual impetus during the Turgut Özal era in the 1980s. This era coincided with the rise of global capitalism in several parts of the world. Therefore, compared with past circumstances, liberalism gained ground as an ideology in Turkey in line with its tangible policies and intellectual approaches. However, the other determining elements of the political culture hampered liberal thought from becoming a dominant actor in Turkish politics. Given the future of the secularization and capitalization processes, liberalism is expected to wield more power in Turkish politics. However, recent anti-liberal trends around the world caution against being optimistic regarding the future of liberalism. The future outcomes of the rising populist policies across the globe are uncertain. Obviously, the relatively objective and cautious approaches of liberalism will not generate positive outcomes under existing circumstances. Therefore, the factor that defines the development and course of liberalism in Turkey will be future domestic developments, as well as international conjectures.

Note

1 The first Liberal Democrat Party was found in 1946 by Kazım Demiraslan, Sabri Manyas, Abdülkadir Aytaç, and M. Suphi Kula. The party soon wrapped up its activities before even engaging in any political actions.

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22

LIBERAL THOUGHT AND POLITICS IN EGYPT

M. Tahir Kılavuz

Introduction

Egyptian liberal thought, just like other political and ideological currents, is one of the cornerstones of Arab liberal thought. The liberal thought that started to develop in the late 19th century – while shaped around issues such as liberties, human rights, religion and state, citizenship, and the rule of law – has focused on different issues in different periods. Egyptian liberalism developed its position over the last century by taking a side against two targets. The first was the central state created first by British rule then later by Gamal Abdel Nasser, and the second was the Islamism that rose specifically in the second half of the 20th century.

In introducing this chapter, understanding what liberal thought refers to and who the liberals were in Egypt is critical. Some studies perceive liberals and liberalism in Egypt as a monolithic meta-narrative (Abu-'Uksa, 2016). For a secondary perspective, liberalism in Egypt has been considered as a discourse group and an analytical category (Hatina, 2015). Rejecting the claim of liberalism in Egypt as a consistent worldview, a third perspective sees it as a discourse in which a variety of ideologies and groups have contributed (Kurzman, 1998; Schumann, 2010).

As will be evident in the rest of this chapter, this third perspective has emerged as a healthy approach to understanding liberal thought and liberals in Egypt. In fact, nationalist, socialist, and even Islamist actors have shared certain liberal ideas from time to time. Even though individuals and groups have existed that defended only the liberal ideas, liberal as a term in Egypt refers to the broader group that has some association with liberal ideas, regardless of whether or not it espouses any seemingly illiberal views. As a matter of fact, liberal as a label has oftentimes been used for many secular thinkers and political actors, even though some of them are not liberal in the narrow sense of the concept. From this perspective, liberal thought in Egypt can be seen as a sum of ideas that lack coherence. Nevertheless, the signs of liberal thought can be traced through this ambiguity; hence, this chapter aims to present the main discussions around the subject of how liberal thought in Egypt developed and which issues have been its main focus.

This chapter consists of three main sections. The first section presents a periodization of liberal thought in Egypt. According to this, the first period captures the historical sources of Egyptian liberal thought and focuses on subjects such as liberties, state, and citizenship under British rule. The second period covers the evolution of the liberal thought, starting with Nasser's rule and the formation of the central state authority. Even though multiple turning points occurred within

this period, a general coherence can be argued to exist in the evolution of liberalism throughout this time. The third period focuses on the development and evolution of liberal thought and the liberals after the Arab Uprisings. After completing this periodization, the second section of the chapter aims to understand the main issues in Egyptian political thought such as state formation, religion and state, liberties, and human rights. The last section, being an expanded conclusion, evaluates the conundrums of the Egyptian liberals and their ambiguous relationship with democracy in practice in light of their position against the regime and the Islamists.

Historical evolution of liberal thought in Egypt

The emergence and the historical sources of liberal thought

Albert Hourani (1983) labeled the 19th century as the liberal age of Arab thought. The foundations of liberal thought in Egypt, being one of the most important hubs of modern Arab thought, were also laid during this period. Liberal ideas entered Egypt following Napoleon's invasion with the modernization efforts of Muhammad Ali Pasha and increasing ties with Europe. Specifically, *Nahda*, the cultural awakening aimed at finding a solution against the material supremacy of Europe over Muslim lands, was one of the most important events of this liberal age.

Understanding how the liberal age has been labeled would also be helpful at this point. In line with the discussion at the beginning of this chapter, Hourani's definition of the liberal age was a rather broad one that encompasses different approaches. He considered the label of liberal age to consist of the broad range of ideas that had sought to respond to the encounters with modernity. To do this, the liberal age included different ideologies that had been part of the Arab Awakening such as liberalism, pan-Arabism, Islamism, and even socialism. From this perspective, early liberal thought in Egypt was an amalgam of different political currents.

The thinkers in the earlier stages of the liberal age could be labeled as modernists or liberals, and were individuals who tried to interpret Islam in a modern sense to find continuity from Islamic tradition to modernity. In doing this, they tried to overcome certain notions that they believed to have led to stagnation in Islamic thought and also tried to develop notions such as scientific values, progress, and reform. Rifaa al-Tahtawi, one of the most prominent of these thinkers, aimed to find the sources of the ideas that he had encountered while living in Europe (Shahin, 2017); he became one of the first thinkers in Egypt to use concepts such as freedom, constitution, and citizenship (Hourani, 1983). In the process that followed, thinkers such as Jamaluddin Afghani and Muhammad Abduh are considered among the most prominent names of the liberal age. These thinkers tried to find a rational and modern interpretation of religion that could resolve the existing problems while trying to remain within the general framework of Islam. In doing so, they also significantly benefited from liberal ideas.

As is evident from these figures, some of the first thinkers of the liberal age have also been categorized as the founding figures of Islamist thought. This indicates different ideologies to have been somewhat fused at that time and liberal thought to have been associated with modern Islamist thought, as well as other ideological currents. Even though a cooperative and amicable relationship existed between Westernized intellectuals and the Islamist thinkers who prioritized reform and liberal values, as Khaled Abou El Fadl (2017) pointed out, this relationship did not last long. Especially in the generation that succeeded Abduh and his student Rashid Rida, two groups emerged among the among the liberals who had benefited from some views of these Islamist thinkers.

One group prioritized nationalism and developed a liberal interpretation by including Islam as part of modern Egypt. These were the activists who founded Al-Wafd [Delegation] Party and carried out the independence movement between 1919 and 1922 under the leadership of Saad Zaghloul (Govrin, 2014). The constitution that was penned in 1923 following independence was the product of this group and was built on nationalist and liberal principles (Mustafa, 2006). Those of the second liberal group that emerged after the separation were called secular humanist liberals (Fahmy & Faruqi, 2017). These thinkers included Taha Husayn, Ali Abd ar-Raziq, and Lutfi As-Sayyid, and embraced a more Westernized interpretation of liberalism divergent from Islam. Some representatives of this group left Al-Wafd to found the Liberal Constitutional Party in 1922 in opposition to Zaghloul.

During this first period that continued until Nasser's rise to power, some of the major issues included reforms in Islam, independence from British rule, foundation of the modern state, and to an extent what the relationship between religion and state should be. According to Fahmy and Faruqi, this period shaped liberal thought in Egypt through two legacies (Fahmy & Faruqi, 2017). First, the ideas that emerged during this period later became the main points of discussion for both liberals and other groups. Second, the activities such as the foundation of the first parties, the writing of the constitution, and the formation of the modern state proved to be an important institutional legacy of the liberal age. As a result, even though sometimes overlooked, this period played a very important role in shaping the Arab thought that would develop later (Ibrahim, 2003).

Liberal thought in Egypt after Nasser

The second period of liberal thought in Egypt began with the rise of Nasser after the Free Officers' coup and the formation of a centralized rule by force. Even though some studies consider this period to have commenced with the Arab-Israeli War in 1967 (Abu-Rabi', 2004; Hatina, 2011, 2015), these two events can be considered as two stages of the same process rather than independent turning points. Accordingly, following the rise of Nasser and the consolidation of Egyptian independence after the Suez Crisis, the liberals started discussions around a strong state apparatus. After the defeat in 1967, negative evaluations of the experience with Nasser were discussed alongside its positive evaluations.

One significant section of liberals, socialists, and communists in Egypt had actually supported the Free Officers' coup at first. The weak rule of King Farouk and the continuing influence of the British even after the independence had justified the idea of Egyptian control of Egypt through the Free Officers' coup. Furthermore, some of the modernist thinkers saw Nasser as a leader to be supported as he likewise had the purpose of modernizing Egyptian society (Meijer, 2002). They also developed hopes for founding a liberal order by modernizing society after achieving full independence and completing the formation of the state. However, after a couple of years under Nasser, these liberals realized that his regime had limited certain rights and freedoms, despite the hopes of providing an environment for liberalization and progress. The war in 1967 bolstered some of these concerns and led liberals to move away from the Nasser regime.

The liberals of this era, also known as the new liberals, saw themselves as the inheritors of the liberals of the earlier period and built their thought upon that of their predecessors. However, due to the period and conditions they lived in, the focus of the new liberals' ideas and activities was relatively different from their predecessors. Specifically, while the early Egyptian liberals had focused more on philosophical debates, the liberals in this era, just like those during the independence process, focused less on philosophical and moral issues, and prioritized political, social, and economic matters. The biggest difference this period had from the previous one was

that liberal thought had not developed under the conditions of a nation-state before. Therefore, unlike the first period, state building ceased to be a central issue for the liberals and had been replaced with issues such as individual rights, social reform, and the separation of powers. However, the relationship between religion and state remained one of the central debates during this era, just like in the previous one.

In the later decades of the century, the concept of liberal was used to include various political views, just as it had been in the earlier decades. Therefore, an important group of these liberals came from various backgrounds such as Marxism and nationalism/Nasserism. Similarly, during the 2000s, several of the thinkers and groups that embraced liberal ideas had Islamist backgrounds.

Khaled Muhammad Khaled, Farag Fouda, and Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd emerged as some of the prominent liberals of this period and led discussions about the place of religion in society and its institutional structure (el-Badawi, 2017). Another prominent name whose influence increased toward the end of the century is Saad Eddin Ibrahim. He became known and influential both domestically and internationally through the Ibn Khaldoun Center that he had founded and made important contributions to Egyptian liberalism through his positions on civil society, democratization, separation of powers, and freedoms (Ibrahim, 2002).

After 2000 in particular, some important developments took place in the liberal political movements. On one hand, Al-Wafd Party, which had been banned after the Free Officers' coup, reorganized as the New Wafd Party in 1978 and claimed to represent liberals. On the other hand, liberal groups further diversified in the 2000s. One group led by Ayman Nour, which claimed Al-Wafd to have been developing closer ties with the regime, broke up and founded el-Ghad [Tomorrow] Party in 2004. They quickly became well-known in Egypt after Nour's presidential campaign in 2005. The April 6 Youth Movement, founded in 2008, later played an important role in the revolution.

Along with specific parties and groups, different opposition coalitions emerged during this decade. In 2005, the Kefaya [Enough] Movement, the opposition coalition launched with the participation of representatives from different political groups emerged as a movement in which liberal views were broadly shared (Clarke, 2011). The National Association for Change was founded in 2010 to support Muhammad ElBaradei's presidential nomination. Similar to Kefaya, the National Association brought together different groups and emerged as one of the last representatives of the liberal organizations during this period.

Liberal thought in Egypt after the Arab Uprisings

Liberal thought and liberals in Egypt entered a new phase, one that still continues today, after the revolution that took place in 2010. Indeed, liberal ideas and liberals played an important role during the protest movement. The main motto of the revolution, "*Aish, hurriyya, adala igtimaiyya*" ["bread, freedom, social justice"] has one economic component, one liberal component, and one leftist component. As a matter of fact, liberals' activities – both in the streets and on social media – during the early stages of the revolution were quite significant. In the following processes of democratization and opposition to Islamism and regime consolidation after the coup, liberals experienced several ups and downs. As a result, this period was an important test for the liberals that exposed some of their contradictions and led to a partial dissolution that in a way helped them question their relationship with the state.

Following the early successes of the revolution with the fall of Hosni Mubarak, the Egyptian liberals embraced a position that was both anti-army and anti-Muslim Brotherhood (MB). Since the army oversaw the transition process, the liberals seriously criticized the army in 2011.

The liberals in particular raised their concerns that the army would not forfeit power as it had promised. During the same process, and as a result of several questionable activities and the electoral successes of the MB, some liberals intensified their opposition to Islamists.

As part of this process, the National Salvation Front (*Jabhat al-Inqad*) was founded in late 2012 with the participation of different liberal groups and actors in opposition to the government led by the MB's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). However, this Front remained weaker than expected because the participants were unable to resolve their internal differences. According to Amr Hamzawy, one of the most prominent liberal intellectuals, the liberal and leftist opposition during this period had committed the mistake of over-generalizing while criticizing the MB and its president, Muhammad Morsi, and had failed to produce alternative solutions (Hamzawy, 2014).

The coup d'état that took place in July 2013 was an important litmus test for Egyptian liberals. Important liberal groups and actors participated in the massive demonstrations on June 30, which had been organized by the Tamarod [Rebellion] Movement and eventually led to the coup. The reactions the liberals gave in response to the coup on July 3 and its aftermath led to significant dissolutions within the broad liberal camp. Even though the general discontent toward the Morsi government and the MB helps in understanding the demonstrations of June 30, the attitudes of several liberals after July 3 exposed their contradictions (Fahmy & Faruqi, 2017).

For example, while Mohamed ElBaradei, one of the most prominent liberal figures, was planned to be made the prime minister in the post-coup government and hence defended the coup on the international stage (Kirkpatrick, 2013), other prominent liberals – including Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Mohamed Abou el-Ghar, and Alaa al-Aswani – also joined him in supporting the coup (Hersh, 2013). In contrast, other liberals such as Ayman Nour and Amr Hamzawy opposed the coup from the beginning and eventually had to leave the country. The April 6 Movement, despite its earlier support toward the demonstrations on June 30, opposed the coup, as well. As a result, some of its leaders were arrested after the coup.

In the aftermath of the coup, some of the coup-supporting liberals changed their positions. Those liberals, who at first had believed the coup would only bring down the MB and lead the country to free and fair elections, re-evaluated their positions after and realized that the promise had been false upon observing the economic, political, and social failures of the new president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. After witnessing the Rabaa Massacre in August 2013, ElBaradei made declarations against the coup and moved away from the Sisi regime. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, despite continuing his support toward Sisi, softened his stance later on and called Sisi in November 2015 for a reconciliation with the MB (Sa'ad Al-Din Ibrahim, 2015). Liberals' negative reactions toward Sisi and his regime increase each year; yet despite this, some liberal figures still support the Sisi regime.

These attitudes that the liberals assumed during the coup exposed some of their contradictions, as well as the problems in their approach toward democracy. This confusing approach the liberals had toward democracy will be covered in the conclusion of this chapter. According to Hamzawy (2017), liberals are at a crossroads where they have the potential to redefine themselves. Therefore, whatever self-criticisms liberals may undertake in the coming years will be an important step toward the development of liberal thought in Egypt.

The main issues in Egyptian liberal thought

The first part of this chapter focused on the evolution of liberalism in Egypt during different periods. This section now turns to the main issues of liberal thought in Egypt. According to the classical Orientalist view, certain obstacles have existed in the development of liberal

thought and liberal democracy in Islam, particularly in the Arab world. Accordingly, the political culture of Islam based on dynastic legitimacy does not allow for liberal thought to flourish. According to Bernard Lewis (1996), freedom is not a concept that has historically been available for Muslims; rather, it is an imported novelty. For Elie Kedourie (1992), liberal thought and democracy did not take hold in the Arab world because these concepts were alien to the mindset of Muslims. For these scholars, Arab and Muslim cultures do not possess concepts such as citizenship, freedom, or the secularity of the state that are the concepts at the heart of liberalism.

In this regard, some of these scholars claim liberal thought to have not developed in Egypt, either. According to them, liberals in Egypt have been unable to produce comprehensive thought with philosophical underpinnings. The facts that Egyptian liberal thought includes a broad range of political currents and has been influenced by various ideologies, as discussed in the previous section, have played an important role in this claim. However, according to Saad Eddin Ibrahim (2003) and Hala Mustafa (2006), liberal thought does exist in Egypt and its roots can be traced back to the liberal age in the 19th century.

The rest of this section discusses several issues at the heart of Egyptian liberal thought. Even though other subjects are found that Egyptian liberals have discussed, this section focuses on major issues such as state building, state-religion relations, liberties, and democracy. As seen from these discussions, to claim that liberal thought does not exist in Egypt is unfair. However, the discussions on these subjects have been strongly influenced by European thought and are not significantly distinct from the liberal thoughts that exist in other places of the Muslim world.

State building and modern society

The issue of building a modern state and society was a subject the liberals had especially prioritized in the earlier periods. As the British had started their de facto control over Egypt by the 1880s, the then-burgeoning liberal thought gave utmost importance to the issue of state building. Accordingly, early Egyptian liberals discussed issues such as anti-colonialism, nationalism, and nation-state building.

The two major concerns liberals had in the late 19th and early 20th centuries were ending the British mandate and building a modern nation-state. Just like in Europe, in the Ottoman lands, and in some colonial entities, the idea of nationalism was also on the rise in Egypt at that time. Not surprisingly, an important group of early liberals were also thinkers and activists who had embraced the idea of nationalism. As previously discussed, Al-Wafd Party and its leaders found a fusion of liberal thought and nationalism during this period. According to Maghraoui, figures such as Lotfi al-Sayyid had shaped their liberal ideas and reforms with a strong notion of Egyptian nationalism and distinguished themselves from other communities in the region (Maghraoui, 2006). After all, in order for political and social life to be developed in line with the liberal ideals, building an independent nation-state was a necessary condition for them, and nationalism was an important driver for this.

After the state building in Egypt, liberals there turned toward building a modern society. The more secular liberals who had been significantly influenced by the enlightenment believed that societal progress was attainable through social engineering in the hands of the state. For them, the main reason why European institutions could not flourish in Egypt was the fact that Egypt did not have a society that appreciated those institutions. Accordingly, a society could be civilized only when it is enlightened through education. For that reason, education has been one of the top issues of the liberal project. The liberals believed that Egypt could transition from a traditional society to a modern one only through this path (Meijer, 2002). The prominent

liberals of this early period, such as Taha Husayn and Lotfi al-Sayyid, probably served as Ministers of Education for this reason.

Because liberal thought was fused with enlightenment and nationalism, building a modern state and society had priority. On the flip side, Abdel Meguid and Faruqi (2017) claimed this to be one of the dilemmas of liberal thought. To them, liberals are supposed to prioritize individual rights over the state, yet the Egyptian liberals had a more *étatist* perspective which later played a role in shaping Egyptian liberal thought.

Religion and state relations

As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, even though liberals in Egypt have had various factions, liberal as a concept has at times been used interchangeably with secular. Egyptian thinkers and activists who defend secular values are called liberals despite sometimes ignoring some of the main concepts of liberal thought. One of the prime reasons for this is the reality that one of the major concerns of Egyptian liberals is the relationship between religion and state. Several Egyptian liberals, following the Orientalist views discussed in the previous pages, have viewed Islam as an obstacle in social and political progress.

The debate over religion and state have been very much associated with the discussion on how to build a modern society. According to Weber's views on the enlightenment and progress, traditional society is the one where religion had been predominant. Therefore, the transition from a traditional to a modern society is related to the change in the role of religion in society. According to Weber, modern action is rationalized action. If the path to modernization is to move from traditional to rational action, the transition to a modern society is possible through the rationalization of religion (Weber, 1978). This view evolved during the 20th century through secularization theory (Berger, 1967).

The Egyptian liberals who had been influenced by these ideas found the key to social progress is rationalization and secularization. According to these liberal thinkers, Islam was a burden rather than an asset, and Western culture should have been a source of inspiration (Hatina, 2015). Therefore, the way to move from a traditional Islamic society to a modern one like those in Europe was possible through rationalization and secularization. For Abou El Fadl (2017), the secularized Egyptian intelligentsia saw themselves as the vanguard and planned to transform society into a progressive one removed from religious decrees.

According to Hatina (2011), the efforts in Egypt to rationalize religion had focused on the Qur'an and followed three strategies. First, these thinkers tried to historicize the Qur'an and perceived it as a historical text that had been shaped under the conditions of the pre-Islamic Arab world. Second, they tried to rationalize the Qur'an by emphasizing the idea of the human factor in the revelation in place of divine intervention. Third, they tried to reduce the Qur'an to a work on ethics rather than one on jurisprudence and law. In order to apply these three strategies, they utilized methods from philology, anthropology, textual criticism, and historical relativism, and prioritized a rational approach (Hatina, 2015). To give an example of this rationalization, according to Khalid Muhammad Khalid (as cited in Govrin, 2014, p. 70), Muhammad did not necessarily shape definitive rules in Islam and therefore, the legitimacy of any system that provides public welfare is permissible. Accordingly, any system that guarantees social justice and individual liberties and moves religion away from politics is a legitimate system (Govrin, 2014).

As can be understood from this example, a close connection exists between secularizing the state and achieving social progress by rationalizing religion. Accordingly, the first step is to keep religion away from the state apparatus. These views were first voiced by the secularized liberals

in the 1920s and then re-emerged as a strong argument in liberal circles in the second half of the same century. Ali Abd ar-Raziq, who had once reached the level of a *qadi* [judge] in the sharia court, is one of the early representatives of this view. In *Islam and Foundations of Governance* (Ali, 2009), he argued religion to have a negative impact on political order and emphasized the necessity of the separation of religion and state (Hatina, 2007).

During the second half of the previous century, one of the most prominent supporters of the idea of the separation between religion and state was Farag Fouda. He took an important position in liberal thought against religious movements and the role of religion in the state during the post-1967 period in which liberals found more opportunity to raise their views against religion. Fouda raised a critical view against sharia and opposed its divinity and compatibility with the modern world. To him, the only way to make sharia compatible with the modern world was by making an enlightened interpretation of religion. In this vein, Fouda actually saw religion as an integral part of the Egyptian experience; however, the importance of religion for him came from being a component of the cultural fabric of society. For that reason, Fouda's rational approach to religion undoubtedly came with the ideas of breaking the influence sharia had had in law-making and the need to separate religion from the state. Accordingly, a state that can bring together different religious communities, provide national unity, and guarantee universal human rights, should be independent from religion (Hatina, 2007; Kassab, 2010). In conjunction, Fouda also opposed the idea that sharia could be a solution to social and political problems. For that reason, he emerged among the liberal thinkers as one of the staunchest opponents to Islamism.

Liberties and pluralism

Individual liberties, human rights, and pluralism undoubtedly are at the heart of liberal thought. Egyptian liberals, just like their counterparts in other societies, emphasized the importance of individual liberties. However, the development of these ideas took place mainly after 1967. As discussed in earlier sections, pre-Nasser liberals had concentrated on the subject of the state and state building. At certain points, they prioritized the state over individual rights. Later on, because they saw Nasser as a leader who could realize the project of building a modern society and the project they shared, they supported his regime in its early years. However, despite founding the republic, when the Nasser regime proved unable to provide the expected liberties and failed to build a modern society, the liberals started to re-evaluate their relationship with the political regime after the 1967 war.

According to several Egyptian liberals, repressive regimes have been among the biggest obstacles in realizing individual rights in the Arab world (Ibrahim, 2002). Republican regimes that appear democratic are, in fact, examples of Oriental despotism (Hatina, 2015). The repressive environment these regimes create prevents human rights – as well as liberal values such as freedoms of expression, association, and media – from flourishing. These political limitations are significant obstacles to social and political progress.

Egyptian liberals naturally demanded the building of a democratic system while opposing the repressive authoritarian regimes. At least in the liberal discourse, democracy has been one of the most important issues called for. On this subject, liberals have two different perspectives. The first group has claimed that a democratic culture needs to exist first (Govrin, 2014). They argue that people in Islam are not ruled by the laws they have made, but by the laws that sharia has imposed on them. A social and cultural transformation needs to occur in order to build a democracy. For that, the democracy building this perspective defends is closely associated with the issues discussed previously with regards to social change and the separation of religion

and state. Because members of this group think religion should be excluded from the political sphere, they strongly oppose Islamist movements.

The second group posits democracy to be attainable in Egyptian Muslim society. According to Saad Eddin Ibrahim (2003), even though he considers the liberal age to have ended early, the seeds of a democratic system and civil society in Egypt had been sown at that time. For him, democracy is the only right path to follow in Egypt and the rest of the Middle East. Because members of this group do not directly connect the possibility of democracy to the role of religion in the state, they do not categorically reject Islamist politics, either. Therefore, liberals such as Saad Eddin Ibrahim (2002) and Amr Hamzawy (Hamzawy & Brown, 2010) accept a democratic system in which the MB is able to operate and eventually moderate. These liberals, who do not see secularization as a precondition for democratization, are the liberal Islamists. Toward the end of the 20th century, some internal debates started within the Islamist camp, and while the MB embraced democracy a bit more (El-Ghobashy, 2005), a more liberal faction split from the MB and founded a new party called al-Wasat [Moderate] Party (Wickham, 2004). Even though this party has yet to become as important an actor as the MB, it has made an important contribution to Egyptian liberals as an Islamist party that defends liberal democracy.

Liberals have also emphasized the importance of civil society as part of pluralism and democracy. According to Ibrahim (1995, 2003), a strong civil society must first be present for democratic institutions to work. As a result, liberals have spent the last 20–30 years investing in building civil society in Egypt. Even though civil society has never been that strong in Egypt, the increase in the number of liberal parties and movements such as the April 6 Youth Movement and the Kefaya Movement being founded have resulted from this process.

As seen in the preceding, Egyptian liberals have paid attention to liberties and democratization. However, the implementation of their ideological contributions and actions have not always been in sync. This is especially observed in liberals' attitudes following the Arab Uprisings. The liberals' problematic relationship with democracy in practice will further be discussed in the conclusion.

Conclusion: the conundrums of the liberals

As seen throughout the chapter, liberal thought in Egypt dates back to the late 19th century and evolved into its current form through the changes that took place both in the post-Nasser and post-Arab Uprisings periods. Although each period has its own specific characteristics, they share certain commonalities such as liberties and democracy, the relationship between religion and state, and cultural and social transformation. As observed from these discussions, liberal thought in Egypt is not monolithic but rather a product of the convergence and divergence of various ideas. While this chapter has aimed to introduce the main characteristics the Egyptian liberals have had up to this point, the conclusion here will present a critical view of them. Therefore, this section discusses the conundrums Egyptian liberals have experienced, as well as their problematic relationship with applying democracy.

Even though liberalism has a rather long history in Egypt, several conundrums have occurred that Egyptian liberals have been unable to resolve. The most important of these conundrums that have been partially covered throughout the chapter can be summarized in the five following points.

First, what liberal as a word actually refers to in its Egyptian context remains unclear. Oftentimes, the concept of liberal is used interchangeably with secular. Liberals occasionally have used the concept of "*madani*" [civic] because of the civil notion the word has, though it is

more common for the concept of "secular" to refer to liberal. This actually indicates liberals to have taken a position against the Islamists with the concept of secular instead of taking position against the state and the army with the concept of *madani*.

Second, liberal thought in Egypt is quite heterogenous and poorly organized (Shahin, 2017). As discussed earlier, liberal thought has been influenced by different ideas such as nationalism, Islamism, and socialism, and representatives from these different groups have joined the liberal ranks at different times. As a result of this, constituting "a coherent school of liberal thought" (Hatina, 2011, p. 5) has not been possible. For that reason, several scholars have claimed no liberal discourse to have existed prior to 1967 and the existing narratives to be weak and ineffective (Abu-Rabi', 2004; Ajami, 1981). Bringing different ideas together can be seen as a merit of Egyptian liberalism. However, this has actually prevented an independent school of liberal thought from emerging and made defining what liberal means more difficult.

Third, the liberals suffered from elitism when sharing their views and taking action (Dunne & Radwan, 2013). As Abou El Fadl (2017) put it, they believe themselves to be the true possessors of legitimacy and to represent the sovereign will; furthermore, because only they possess the civilizational and intellectual values for building an enlightened order, they believe society should be shaped in line with their vision. Therefore, Egyptian liberals perceive themselves as vanguards and have aimed at cultural and social transformation by educating the masses (Meijer, 2015). This elitist perspective liberals have is one of the greatest obstacles to their becoming more prominent in Egyptian society.

Fourth, Egyptian liberals have had a continuous relationship with the state, one that can even be called anti-liberal. The idea of social and political change has pushed liberals to use the state apparatus as a tool. Even though liberal thought is supposed to defend individual rights against state authority, their purpose for change has been a core reason for them to prioritize state. According to Abdel Meguid and Faruqi (2017), liberals in this respect resemble the Islamists whom they always criticize. Even though these are two rival groups, both have focused on the state apparatus in order to realize their own purposes. As a result, liberalism in Egypt has not been either by the people or for the people as it should have been but rather in the service of the state (el-Badawi, 2017). Furthermore, Egyptian liberals have usually fallen short of producing alternative solutions when criticizing the Islamists (Hamzawy, 2014).

Fifth, and finally, a significant disconnect has been present between the notion of democracy Egyptian liberals have in their ideas and the discourse and implementation of democracy they have pursued. Even though the liberals claim to be against both Islamists and despotic regimes, they have been found on certain occasion to oppose Islamists more rather they have taken a position against dictatorship. Because Islamists, particularly the MB, are more likely to benefit from democratization, liberals have preferred at times the status quo over the rise of the Islamists.

Two main views have been found among liberals regarding the MB's participation in political processes. First are the liberals who defend secularist ideas more and claim that including the MB in modern social and political systems would be wrong as the MB claims the only solution to be Islam. By voicing a concern similar to the "one man, one vote, one time" understanding that is common in the West, they believe that if Islamists come to power through democratic means, they would entirely transform the system.

Meanwhile, the second group defends the idea of including Islamists. For example, Saad Eddin Ibrahim (2002), who is personally against the Islamist discourse, emphasized the need to accept the reality of the MB in Egypt. According to him, the MB who participate in the country's political life would eventually become moderate (Fahmy & Faruqi, 2017). Similarly despite being a bit more cautious, Mustafa (2006) defended the idea of giving some place to the MB in the political system while having the army serve to safeguard the secular system.

However, the Arab Uprisings and the subsequent short rule under the MB also changed these liberals' views regarding Islamists. For example, despite spending most of his career calling for the idea of Islamist inclusion, Saad Eddin Ibrahim supported the July 2013 coup and made declarations in defense of General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and of the repression of the MB (Fahmy & Faruqi, 2017). Alaa al-Aswani, another prominent liberal, also supported the coup, claiming that the MB would have overtaken the whole media had Morsi stayed in power (Azimi, 2014).

In relation to that, it is important to understand the relationship between the liberals and the regime. Many liberals have undoubtedly been subjected to the regime's repression. Figures such as Saad Eddin Ibrahim and Ayman Nour have been imprisoned due to their opposition to the political system. Several liberal civil society organizations have also been shut down from time to time (Mustafa, 2006). From this aspect, a very positive relationship has not existed between the liberals and the regime. However, when forced to choose between the Islamists and the regime, the liberals have preferred the status quo (Ottaway & Hamzawy, 2007). Several signs of this attitude have been found prior to 2011, yet liberals' stance after the Arab Uprisings and the 2013 coup is a major example of this. Many liberal intellectuals and politicians (aside from several names, including those covered in earlier sections here) accepted overthrowing the government as a necessity for the survival of a state that, despite all its political shortcomings and mistakes, had been elected democratically. Even though most liberals believed at the time that the post-coup regime would only be temporary, several liberals still support the Sisi regime – even though, at the time of writing, seven years have passed since the coup.

Once again, this reveals the problematic relationship liberals have with the state. Even though democratization and liberties are at the core of liberal thought, Egyptian liberals have committed actions that are fundamentally anti-liberal. This is one of the biggest contradictions in their relationship with democracy. According to Hamzawy (2017), a prominent liberal who opposed the coup, Egyptian liberals are removed from the main principles and values of democracy. To him, a thick wall has arisen separating liberal democracy from liberal politicians, intellectuals, and activists (Hamzawy, 2017). Therefore, some believe that Egyptian liberals need to launch a significant self-criticism in order to redefine themselves (Hamzawy, 2017; Shahin, 2017).

To conclude, liberal thought in Egypt dates back to the liberal age and has been one of the most important political currents in Egyptian political and intellectual life. Egyptian liberals have a rich history of intellectual discussions focused on different issues and have evolved over time. However, as seen in the conclusion, serious problems are found in the coherence between liberals' ideas and their relationship with liberal values and notions such as democracy. These puzzles became even more apparent under the Sisi regime founded in 2013. The re-positioning of Egyptian liberals and a self-critique of their ideas would likely be very important for understanding how liberal thought will be reshaped in the coming years, and may lead to a new era in Egyptian liberal thought.

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23

ROWSHAN FEKRAN-E DINI [NEW RELIGIOUS THINKERS] AND THE INSTITUTION OF *VELAYAT-E FAQIH*

Crossing the Rubicon of Islamic law and venturing into discourses on human rights

Janet Afary

Introduction

Morad Saghafi, editor of *Goft-e Gu* [*Dialogue*], a quarterly journal on culture and society in Tehran, has suggested that if any genuine breakthrough is to occur in Iranian politics, the generation that made the Revolution possible has to come to terms with the role it played after 1979 (Saghafi, 2001). In the late 1980s, when the government chased out the intellectual men and women who had initially supported the Islamic Revolution, these dissidents became public intellectuals who took on the task of rethinking the future of the state. However, this was no easy task. Most Reformists, as they came to be known, remained heavily invested in the regime and miles apart from the more secular intellectuals and activists who had opposed the ultimate direction of the 1979 Revolution nearly a decade earlier. Reformists had devoted years to the project of creating a new Islamic state. They had lost friends and family members who had devoted themselves to the Islamist cause in the strife during the early years of the revolution and the massive carnage of the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988). They had remained committed to the ideals of the revolution, the legacy of Ali Shariati (1933–1977), and even the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini. Fundamentally questioning these early years, renouncing their revolutionary legacy, or siding strongly with more secular dissidents, including student activists of the 1990s, would have amounted to repudiating a significant part of their lives and those of their loved ones.

The question before the Reformists was whether the Revolution had been a grave mistake with catastrophic consequences or whether the ideological foundations of the Revolution and its constitution could be built on and revamped. Could the Reformists replace the militant Shi'ism of the 1970s and 1980s, which formed the initial ideological basis of the regime, with a different discourse on religion, politics, and civil society – one that involved a more liberal and progressive interpretation of Islam? This was the project that preoccupied a group of intellectuals known as the Now Andishan-e Dini [New Religious Thinkers], mostly men and some

women who had been intimately involved as leaders in the early years of the regime, but who by the turn of the 21st century had become advocates of a more tolerant and pluralistic concept of Islam.

By the last decade of the 20th century, the foundational concept of *velayat-e faqih* [rule of the jurist/leading cleric] had come under criticism from several camps, among them the legal pluralists, hermeneutical theorists, and human rights activists. In June 2002, Professor Hashem Aghajari was jailed for demanding a Protestantization of Islam. In the now famous speech that landed him in jail, he argued that the relationship between religious leaders and the people should not be based on emulation but on thinking and learning. In a direct jab at the *marja' taqlids*, Aghajari asked if people are monkeys who are expected to mimic one another. He also questioned why the state continued to authenticate conservative readings of Islam but rejected more liberal ones as illegitimate and un-Islamic (Bollag, 2004).

Aghajani was one of several liberal theologians known to have sided with the more secular opponents of the regime in denouncing the system of *velayat-e faqih*. These early supporters of the Islamic Republic had gradually broken away from the regime in an effort to articulate a more liberal and progressive reading of Shi'i Islam, one that was more tolerant of democratic principles. These new thinkers, who held a variety of views on how to liberalize the state, became the theorists of the Reformist movement, helping to shape its direction in the 1990s, and were strong supporters of President Muhammad Khatami (1997–2005). Today, more than 40 years after the revolution, two generations of new religious thinkers can be mentioned. This chapter will pay particular attention to the ideas of a select number of the first generation, focusing on their critique of the institution of *velayat-e faqih*, and will end with brief forays into members of the second generation, who have written more openly about the subject of gender equality.

Kadivar: absolute guardianship of the Islamic jurist is not a requirement of faith

The most notable members of the first generation are Mohsen Kadivar, Abdolkarim Soroush, and Mojtahed Shabestari. These theologians were once committed Islamists but eventually broke with the ruling ideology and attempted to provide a new reading of Shi'i Islam that challenged the doctrine of *velayat-e faqih*.

Mohsen Kadivar (b. 1960) is a cleric by training who held the mid-level rank of *hojat-al-Islam* in the 1990s. Kadivar began his career as a young revolutionary during the Shah's regime when he was studying electrical engineering at Shiraz University and was briefly imprisoned in the anti-Shah protests of 1978. After the revolution, he attended a theological seminary in Qom, where he studied under Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, the designated heir to Ayatollah Khomeini until his abrupt removal in 1989. Kadivar taught *fiqh* [Islamic law] and philosophy in Qom for 14 years. In 1999, he received a doctorate from the University of Tehran in Islamic philosophy and theology. Subsequently, he became a professor of philosophy at Tarbiyat Modarres University in Tehran. In February 1999, he was arrested for his criticisms of the regime. Refusing to repent, he was sent to the notorious Evin Prison. Eighteen months later, after national and international pressure, he was released and moved to the United States where he has held visiting positions at a number of leading universities and continues to write on religious reform.

Kadivar is the author of numerous books and countless articles and essays that have appeared in leading Reformist publications in the 1990s, such as *Kiyan* and *Negah-Now* (Vahdat, 2000b). His multivolume *Andisheh-ye Siyasi dar Islam* [*Political Thought in Islam*] became a bestseller

inside and outside the country despite its dense and seemingly archaic subject matter. Kadivar is well versed in Arabic and is intimately acquainted with classical Shi'i texts, a knowledge that many secular-minded dissidents lack. With this background, he commands enormous authority because he can refute the claims of the more orthodox clerics by appealing to the same sources that they have used to construct the legitimacy of the regime.

The second volume of Kadivar's *Political Thought in Islam* is a detailed investigation into the historical roots of the concept of *velayat-e faqih*. In this 400-page tome, he explores the Qur'an, the Sunnah (traditions attributed to the Prophet), the sayings of the Shi'i Imams, and the writings of leading Shi'i scholars. He has concluded the concept of *velayat-e faqih* to be "not a major requirement of religion," but a minor one that may be opposed by believers without negative consequences, making this bold assertion quite explicitly: "The term *velayat-e faqih* has never been used in the Qur'an, nor can one find parallel terms or concepts in the Qur'an" (Kadivar, 1998, p. 81). He goes on to say that the term has never been attributed to the Prophet, to his family, or to any Sufi or philosophical texts of Islam (Kadivar, 1998, p. 98), and concludes that the concept of *velayat-e faqih*, "is not a requirement of the faith, a requirement of religion, a requirement of [Twelver] Imami jurisprudence, a requirement of Shi'ism, nor a matter of one's belief" (Kadivar, 1998, p. 237).

This has led him to the conclusion that a "*faqih* cannot claim the authority to rule based on the *sharia*" (Kadivar, 1998, p. 392). Kadivar points out that the term *velayat-e faqih* first appeared in the writings from the 16th-century Safavid religious scholar al-Mohaqiq al-Kirki (d. 940 AH/1533 CE), who suggested that a *faqih* was entitled to all the duties and powers of the Mahdi in his absence (Kadivar, 1998, p. 103). Kadivar then shows that Ayatollah Khomeini revived the idea of *velayat-e faqih* in his 1943 book, *Kashf al-Asrar* [*Unveiling of Secrets*] and never abandoned it.

Not until the summer of 1979, nearly six months after he had assumed power, did Khomeini and two other grand ayatollahs speak in favor of the concept of *velayat-e faqih* as the new constitution was being drafted (Kadivar, 1998, pp. 184–185). Kadivar uses these historical facts to show that the notion of *velayat-e faqih* had not been put forward as the platform of the 1979 Revolution. After the revolution, he wrote, the concept of "*velayat-e faqih* moved from a minor principle of jurisprudence to a major one," but still was not a requirement of the faith (Kadivar, 1998, p. 233). In the summer of 1979, Khomeini told the Iranian people that they should not "fear an Islamic government, nor the concept of *velayat-e faqih*, because it would not harm anyone, create a dictatorship, or do anything that is against the best interests of the nation" (Kadivar, 1998, p. 195). Kadivar uses this statement to conclude that "when a *faqih* commits a dictatorial act, even if it is only in one instance, he loses his *velayat* [authority to rule]" (Kadivar, 1998, p. 199).

In his other writings, Kadivar looks for models in Iranian history that offer more liberal readings of Islam. He argues that, during the course of the Constitutional Revolution (1906–1911), the *faqih*s suddenly encountered many unfamiliar social and political concepts. A variety of new and unfamiliar words entered the political and linguistic lexicon, words such as the rights of the people, freedom, justice, supervision, autocracy, separation of powers, equality, representation, vote, law, constitution, and so forth. These were accompanied by new social realities. Iran's Parliament redefined the role of the monarch and restricted his authority. The 1906 constitution stated that the Shah was responsible to the nation and to the Parliament. Moreover, the Shah was expected to uphold a new document in addition to the Qur'an (i.e., the constitution). In response to this avalanche of new ideas, the *faqih*s adopted two approaches. One group of clerics entirely rejected the new political process. Led by the highly conservative Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri (d. 1909), they maintained that the *faqih*s ruled on matters of the *sharia* and personal

rights, while the Shah dealt with *'urf* [secular] matters such as trade and commerce. But a second group of clerics accepted some of the new ideas. Mirza Muhammad Hossein Gharavi Na'ini was the leading proponent of this view. He believed that a constitutional government was compatible with the *sharia*, provided that the Parliament included *faqih*s in its ranks and consulted with them in ratifying laws (Massie & Afary, 2018). Kadivar sees Nai'ini as a role model and his contribution as a high point in modern Shi'i jurisprudence, one that was lost in the Pahlavi era (Kadivar, 1997, pp. 20–21). Thus, in his earlier work, Kadivar had argued for a revival of the 1906–1907 Constitutional Laws, albeit with some additional revisions, to address modern concerns.

Abdolkarim Soroush: a matter of interpreting the text

Another highly influential religious thinker of this first generation is Abdolkarim Soroush (b. 1945), the founder of a new Shi'i school of hermeneutics. Soroush received a Ph.D. in history and philosophy of science from the University of London in 1979. He is an eloquent speaker with an amazing memory for classical Persian literature. In the 1990s, he advocated a new and more liberal interpretation of Islam, and his lectures attracted tens of thousands of followers (Matin-Asgari, 1997; Sadri & Sadri, 2000). Soroush was not always a liberal. In 1979, he served as a member of the High Council of the Revolution and of the Academy of Sciences. He was the youngest member of the seven-member Committee of the Cultural Revolution. This committee was the one that closed down universities from 1980–1983 in order to purge them of all non-Islamist academicians and students. The committee subsequently revised the curriculum in accordance with Islamist principles. Hundreds of professors were dismissed from their posts or forced into early retirement before the universities reopened in 1983. Many intellectuals have never forgiven Soroush for the destructive role he played in these early years, and whenever he speaks in a public forum in the United States or Europe, members of the audience angrily denounce him for his earlier role. In the 1990s, Soroush co-founded the Reformist journal *Kiyan*, which became the mouthpiece for the Reformist religious intellectuals and advocated pluralism and tolerance in Shi'is Islam. He soon came under public harassment, including physical attacks during these events by the government's goons. During the mid-1990s, he lost his academic positions, including a deanship, and was forced into exile (Wright, 2000, p. 57). Since then, he has held a series of visiting positions at leading U.S. and European universities. Although he is criticized by other dissidents, he has remained an influential figure and was named as one of the world's 100 most influential people in 2005 by *Time Magazi*ne and as one of the most influential intellectuals in the world in 2008 by *Prospect Magazine* (Urschel, Library of Congress, 2009).

While Kadivar goes back into the history of Shi'ism to show that numerous types of relationships have existed between the *faqih*s and the state, Soroush introduces the idea that one's comprehension of religion is socially and culturally constructed, and hence open to multiple interpretations and critiques. He castigates despotic kings and despotic religious leaders, but his real contribution has been to move beyond the other liberal Muslim thinkers who have searched for verses and quotes in Islamic texts in order to find statements compatible with the requirements of modern democratic societies. Instead, Soroush argues that the force of God manifests itself in each historical period according to the understanding of the people who live in that age. The search for the reconciliation of Islam and democracy is thus *not* a matter of finding appropriate phrases in the Qur'an that are in agreement with modern sciences, democracy, and human rights. Instead, Soroush draws on the work of Immanuel

Kant, G. W. F. Hegel, Karl Popper, and Erich Fromm, as well as several modern Christian theologians. He calls for a re-examination of all the tenets of Islam while maintaining the original spirit of Islam, which he sees as one of basic human decency and concern for fellow human beings.

Though Soroush offers very little discussion of contemporary social and political events, his interpretation of the *sharia* is a challenge to the very constitution of the Islamic Republic and the *velayat-e faqih* because Soroush insists that even the best leader is a human being with all the flaws of mortals. No one, not even the highest religious authority, can claim a definitively correct comprehension of the *sharia* (Soroush, 1991).

Soroush has also tried to expand the space for religious tolerance within Islam. In this instance, he has examined verses in the Qur'an that privilege Muslims over non-Muslims and questioned a narrow reading of these texts. He has insisted that an Islamic democracy is possible if those tenets of Islam that are incompatible with modernity are systematically re-examined and ultimately set aside (Soroush, 1994).

Soroush gives several examples of how advances in the sciences have influenced Islam's comprehension of the world. The Qur'an states that God created seven skies, but modern science no longer regards this as valid. Elsewhere, the Qur'an (86: 6–7) indicates that human beings are created from fluid "coming from between the back and the ribs," but again, modern science indicates differently. What, then, are theologians to do? Should they say, "God's word is false?" Or should they say, "Our comprehension of the text ought to be changed?"

In another case, Soroush takes up a well-known Qur'anic verse (3:85) that has been used to justify discrimination against non-Muslims: "And whoever desires other than Islam as religion, never will it be accepted from them, and they, in the Hereafter, will be among the losers." Soroush translates the term *Islam* here as submission to God and makes the following argument: If a person submits to God, but does not reach the higher stage of becoming a Muslim, then they will not be lost in the next world (Soroush, 1994, p. 336). Hence, people of other faiths should also be respected because they recognize the Almighty.

Mojtahed-Shabestari: official reading has wilted Islam

The third influential religious thinker of this generation is Muhammad Mojtahed-Shabestari (b. 1936), who ventured outside the hermeneutical perspective and into the camp of human rights advocacy (Vahdat, 2000a). Mojtahed-Shabestari, commonly referred to as Shabestari, is a cleric by training. He studied under Ayatollah Khomeini and 'Allameh Tabataba'i in Qom, where he received both his *ijtihad* and a Ph.D. in philosophy (Sadri, 2002). After the Revolution, he was elected to the first Islamic Parliament and became editor of the journal *Andisheh-ye Islam* [*Islamic Thought*], but he retired from politics in 1984. He became a professor of theology at the University of Tehran until he was dismissed in 2006 during the presidency of the conservative populist Mahmoud Ahmedinajad.

Despite his more advanced age, Shabestari has moved much closer to the human rights camp than either Kadivar or Soroush, and his writings have pointed to the limitations of Islamic law. Like Soroush, he expands upon the spiritual dimensions of Islam, suggesting that official readings of religion – by which he means government speeches, sermons, lectures delivered on the state-controlled radio and television stations, and editorials in state newspapers – have wilted Islam and deprived it of its vitality. Mojtahed-Shabestari argues that Islam can have multiple readings and "every reading of religion can be critiqued and none can be excluded." (Mojtahed-Shabestari, 2002, p. 7).

Unlike Kadivar, Shabestari in his earlier works had stated explicitly that *fiqh* [Islamic law] cannot be completely adapted to the needs of the modern world. Shabestari is well versed in poststructuralist critiques of modernity but also has no illusions about progress.

> Modern civilization cannot be defined as a world in which the goals of humanity progress toward the elimination of hunger, disease, and other such maladies because the truth is that no one knows how far and in which ways modernity will push ahead.
>
> *(Mojtahed-Shabestari, 2002, p. 15)*

Nevertheless, he sees no alternative. One does not have to give up religion to live in this modern world, but one cannot live under the illusion that the route to modernity is through religious progress and development, either. Modernity begins with the acceptance of a democratic form of government, which for him is "a mechanism that prevents the accumulation of aggression in certain layers of society" (Mojtahed-Shabestari, 2002, p. 15). Shabestari avoids a head-on confrontation with Khomeini's legacy or with the constitution of the Islamic Republic. Instead, he has argued that problems began when the state ignored the citizens' votes, adopted "an official reading of Islam," and turned *velayat-e faqih* into an absolute and irreproachable concept (Mojtahed-Shabestari, 2002, pp. 30–31).

Shabestari's most important contribution has been a rethinking of concepts such as justice and tolerance as the cornerstones of a future democratic order in Iran. He argues that the very meaning of justice has changed in our modern world and multiple definitions exist for the word. Tolerance [*modara* or *tahamol paziri*] means recognizing the social and political rights of others who may have different values, morality, or religion. "We cannot say we accept Islamic tolerance, but reject Western tolerance. This is a distortion of political concepts that will lead us to a dead end" (Mojtahed-Shabestari, 2002, p. 70). He points out that, in today's political lexicon, tolerance has a particular meaning. First, we have to define it, then we have to say whether we accept it or not. He goes on to say that the same problem exists with regard to terms such as *freedom*, *human rights*, and *democracy* (Mojtahed-Shabestari, 2002, p. 78).

To him, a deeper level of tolerance [*modara-ye mohtava'i*] emerges where the "framers of the constitution, the statesmen, and the powerful do not think that they have a monopoly on religious and political truths. . . . [It emerges where] human rights, in the contemporary meaning, have been accepted" (Mojtahed-Shabestari, 2002, p. 71). He points out that tolerance always suggests a difference in power and authority between the two sides of the equation. One cannot call the attitude of a slave who remains obedient towards his master tolerance, nor can one call the attitude of an old woman who continues to live with her violent and abusive husband tolerant, since neither individual has much power to leave the relationship. Tolerance is the attitude of the more powerful person or a majority population toward a less powerful person or a minority group (Mojtahed-Shabestari, 2002, p. 82).

Shabestari is one of the most forceful advocates for the rights of non-Muslim minorities in predominately Muslim countries. He maintains that people of different religions and genders must be treated the same by the state (Mojtahed-Shabestari, 2002, p. 143).

Shabestari's response is that one cannot call a system of government a democracy when "the state propagates Islam and there is more freedom and equality for believers (Muslims) than for non-believers, for men than for women" (Mojtahed-Shabestari, 2002, p. 145). Mojtahed-Shabestari takes issue with the institution of *marja' taqlid* and suggests that it is not a requirement of the faith. He points out that no official interpreters of religion exist in Sunni Islam and that, likewise in Shi'ism, the last official interpreter of religion had been the *Mahdi* (the Twelfth

Imam, who over a thousand year ago in Shi'i parlance went into occultation [hiding] and will reappear some day at the end of times). The *bab al-ijtihad* [door of interpretation] is, therefore, open, and individuals have a right to read and interpret the Sunnah as they see fit (Mojtahed-Shabestari, 2002, p. 77).

He then compares the concept of fatwa under Islam with the concept of dogma in Roman Catholicism, concluding that Islam can be a more open religion than Roman Catholicism. Catholic dogma invokes the authority of God. Dogmata are seen as God's messages for one's era, and believers are required to follow them. In contrast, fatwas are not about religious beliefs but practical matters, and they can be revoked. If a Shi'i does not trust a particular *mojtahed*, they have the right to follow the fatwa of another (Mojtahed-Shabestari, 2002, pp. 95–97). From this, he concludes Islam to be a more open-ended system than Roman Catholicism. All interpretations of the Qur'an and the Sunnah are acceptable, so long as the prophecy of Muhammad is not denied (Mojtahed-Shabestari, 2002, p. 137).

In the last years of his life, Ayatollah Khomeini argued that the principles of the new Islamist state had priority over even the core religious requirements of the faith. Khomeini made this argument in order to reduce the power of the more traditional ayatollahs who had become dissenters within his Islamist state and objected to his institution of *velayat-e faqih*. Shabestari makes a creative use of this precedent from Khomeini when he argues that nothing really sacrosanct exists about *fiqh* and interpretation of Muslim law. From this, Shabestari concludes that inequalities between Muslims and non-Muslims – and between men and women – in Muslim law should be discarded and other attitudes adopted: "Today we can have a democracy for Muslims, but we cannot have an Islamic democracy" (Mojtahed-Shabestari, 2002, p. 151).

The followers of every monotheistic religion believe that their religion has perfected the other religions, and such readings have led to violent repercussions (Mojtahed-Shabestari, 2002, p. 313). In an innovative reading, Shabestari argues that these are all matters that involve the other world, and not this one. We should not presume to know God's mind and therefore institute discriminatory laws against minority citizens or against women in modern societies based on our assumptions of what God might have in store for them in the other world (Mojtahed-Shabestari, 2002, p. 317). All human beings have a right to live in a world free of persecution. This has no relationship with their presumed standing before God after death. Leaving aside Buddhists and atheists, Shabestari argues as essential that "Jews, Christians, and Muslims recognize one another as human beings with equal rights" and struggle to achieve such rights by extending "human justice according to the principles of human rights" to one another (Mojtahed-Shabestari, 2002, p. 317).

Shabestari is a strong defender of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, and notes the pioneering role of Eleanor Roosevelt in the creation of this document (Mojtahed-Shabestari, 2002, pp. 207–222). In a chapter entitled "Muslims Must Recognize Human Rights," he discusses this at length, suggesting that Muslims must use it to re-examine Islamic precepts, to discard some, and to redefine others. He argues further that notions such as religious and political freedoms are new concepts that did not exist in the era of the Prophet, but are products of our modern civilization. Hence, one may conclude that the Prophet was silent about such issues. He concedes that, in early Islam, non-Muslims were deprived of religious and political rights. The Prophet destroyed the idols in the temple of Mecca and placed a special tax [*jazziyeh*] on Jews and Christians. But he also insists that in the Prophet's time, people did not live in a world where political or religious freedoms were an option (Mojtahed-Shabestari, 2002, p. 276). He additionally criticizes the entrenched idea that Shi'i Muslims should *taqlid* [imitate] a religious leader (Mojtahed-Shabestari, 2002, p. 287).

Ever since the 1906 Iranian Constitutional Revolution, one of the most persistent claims of conservative clerics has been that the modern notion of freedom leads to immorality and sexual promiscuity.[1] Shabestari also refutes this argument. Islam need not adopt all the freedoms of the West, but it also must not curtail civil rights in the name of preservation of morality. Shabestari is a strong critic of those who view the hijab as a requirement of faith for women. He believes that the whole issue of hijab has to be rethought and complains that government authorities "have turned the question of *hijab* into an enormous and insoluble political problem in our nation!" (Mojtahed-Shabestari, 2002, p. 306). He argues that, in the name of morality, one cannot limit freedoms by "crushing basic liberties such as freedom of expression, freedom of political organization, freedom of participation, freedom of religion, and so forth, at which point we end up with a totalitarian, authoritarian, and anti-democratic system of government" (Mojtahed-Shabestari, 2002, p. 337).

Having refuted an orthodox notion of God, Shabestari embraces a mystical view of the Almighty. The relationship of human beings to God is more like "making love," he writes. It has to emerge from the inner depths of a human being and can only be achieved through complete freedom. "Such a religion cannot be an imitation . . . but [is] a choice." Doubt is a natural process for believers who constantly think and rethink their relationship with God (Mojtahed-Shabestari, 2002, p. 325). He sees human beings' relationship to the arts as another metaphor for their relationship to God:

> If a word or an object transforms people, if it opens a "new horizon" for them, then that word is the word of God whether one hears it from the mouth of a prophet or from the mouth of another human being. It is not important who uttered the word. It is not important through what medium it is uttered. . . . It is the word of God if it opens a new way toward God for human beings. . . . When I stand before a work of art for an hour, and I contemplate it, it may conquer my whole being and make me distraught. When I read a poem by Hafez or Rumi, and I contemplate it, and discover secret or hidden meanings in it, the same has happened. In all of these cases my inner horizon has opened up. The word of God does the same.
>
> *(Mojtahed-Shabestari, 2002, p. 325)*

Shabestari is closer to secular advocates of human rights regarding both the rights of non-Muslim minorities and women. He has emphasized the limitations of religious laws and the need to accept many secular and democratic principles, but whether his mystical notion of God can overcome the hard-liners' *fiqh*-based concept of religion remains to be seen (Sadri, 2001). However, as I shall show in what follows, he has had a profound impact on the second generation of new religious thinkers, mostly those who live in the diaspora and who have appropriated his ideas and innovative thinking.

Second generation: modern justice and modern mysticism

The debates among Kadivar, Soroush, and Shabestari on the relationship among religion, tolerance, and human rights have continued inside Iran, but blossomed more freely in diaspora publications. The remainder of this chapter will examine the works of Kadivar after he moved to the United States, as well as the writings of another younger religious thinker, Soroush Dabbagh, both of whom have called for unequivocal gender equality.

By the second decade of the 21st century, Kadivar and Abdolkarim Soroush had moved closer to Shabestari's position. Soroush had always been a strong advocate of religious tolerance. He had called for a re-examination of all the tenets of Islam in light of the true spirit of Islam,

which he saw as a concern for other human beings and human decency. He had also made a major contribution to a new and liberal Muslim discourse by arguing that the same religious texts could be read in multiple ways. But Soroush had remained conservative on fundamental gender reforms, and neither he nor Kadivar would touch the subject of the rights of sexual minorities. Kadivar was originally more committed to the letter of the Quran and the Sunnah, and more reluctant to tackle Quranic verses that came into conflict with the full equality of minorities, women, and nonbelievers. But after leaving Iran, he and the new generation of religious thinkers have moved the barrier farther in these arenas.

In his "Revisiting Women's Rights in Islam," Kadivar (2013) divides Quranic verses dealing with women's rights into two categories: (1) verses that treat men and women equally despite their biological differences; and (2) verses that regard women as inferior to men on the basis of their supposed lesser physical abilities, and hence grant them fewer rights in public and private realms. Kadivar argues that Muslim theologians and scholars have ignored the more egalitarian Quranic verses and built a patriarchal body of work that consistently diminished women's rights. Moreover, he suggests that these verses that do discriminate against women are not eternal or immutable. Following Soroush and Shabestari, he points out that Quranic verses are debatable and ought to conform to the social norms of the time. Hence in our modern world, Quranic literalism is "indefensible and unjustified" (Kadivar, 2013, p. 231).

He moves on to make a distinction between premodern notions of justice, which he calls desert justice, and modern ones. He notes that premodern justice was based on social hierarchies, a presumption of inherent differences in presumed physical and mental capabilities. People were treated according to their social status in that society. Thus, treating a slave holder and an enslaved person equally was deemed preposterous and unjust. Currently, he writes, "[We know that men and women,] given similar opportunities, have a similar potential to grow and to attain perfection" (Kadivar, 2013, p. 225). Kadivar uses his authority as a *mujtahid* to rule that "verses that apparently imply legal inequality and greater legal rights for men should be considered temporary rulings whose validity has expired" (Kadivar, 2013, p. 232). He also issues a much broader ruling to cover most forms of discrimination in our modern world:

> Although women differ from men physically and psychologically, they are entitled to equal rights because they are human, and it is their humanity – not gender, color, race, class, religion, political ideology – that carries rights, duties, dignity, and trust and divine vice- regency. This position is more consistent with the Quranic spirit and the Islamic standard.
>
> *(Kadivar, 2013, p. 232)*

Soroush Dabbagh (b. 1974), the youngest member of this second generation, is the son of Abdolkarim Soroush. Born in London, Dabbagh grew up in post-Revolutionary Iran in the 1980s during the time when his father was an influential regime ideologue. Dabbagh attended school with the children of leaders of the Islamic Republic in the 1980s. He witnessed the gradual transformation of his father into a political dissident and the resulting innuendos and physical attacks on him, which ultimately led father and son to go into exile. Dabbagh is thus intimately familiar with the ideologies and discourses of the Islamic Republic and of the Reformists. He received a Ph.D. in pharmacology and also pursued his passion in the humanities. Eventually, he went to Britain and in 2006 received a second Ph.D. in philosophy from Warwick University. He is currently teaching in Canada.

While paying tribute to Shariati, Dabbagh distances himself from his politicized and ideological Shi'ism and instead follows the hermeneutical traditions of his father and Shabestari.

Dabbagh makes a clean break from generations of religious thinkers such as Mehdi Bazargan and Yadollah Sahabi, who had tried to construct a rational and scientific explanation for Quranic verses on matters such as the creation of the universe and humankind. Instead, he states in the manner of the French Enlightenment that the purpose of the Quran has never been to provide a scientific or philosophic explanation of the universe and humanity. It is the ethical message of the Quran that needs to be recreated for each time. "To study philosophy and sciences, we must search for books that are about such sciences. . . . Religion is not supposed to be a supermarket whose shelves are stocked with every product" (as cited in Tabataba'i, 2018, p. 296).

He introduces the field of religious studies to his Iranian readers and points out that a religious thinker need not be a religious believer or practitioner. Instead, he must have the following attributes: (1) awareness and engagement with religious tenets and practices; (2) sympathy for a (Muslim) liberation theology; and (3) scholarly training in the humanities and the philosophical and theological traditions of the modern world (Tabataba'i, 2018, p. 320). This bold statement by Dabbagh, that a religious thinker need not be a believer, has led to serious criticism of his work by other reformers inside Iran, such as Mohammad Quchani (Parsine, 2015).

Dabbagh calls himself a practitioner of a minimalist view of the *sharia*. He believes that, if a conduct or opinion is not in "absolute opposition to Islamic traditions," one ought to find a place for it in the "tumultuous and running river of *fiqh*" (Dabbagh, 2018, p. 122). He defines morality in a different manner than that of previous Muslim thinkers but in accordance with the ethics of reciprocity and the Golden Rule, or the principle that you must treat others as you want to be treated yourself. An action that does not harm oneself or others may be deemed ethical and moral, even if it breaks with centuries of tradition.

One key contribution from Dabbagh is seen in his essays on modern mysticism [*erfān-e modern*] and the key place of love and empathy in that discourse (Dabbagh, 2018). Classical mysticism was constructed on the dualism between this earthly world and the other ethereal world. The way to reach God was to isolate oneself from worldly pursuits and pleasures. Thus, asceticism has always held an important place in mystical fellowships. Love is also a prerequisite to the ultimate unification with God. As a Sufi scholar, Annemarie Schimmel has pointed out that, in Persianate mystical traditions, God is a hidden treasure and a beloved; He needed to be loved for His Own perfection (Schimmel, 1975, pp. 290–291). For a seeker, falling in love in this world is ultimately a practice, a bridge, to the higher pursuit of falling in love with the divine beloved. It is not an end in itself.

Dabbagh argues for a modern worldly mysticism whereby issues of "flesh-and-blood mortals" take center stage (Dabbagh, 2018, p. 65). One must deeply and passionately care about the world and the people in it and engage with the social issues of one's time in order to make this world a better place. This new Muslim spirituality, in the tradition of Christian existentialism and of celebrated writers and thinkers such as Fyodor Dostoevsky and Gabriel Garcia-Marquez, pays keen attention to the suffering of others and turns love for humankind into a key component of its spirituality. Dabbagh was influenced by the Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, who wrote of the post-Holocaust morality and the notion that one must truly see others, and touch and feel their problems and concerns, before one can understand oneself – and that the responsibility toward others comes before any objective search for truth (Dabbagh, 2018, p. 64). In Dabbagh's view, flickers of such a mysticism exist within classical Persian mysticism, but these sparks have yet to become a fully-formed modern Muslim mysticism:

> While in traditional Islamic mysticism concepts such as fidelity, kindness, and affection toward other human beings are discussed, and great emphasis is played on rituals such as generosity (fotuvat) and chivalry (javanmardi), the idea that paying attention to the

> pain and suffering of others should be a central and necessary condition of behavior of the seeker is not a central concept.
>
> *(Dabbagh, 2018, p. 67)*

The centrality of human love and empathy in Dabbagh's work has led him to address human rights and gender concerns from a different angle than his predecessors. He writes that, 60 years after the ratification of the Declaration of Human Rights, the idea that a person could be killed because he changed his religion or his political views is preposterous. One may disagree with such a person, even consider them immoral, but that does not mean one has the right to imprison or murder such a convert (Dabbagh, 2018, p. 99).

Likewise, Dabbagh's writings on women's rights move beyond a liberal position on the hijab. He does point out that a woman's decision not to cover her head and neck should not be seen as a sign of immodesty or immorality; nor should the observance of the hijab be equated with morality and piety. He also blames the Islamist state for placing the burden of proper morality only on women and not on men (Dabbagh, 2017), but then he moves into new territory by connecting the centrality of love in his discourse on heterosexual non-marital cohabitation, which has become much more common among the urban middle classes of Iran. Such unions are dubbed "white marriages" in Iran because the page on the identity card where a person's marriage status is indicated is left blank (i.e., white). The government and traditional clerics have declared such relations illegal and immoral. Dabbagh, who prefers to call them *'urfi* marriages, connects them to earlier customary marriages in Iran and the Muslim world (Dabbagh, 2018, p. 106).

In his view, such unions ought to be encouraged, provided that the two make a moral commitment to one another. Dabbagh points out that an '*urfi* union might result in a formal marriage, or it might break up if the couple decide they are incompatible. In distinguishing such relations from Shi'i temporary marriages (*mut'a* unions, or *sigheh* in Iran), he points out that, in the latter, the man owns the woman and regards her as his property. She is a sexual object and not a companion. In contrast, in white/ *'urfi* marriages, sexual relations are only one part of the union. The man does not own the woman, and the two become each other's companion and compatriot. Drawing on years of living in diaspora and witnessing such cohabitations among North Americans and Europeans, he reminds his Iranian readers that two ethical principles maintain such relations: a commitment to fidelity and a promise not to harm the other person. These two ethical commitments turn the relationship into a moral one, and hence such unions ought to be accepted by Iranian society, as well (Dabbagh, 2018, pp. 111–113).

Dabbagh also finds precedents for such unions in Islamic *fiqh*. The Quran speaks of binding oral commitments [*aqd-e mo'ātāti*] between two people, and such a concept can and has been used to religiously sanction such unions (Dabbagh, 2018, p. 106). He points out that a number of legal issues have to be worked out, such as paternity and property rights of any children born of such a union. But he maintains that no religious impediment exists for either the union or the legitimacy of the children of such unions. The public (meaning mainly parents and the extended family) and the laws of the nation simply have to catch up with this important shift in the institution of marriage that has taken place over the last two decades.

Conclusion

In the 1970s, Ali Shariati called for a politically and ideologically committed Islam, and attempted to combine a materialistic reading of Marx with Islamic spirituality as the foundation for a new Islamic utopia. By the late 1980s, religious dissidents had abandoned their hopes for

an Islamic utopia. The Revolution had instead brought about a brutal and authoritarian theocratic regime with little recognition for the rights of the dissidents – not only secular dissidents, but also more tolerant Muslims.

The first generation of the new religious thinkers began by undermining the religious authority of the new system of *velayat-e faqih*. Kadivar interpreted religious texts to argue that *velayat-e faqih* had never been a founding principle of Islam, not for the Prophet, the imams, nor any Sufi or philosophical text. Therefore, a *faqih* did not have the right to rule a whole nation according to his interpretation of the *sharia*. Soroush questioned the very legitimacy and right of a *mojtahed* to interpret religious texts for other Muslims. In his view, the only parts of Qur'an that could not be refuted were belief in God and the essence of the spirit of Islam. This original spirit was centered on human decency and care for one's fellow human beings. Everything else was subject to interpretation. Shabestari, who had studied with Khomeini in Qom, eventually moved closer to the secular human rights camp. He bluntly stated that *fiqh* could not answer the needs and demands of modern times. Moreover, he argued that modern concepts such as political freedom, human rights, tolerance, and democracy were unified philosophical concepts. They either had to be accepted in their entirety or rejected. Democracy for Muslim people can exist, but an Islamic democracy cannot. A state that propagates religion cannot be called democratic. As long as the prophecy of Muhammad goes undenied, all other parts of the Qur'an and Sunnah that did not conform with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are open to questioning and rethinking. Despite their bold statements on religious tolerance and human rights, which landed them in prison or led to their internal or external exile, the first generation was extremely careful not to cross what was known as the "red line": demanding complete equality for the women and non-Muslims of Iran, let alone sexual minorities.

The second generation finally made the provocative move to address these concerns, starting with Kadivar, who wrote about equal rights for women and non-Muslims after he moved abroad. He argued the Quranic verses that uphold a patriarchal view regarding women and gender and other religious doctrines that discriminate based on gender, color, race, class, religion, or political ideology to be "indefensible and unjustified" (Kadivar, 2013, p. 231). Dabbagh recognized the Golden Rule as the kernel of Islam and placed great emphasis on love and empathy. In this view, humans' responsibility to others comes before the search for truth. The centrality of love led him to call for recognition of consensual heterosexual unions that are not consecrated by law but that maintain an ethnically committed relationship.

A number of social, economic, and political factors contributed to the 1979 Revolution. Among these was public anger towards the new gender norms and sexual mores that had emerged during the Pahlavi regime, specifically the dramatic entry of unveiled urban women into the public sphere. Ayatollah Khomeini's base was composed of men and women from the more traditional sectors of society who abhorred these new gender norms, and they enthusiastically embraced his leadership. Their mutual goal was to bring about a new regime of morality that disallowed such conducts and pushed women's rights back to the early 1930s. In this sense, the pronouncements of the new religious thinkers on gender and women's rights break some of the strongest taboos in Iranian society, and the degree to which they have been accepted by the general public suggests that a major shift in public thinking has occurred.

Note

1 For the response to this critique by constitutionalists, especially advocates of women's rights, see Afary (1996, ch. 7).

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24

LIBERAL TRENDS ON THE CONTEMPORARY MUSLIM INDIAN SUBCONTINENT

S. M. Mehboobul Hassan Bukhari

Introduction

The chapter seeks to expound the recent relationship between Islam and liberalism in recent postcolonial Muslim South Asia. Needless to say, the Indian subcontinent has been quite active in producing rich Islamic thought. This is even truer in the context of colonial and postcolonial discourses. Muslim engagement with liberalism as the single dominant ideology has been deep and diverse.

Liberalism has been a contested ideology, not only in the West but also elsewhere in the world. As a systematic political creed, liberalism came into currency in the 19th-century Western European milieu. Since then, it has undergone many transformations, revisions, and reorganizations. Thus, liberalism is an ideology that was contested, defended, and reformed within the West. After the end of the Cold War, liberalism was represented as the end of history, the only triumphant ideology. However, the triumphant status of liberalism was challenged by the *clash of civilizations* thesis, Islam's equal claim to representing civilization.

The Orientalist essentialist scholarship has monolithically represented Islam as terrifying, ignorant, and backward in the academic literature produced in Western languages. Diversity quickly replaced the monolithic representation. Now one understanding of Islam is that of terror, but at the same time another understanding of Islam supports democracy, freedom of speech, women's rights, and more. The latter understanding of Islam, which is in close proximity with Western liberal values, was deemed a paradigm shift in the academic study of Islam. The paradigm shift shows the face of Islam in compatibility with the civilized West.

However, the new representations of Islam have further been classified into the categories of friends and foes. Revivalists and traditionalists have been projected as foes and thus as undesirable, whereas secularists and liberals have received friendly treatment and support. Policies have been drafted to encourage friends against foes. The symbiosis of Islam with liberalism either as Islamic liberalism or liberal Islam in the final quarter of the 20th century seems to stand out as these representations looked to win the favor of the powerful liberal West.

Paradigm shift: studies on liberalism and Islam

The literature exploring the relationship between liberalism and Islam began to appear in the last quarter of the 20th century.[1] Leonard Binder's *Islamic Liberalism* (1988) attempted to map

out the possibilities of liberating the Middle East from the shackles of traditional and revivalist Islam. His study focused on the Middle East. Binder argued liberalizing the Middle East to only be possible if Islam is interpreted liberally. The liberal interpretation of Islam outlined by Binder in Muslim thinkers has been influenced by the Western tradition of liberalism, and thus implies Western standards.

Charles Kurzman's *Liberal Islam* challenges Binder's contention of Islamic liberalism being a subdiscipline of Western liberalism. Assuming liberal values to be trans-historical, Kurzman argued that Islam's leaning toward liberal ideals is not necessarily due to Western influence. For him, Muslims have concerns paralleling those of Western liberalism, such as separation of religion and politics, "support for democracy, guarantees of the rights of women and non-Muslims. . ., defence of freedom of thought and belief in the potential for human progress" (Kurzman, 1998, p. 4). The shared concerns do not necessarily imply that Muslims are imitating the West. Thus, understanding liberal Islam as a subdiscipline of Islam is not contradictory. Kurzman's anthology encompasses all major regions of the Muslim world, though weaved around themes based on Western experience and idealism. Kurzman's study was hesitant to uncover the colonial context in which disciplinary institutions and practices had made liberal ideals rational for Muslim reformists. Binder and Kurzman's urge to frame Muslims around liberal vectors appears to be more than an epistemological enterprise. In addition, both authors have been reluctant to examine the contemporary marriage of liberalism and capitalism as a form of hegemony.

Before outlining contemporary trends in receiving liberal values in the Muslim subcontinent, discussing the background in which these contemporary trends had appeared would be useful.

The historical background of liberalism on the subcontinent

Many liberal Muslim intellectuals in general, and South Asian Muslims in particular, refer to Shah Wali-Allah (1703–1762), the eminent 18th-century scholar, as their inspiration. For Wali-Allah, understanding and disseminating Islam should be done according to the principle of reasonable adaptation (i.e., presenting Islam in an acceptable vocabulary of the age and people). Under *ijtihad*, human reason and social organization are combined to meet the challenge of the contemporary age. Liberal intellectuals celebrate Wali-Allah's emphasis on *ijtihad*, human reason and the urge for adjustment to the local conditions. However, they disagree with Wali-Allah's confidence in the ability of traditional Islamic scholarship to meet the challenges of the contemporary world.

After the successful transition of the East India Company to Victorian Rule on the subcontinent, Syed Ahmad Khan (1836–1898), a renowned Muslim thinker and educationist, employed *ijtihad* to liberate Muslim thought and practices from the shackles of *taqlid* in accordance with the needs of his age. For him, *ijtihad* is an unrestricted Muslim right to reason and differ with others. This right is equally distributed among all members of the Muslim community, provided it is practiced in accordance with the spirit of the age, modern science in this case. The word of God, emphasizes Khan, must be understood along the lines of the work of God. *Ijtihad* gives everyone permission to challenge past interpretations and practices if understood alongside the existing colonial science and technology. It implies the legitimacy of all interpretations as they emanate from the right to reason and differ. His freedom of thought – the equal right to interpret the word of God – and critical attitude toward authority in the form of past interpretations of Islam made him a model for later liberalist sympathizers. To instill openness and its reproduction, Khan established the Muhammadan Anglo Oriental College. Note that an important concern here is how the needs of the age are understood and interpreted. To resist

European rule or acquiesce to it or to reform traditional schools or establish new ones is a matter of interpretation.

The 18th-century Shah Wali-Allah and other subcontinent scholars were confident in Islam's self-sufficient ability to meet the challenges of the day. They had been less exposed to the Western sciences and modernity. In contrast, the 19th-century thinkers partially experienced modernity and the impact of science during British colonialism. They were critical of the traditional scholarship of Islam and influenced by modernity and Western sciences, military technology, and medicine. They were relatively uncritical of the West. Modernity and progress were construed as being neutral.

With the increase of interactions with the West in the context of the presence of colonial masters on the subcontinent, as well as Muslims' journeys to the West, particularly their experiences at Western universities, the early 20th-century Muslim scholars started to become sensitive about the fallible nature of Western values. They had now become critical of the West, as well as of traditional Islam. In pre-partitioned India, Muhammad Iqbal (1878–1938), the poet and the philosopher, inspired many toward free thinking and individualism. Iqbal first graduated from Punjab University (in present-day Pakistan) and then from Oxford University in the United Kingdom (UK). Next, he acquired his Ph.D. from Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, Germany. For Iqbal, the principle of adjusting to the present lay in Islam's concept of *ijtihad*. Any limits to *ijtihad* are tantamount to murder Islamic scholarship. Iqbal idealized neither the West nor the East. To him, the West suffered from materialism and the East lacked creative thinking. Careful *ijtihad* may enable Muslims to adapt to the good of the age (perhaps the combination of the best of the East and the West). However, Iqbal warned that he individual and self should not be compromised in this process for the welfare of the community. Individualism begins to appear here as a value.

Contemporary trends in the Muslim subcontinent

In the latter half of the 20th century, Muslims were exposed to modern education at universities both on the subcontinent and in the West. As the post-partition debates reflect, the liberal Muslims had managed to achieve power – state machinery, universities and research, and policy institutions – to counter the traditional understanding of Islam. Most of them had graduated from elite Western universities. Some of them managed to teach at different departments of Islamic and religious studies in Western universities that had newly opened. They started to get their works published in English through reputable publishing houses. They studied Islam by applying non-religious methods. Though the West had partially lost its ideal image in their sight, abstract liberal values still continued to appeal to them.

The political and intellectual elite of the newly born Pakistan was fully committed to both Islam and abstract liberal values. Without appropriately working things out, the politico-intellectual elite took Islam and liberalism as one and the same thing. In 1949, almost two years after the birth of Pakistan, abstract liberal values such as freedom, equality, tolerance, and social justice were primarily embodied in the Objectives Resolution – an outline of the objectives of the future constitution of Pakistan – and then in Pakistan's later constitutions (1956, 1962, 1973) without any substantial changes. The brief mention of liberal core values was accompanied by the phrase "as enunciated by Islam." It gave rise to a multitude of questions, concerns, and sensibilities. For instance, what does "by Islam" mean? What kind of freedom, equality, and tolerance does Islam advocate? Do Islam and the West share the same meanings for these values, or do Muslims understand these values differently? And to what extent were the socio-economic and political conditions of the global world able to contribute to the shifts and twists in this debate?

These questions – and their answers and criticisms – formulated the main core of the debates that later took place in Pakistan.

In the second half of 20th century, Pakistan's reception of liberalism was diverse. For some, abstract liberal values and Islamic norms are one and the same thing. This thought formulates the compatibility trend discussed in this chapter. The values of freedom, equality, and progress are inherently good and compatible with Islam. Any interpretation of Islam that departs from these values is tantamount to departure from Islam. Fazlur Rahman epitomized this trend. For others, liberalism was a Western rhetoric operating as a meta-narrative in postcolonial spaces in general and Muslim postcolonial cultures in particular. Liberalism as a meta-narrative had been imposed without the free choice of the inhabitants of these cultures. Islam as a better alternative narrative could challenge this meta-narrative. The Islamic narrative offers a different but better experience of freedom and human rights. Both narratives are equal and can learn from each other. The rhetoric character of liberalism and its inseparability from capitalism is considered a good opportunity to see off the white supremacy of the West. This brings us to the trend of Muslim identity. Arifa Farid was an exponent of this position. Still others believed knowing the contingent, rhetorical, and imperial character of the liberal narrative to be a good opportunity for Muslim scholars to abandon the liberal-capitalist nexus in its totality. Reinterpretation or dialogue in these circumstances was considered irrational (i.e., the final trend of conflict, which will be discussed in this chapter). Javed Akber Ansari championed this position.

Compatibility of liberal values

In contemporary Muslim South Asia, an uncompromising support for liberal ideals and values had emanated from one influential thinker known as 'The child of enlightenment,' Fazlur Rahman (1919–1988) of Karachi and Chicago; he is a reference point for many contemporary Muslim thinkers in the region and worldwide. He was born to a traditional family in the Hazara region now part of Pakistan. His father was a traditionally trained Islamic scholar. Rahman completed traditional Islamic curriculum privately under his father's supervision. He then obtained his bachelor's and master's degrees in Arabic from Punjab University in Lahore. In 1946, he was able to study modern Western thought at Oxford, where he obtained his Ph.D. in 1949. From 1950–1958, he taught Islamic philosophy at Durham University. In 1961, Muhammad Ayub Khan, the president of Pakistan, installed him as head of the new regime think tank. He was put in charge of liberalizing and modernizing the existing laws of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. He resigned from this project in 1968 after being heavily criticized from different quarters concurrent with the government. He then left for the United States and taught at the University of Chicago as a professor until his death in 1988.

For the economic and political welfare of postcolonial Muslim societies in general, and Pakistan in particular, he addressed issues such as the redistribution of wealth, the status of women and non-Muslims, democracy, and the growth of education. Like Syed Ahmad Khan and Muhammad Iqbal, the traditional approach toward understanding Islam did not satisfy him. He embarked on a project of reconstructing or reinterpreting Islam through *ijtihad* as, according to him, Islam recognizes one's right to reason – freely provided it is grounded in the Quran. To understand Islam correctly and establish a Muslim society on a progressive, egalitarian, and open spirit, using the correct hermeneutical method is imperative.

Rahman had identified the contemporary socio-economic decline of Muslim societies to have been rooted in their intellectual inability to create genuine, original, or adequate Islamic thoughts or worldviews. Due to this lack of methodology, Muslims had incorrectly prioritized historical Islam as normative Islam. Rahman drew a distinction between historical Islam and

normative Islam. Normative Islam is the recognition that Islam is intrinsically a set of transcendent, universal, and abstract norms and values. The Quran contains these norms and values. To pursue trans-historical norms, each Muslim society develops its own polices and strategies in accordance with its own socio-economic and political circumstances. This particular adaptation and materialization of universal normative values in specific Muslim culture and society had been Islam's historical aspect. Historical Islam is the time and place bound to the socio-economic context that is peculiar to each particular society. Thus, historical Islam is not an essential objective of the Quran. Nor is it binding for other societies. Rahman illustrated the absolute and universal aspect of normative Islam through this distinction. Normative, or 'ideal,' Islam is binding for every Muslim society. Therefore, contemporary Muslim societies should explore the normative/ideal Islam and develop policies to materialize it by taking into consideration the prevailing contexts.

In order to develop an Islamic worldview on the basis of normative Islam so as to meet the needs of the age, systematically creating "ethics on the basis of Quran, for without an explicitly formulated ethical system, one can never do justice" in Islam (Rahman, 1979, p. 256) is imperative. Rahman claimed no systematic attempt had been made in the past to formulate Islamic ethics on the basis of the Quran. No single work on Islamic ethics can be pointed to in Islamic history (Rahman, 1979, p. 257). One should, however, note that a systematic formulation of ethics must be done "with due regard to the situation currently in existence" (Rahman, 1979, p. 256). Once the normative principles are derived from the Quran, then the formulation of economics, politics, law, and philosophy should accordingly be carried out for the Muslim world. He cautioned that, unlike in the past, no compromises should be made in the name of political or legal objectives while building the Islamic worldview.

To derive ethical norms and values (i.e., normative Islam) from the Quran and build an Islamic worldview, Rahman emphasized the significance of using the correct rational hermeneutical method. He inaugurated the double movement theory of hermeneutics. Accordingly, the first movement is directed toward exploring the micro- and macrosocio-economic context of society and the world with all its complexities at the time the Quran had been revealed. Different occasions and the abrogation of various verses of the Quran help in exploring these aspects. The particular occasions for the revelation of Quranic verses "at a point in history does not exhaust their practical impact or one might even say, their meaning" (Rahman, 1982, p. 5). The first movement generates a coherent narrative for the normative Islam underlying its various injunctions. The second movement is directed toward the application of normative principles in the contemporary socio-economic context of the one reading the Quran. Here is where the dialogues of revelation and history (universal normative values being applied in a changing world) take place. Rahman emphasized that, in principle, the application of normative values ought to be carried out by taking full account of the potentialities of circumstances. Interestingly, Rahman had remained inarticulate regarding the complexities of application, as well as the potentialities of contemporary conditions.

Rahman's double movement theory was a means to the ultimate end of his campaign, namely Islamic reconstruction for historicizing revelation. The history-revelation dialogue gives birth to new and innovative socio-moral values that will eventually enable contemporary Muslim societies to link with the West. Put simply, the double movement theory substitutes historical or customary Islam with a set of abstract social and ethical values linked "positively with the broad ideals of rational, liberal, and humanitarian progress" (Rahman, 1975, as cited in Zaman, 2014, p. 16). In other words, newly created values are anchored in the liberal (i.e., left liberal) canon or Rawlsian model (Moosa, 2000, p. 23). The revelation-history dialogue, namely the systematic hermeneutical engagement with the Quran, creates new values: basic individual freedom,

egalitarianism, socio-economic justice, freedom of thought and speech, potential for human progress, and rights for women and non-Muslims. For Rahman, truth is singular with multiple expressions. Accordingly, the contemporary expression of truth appears as liberal capitalism.

Rahman uncritically advocated the axioms of a free market economy. He realized that capitalist order requires a moral legitimacy that would not be achieved as an automatic process. He urged Muslim scholars and reformers "to infuse onto people a proper sense of endeavor and achievement, [relate proactively the] moral imperatives of Islam to economic problems[, and create a] moral climate [for] economic progress" (Rahman, 1970, p. 4), and argued that "wealth has to be earned and created [which is morally justified, for him, under the] right of private ownership" (Rahman, 1970, p. 4). For Rahman, "acquiring of wealth is good thing, [therefore, people can] own and earn wealth" (Rahman, 1970, p. 5). Nothing morally wrong is contained in accumulation. He "exhorts to exploit the resources of earth and so on [by employing the] right to private ownership" (Rahman, 1970, pp. 4–5).

For Rahman, the principles of "essential human egalitarianism" and social justice underlie social injunctions of Quran (Rahman, 1982, p. 19). The Quran disapproves any distinction between "male and female" and supports "their equal participation in the life and conduct of the community and in any aspect thereof" (Rahman, 1984, p. 4). In expounding views about women, Rahman prefers social convention to the 'official' source of Quran. On women's testimony, he observes that "no matter how much women may develop intellectually, their evidence on principle carry less value than that of a man is an affront to the Quran's purposes of social evolution" (Rahman, 1982, p. 19). For Rahman, monogamy is the normative position of Islam. As the circumstances had changed due to the deaths of Muslim men in early Islam, polygamy had been allowed temporarily. Rahman was the architect of Pakistan's Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (PMFLO) 1961. This law restricted and introduced the procedures for contracts on polygamous marriages and divorce.

Furthermore, *shura* (i.e., mutual deliberation and consultation) is an important normative guiding principle for the process of socio-political decision making in community affairs. The Quran acknowledges not only humans' right to reason but also emphasizes its equal distribution among all participant members of the community. *Shura* is mutual consultation based on discussions and debates on an absolutely equal footing. The Quran refutes elitist forms of consultation in which one dominates over the other. According to Rahman, from this follows that even the head or chief of the community cannot arbitrarily "reject the decision arrived at through *shura*" (Rahman, 1984, p. 5). Rahman categorically disentangled the presumed necessity of *shura* with its political role and the principle of election. The historical association of *shura* with the principle of election has prevented its development as a self-sustaining institution. As a socio-political normative principle, *shura* functions bottom up in a Muslim society and makes it inherently democratic. This normative democratic spirit must be reflected in all institutions of modern Muslim society. Being a normative ideal, expressions coming from *shura* (direct, representative, and deliberative) may vary from time to time and place to place, depending on the prevalent social and political circumstances.

For Rahman, modern democratic institutions are not un-Islamic. His practice and position remained ambivalent. In some places, he argued that the Western model of representative democracy does not befit postcolonial underdeveloped Muslim societies, as the majority of the Muslim masses were illiterate. He advocated for a strong centralized and regulating government, provided it ensures "the spirit of democracy is genuinely and gradually cultivated among people" (Rahman, 2007, p. 654). Rahman himself played the role of philosopher-king in the regime of General Ayub Khan during his ambitious stay from 1961–1968 in Pakistan. In this time, he was observed to have regulated religion for the purpose of the state, as well as free speech for

the press. For him, "Islam is a charter for interference in society and this charter gives to the collective institution of society, i.e. the Government, the right and duty to constantly watch, give direction to and actually mold the social fabric" (Rahman, 1967, p. 107). Islam disallows "the public broadcast of news which is not in the public interest and denounce such practice as a mischievous license calculated to demoralize the people and disunite them" (Rahman, 1967, p. 112). Ironically, these stances radically changed when Rahman advised the government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, then Prime Minister of Pakistan, on the goals of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. He proposed to present and link Islam's socio-moral norms "with the broad ideals of rational, liberal and humanitarian progress" (Rahman, 1975, as cited in Zaman, 2014, p. 16).

From Khan to Rahman (i.e., from the late 19th century to the late 20th century), in conjunction with reason, historicization has emerged as an important investigative tool for new scholarship. Khan emphasized the rational character of Islam more, also adding to it the historical aspect. Rahman insisted that contemporary scholarship must historicize Islam holistically in order to know its essence. Inquiring into how far Rahman had been able to transcend the Orientalist construction of Islam is important (Faruqi, 1968, pp. 110–111). At places, he appears to have presupposed Islam as a religion. The latter is a recent construct with a European history. The category of religion became global due to European colonialism. Rahman postulated that "Islam bears the burden of proving its compatibility with liberal ideals," and never challenged this assumption when expounding his campaign (Mahmood, 2004, p. 74). Rahman was more critical toward the Islamic past and less toward the single dominant perspective driven by liberal and neoliberal capitalist hegemonic forces. Rahman's uncompromising and dogmatic belief in capitalism as a single true interpretation of liberal freedom and human rights may have prevented him from a rigorous and systematic analysis of the present. Analyzing the present (i.e., the prevailing context) is vital because here is where normative Islam is to be applied for the creation of new values and sciences. The inherent and ceaseless recoding process of capitalism has commodified the reconstructed ideals of the normative abstract for its consumption (Deleuze & Guattari, 2009).[2] As a result, reconstruction has become a tool for further exploitation and enslavement (Bukhari, 2019, pp. 106–109). Current hegemonic conditions have taken from Muslims "the agency to determine their own futures" (Moosa, 2000, p. 24). Equally important to note is where this rethinking takes place. In the underdeveloped Muslim world ridden with poverty and genocide, rethinking has been construed as a "luxury" when it fails to address the real issues of the natives (Moosa, 2000, p. 25). Rahman appears to have been guilty of not providing any resistance mechanism against the unfettered dominance of capitalism.

Muslim identity

Arifa Farid (b. 1939), a Karachi-based scholar, has explored the possibilities of a dialogue between Islam and the liberal West on freedom. She was educated in Pakistan and the United States. In 1961, she acquired her M.A. in philosophy from Karachi University (Pakistan) and then in 1974 from the University of Hawaii (United States). Afterward, she obtained her doctorate from the University of Arkansas (United States) in 1985. Between 1991 and 1992, she was awarded an in-residence fellowship at the East-West Center in Hawaii. She has authored several books and articles and taught philosophy as a professor at the University of Karachi until her retirement. In 2007, she also served as a visiting professor at Catholic University in Washington D.C. (United States).

Farid is concerned with the cultural, economic, and political conditions of contemporary liberalism and the Muslim world. Before exploring the transcendent values of good, Farid argues the imperativeness of first knowing how contemporary conditions have come to be what

they are. Knowledge of the forces shaping the contemporary world order is important. In her book, *Liberalism and Islam* (2016), Farid contests the presumed status of liberalism as a master narrative.[3] The liberal narrative with its apparently attractive but intrinsically shallow slogans of open society, democratic polity, and free market economy has played out as the truth in the contemporary world, eventually subordinating its other (i.e., the rest of the world, including the Muslim world). Rather than a free choice, freedom has turned out to be the forced choice imposed on Muslim societies by the neo-imperial West. Farid seems to share with Rahman the belief in the universality of freedom and human rights. However, unlike Rahman, Farid subscribes to the belief that freedom and human rights can be understood and practiced differently from that of the liberal West.

Farid contends freedom in the West to have been understood as an unconditional absolute value, an end in itself and a basic individual human right that requires no rational justification. Quite recently, freedom has become a moral, social, and cultural value (Farid, 2016, p. 43). Today's liberalism is a rhetoric surviving in the capitalist order. Capitalism has hijacked the project of freedom. Liberal freedom has lost its true spirit in its current trajectory, as it now focuses on the "maximization of capital" (Farid, 2016, p. 45). In earlier Western tradition, the true moral meaning/spirit of human freedom is the right to choose, provided that it is exercised through reason. This logic and consistency of the freedom argument does not survive today. Reason has become an instrument for the maximization of capitalism. Neoliberalism as a minor adjustment to the classical liberal narrative has not improved freedom's position. Instead, freedom has been replaced by power. Currently the United States assumes leadership of the liberal ideology that had earlier been a European project. Along with its allies, the United States has imposed the free market on the Muslim world via the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, and the World Bank. In doing so, it has joined hands with capitalism in exploiting the Muslim world. The recent rise of the Muslim and Third worlds is a realization of their exploitation in the name of freedom. The United States has attempted to impose democracy in Iraq. To transform Afghan society into an open society, it has dropped daisy-cutter bombs on Afghans. Force has replaced reason. Coercion has replaced freedom. Tolerance has become the responsibility of the weaker nations. The liberal agenda is being pursued without the will of the people involved (Farid, 2016, p. 54). The end result is the hegemony of the West. Liberal ideology has turned out to be identical with the superiority of the white race and its security concerns.

This individualistic, worldly, commercial, and data-based experience of freedom underlying Western liberalism does not satisfy the Muslim consciousness (Farid, 2016, p. 29). Farid urges that Muslims should understand "the meaning of freedom in the new age's idioms" (Farid, 2016, p. 42). For her, Islam's understanding of freedom is inherently different from that of Western liberalism (Farid, 2016, p. 4). To explore freedom in Islam, she invokes the famous Prussian philosopher Immanuel Kant's (1734–1804) distinction between precepts and concepts. Western freedom, according to Farid, is a concept-oriented freedom. It is defined, understood, practiced, and contested around the concept of freedom,[4] whereas freedom in Islam is based on "authentic live human experiences[, how Muslims] experience [or] feel [to be free]" (Farid, 2016, pp. 29, 44). Unlike the Western egoistic understanding of freedom, Muslims' experience of freedom is communitarian and collective. Muslims feel free when their family unit is intact. A Muslim is ready to sacrifice privacy for the sake of being a good neighbor. Private pleasure, individual success, unrelatedness, and loneliness are a great curse here. Muslims feel free when they fulfill their moral and religious obligations. Muslim culture is based on siblinghood,

> bonds of fraternity, love of children involving sacrifices, . . . kinship relationship, ethics of caring and sharing, respect for the elders and parental authority have their own

> rationality which provide to community members certain experiences of freedom unknown in the West.
>
> *(Farid, 2016, p. 29)*

For Muslims, freedom is a means, not an end in itself. It is a means to actualize moral objectives and the commandments of God. Human freedom is not antinomy to the sovereignty of God. Freedom is the privilege/gift/reward from God to actualize the "universal norms and values . . . [such as] justice, equality and brotherhood deep rooted in human consciousness" (Farid, 2016, p. 56). Freedom is not just a basic human right. Rights and duties are complementary in Islam. Free choice is accompanied by a sense of responsibility that ensures basic norms are not violated.

Farid emphasizes that liberalism and neoliberalism must "learn to respect the sensibilities of other cultures" (Farid, 2016, p. 30). The "other" narratives have equal importance and authenticity. She proposes Islam as a sensible alternative narrative to the liberal ideology. Islam and the West can learn from each other's discourses and experiences. Interestingly, Islam's acclaimed absolute and universal status appears to be at stake here. The West can learn new dimensions of freedom and rights from Muslims, because Islam looks at freedom and human rights from an inherent spiritual view (Farid, 2016, p. 29). The spiritual aspect of Islam can help improve the Western narrative of freedom and human rights. Islam can also learn from the West in developing its disciplines.

Farid's skillful application of the category of history on liberal freedom has exposed its rhetoric and imperial role in the contemporary discourse. The culture-specific and historical character of liberal freedom has turned it into a relative cultural force. Her proposal for a fair dialogue with the West sounds implausible. Dialogue presupposes trust and equality. The rhetoric character of liberal freedom accompanied by imperial interventions has discredited the West in the sight of common Muslims. The sense of equality required for meaningful dialogue also appears to be missing. The present balance of power in the world turns Farid's proposal into a humble plea.

Conflict

Javed Akber Ansari (b. 1960), a Karachi-based political economist and thinker of international repute, has challenged the universal and absolute status of liberal freedom and human rights. He was educated in Pakistan and the UK, with a Ph.D. from the University of Sussex, and an M.Sc. from the London School of Economics, UK. He has worked at the City University of London, the University of Sussex, and several United Nations (UN) agencies. In Pakistan, he has worked with the Federal Ministry of Planning and the University of Karachi. He has authored numerous articles, several UN reports, and more than 15 books.

Like Farid, Ansari is also critical of capitalism's contemporary liberal clothing. Liberal freedom and human rights are the means by which capitalism imposes its discipline and consolidates global capitalist order, which is to say they are not merely rhetorical but also imperial instruments for postcolonial Muslim cultures. They are only mental constructions with no reality at all in themselves. Freedom, though theoretically, opens up the possibilities of any lifestyle one wishes but practically allows only the capitalist form of life. One is free, provided that one "submits himself to capital" and does not challenge its hegemony (Ansari, 2016, p. 14). Individuals are not free to refute freedom, organization of the market, or the state. Any meaning of freedom as value or right that exceeds the jurisdiction of capitalist hegemony is nothing more than a dream. The more capitalism expands, the more oppressive and exploitative it becomes. The UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights enlists the duties of the state for reproducing

capitalist individuality (Ansari, 2011, p. 14). Human rights are formally available but practically inaccessible (Ansari, 2014, p. 28). Resources are necessarily distributed unequally in contemporary capitalist societies. Unemployment increases as the right to work is formally distributed. The formal right of free speech is practically suspended when the space of expression is monopolized by 30 multinational corporations. Huge funding is invested to shape ideas rather than their free expression. The formal right to private property is challenged when multinational companies monopolize property management for capital accumulation. Human rights is a means to ensure that "private moral valuations of individuals are rendered equally trivial and barred from affecting public choices" (Ansari, 2011, p. 17). The consistent failures of human rights to make humans autonomous and free were corrected first with the support of social and economic rights and then by welfare rights, but every new measure to reform human rights turns them into a far-fetched ideal.

Difference is formally permissible for postcolonial consciousness; however, recoding the mechanism of capitalist order homogenizes all differences and integrates them into a grand capitalist regime. Anyone who happens to disobey the law of capital deserves sanctions from the United States. Human rights are not the end in themselves, but rather the instruments of capitalist exploitation. Reason, freedom, and progress are contingent and contextual. These values were produced in a specific socio-political environment of the West between the 16th and 20th centuries. The cultural specificity and historicity of liberal values deprives them from their universal claim. Challenging their global expansion is not irrational.

Having recognized the relative and historic character of freedom, the West has focused on the renewal and reinterpretation of freedom rather than its abandonment (Farid, 2016, p. 53). Unlike Farid and others, Ansari dares to challenge freedom as a genuine goal. In his *Rejecting Freedom and Progress*, Ansari critiques the partial and reluctant criticism of "isolated aspects of capitalist order" premised on postmodern discourses like that of Lyotard (which Farid has also adopted; Ansari, 2016, p. 1). Instead of contesting the contents of freedom, equality, and progress, postmodernism and poststructuralism are happy to challenge the specific forms of capitalism and avoid its total rejection. For Ansari, real change signifies principled and practical rejection of capitalism – namely, its norms, regulatory procedures, and transactional forms – as a way of life.

He recognizes that liberalism/capitalism – along with all its catchy phrases such as human rights, freedom, equality, and progress – is "beginning to implode" and undergoing a legitimacy crisis (Ansari, 2016, p. 164). In this scenario, to re-interpret liberal capitalism with Islamic arguments either for creating a space for dialogue premised on the politics of identity/difference or for validating capitalist values and practices apologetically would be tantamount to murdering Islamic scholarship. These responses happen to keep capitalist values and axioms intact with marginal formal changes. Re-interpretational stances emanate from "ideologically blind" intellectuals who skillfully distort the facts and create a "sense of crisis" in postcolonial Muslim societies (Ansari, 2016, p. 198). These intellectuals deliberately refer to the Muslim world using such vocabulary such as collapsing economy, institutional breakdown, and universal despair.[5] This designed representation (distortion) of facts and figures makes the liberal/capitalist solutions appear indispensable. The liberal/capitalist solution for contemporary Pakistan – namely, the betrayal of Kashmir, acceptance of Indian regional hegemony, and the de-Islamization of society – would merely be the "Bhutanisation of Pakistan" where imperialist-financed NGOs turn Bangladesh into a non-state (Ansari, 2016, p. 198). Put simply, liberal/capitalist solutions are nothing but attempts to integrate 'the other' into the global capitalist order.

Any solution premised in the West's epistemological and ethical values system or Europe's political-economic-historical experiences will not be able to transform the Muslim world in

general or the Muslim subcontinent in particular. The solution must be grounded on Islamic values and historical experiences. For Ansari, the thesis on the clash of civilizations signifies the clash of capitalism and Islam. Ansari argues that Samuel Huntington himself recognized albeit implicitly that Islam has the ability to transcend capitalism completely (Ansari, 2016, p. 1). Seeking complete transcendence is a definitive criticism of capitalism (Ansari, 2016, p. 170). Rejection of capitalism (i.e., the materialized reality of the liberal ideology) involves the construction and consolidation of an Islamic society. For Ansari, "The pursuit of freedom and the maximization of power/pleasure is neither inevitable nor desirable" (Ansari, 2016, p. 165). Ansari insists that the act of rejection must be "firmly rooted in Islamic epistemology" (Ansari, 2016, p. 164). He urges Muslim scholars to develop methodologies to debunk and transcend capitalism in its totality.

Ansari's optimism for total transcendence from capitalism resides in the method and model of 12th-century medieval Muslim thinker Abu Hamid Al Ghazali (d. 1111). Al Ghazali mainly developed two methods of criticism to deflate Greek philosophy. The first of the two is the internal critique. By exploring the assumptions, methods, and implications, Al Ghazali attempted to expose the internal incoherence in Greek thought and philosophy. The internal critique was accompanied by the second method of external critique. On the basis of Islamic thought and values, al Ghazali analyzed the unsaid assumptions and implications of Greek philosophy. According to Ansari, al Ghazali's critique disputed the metaphysical assumptions of Greek philosophers, which thus alienated them in mainstream Sunni Islam. Ansari now urges Muslim scholarship to develop appropriate methodologies to discredit the unstated assumptions about the universality, superiority, and morality of the West.

Ansari's contention of total rejection amounts to moving beyond the thesis of the supremacy of the white race. Nonetheless, the criticisms from Ansari and Farid regarding Western liberalism mainly rely on Frankfurt thinkers' disagreement with mainstream Western thought and do not originate from indigenously developed discourses. Ansari identifies the potentialities in the postcolonial territories of the Muslim subcontinent for total rejection; however, he fails to take comprehensive account of the practical impediments in materializing his campaign. In addition, he has also ignored the implications total rejection has for the Muslim subcontinent while being fully aware of the imperial character of the existing capitalist order.

Conclusion and summary

This chapter has surveyed the contemporary Muslim discourse on liberalism in the socio-economic and cultural-political milieu of Pakistan. In doing so, it has described and analyzed the pertinent challenges and issues in the debate. Basically, the chapter has outlined three key trends. Each trend has been expounded by its leading representative voice. One of these trends, pre-existing compatibility, was pioneered by Fazlur Rahman, who projected liberal values (i.e., individual freedom, human rights, and human progress) as trans-historical and considered 'correctly interpreted' Islam as being in complete harmony with these values. He was skeptical about the traditional methods used for understanding Islam. Understood in this way, Islam can be viewed as the continuity of liberalism. To correct traditional Islam, he employed the category of history to differentiate permanent Islam from time-space–bound Islam. Very surprisingly, he hesitated to contextualize the rise of liberal values in its socio-political context. Instead, he seemed to assume that the burden of proof for showing its compatibility with liberal ideals – the present status quo in the post American world – to lay within Islam. This assumption remained uncontested in his entire campaign. Dogmatic motivation with liberal ideals made his enterprise purely ideal. When the time came to apply these ideals, he looked to have been in a hurry. He

readily imposed from the top down his modernist ideals through the authoritative regime of Ayub Khan. The top-down authoritative imposition of liberal values not only contradicted his ethical project, but also raised doubts about his confidence in the reformed Islam. The top-down enforcement of liberty seriously violates the right of consent and the sense of equality of the native Pakistanis. Freedom without the free choice of the subject sounds strange. Fair process has been ignored. This looks to be a clear departure from the ideals that were quite dear to him.

Can the needs, values, and sensibilities of indigenous Muslims be ignored for so-called freedom and rights? Will any means justify the ends of liberal values? The second trend – Muslim identity – which is represented by Arifa Farid, raises these questions. By resisting the repressive master narrative of liberalism, she proposes Islam as an alternative narrative that is equally rational and self-sufficient. She has brilliantly exposed the cultural relativity of the liberal conceptualization of freedom, along with its ceaseless connection with oppressive capitalism. According to Farid, instead of dialectics, the essence of reason (i.e., the neoliberal-capitalist link or regime) has been turned into rhetoric. By chanting the rhetoric of freedom, the liberal West has been exporting subjugation onto the Muslim world by means of transnational political and financial institutions. The West's egotistical and individualistic interpretation of freedom conflicts with the telos and sensibilities of Islam. For Muslims in Pakistan, being with God is more important than being in the world. Contrary to the liberal West, freedom is a means to achieve God's commandments in Islam. God's sovereignty is not in conflict with freedom. Islam has its own experience of freedom that is totally different from that of the liberal West. Islam's spiritual aspect offers rich and better experiences of freedom and human rights. As an equally valid narrative, Islam must resist the mega-narrative of liberalism. Islam's resistance is good for the West because the West can learn from the Muslim experiences of freedom and rights in order to improve its own discourse. In the same vein, Farid believes that Muslims should also learn from the Western experiences of technology and science. According to Farid, the narrative of Islam is a good means in this way to end the white race supremacy of the West. The liberal values of freedom and rights are viewed here as ahistorical, but not its Western interpretation. Will cultural resistance be enough to resolve Muslim problems? Will dialogue resolve all the problems of the Muslim world? Keeping in view the present balance of power, is there any possibility of a real dialogue in its true spirit between the West and Islam?

The third and final trend – conflict – is discussed in this chapter as advocated and led by Javed Akber Ansari. Ansari deems reinterpreting Islam according to liberal values or dialogue with the liberal West to be irrational after the West's rhetoric and imperial character has been explicitly unmasked. Ansari seeks to move beyond the white supremacy thesis enmeshed in identity politics. Primarily for him, pursuit of freedom and progress are neither inevitable nor desirable values. The liberal campaigns of freedom and human rights are vehicles of Western neo-colonialism. Theoretically, the instruments of rhetoric open up the possibilities for any lifestyle one likes, but in practice, they have removed the agency to act freely. For Ansari, any solution grounded in alien (Western) epistemological discourse is unlikely to be successful. Total transcendence from capitalism is imperative. Complete transcendence must be accompanied by a reconstruction of Islamic epistemology and society on purely Islamic norms. Ansari's optimism is rooted in al Ghazali's model and methodology that had been used to deflate Greek philosophy. Ansari urges Muslim scholars to develop methodologies to debunk and discredit the unstated assumptions of the Western epistemology and axiology.

With the birth of Pakistan, political liberalism was crystalized into its constitutions and legal framework. However, due to a multitude of reasons, the fate of liberalism had remained dark until recently. In the earlier history of Pakistan, liberalism had been projected as pure and

freedom valued. As time passed by, the hegemonic behavior of the West, the double standards of the United States, the dogmatic and pragmatic commitment of intellectuals and the inconsistencies in their practices, and the local sensibilities about traditional Islam all contributed to the limits of liberalism in Pakistan. The diverse and rich but critical engagement with liberalism expressed in the aforementioned three trends showcases the inherent problems and issues in the debate. The latter criticisms of Farid and Ansari must be noted to appear to rely on critical theory, which postulates the Western worldview. How far their criticisms rooted in critical theory support their thesis remains to be seen. Apart from this, Farid's will to resist the dominant Western narrative and Ansari's optimism in Pakistan's indigenous economic potential are positive aspects in this debate. However, Ansari's ignorance about the practical impediments in completely transcending capitalism and its implications in the Muslim world require further exploration.

Notes

1 Some important works besides those mentioned in the body of this chapter include Albert Hourani's (1962) *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1898 to 1939*, Nader Hashmi's (2009) *Islam Secularism and Liberal Democracy*, Andrew F. March's (2009) *Islam and Liberal Citizenship*, Joseph A. Massad's (2015) *Islam in Liberalism* 2015, and Faisal Devji's (2017) edited work *Islam after Liberalism*.
2 I have in mind the argument expressed in *Anti-Oedipus* by French philosophers Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995) and Félix Guattari (1930–1992) regarding the operation of modern capitalism.
3 Joseph A. Massad (2015) has argued in his *Islam in Liberalism* that liberalism has developed its identity while positing itself as Islam's 'other'.
4 Isaiah Berlin proclaimed in his celebrated article "Two Concepts of Liberty" that freedom has more than 200 meanings in the Western tradition. For details, see "Two Concepts of Liberty" in *Four Essays on Liberty* by Isaiah Berlin (1958), *What is Wrong with Negative Freedom* by Charles Taylor in *Philosophy and Human Sciences* (1990), and *Negative and Positive Freedom* by Gerald Mac-Callum Jr. in *Freedom: A Philosophical Anthology* ed. Carter I., Kramer, M.H & Steiner, H. (2007).
5 Problems associated with the representation of 'the other' was the focus of Edward Said (1935–2003) and Gayatri Chakrawati Spivak. They are all troubled by the Western-biased representation of the other.

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SECTION VII

State, civil society, and democracy

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REPRODUCTION OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT IN TURKEY

Major milestones and state-society relations

Necdet Subaşı

Introduction

The ever-existing connection between daily life and thought shows itself when addressing the role of religion. Religious thought cannot be handled independently of intellectual efforts or initiatives. Among the entities that influence and feed into each other, religion finds itself in an idiosyncratic place in many aspects based on the course of daily life and the realm of thought. Most studies on the social formation of religion point to its nature being intertwined with the general course of events in society. The endless continuity of all this uniformity is strongly felt in the shaping of politics, economics, and mentalities.

This study will address the transformation of state-society relations with regard to the social position of religion in Turkey. The state's position toward society in Turkey has been decisive in the development of religious thought, sometimes as a pressure and sometimes as support. In this respect, new forms and tones have emerged in contemporary Turkish religious thought. This chapter will look at these forms of religious thought chronologically.

Search for a new system

Modern Turkey is in fact a result of the Western perspective that existed among the proposals brought to the table to enable revival during the last period of the Ottoman Empire. In this context, the place of religion in Turkey has always been controversial. The current situation can easily be observed to be mostly related to interventions aimed at restricting the scope of religion and all these restrictive steps to have sped up the desired result. Religion has always been portrayed as a phenomenon requiring explanation. From another perspective, it is also continuously monitored in terms of its presence, influence, and outcomes. However, religion has had an exceptional role and function in the Ottoman social structure as the source of legitimacy for culture and politics. Within this scope, Islam as a religion could not be expected to be opened to discussion within everyday thought and imagination, or to be made part of an unusual bargain that would validate certain visions, until the beginning of the 19th century.

Ottoman modernization was not only experienced as a rescue mission in this respect, but also with the hope of helping re-attain a reality that was deemed lost. In addition, the meaning

inherent in the Ottoman pragmatism that had overlapped Ottoman religiosity provoked and encouraged the stand behind a legitimate and traceable formulation that would compensate for the frustration, embarrassment, and exhaustion felt as a result of being defeated by the West.

Religion has always been an ominous subject throughout the process of Turkish modernization. Critical objections to Westernization were seen and rejected as reflections of backwardness and aspirations for an archaic order. Therefore, backwardness became the ultimate label for those who longed for an archaic order and to use religion as a privileged discourse. Modernization has been used for a long time as an anti-religion discourse in Turkey. Proponents of modernization have not refrained from rejecting any structure that they regard as an obstacle to modernization. Religion stands front and center among these rejected structures. Traditional mindsets, customs, traditions, and – undoubtedly – religion are viewed as the main sources for anti-modernization discourses. For this reason, the handling of religion along the axis of modernization is usually shaped by its negative definition.

The reasonable and the recognized

The attempt to approve modernity with religious priorities attempted to decipher and prove the ever-existing modern nature of Islam. Ottoman modernizers' discoveries and observations about the progressive aspects of Islam were updated, and thus, religion was made a principal element of modernity, so much so that modernization without religion was regarded as impossible. Within this framework, Islam as a religion had been transformed into an element that complements modernization. And eventually, modernization attempts became tied to religion.

Turkish modernization also has a problematic past in its relationship with Ottoman religiosity. The Ottomans' religious background could not provide the progress required, and religion often became a hindrance to the modern demands for competing with contemporary states. For this reason, the outlook of the modernization project does not put forth an adequate explanation within the Ottoman social structure regarding the functionality of religion. In fact, Ottoman modernization considered a specific Westernization necessary for the emancipation of the *ummah*. Nevertheless, this Westernization draws attention to its specificity above all. The science of the West would be accepted, but its morality would be rejected.

The state of affairs took a completely opposite turn during the Republican modernization period. Modernization became essential, and religion was reduced to playing a specific function whenever deemed necessary. The main goal was to reach the level of a contemporary civilization. This goal itself is part of modernity and can be safely achieved only through Westernization. The insistence of the new regime on modernization would soon be met with a reaction that justified tradition by using religious expressions. Opposite the traditional/social reflexes resisting radical modernization, the Republic also displayed a resistance that mobilized its own system of reference (Reed, 1995).

While the Republic aimed to remove religion from being a political reference within secularism, which is considered one of the guarantors of modernity, it wanted to operate secularism so as to alienate religion from social life. The political will, disconnecting the state and everyday life from the power of religion, intended to establish public security in this way. In the understanding of secularism in Turkish modernization, the separation of religion from state affairs is not seen enough, as Islam has a specific dimension that can be regarded as very worldly for establishing and surrounding daily life. Practices of radical secularism for the removal of religious belonging from society rapidly declined against the background of tradition meeting with religion. The new meanings that secularism had gained in the Turkish political experience and

the secular forms of religiosity surprisingly revealed hybrid patterns arising from the complex relations of Islam and modernity (Göle, 1998).

Turkish modernization has always been claimed to have had a unique method. These claims accentuate that the modern Republic of Turkey had made a series of decisions to design the political and public roles of religion, unlike in Ottoman modernization. According to these approaches and despite the distance it placed between religious structures and the state, secularism has never been able to produce a modern, Western concept of religious freedom whereby all kinds of religious beliefs would be tolerated (Hodgson, 1993, pp. 3, 287).

The mystification of ambiguity

The ambiguity that emerged alongside the cultural upheavals is striking with regards to the interventions in the structural character of religiosity. In this context, the cultural/religious structure and indications of the people's Islam were insistently pushed, the images for the mechanisms of an exalted Islam were shaken, and their existing prestige was either destroyed or eroded as much as possible. In fact, this insistence on modernization reveals the determination to reach a modern world.

The radicalism that determined the style of change for the modernist Republican elite has often been associated with the stiffness and superficiality that it creates. Due to the reforms that clearly disrupted religious life, not only the main actors of spirituality, but also the whole discourse and thought that these representations followed, had been condemned (Subaşı, 2017).

Discussing the relationships among religion, the state, and society on the grounds that it transforms servants into citizens indeed puts forth important data for observing the direction of non-Western modernity. The single-party period represents a supra-historical ideal period considered as the golden age of the Republic and evokes calls for a return to it from many Kemalists today. In this period, very clear and determined policies were followed regarding secularism, and every step was taken to eliminate the presence of religion from the state structure.

In the founding universe of the Republic, a suitable medium for religion limited to a specific field was to be followed in light of the reformist attempts that can be considered partially innovative such as having the Quran read and worship celebrated in Turkish; efforts to present these to the public occurred through another paradigm. However, the efforts to legitimize the call for prayer in Turkish should be noted to have not had clear support from the Directorate of Religious Affairs, and even the attempts to suppress the religious communities and orders that were often emphasized as illegitimate could not receive similar support (Toprak, 2019).

Islamist discourses

The idea of Islamism emerged as a flash of sensibility concurrently with Ottoman modernization and progressed with the intellectual trials and practices for overcoming the so-called poor state of Islam (Aktay, 2004). Islamist discourse was ineffective in the new period, at least in the beginning. A serious delay had occurred in guiding society, whose relationship with religion had been re-coded in line with the modern demands of the state.

Islamism was the language of solid defense and quests in the Ottoman hinterland. A special effort for the pioneers of Republican Islamism was to occur in order to distinguish Islam as both a core value and a reference point that should be protected. Indeed, after a series of attempts that resulted in the relative separation of religion from social life, the question of the degree to which a decisive religiosity could be maintained became a serious religious-intellectual issue that had been frequently discussed since the emergence of the journal *Sebilurreshad*. When

carefully examining the main routes of the new discourse on Islamism that started with *Sebilurreshad* and developed with some other journals such as *The Great East*, *Resurrection*, and *Islam and Literature*, religion can easily be seen to have been the main debate marking the distressful times flowing from the single-party period to the multi-party period (Subaşı, 2004). The motto of the National Vision discourse was Morality and Spirituality; this was also effectively transferred to public politics under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan toward the 1970s.

From the 1940s onward, religion came to the agenda in politics as a force and social reality. At this stage, discussions began regarding what kind of discourse the government should make on religion. This has had several consequences, one of these being the emergence of Imam Hatip schools (Subaşı, 2005).

Current religious life in the 2000s in Turkey offers significant data for drawing a comparison with the state's decisions on religion in the early years of the Republic. The state had a firm policy about religion and supported certain attempts regarding religion in the later periods. Books on religious culture did not produce a deep enough religious discourse, and the aim of theology faculties was to train expert staff who could provide high level religious education and possess a high level of religious knowledge. Theology graduates were expected to be educated in this way and to provide the religious support that Kemalism might require. Meanwhile, the establishment of the Imam Hatip schools and their respective curricula, staff, and training methods were subject to a certain mission. As the power of religious objections in society grew, theology faculties started being seen as the lifeline for responding to these objections.

Theology faculties have been an interesting institutional structure with regard to the development of a religious discourse independent of religion, especially the Islam of the people. Nevertheless, considering the current religious speculations, viewing this as the greatest gain of the Turkish revolutions would not be so surprising. For example, faculties of theology should be taken seriously with regard to certain sectarian movements that associate themselves with Islam, such as the Turkish Hezbollah, and to groups that frequently find a place in the media and often use a mundane and distorted analysis of religion.

Religious thought: new areas of production

When discussing the dialects of religious thought in modern Turkey, some breaking and transformative points must be taken into account. The religious life that the Kemalist dialect of secular politics tries to shape is very important, primarily because it carries founding and constructive claims. Within this framework, its protective, watchful, and observant basis cannot be ignored regarding the guidance of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, religious education institutions, and the main boundaries of religious language. On the other hand, looking at the civil language of the religious argumentation process, which works with an affinity that tries to be in line with the state at times and at others with the motive to remain partially independent, is also necessary. In this context, carefully following the religious synergy journals such as *Sebilurreshad*, *The Great East*, and *Resurrection* reveal would be felicitous. In addition, the discourse on the National Vision, which gained a political language under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, was a remarkable breakthrough that sustained continuity in terms of promoting what Islam means to the public. The legal procedures put forward in the face of religious movement and enthusiasm and Turkish secularism can be seen as key points for being able to understand the ambiguity of the religious language and its occasional self-conviction to an incomprehensible syntax. The fact that religion could be invoked at times as an effective tool and means through certain practices at the national and international level is undeniable. The military

interventions on March 12, 1971, September 12, 1980, and finally February 28, 1997 were important turning points that clearly reflected this differentiation (Şimşek, 2019).

To produce a language of thought about Islam that had not been subject to state requirements, one needs to go back to the late 1960s. Attaining the religious language needed for the security of the new regime was not very difficult, but a more national religious language was understood to be needed that followed the new patterns of the Islamic discourse flows. In this respect, Aksekili's language of affinity and partnership that started with his *Askere Din Dersleri (Soldier's Book of Religion*, 1925) has always survived despite the Kemalist-founding discourse's efforts to keep a distance. Afterward, the regime's efforts to dominate the religious sphere through certain operations were deliberately and willfully ignored. The sociological imagination that all these were temporary, mostly created by the mosque community, must have also included intellectuals within its area of influence (Subaşı, 2002).

Reform and radicalism

The elite hoped for a truly indispensable Turkish reform that would liberate Islam from the non-essential elements of the ancient legacy and make it not only modern but a totally Western religion. Regarded as the pioneer of the struggle for secularization in the Ottoman period, Abdullah Cevdet sometimes openly wrote in the journal *Ijtihad* that clergymen should not interfere in politics. Like other Westernist publications from the Constitutional period, many reforms that were implemented later by the Republic can be seen to have already been proposed in *Ijtihad*. Among these reforms were the suppression of dervish lodges and hermitages, the closure of the madrasahs, the conversion of the alphabet to Latin letters, the liberation of women, the banning of traditional women's clothing, the replacement of Islamic headwear with a Western-type hat, and the translation of the Quran and traditional religious books into Turkish (Hanioğlu, 1981; Dumont, 1999, p. 66).

The Kemalist secularization reforms were nothing but the acceleration and radicalization of a pre-existing process (Karpat, 1996, pp. 224–238; Lapidus, 1996, p. 22; Lewis, 1984, pp. 397–436). However, the complete separation of religion and state from each other was unable to be fully realized, even within the possibilities created by the Republic regime. Mustafa Kemal and his companions were all well aware that the power of religion was too great to be left entirely in private hands. Allowing fully independent religious institutions to be established was avoided on the grounds that sooner or later they might oppose the regime. The administrators resolutely maintained their belief that the state should keep religion under strict control (Dumont, 1999, p. 67). A series of reforms was aimed at controlling the visibility of religion, which previously had built almost every element of daily life. The perseverance and persistence shown in these reforms is remarkable. On the other hand, the reforms aiming to transform daily life, to give a new direction to politics, and to re-establish the state in the Western style all received the strongest resistance from the reactions within the context of religion. Surely, the state was to be a secular institution and religion should have become an inner and personal choice. This meant separating religion from the state organizationally and institutionally (Hodgson, 1993). The secularizing reforms of 1924 were directed against the ulama rather than the dervishes in this respect, but soon the most steadfast resistance to secularism coming from within the tradition of the mystic dervish orders rather than the ulama would become clear (Lewis, 1984, p. 405).

Through Kemalist reforms, the Republic administration in fact desired to adopt all Islamic elements that would not contradict the spirit of the modern age without wanting to renounce

Islam. In this regard, even the practical details of Islamic prayers had their share of Western-oriented reforms (Turner, 1997, pp. 283, 286). Therefore, the Republic of Turkey is distinct in being a nation-state that pushed the boundaries of Islam so far as to fulfil the requirements of a modern society. Reformist regulations served multiple purposes at the same time. Undoubtedly, these initiatives symbolized the rejection of elements from the Persian-Arab heritage and acceptance of the Western way of life. One of the long-term sociocultural consequences of the reform has been that all printed books and works belonging to the Ottoman written heritage remained unknown to the children of the Republic (Hodgson, 1993, pp. 81–282).

The aspects of religious thought that blend with the state bureaucracy have always been limited. The determination on Westernization, the extent to which religion would be included in the educational curriculum, and what kind of function religion would perform were all important subjects of discussion. Leaving aside the common myth that a hostile distance existed between the state and religion in general, the elites of the Republic felt an urgent need for the Directorate of Religious Affairs to issue a formality that would weaken all the possible effects of organized civilian religious communities and suppress the reflexes that might come from the grassroots. The Directorate of Religious Affairs was established in order to abolish the caliphate, close the dervish lodges and hermitages, and urgently bridge the deepening divide with religion, thus taking a serious and effective step in the administration of what is religious without allowing for an opportunity to analyze intentions.

The search for a middle ground with secularism

Along with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's tendencies toward religion, his political plans regarding what kind of vision religion should have had under the new conditions were also related to the discussions and conflicts of his day (Tunçay, 1992, p. 213; Dumont, 1999, pp. 49–74; Lapidus, 1996, p. 82). As a matter of fact, the First Parliament was well known to be very open to religious interests. The idea of reviving religion with a new rhetoric within the hegemonic weight of the Islamist discourse initially attracted the attention of the elites as an acceptable channel. However, the potential problems the given dimension of religion could create for achieving the ideals of a modern Turkey were especially highlighted, and religion was desired to be taken out of the public sphere from the outset. The bureaucratization of the ulama initiated by Mahmut II thus had reached its logical conclusion. While the ulama were gradually turned into small civil officials, religious organization had now become a department of the state (Lewis, 1984, p. 409; Bein, 2013).

With the claim that religion is less important in public life or in the structure and functioning of the universe, religion henceforth only served to satisfy moral and psychological needs. With the decline of Sufi ceremonies and the tomb culture, a religion had been designed that was more intellectual and more liberated from superstitious beliefs. The strategies on regulating the personal dimensions of religion were sufficient to show how an Islam purged of its political aspects had been developed at the end of this search. During the foundation period of the nation-state, the importance of religion was closely related to its functional role in establishing the official ideology. In this context, apart from its meaning on its own, Islam is seen to have occupied a place in developing the national identity. Many people are actually 'Muslims', even if they do not believe in Islam because the elements that provided content to the Muslim identity included concepts from the nationalist intellectual world such as patriotism (Lapidus, 1996, p. 383).

Acknowledgment of intention

Undoubtedly, even though the Republic's determined attitude toward religion had been overshadowed by certain strategies, its predominant demand was to find ways to turn religion into a strong foundation for the new regime as much as possible. Although the preference in this respect was to reform religion, that the radical implementations of such an intention would produce a higher cost than expected was soon observed, and the project was predicted to spread over time with more deep-rooted reforms rather than practical solutions. The foundation period of the Republic had an account of the Ottoman opposition intellectuals' attitudes toward religion, especially the intellectual interests that formed the composition of Atatürk's thinking. The main problem for the Kemalist elitist group, however, was not parallel to the concerns of the Islamists. The most radical objection for religious reform came not from the Islamists and the Westernists, but from the nationalist bloc. Ziya Gökalp was the one who removed this view from being a theological or religious problem (Berkes, 1988).

Although Islam had been rejected as the basic element of social cohesion, radically separating religion from state was seen to be impossible, and establishing an autonomous structure resembling that of Christian churches, which Ziya Gökalp had considered possible, did not occur. Instead, the choice was made to keep Islam under the control of the state. All kinds of political activity related to religious demands were put under strict official notation and kept out of the political arena.

On June 20, 1928, a draft text that could be understood as a completely different rearrangement of religion from the known and experienced form was brought before a commission headed by Fuat Köprülü at Istanbul University, Faculty of Theology. The idea of the Reformation had previously been handled by ideologists such as Yusuf Akçura, Celal Nuri, and especially Ziya Gökalp, with various opinions and suggestions during the Constitutional Monarchy period. The most important suggestions in the report, clearly influenced by Gökalp, were the change in mosque services by having prayers, sermons, and Qur'anic verses read in Turkish, musical instruments be used while worshiping at shrines, and sermons be prepared based on more instructive and newer ideas. The government also disagreed with the suggestions that had already been rejected by many of the commission members; these had to be withdrawn while still in the stage of being ideas. Similar suggestions can be found in the articles from the Ottoman-period Westernist intellectuals, especially in the writings of the Young Ottomans in the period of Sultan Abdulaziz (Dumont, 1999, p. 68).

This plan was found untimely and not put into practice (Tunçay, 1992, pp. 220–221). The enormous tension created by this reform plan even forced the government to deny it and eventually dissolve the commission (Jäschke, 1972, pp. 40, 42). Yet the government still did not give up its insistence, and the idea of reform continued with new attempts to transform religious life.

Gökalp proposed the establishment of a new branch of science called the science of social origin of laws (social-style *fiqh*) in order to study Islamic customs and culture in more depth. Gökalp even proposed a more comprehensive religious reform based on this theory (Gökalp, 1968, pp. 35–36, 158; Smith, 1953). His aim was to separate religion from the state and to separate religion from Eastern culture, allowing the main values of Islam to be maintained alongside Western civilization and national Turkish culture. In this context, Turkish religious reform was an incomplete project, and the right to intervene, stemming from this intention, still remained in the hands of the state; this issue would still gain new dynamism every time the issue of religion became an important problem.

New climates, new Breezes

One common interpretation of Islam that penetrated into Turkey's one-party and multi-party experiences is striking, as the state always approved and embraced the Directorate of Religious Affairs. The regime routinized a state of caution based on the anxiety created by each opposition that had embraced the political emphasis of Islam. The reason for this is that a possible reactionist organization might gain momentum that would block the Westernization and modernization of a young Turkey aspiring to reach the level of a contemporary civilization.

In this respect, the philosophical, sociological, and especially anthropological definitions of religion required no effort at analysis to reveal the religiosity or social orientations of religion of the time. This negligence was ultimately adept enough to describe religion as a functional device. On the other hand, some attention should also be placed upon the aspects of this competence, as it can be easily updated at every change in the life of modern Turkey. As a matter of fact, most of the energetic steps that had been planned for re-establishing the regime each time with a few military coups had in fact created historical opportunities to determine the place of religion in daily life with their inclinations toward genuine expansions (Subaşı, 2002).

In fact, popular arguments that the stubborn attitude of the state toward religion have loosened from time to time are also remarkable. A series of developments that can be regarded as the product of efforts to prevent latent religious opposition in the transition to the multi-party period – such as the introduction of elective religious courses in schools, the unofficial toleration of some sects, and the opening of Imam Hatip schools – sometimes reflect the submission of the official state line to pragmatism. In this way, the reactionary forces, even if weak, can be identified as having gotten what they wanted. On the other hand, some regulations put forward by the state in an effort to limit religious initiative in almost every intervention and precaution process so as to remain loyal to the continuous revolutionary line have often been perceived as unpredictable by various segments of society.

The translation wave

Waiting for translations from both the East and the West to emerge would be required before a strong awakening between the secular state and Muslim society in favor of Islam would occur. As a matter of fact, among the founding ideas of the construction of a new discourse that now would be portrayed as Turkish Islamism, the idea of *ummah* would begin to find its own strong response by integrating with the ideological discourses formed around other international themes, especially with the translations made from the Islamic world. Since the 1960s, the line of sensitivity especially around the journals *Islam* and *Hilal* had paved the way for a political imagination that would remove Turkish Islamism from its national context and prioritize its handling in a broader spectrum based on many actual developments such as the Algerian and Palestinian problem, the independence of Pakistan, the ancient tension points in Cyprus, and the blockade against the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

Sayyid Qutb was a sociologist and thinker who raised the emphasis on Islam in the face of Nasser's policies in Egypt. He is the author of *Fi Zilal al-Quran* [*In the Shade of the Quran*], a renowned Qur'anic commentary read extensively in Turkey (Qutb, 1992). This commentary is still important for many people with religious sensitivities in Turkey. In fact, this work has such a symbolic value that its importance makes the book be found in homes as an identity statement even if it is not read. Another scholar worth mentioning is Maududi, who is well known in the Islamic world and became known in Turkey in the 1970s. Known by many people in Turkey,

Maududi is read and respected deeply by many Muslims for his Qur'anic commentary *Tafhimu'l Qur'an* (1954–1965; Turkish translation, 1988).

Wahhabism is a modern representation of Salafism and a sectarian activity that can be encountered through more regional characteristics. When all these elements began to flow to Turkey, they started to gain considerable ground because Turkey did not have a mechanism to update and interpret religion. Such ideas can be said to have found a significant place in the eastern regions of Turkey in particular. Because Islamic thought in Turkey did not possess thinkers of its own such as Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır (1877–1942) who would renew themselves within the religious world, it had to fill in and feed this gap by borrowing from the outside world. The works in which Islamic thought spread through their perspectives and actions are not as dangerous as they appear when handled one text at a time. But borrowing is quite problematic, as these texts carried their social world into Turkey. The first and foremost reason is that religious life in Turkey had been unable to update itself. At this point, part of the damage caused by the developments of the time could be found in some of the flaws of the Turkish modernization experience.

Among the important names of the Islamic modernism movement, Fazlur Rahman Malik in particular should be mentioned; Algerian thinker Muhammed Arkoun and Moroccan thinker Jabiri are additionally very important names in Islamic philosophy and intellectual Muslim formation. Mentioning other than a few names from within Turkey is impossible. These people symbolized and reflected religious life within the country, but many thinkers like Fazlur Rahman Malik and Jabiri – who were particularly compelled to comment on Islam through their experience in the Western world and make a different transformation in Islam due to the problems they had faced in the West – remained rather weak before Turkey's religious life and typical modernization. The life patterns that Turkish society has internalized are unable to be defined by the usual modern or anti-modern categorizations. An enormous need exists for attempts to explain the religious structuring in the Turkey of today, as well as the surprising and yet genuine relationship that Turkish modernization has established with religion. Therefore, despite all the turmoil, fights, and conflicts within Turkey, how can one make a thorough explanation for the fact that religious discourse still receives respect as an important frame of reference and that this respect is found just as much as Turkey is filled with modern tools? In response to all these, the impulse of the masses in daily life and the weight of what is social are extraordinarily large and continue to expand. The meaning of this development should not be overlooked.

The National Vision movement: delayed public demand

Different Kemalist conceptions have also led to a relative differentiation of tendencies toward religion. The abstract relations between religion and power marked the pragmatism of Kemalism's quest to gradually gain legitimacy. The radical Westernism of the single-party period (1923–1945) encountered Kemalism, and religious structures did not hesitate to approach any opposition formation that would voice their demands as much as to take refuge in them after the transition to the multi-party system (1945–1960). The fact that the Progressive Republic Party (1924–1925), which is seen as the first attempt in the transition to the multi-party system, took religious expectations into account while ensuring its social legitimacy should have clearly served this focus at the beginning. This political understanding would direct the sensitivities of the Democratic Party (DP, 1946–1960) and even the Justice Party (AP, 1961–1980). In the political imagination of the Cold War years, Islam was frequently voiced as being able to shield against communism and was expected to be able to become a carrier of daily morality

as a part of NATO and all-Western values. However, the implications of this use, which challenged Kemalist loyalty measures, were never forgiven. Indeed, the Kemalists fully rejected and punished the romantic spiritualism of Said Nursi (1873–1960), the intellectual objections of Eşref Edib (1882–1971), the militant spirituality of Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan (1888–1959), the opposing rhetoric of *The Great East* (1943–1978) from Necip Fazıl Kısakürek (1905–1983), and the National Vision policy of Necmettin Erbakan (1926–2011) in particular.

The main formation in which religious-based political demands were able to be expressed openly by transforming within right-wing, conservative, and nationalist groups was the National Vision movement that emerged with the National Order Party (MNP, 1970–1971), which continued with the National Salvation Party (MSP, 1972–1980) and succeeded in translating Islam into the public sphere through a series of symbolic discourses that transformed religious arguments into a political language. Today, the MNP is remembered for its program and activities that envisioned religion regulating social life. In fact, this tradition's ability to create a successful synthesis with modernity has often been ignored by politicians (Mardin, 1991, p. 109). MSP, on the other hand, aimed to increase the impact religion has in regulating social life. The dominant approach in the first course of the movement, which started with the MNP and continued with the MSP until it ended on September 12, 1980, was to make Islam an original part of the Turkish national identity and, while so doing, integrate it with the *ummah* union.

The lines of the Refah (RP; 1983–1998), Fazilet (FP; 1998–2000) and Saadet (SP; 2001–present) parties are aligned with the National View; but after 1980, they competed with it using representations of religiosity that met the basic strategies of the state. Their party programs have always had a symbolic language that reflect anxiety. The tendency of the September 12 administration, marked by the policies that made religious culture and ethics lessons compulsory, was aimed at creating a frontline against those in the opposition who use religion as a means of objection. Islamization eventually became an integral part of the state's security strategy.

The National Vision movement started with the MNP as the independent political power of the Islamist tradition, which had previously been represented by large party coalitions, continues today through the Saadet Party. It aims to overcome some problems such as secularism and freedom of belief and thought by developing policies based on protection of human rights. In fact, it has drawn lessons from some examples of consequences of these policies in the past and has paid attention to the production of a discourse that does not operate randomly. A dominant symbolic network still exists within the party programs, though. Now, a special language is seen to have been born from the troubles brought about by the secular siege. Islamic political discourse is expressed through legal formulation.

In the 1980s, Turkey needed a blockage in the face of the emerging religious-based trends, and the measures taken within the country were associated with the Green Belt strategy. The Green Belt project expressed the strategy of creating a shield against Soviet expansion using religion in the Cold War–era structure of the United States. The aim was to control or even disable the rise of radical religiousism using the new form of religiosity that the state had defined as moderate. This became the sign of a national emphasis that found its voice withing the formulation of a Turkish–Islam synthesis and over time allowed for concepts such as Turkish Islam and Turkish Muslims. With the Turkish–Islam synthesis, a new definition of belonging was introduced by emphasizing nationality through Turkishness as a common pattern of nationalist discourses and emphasizing religion through Islam. For this reason, instead of a religiosity that feds on sociality, a technical Islamization that had been shaped within the state's strategy was placed within the cultural inventory of the social realm. A new definition of religiosity was made in a way that met the Kemalist discourse. This religiosity has always had the position that calls for restraint in the face of the unbounded course of secularism (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2000).

Despite all this, the Kemalist elite have always perceived Erbakan's National Vision movement as a source of anxiety. Therefore, all political formations with their background in the National Vision discourse that were led by Necmettin Erbakan were coded as security problems at every opportunity and neutralized, one way or another. MSP, RP, FP, and especially MNP experienced the same result. Erbakan's movement was seen as an effort to create a religious state, and his religious background, which guided his nationalist conservative orientations, was seen as a sign of backwardness. Finally, with the latent coup attempt on February 28, 1997, the government under Erbakan's prime ministry was heavily accused, and major Islamic operations and organizations were largely interrupted. The Post-Modern Coup (February 28) identified backward fundamentalism as the greatest danger before Turkey, and a harsh war was declared against religious tendencies. As a result, National Vision was banned once again from politics, and Erbakan was removed from daily politics.

Erbakan's National Vision rhetoric was clearly inherent in his first political experience with the MNP program. Therefore, the opinions put forward by the MNP program at the beginning formed the general framework of the programs of all the parties Erbakan and his companions established under the name of the National Vision in later years. The main arguments the National Vision had identified actually reflected a general summary of Erbakan's personal religious orientations. Criticizing the Turkish modernization project for causing moral and spiritual degeneration and a social collapse with an intense series of objections, Erbakan aimed to gain the support of the masses, who often identified themselves as having conservative religious demands using the arguments he developed. However, Erbakan was never given a chance to become a powerful government figure – yet, the relationality created by political chaos and different expectations have always served to keep him and his party in a key position. In the peculiar pragmatism of the Turkish political world, Erbakan achieved a power partnership that always had a high chance of bargaining with both right- and left-wing parties. Erbakan's discourse, which transformed Islamic demands into the language of politics, cannot be said to have found a very firm footing in society. However, complex voting preferences, surprising reflections of the political distribution, and the ability to grasp the insight created by social demands and expectations enabled Erbakan to play a role exceeding his power (Sarıbay, 1985; Akdoğan, 2000).

Erbakan's criticism of the regime was not destructive, but the direction attributed to the National Vision was always coded as a problematic political choice for the statist elite. Every time the National Vision was included in the administration, deep state sensitivity was always trying to reveal its dangerous aspects. Even some Islamic initiatives that challenged Erbakan's political discourse and imagination were often considered aligned with the National Vision movement. Thus, Erbakan's National Vision project was considered an umbrella entity for all kinds of religious orientations that had aspired to be translated into the language of politics since the 1960s. Even some marginal religious groups that persistently avoided being included in this entity got the chance to express themselves, thanks to the political environments that Erbakan tamed.

As a cause that Erbakan devoted his life to, the National Vision was among the leading reasons for the interventions that have disturbed Turkish politics at various times (Çakır, 2004). As can be clearly seen by looking at the course of politics chronologically, political organizations in line with the National Vision represented by Erbakan were constantly blocked by the Constitutional Court, and the movement was frequently interrupted. Eventually, the Constitutional Court closed the MNP on March 21, 1971 on the grounds that it contradicts the principles of protecting the secular state quality and Atatürk's revolutionism. Erbakan then became the leader of the National Salvation Party in 1973. This party was also shut down with the September 12 coup. With the referendum held in 1987, the political ban on Erbakan, who had

remained in prison for a while during this period, was lifted and he became the leader of the Refah Party established in 1983. After this party was also shut down for similar reasons in 2001, Erbakan's party this time was the Fazilet Party. The closure of the Fazilet Party for identical reasons marked the beginning of Erbakan's newest ban period. Today, the National Vision line is embraced and maintained by the Saadet Party.

On March 12, 1971, the MNP, which reflected the young spirit of the National Vision, was shut down, and on September 12, 1980, the National Salvation Party that had often been forced to regulate itself due to its experiences with the state and government was banned from politics. With the latent intervention on February 28, 1997, an atmosphere was created that opened the way to the Refah Party (RP) and Fazilet Party getting shut down. The main theme that stands out in this strategy is the concern that Erbakan would establish a government that respects Islamic fundamentals, as this would undermine the secular order with its pro-Sharia strategies. In all these shutdowns, democracy was underlined to be actually seen as a fundamental tool for the Erbakan-led movement, and the legitimacy of the Republic regime's resistance to pro-Sharia/anti-establishment organizations was accentuated in order to secure itself. Thus, an anonymous call for confrontation showed that the state saw itself entitled to resort to extraordinary measures. The RP was in power when the February 28 latent-military intervention took place. The context of this intervention, which ended Erbakan's prime ministry using highly sophisticated strategies, also depicts the crucial breaking moments of Turkish political experience. In this regard, not only were the RP and then the Fazilet Party shut down for similar reasons, but Erbakan was also removed from politics and the National Vision line began to be seen as the focus of anxiety in the atmosphere following these successive warnings and interventions.

The Muslim style of modernity

In the global environment of the post-1980s, religion and society faced a serious change. The end of the Cold War period, the unbounded effects of globalization, and the increase in Islamophobic outbursts for the worldwide condemnation of Islam have been significantly determining in the new order. In order to achieve the opportunity for thinking deeply and comprehensively about Islam, revoking the articles that restrict the use of freedom of belief and thought, such as Article 163 of the Turkish Penal Code (1991), would be necessary. Although the sociocultural change and comforting global differentiation that had started in the 1980s and paved the way for reshaping the religious sphere in the 1990s had been interrupted by some interventions like the February 28 Post-Modern Coup in 1997, restraining intellectual diversity for the sake of political reasons no longer remained a possibility. In this context, the constant transfer of information from high-tension regions such as Egypt and Pakistan that dominated Turkey's religious-intellectual circles clearly was to gain new momentum with the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Based on the local discourses being observed to have mostly gained a language through journals such as *The Great East* and *Resurrection*, the effect of the timely transmission with the help of translations would be higher than expected. In this respect, even Necmettin Erbakan's political movement – which did not compromise the national-religious character – was forced to revise itself in a way that would take these interactions into account. In this sense, Erbakan was quick to recognize the need for a new political dialect in the face of both secular state requirements and the currents of radical Islamist discourse that were affecting society at an extraordinary pace.

The developments in the world conjuncture, the directional shift in Westernization policies, and the noticeable increase in U.S. domination in the region have also radically changed the formation of religious attitudes and discourses within Turkey. Partial relief in human rights and

freedoms, the weakening of secularism and lightening of its legal leverage, and the expectations from the interim period becoming meaningless have led also to the evolution of an established religious language. The intersection between the intellectual wing nourished by the works written by reverted Muslims from the West, and the opposing ideas fed by the East, had generally opened Islamism of the state to debate and created a new repertoire of religious discourse.

As a result and based on the increasingly clear structure of the relationship between the state and society, religion has surpassed the discussions in which it had been involved through modernization and encountered an actual reality in pursuit of new and developing questions. Today, the diversity in the sphere of religious discourse implies that the line of belonging that had forced Islam to be considered from radical, liberal, or traditional perspectives is breaking down. A language of confrontation and introverted reckoning can be stated as a possible and acceptable turning point in this context. For a sound and consistent religious discourse, removing all these burdens and forced uniformity – whose physical and spiritual integrity has been shaken thoroughly – is necessary.

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26

IMAGINING EGYPT IN POSTNORMAL TIMES

The state of war

Heba Raouf Ezzat

> The Army is an apparatus for killing.
>
> *Abdel Fattah el-Sisi (Al Arabi Newspaper, 2014)*

> For there is no proportion between one who is armed and one who is unarmed, and it is not reasonable that whoever is armed obey willingly whoever is unarmed, and that someone unarmed be secure among armed servants. For since there is scorn in the one and suspicion in the other, it is not possible for them to work well together.
>
> *Niccolo Machiavelli (1532/1998, p. 58)*

Introduction

Accounting for the whole matrix of complex relationships between society and the state in Egypt after the Arab Spring in one go is not easy, nor is offering an analysis of the complexity of civil-military relations in Egyptian history and politics a small task. This chapter will only attempt to highlight in broad brushstrokes the changing nature of the concept of the political in Egypt today in relation to spatiality and to reveal the need for a new paradigm in Middle East studies, as well as an overdue reformation of Egyptian political thought.

The hegemony of the nation-state paradigm with its European notion of sovereignty, as well as the over-occupation with social movements and associational life, has not left much room for a different political imagination to grasp the speedy change that has been taking place in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. This dominant approach of methodological nationalism has been challenged by different studies at different levels of analysis (Ezzat, 2005; Salvatore, 2007), yet "Over-Stating the Arab State" (Ayubi, 1995) has been the overarching trend, one that has been strengthened by the emergence of ISIS in the region as it has cemented state and non-state actors as a dichotomy based on territoriality and power. This has led to more interest in the dynamics of order and control, and has greatly obstructed the horizons of examining emerging political strategies related to spatiality.

In this chapter, I argue that what has been unfolding in Egypt since the uprising of 2011 is neither a violent democratic transition nor a tension in civil-military relations that requires only

struggling for more liberties, establishing measures to empower civil society, or reforming the security sector.

Waves of dislocated civilians due to urban planning have become a rising trend. Projects for new cities are merging urban areas and military bases, and the military's land acquisitions are at an unprecedented scale and based mainly on presidential decrees. This is paralleled by wide violations of human rights under a prolonged legal state of emergency and state of exception.

I argue that these changes can only be understood as war. General Sisi (who later became a field marshal then a president) frankly stated in a famous video disclosed by Al Jazeera on February 20, 2014 that the army is an apparatus for killing (Al Sisi, 2014). Only a shift in the study of Egyptian politics that highlights brutality and war as a tool used in all civil spheres by the regime can anticipate the long-term outcomes of the military hegemony over society and the economy, and explain the ongoing corrosion of civility.

Changing geographies and post-normal times

After the Arab Spring changed the map of the Arab world, asking why the political imagination of many forces in Egypt – as well as the approaches of academics – could neither anticipate the scale of the uprising nor offer solutions to the problems faced after the fall of Mubarak in 2011 has crucial importance for rebuilding the social, economic, and political spheres. The geographical imagination has also been limited by notions of sovereignty and territoriality rather than spatiality. From the era of Arab nationalism to Islamism, the lack in complexity of the dimensions of territoriality and space have been striking. A crucial need exists to shift from geopolitics to geographies of power. The old frames of thinking are futile, and the need is found to introduce new concepts or redefine old ones (Ezzat, 2015, 2018).

The underdevelopment of the Middle East studies has been addressed in many writings on the state of the art (Binder, 1976; Mitchell, 2004; Hafez & Slyomovics, 2013). Because Middle East studies not only have different methodologies but also different theories that resonate with different ideologies in the region and stem from the diversity of philosophical underpinnings from each approach, the suggestion has been made that the future of Middle East studies would be shaped by whichever theory prevails (Bilgin, 2006).

Intellectual and social movements have given more attention to power sharing than to changing maps; one can hardly find anything written by Egyptian intellectuals regarding the relation between politics and urbanization, and how sovereignty is manifested in urban planning. Nor is there much written about the problem of land acquisition by armies in North Africa, or the right to the city as a major indicator of citizenship rather than the politics of mere representation.

An overarching legal mentality is also found to have dominated the intellectual scene in Egypt in the 20th century. Law has always dominated the thinking in Egypt due to the struggle for a constitution and national independence (Hourani, 1983; Salem, 1994). Islamic movements took *Sharia* debates toward a canonical plateau. Nazih Ayubi's title "Over-Stating the Arab State" is a phrase that has never been disputed (Ayubi, 1995). In the 1980s, most intellectual contributions from different streams of thought and ideology were occupied with defending freedom and democracy in the public sphere; the question of sovereignty remained rhetorical and over-ideologized, showing up only in slogans and emotional statements against Western interference in the region. The centrality of the Arab-Israeli conflict necessitated the dominant role of the state against the enemy, and the post-9/11 era brought the war on terrorism to the forefront. Again, the state as a concept and apparatus was not subject to deep reflection, and reforming the way civil-military relations were viewed was continuously postponed under the urgency of

other challenges. In a moment of radical change, an ironic over-constitutionalization occurred within the struggle by diverse political groups in Egypt that drew attention away from major changes unfolding on the ground, as the main disagreement and conflict was about elections and drafting the new constitution (Tarek, 2016). Many studies have concentrated on structural factors and structured factions rather than the balance of power in everyday life (Çakmak, 2017).

The extension of the role armed forces have played in the economic sector is not only part of a power triangle of military, security, and politics (Kandil, 2016), and stating that the military control has brought about recurring maladministration crises for many decades would be an understatement, especially after 2013 (Abul-Magd, 2017, pp. 232–233). Instead, this needs to be seen as part of the wider transformations in global economy and high finance; new strategies are required that deal with space, not just spheres.

Recent studies have highlighted the economic role of the armed forces in land acquisition (Transparency International Report, 2018, pp. 10–11), but there has been no detailed account of the urban planning strategies related to building new cities across the country, the statistics of dislocation and expulsion of the poor from developed areas, or the gentrification of areas of downtown and the old city in Cairo. Though urban planning and expulsion have obviously been important tools in reshaping the map of power in everyday life, they remained sociologically marginalized because they could not be easily made visible through the current categories of understanding (Sassen, 2014, pp. 80–116, 211–224).

Dislocated people, hegemony over the economic sector and public policy decision making, and the change in national borders have been classified as mere abuses of power by sovereignty that could be curbed through democratic struggle, security sector reforms, and civil activism (Kandil, 2012; Grawert & Abul-Magd, 2016; Abul-Magd, 2017).

The concept of time has also been part of this crisis of imagination. Most intellectual and political discussions limit time to a conception of history such as the *longue duree*. The Islamists aspired to revive the early Islamic model of the state, the Arab nationalists focused on identity as historical, leftists thought in terms of historical determinism, and liberals thought in terms of secular time when the here and now is liberated from the burden history. A notion of political time and its diverse multilayered temporalities has been missing (Pierson, 2004), one with a profound understanding of the global capitalism's spirit of the age, its techniques for time, and even its notions of multiple times. Time, not history, was missing as a subject of intellectual and political consideration.

Egyptians aspired to achieve their goals of change in terms of cyclical notions of time. Parliamentarian and presidential elections captured their attention, ignoring the parallel time dimension of logistics that the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) alone managed. In the military mind, decision making needs to exceed the speed of events, and decision making and execution should be rapid. A time gap is found all through out in favor of the SCAF's use of shock and awe to manage the scene during the events of 2011–2013.

Complexity, chaos, and contradictions are the main features of the present and define its multilayered morphologies. Ziauddin Sardar (2010) argued that the ideas of control and management should be abandoned in favor of rethinking the cherished notions of progress, modernization, and efficiency. This logic simply contradicts the way modern armies think and function.

War as a political paradigm

The long line of violent actions by security and armed forces is still present in the memory of many Egyptians, starting from the sniping of demonstrators in the square during the days of

the uprising in January 2011 and the attacks by thugs, to the killings of Maspero-area Christian demonstrators in October 2011, followed by Mohamed Mahmud's clashes in November 2011 and the February 2012 killing of 74 football ultras from the Al-Ahly team at a stadium in Port Said city. Since the military coup that took place on July 3, 2013, another series of acts of violence erupted, amounting to the five mass shootings that took place in Rabia and Al Nahda squares in July–August 2013, followed by the Al-Fath mosque shootings where police helicopters opened fire, targeting civilian protestors. Paralleling this, army and police officers have been targeted by terrorist militias in Sinai, where the war on terrorism has led to limited civilian access to some of the conflict areas since August 2012. ISIS terrorists have declared and even filmed and posted many of their terrorist attacks, and civilians have paid a heavy price in the clashes. Caught in the exchange of fire, and often victims of random shootings, the fighting in Sinai has escalated and human rights reports describe the way armed forces have dealt with the Bedouin civilians of Sinai as amounting to "crimes of war" (Human Rights Watch, 2019).

Bringing the concept of war into political analysis necessitates introducing a definition that covers the dimensions of a violent conflict that includes sustained combat between two or more organized armed forces that results in numerous deaths and that lasts more than a year. Yet, sociologists tend to utilize more general definitions that focus less on quantifiable fatalities and more on the social processes underpinning the experience of warfare. In this context, war is understood as a protracted armed conflict involving widespread use of physical violence and aiming to coerce one or more social organizations to comply with the demands of another social organization, resulting in significant social change (Malešević, 2018).

After almost five centuries of Westphalia's peace treaty, new theoretical endeavors clearly are emerging to assess and revise this absolute right in deciding the state of exception with all its complications and consequences. Carl Schmitt's (2007) definition of the political clearly shows the spatial aspects of its meaning to have been formed in contrast with war. Yet, the concept of the state of exception – which was meant to be a provisional measure – became a framework for governments throughout the 20th century (Agamben, 2005). Agamben's later elaboration on stasis (i.e., civil war) adds to the understanding of the concept of the state of exception as a dimension of war (Agamben, 2015).

He noticed that the generalization of a model of war that is unable to be defined as an international conflict yet lacks the traditional features of civil war has led some scholars to speak of "uncivil wars," which, unlike civil wars, appear to be directed not toward the control and transformation of the political system but toward the maximization of disorder (Agamben. 2015, pp. 2–3). The sole form in which life as such can be politicized is its unconditioned exposure to death (i.e., bare life; Agamben, 2015, pp. 24–25).

That line of thought can be linked to Zygmunt Bauman's (1999) idea of destructive order and creative chaos and urban space wars (Bauman, 1999). The study of urban wars and wars that take place in urban spaces gained more attention after 9/11. The purposive destruction and annihilation of cities not only takes place in war, but also in urban planning and even in virtual games. He saw this state of militarization as interwoven with urban modernity (Graham, 2004).

While Charles Tilly (1985, pp. 185–186) has compared state formation in Europe to the rest of the world, stating that the struggles and organizational features in European history have led a relative subordination of military power to civilian control and accountability of rulers, states elsewhere in the world have developed differently. The newly independent states of the 20th century harbored powerful, unconstrained organizations that easily overshadowed all other social formations and associations under their sovereignty. The power given to military bodies became enormous, and the incentives to seize power over the state as a whole by means of that

advantage tended to be very strong. Hence, state formation can be seen as a type of organized crime.

The relation between speed and spatiality has a political as well as a military aspect. Technological advances have developed in military circles to serve the war machine; hence, speed has been a primary force in shaping civilization, according to Paul Virilio (2006). In this technical vitalism, the metabolic bodies of soldiers and transport vessels, as well as information and computer technologies in modern times, are launched in a permanent assault on the world and on human nature. Logistics is the preparation for war by transferring a nation's potential to its armed forces in times of peace as it does in times of war. Theaters of operations are diversified, and speed is an important factor; logistics in governance are a continuous preparation for escalation of conflict with the mobility of bodies being monitored in space. Wars move from topology to dromology, which is the study of the impact increasing the speed of transport and communications has on the development of land use. This is the emerging war paradigm.

Politics as war was also a subject Foucault (2003, pp. 1–19) highlighted in his lectures, problematizing the use of words like tactics and strategies. The idea of politics as war resonates a lot with what has happened in Egypt since 2011 and what millions have seen in their day-to-day lives.

From militarized urbanism to urban militarism

The Egyptian military controls the economic sector, and army and police officers occupy high ranks in the governmental bodies. The military owns business enterprises and factories, produces food in vast farms, builds bridges and roads, constructs social housing, and runs hotels with lucrative wedding halls and sea resorts with luxury summer houses. It runs gas stations, shipping firms, domestic cleaning companies, and spacious parking lots. It constructs toll highways to collect daily tolls. Above all, retired generals control the state's bureaucratic apparatuses; the top government positions are in control of public transportation, water and sewerage services, land allocation, internet lines, housing projects, and security companies (Sayigh, 2012, 2019; Transparency International Report, 2018). "With all that control on the ground, a moral cause needs to be propagated, hence it perpetuates a nationalistic discourse about saving the nation from and securing it against internal and external threats alike" (Abul-Magd, 2017, p. 228).

Land acquisition and urban planning were the main battlefields for the army in the post-coup years. Besides enlarging its capacity through arms deals, support for the coup from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia has resulted in concessions that include land allocation; the Emiratis also backed the new urban militarism of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and influenced his design for the new capital, borrowing from a Dubai image.

To comprehend the importance of land appropriation, land tenure, and urban planning in Egypt since 2013, one needs to realize a tendency has existed to see contemporary cities through a civic lens; while war is exceptional and remote, urbicide is mentioned only when there are drones, explosions, and airstrikes. Steven Graham unmasked and displayed the many ways in which warfare is intimately woven into the fabric of cities and the practices of city planners (Graham, 2010).

Eyal Weizman (2012) has discussed in his work how cities have always reflected the dominant military techniques of their times. With the demise of linear warfare between nation-states and the advent of non-linear wars waged against internal so-called terrorists, cities have become the primary battle spaces. Weizman elaborated on the military (mis)uses of the urban fabric and how military operations during war target urban planning and map changing.

The idea of military operations as urban planning Weizman introduced can also be reversed based on the recent developments in Egypt after the coup of 2013. Some urban planning can be seen as a military operation, especially if it entails urban apartheid that secures the interests and authority of the armed forces and the social segments that support their hegemony.

Since 2013, control over land and application of large plans for development and gentrification have increasingly taken place in Cairo. Many were drafted during the time of Mubarak but had faced resistance. With the rise in military urbanism and control of space, the speed of change has accelerated.

The downtown area with its Nile waterside has been subject to urban development since the 1990s. In 1992, the wholesale vegetable and fruits market of Rod El Farag was relocated to outside Cairo, and the Maspero Triangle nearby has ever since been targeted by investors for urban development due to its central location near the Nile waterfront; however, the plan has progressed slowly due to resistance from the local community. The Maspero Triangle is 288,500 square meters of houses with 3,500 families (18,000 inhabitants), 80% of whom have lived in the area for generations, and many of the buildings date back to the early 19th century. About 68% of the population works in the Maspero Triangle, while 22% work outside of it. Eventually, the evacuation took place in 2017/2018 under pressure from the current regime. Residents of the area were forced to leave following long negotiations that only offered them residential units in the area in the future which they would never be able to afford or a compensation that could barely provide them with a small flat at the very far end of the city in areas less developed and with poorer public services compared to the central location of Maspero (Khalil, 2018). On the other hand, the modern heart of downtown Cairo, constructed in the 19th century, has been undergoing gentrification since 2008, with increasing numbers of large international investments, especially in the hotel and entertainment industry. These are protected by heavy securitization that prohibits demonstrations from returning to areas where the syndicates are located downtown; direct military intervention was also used to arrest street vendors who had occupied the streets of downtown for years until its liberation from intruders and outlaws in 2013 (Kingsley & Berger, 2014; Naceur, 2016).

The cases of the dispossessed inhabitants of Nazlet El Saman in the Pyramids area, of the Nile Al Warraq Island in the heart of Cairo, and most recently of Ain Al-Sira in Al-Fustat area in old Cairo show the leading role the army has had in the acquisition process and the steady policy of territorial and spatial hegemony in alliance with regional and global capitalism.

After President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi held a conference titled "Removing Encroachments on the State's Properties" in July 2017, the government embarked upon restoring the so-called originally state-owned land.

As the resistance and displacement that occurred was widely covered on social media, the process slowed down. in mid-February 2018, the parliament approved amendments to the 1990 Law of Property, expanding the president's authority and assigning him the authority to dispossess land for the public benefit. The role of the New Urban Communities Authority (NUCA) became more active as a façade for the obvious involvement of the army in all urban development projects.

Emirati construction and investment companies were partners in the Maspero and Al Warraq development projects, and EMAR Emirati construction company was the first partner in designing the new capital; other partners, including Chinese companies, joined later on. The main highway in the new capital is not named after an Egyptian national or historical figure, but after the ruler of Abu Dhabi and deputy ruler of UAE, Mohamed Bin Zayed.

Speed and segregation are key factors in understanding the military vision behind the new capital. El-Sisi needs to have his green zone quite remote from Cairo's dense population (Dunne, 2018).

Egypt would not be the first country to move its government (i.e., parliament, presidency, ministries, and embassies) to a capital city built from scratch, but it would be the first to spend $45 billion (U.S.) doing so while bread riots break out in the streets, and that is just the cost of the first phase. Located 45 kilometers east of Cairo between the Cairo-Suez and Cairo-Ain Sokhna roads, the government would also like to have its own huge electricity generators and daily water supply from the Nile. Apart from the residential areas and governmental buildings, the city also has a gated military complex where top army officials and their families will live next to the ministry of defense behind tall walls. The first building, launched a year ago just two years after the launch of the project, was a luxurious Royal Al Masa Hotel owned by the army.

The isolation of the capital from Cairo is deliberate, and the prices are the highest compared to Cairo proper and its suburbs, drawing a clear line between classes.

The attractive character of the developments in Egypt's new capital will make housing developments near the new city increasingly unaffordable. The government has a policy in force to control the price of land every six months. So far, the price of land has only increased. This approach is not an effective way to ensure that housing in the new capital remains affordable for Egypt's lower income citizens. There's a real risk that the new city will replicate the historical trend of spatial segregation which is still observable in Cairo today. The excitement of a brand-new capital and its image as a clean, organized, surveilled, and sustainable city must not overshadow the need for a balanced, diverse, and fair community (Badawy & Pinto, 2018). Private construction and real estate companies are marketing among the English-speaking upper class that had produced the suburbs of Cairo's District 5 20 years ago.

The new capital, which Lindsey (2017) called "the Anti-Cairo," is claimed to be the only solution to the traffic congestion in the historic center, yet it ignores the inequitable allocation of resources or the failure to develop urban and public spaces. That greater Cairo as a region suffers from grinding traffic, tragic pollution, and severe water stress is true. Yet all the suburbs and new medium-size cities constructed around Cairo since the late 1970s have attracted fewer than one million people, and those mostly in the areas closer to central Cairo.

Military urbanism has been examined by Stephen Graham (2010) as a way to govern the central spaces of power following the Arab Spring. Yet the urban transformations across the country and their speed deserves to be called urban militarism. Not only camps but also cities can be sites for the military hegemony in post-normal times – and hence, serve military goals.

Al Alamein New City (ANC) is yet another example of the new urban militarism. ANC is located at a site named after a battle that took place during World War II in 1942. The description of the city's master plan was only available in English until 2019, when substantial information became available in Arabic (Attia, 2019), even though construction had been going on since at least 2017. The Egyptian government selected a site in the northwestern part of the country as home for the new city, which is expected to set a new benchmark and be a model for the new generation of sustainable cities in Egypt. It is currently going through a branding process.

To grasp the strategic nature of military urbanism, seeing how el-Sisi in July 2017 opened the largest military base in the Middle East, located only 40 kilometers away from Al Alamein, is important. The new base includes more than 1,100 buildings, 72 training fields, two residential complexes, and a huge convention center. Mohamed bin Zayed, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE armed forces, attended the opening. A Saudi

delegation also participated. Attached to it is the megaproject for the country's greenhouse agriculture. In addition to these, a U.S.-Saudi Arabian investment project for a $3.3 billion Disneyland-style theme park was announced in Alamein in mid-2019.

In July–August 2019, the Egyptian cabinet held three sessions in ANC, one coincided with a Jennifer Lopez concert on a stage in a city that was then still under construction that was attended by three ministers. The city also has a presidential palace. This regionalization of authority and governmental decision making regarding urban sites has raised many questions about the changing spatial imaginations in a country of centralized power.

This complex scene of a military base, city, entertainment, and greenhouse plant is unprecedented in Egypt and can be considered as a new type of "weaponized architecture" (Lambert, 2012, pp. 10–25). It shares some features with the urban policies of the Syrian regime, which also has cities and neighborhoods divided among sects and classes; this facilitates bombing areas that challenge the power of the regime.

Not only was Al Alamein and its neighboring areas planned and developed with this mix of urban and military spaces, but another new project was announced in May 2017 in Gargoub, west of Marsa Matrouh and closer to the Libyan border. A harbor and an industrial/commercial area were planned at a cost of $10 billion to attract foreign investments, according to media (Abdel-Aty, 2017). Not until June 2020 did the news of a naval base as part of the Northern fleet region of the Mediterranean Sea came to surface, which is when el-Sisi officially launched the project.

The Gargoub Base is due to be in charge of securing the western part of Egypt's northern coast along the Mediterranean, which includes the Dabaa nuclear station and ANC; in addition, an economic zone will also be established (Morsi, 2020).

The scale of construction taking place in Egypt today is not just confined to new urban spaces. It also includes highways linking new and future locations of planned cities, and these are vast. In August 2020, 130 billion Egyptian pounds (EGP) ($8.3 billion) had been allocated to complete 1,000 bridges and tunnels by 2024 (about 600 are already done). The goal is to double Egypt's urban space over the next 30 years. As usual, and as he states in every meeting for a new project that is aired to the public, President/General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi wants the work done quickly (*The Economist*, 2020).

Much of the construction appears poorly planned, and the president publicly declared that if proper feasibility studies were to be done, nothing would be achieved. Speed was set as priority. Some ancient sites in Cairo listed by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as world heritage sites have been bulldozed, and a highway close to the pyramids has also recently raised concerns.

In September 2020, the project for building a high-speed electric rail starting in Ain Sokhna and ending in Al Alamein at a cost of $9 billion was announced. The train is said to cover 543 kilometers at a speed of 250 kilometers per hour, and will also pass through the cities of the New Administrative Capital, 6th of October, Burj al-Arab, and Alexandria. In a few years, the project will split into two different lines, one linking 6th of October City with the other governorates in Upper Egypt until Aswan and one beginning in Ain El Sokhna and passing along Hurgada and Marsa Alam as far as Luxor. According to Enterprise, railway officials reported in January that 55 billion EGP will be spent from July 1, 2020–July 1, 2022 (Morsi, 2020).

The raise in prices for national metro and bus tickets that took place in early 2020 and the costs that have been incurred to have high-speed trains linking the new cities and urban areas, as well as the prices of tickets for these new monorails and electric trains, are expected to exceed the financial capabilities of the majority of Egyptians. As Virilio (2006, pp. 73–79) indicated in his work on speed and politics, speed and space are an integral part of the dromological process

that represents the logistical dimension of the state's exercise of military power. Transportation is essential to that development and is part of what he called "practical war."

The projects of new urban spaces and the development of urban areas in major cities alongside military bases are exclusively run by the construction authority branch (Al Haya'a Al-Handasseya) of the Egyptian armed forces. It is important to notice that Kamel El-Wazir, who was the head of the construction authority in the Egyptian army for years leading the early stages of establishing the new cities that had been erected from scratch, is now the current Egyptian Minister of Transportation.

Parallel to these new complex sites, Egypt's Social Housing and Mortgage Finance Fund has actively been designing policies and coordinating social housing programs, attracting loans from the World Bank and the like.

According to official statements, these programs have benefited 287,600 households across the country since 2015. The program has prioritized families (57% of beneficiaries are married couples with young children). On average, over 75% of beneficiary households over the past five years have been among the lowest 40% of Egypt's households in terms of income distribution, with this percentage steadily increasing from 68% in 2015 to 80% in 2019 (World Bank, 2020). Yet, the housing policy is not spatially inclusive, and the construction of housing projects that relocate people from the poorest slums (e.g., Asmarat in Cairo and Bashayer El Kheir in Alexandria) separates them from the texture of cities. Though this will temporarily solve the problems faced in their earlier informal housing where they suffered from lack of infrastructure, high density, and poor basic services, it will – in the medium and long run – raise issues of social segregation and economic exclusion. The cost of these so-called social housing apartments offered by the state in these new cities supposedly constructed for attracting the middle class are unaffordable for most of that class.

The year 2020 also witnessed other events that indicate the core goal of the governing military/capitalist elite in Egypt today to be linked to spatiality, land tenure laws, and building regulations; these all indicate a will to control the constructed environment and all relevant aspects of housing. After years of failing to contain informal urban housing and building without official permits, authorities embarked on a massive campaign in April 2020 to abolish hundreds of thousands of houses and extra floors built illegally. El-Sisi has mentioned in a recorded statement that he is serious about it, using the word urbicide to show determination. According to official estimates, some 2.8 million building violations are found nationwide. In Alexandria alone, the number of violations between 2011 and 2019 reached upwards of 132,000.

Unplanned buildings constituted about 50% of the urban areas in villages and cities across the country between 1981 and 2011. An estimated 133,000 demolition orders were issued between 2011 and 2020, but just 9,000 (6%) were carried out.

As of mid-September 2020, 1.1 million property owners have submitted requests to reconcile and legalize their situation, and the government has collected 6.9 billion EGP from reconciliation fines.

Following unrests in many governorates, the prime minister vowed to introduce new measures to facilitate the process of reconciliation, including accepting applications that may have some documents missing. And in a move aimed at encouraging people to submit reconciliation requests, several governorates including Cairo, Alexandria, Assiut, and Damietta have announced a 20–50% reduction in reconciliation fees for certain building violations (Tarek, 2020).

When the campaign sparked violent confrontations between citizens/residents and local authorities, two men were reportedly killed and thousands arrested across the county (Michaelson, 2020). In some villages, the unrest lasted for several days.

While political protests have declined because of the random arrests and harsh measures taken by the regime, the protests related to land and housing clearly were the largest and lasted for many years. This should signal where some future strategies of dissent will be found.

This scene is taking place on a background of unprecedented levels of poverty in the country. In 2019, the Egyptian Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) reported a spike in poverty rates from 27.8% in 2015 to 32.5% in 2018 (*Egyptian Streets*, 2019). In other words, 9.8 million Egyptians had fallen into poverty over the span of five years. A fiscal and economic policy designed to accelerate the transfer of wealth from the lower and middle classes to the business elites is the main culprit. This policy is based on several pillars. First, the government relies heavily on loans in lieu of taxation to finance government operations and mega infrastructure projects. Tax revenues are instead disproportionately used for loan and interest payments. This leads to a transfer of wealth from the lower and middle classes to the regime's creditors, both foreign and domestic. Second, the government continues to cut subsidies and social spending. Third, the use of a regressive tax structure that shifts the tax burden onto the shoulders of the middle and lower classes is ongoing. At the same time, the government continues to pursue mega infrastructure projects spearheaded by the military; this acts as a tool for appropriating public funds rather than being used for social spending and poverty reduction programs (Mandour, 2020).

Sovereignty revisited

Michael Mann (1984) examined the infrastructural power of states in parallel to the despotic power of sovereignty; both are conditioned by a differentiated set of institutions and demarcated spheres of authority that are regulated by law. The state has the monopoly over the means of physical power, but the forms of infrastructural power are a dialectic of social development. States have acquired a variety of power infrastructures throughout history (Mann, 1984). In the case of Egypt, instead of autonomy, another level of infrastructural power is seen that resonates more to spatiality, concrete material infrastructures, and control of land that gives way to a real estate state model far more complex than the examples of gentrification or mega-urban projects that have usually been studied under that title (Stein, 2019). It is a manifestation of coercive organizational power of the military allied with global high finance institutions and regional rentier states investments that are all vehicles of political influence.

Malešević (2017) argued that a relationship of interdependence exists, as not only is the military power dependent on the presence of durable social organizations, but organizations themselves are inherently coercive entities. All complex social organizations entail a division of labor, hierarchical delegation of tasks and responsibilities, degree of discipline and control, and – where lack of compliance with the rules is penalized – reliance on the use of coercive means to accomplish organizational goals.

The legal and political spheres have been restructured accordingly, and from this eventually follows the social realm contrary to the balanced way Mann described. This type of infrastructural power is inherently and structurally violent and stems from a military imagination, not a civic one. Understanding this enables one to see the many features of war in this urban planning and legal system. This is why analyzing the domain of law as a terrain in the military imagination wherein armed forces conquer with a war approach helps explain the scene in Egypt today. The legal domain has also been targeted with a scorched earth policy.

All these described changes, when added to the urban militarism examined earlier, can explain how (not why) President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi officially signed into effect the controversial Tiran and Sanafir agreement on June 24, 2017, which dominated Egyptian and international

news and social media for more than a year. The April 2016 agreement between Egypt and Saudi Arabia will give Saudi Arabia sovereignty over the two Red Sea islands at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba, Tiran Island and Sanafir Island.

This agreement unleashed opposition and protests that undermined the legitimacy of el-Sisi's government even more than the coup and the Rabaa massacre had, around which the various political actors had diverse stances. This has undoubtedly shaken the public trust in the army and raised many eyebrows (Lotito, 2018; Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy [TIMEP], 2018). Syndicates and parliamentarians objected, and a court annulled the agreement, but the demonstrations were crushed and arrested participants were each sentenced to five years; soon afterward, the Supreme Constitutional Court revalidated the Tiran and Sanafir agreement and overturned the previous rulings. Thus, in this way, these two islands were handed to the Saudis.

Since 2013, the military's penetration into the judiciary has increased (Eldakak, 2012, pp. 300–306; Khalid, 2020). The constitutional amendments of April 2019 included Article 200, which gives the army the role of "safeguarding the constitution;" this is a very ambiguous notion. Paragraph 2 of Article 204 states:

> A civilian shall not be tried before a military court except for crimes that constitute an [here the word "direct" was removed] attack on military installations, camps of the Armed Forces or the like, facilities under the protection of the Armed Forces, the military or border areas, the forces' equipment, vehicles, weapons, ammunition, documents, military secrets, its public funds, military factories, or crimes related to recruitment, or crimes that constitute a direct attack on its officers or members for the performance of their duties.
>
> *(Mamdouh, 2019)*

With this broad phrasing and under renewed emergency laws, building without a permit became in 2020 a crime that would be referred to the military prosecutor under Law 22. Though according to the law, the military prosecutor cannot issue a rule and has to refer the case back to the general prosecutor or the high court of national security, this law strengthens the military's engagement in civil affairs.

Comparing the dynamism of political parties, social movements, and the parliament before 2011 with the situation since the 2013 coup shows Egypt's parliament to have been broadly excluded from the country's political developments and to have instead busied itself with issuing laws referred to it by the president. The very fact that parliamentary elections only took place at the end of 2015 indicates the military's intention. This delay was part of a strategy, as the army seized the opportunity to draft a law with the support of the judiciary that formed a legislature that would not challenge the regime (Völkel, 2017).

Conclusion

Borrowing Étienne Balibar's idea of "statism without a state" whereby the governance role overshadows politics in its deepest sense, cities have become sites of hegemony where the army controls the land rather than defends the sovereignty of state territory. This can also be understood in light of developments in the Egyptian political economy, where a strong regime is weakening the state (Soliman, 2011).

When urban spaces become a site of uncivil war, as Agamben (2015) described, a condition of impure war in accordance with Lotringer and Virilio (1983/2008). After the classical and political world wars, "we now have the asymmetrical and trans-political war of groupuscules,

groups, and other paramilitaries" (Agamben, 2015, p. 7). However, a new type of urban war has also occurred.

The "Owners of the Republic," as Yazid Sayigh (2012) described them, are now doing business, but it is also accurate to suggest that the generals are also at the very same time doing their business as usual (i.e., war).

In a recent book, Kenneth Pollack (2019) asked what the reason was for Arab militaries to consistently perform poorly in war. Pollack's main argument was that culturally motivated patterns of behavior inculcated by Arab educational processes are primarily to blame for Arab military's weaknesses. The absence of organizational flexibility, initiative, resourcefulness, creativity, and tactical autonomy all contribute to the poor Arab display in combined-arms and maneuver warfare. This chapter has attempted to widen the scope of analysis by redefining politics and war in relation to urban spatiality in the search for more answers, and in anticipation of the future challenges and threats.

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27

THE CONCEPT OF ISLAMIC REPUBLIC IN IRAN

Before and after the revolution

Serhan Afacan

Introduction

After the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini famously declared his vision of the new state in the following words: "The Islamic Republic, not one word less, not one word more" (Jahanbakhsh, 2001, p. 135). For him, the word Islam did not "need adjectives such as democratic. Precisely because Islam is everything, it means everything. It is sad for us to add another word near the word Islam, which is perfect" (Fallaci, 1979). Behind Ayatollah Khomeini's uncompromising attitude lay the different proposals regarding the name and content of the new regime (Khosravi, Fallah, & Dehnavi, 2016, p. 130). Ultimately, the new political system was named the Islamic Republic of Iran following a referendum held on March 29–30, 1979 (Farvardin 9–10, 1358 Hijri-Shamsi [HS]) that resulted in an impressive 98.2% of affirmative votes. Obviously, the difference in opinions was not a simple question of naming but concerned the very nature of the new system, because Iran, for the first time in its history, was experiencing a non-monarchical political system, and this caused several uncertainties. The first uncertainty concerned the content of the constitution. Although preparations for drafting a new constitution had already started while Ayatollah Khomeini was still in exile in Paris, 99.5% of the votes cast by Iranians on December 2–3, 1979 (Azar 11–12, 1358 HS) being in favor of the new constitution partly sealed the debate, and the administrative bodies of the new state gained a constitutional foundation. Only the debate was sealed, partly for reasons which will be discussed in what follows.

The second uncertainty concerned the rank and file of the new state. Because the officials, especially the high-ranking ones, of the Pahlavi regime had been prosecuted or fled from Iran, the question occurred of which personnel to employ for state services. Furthermore, what kind of paradigms exactly would inform the state on its domestic, international, economic, and social policies was just as unclear. Ayatollah Khomeini's ideology was certainly unrivaled, but its details were far from apparent. From that time onward, a comprehensive consolidation process unfolded under the auspices of the Council of the Islamic Revolution whereby a complex state-rebuilding process commenced. By 1980, the new state had taken its form to a certain extent, and little, if any, tolerance was found toward the opposition, whether from the right or left or from within the religious circles. When the Iran-Iraq War broke out in September 1980, things became even worse. Iran was plunged into chaos with assassinations and executions occurring daily. The unusual 1980s allowed the revolutionary leadership to take unusual steps that under

ordinary circumstances would have been more difficult to perform. In fact, Iran had already been going through strange times for quite a while, due to Muhammad Reza Pahlavi's policies. "Let *him* [the Shah] go and let there be flood afterwards" was the most widespread slogan uniting the anti-Shah protestors in the 1970s (Katouzian, 2003, pp. 29–30). Days before Ayatollah Khomeini's arrival on February 1, 1979 after 15 years of exile, the Shah had left Iran on January 16, 1979. This was allegedly for medical treatment, but in reality he had gone never to return. This all-or-nothing approach has had a relatively long history in Iran.

A glance at Iran's 20th-century intellectual history reveals some concepts to stand out as being more than mere abstractions, among these being *adalat* [justice], *esteqlal* [independence], *azadi* [freedom], *gharbzadegi* [Westoxification], and *este'mar-setizi* [anti-imperialism]. Yet the concept of an Islamic republic was more important and complex than the others, both in its nature and strength. It was an umbrella term that lay at the crossroads of the discussions which had started in the 19th century and accelerated with the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 around the necessity of transforming the absolute monarchy and the position of Islam in this regard. In the Iranian context, while the proponents of an Islamic republic propounded it to embrace all the other important concepts and ideals, its opponents saw a confusion in it that stemmed from the fact that its two pillars, Islam and republic, stood on different foundations of legitimacy (i.e. revelation and popular will, respectively). On the one hand, the position of the first group had made the concept of Islamic republic different in nature. *Esteqlal*, *azadi*, *wa cumhuri-yi islami* [Islamic independence, freedom, and republic] was a slogan that aptly shows this uniqueness. Meanwhile, the concept gained a constitutional and organizational form after 1979 that differentiated it from the other concepts in strength. Thus, just as the Islamic Republic of Iran has been studied from political, geopolitical, economic, social, and other aspects, the concept of Islamic republic also deserves close scrutiny. The present chapter aims at doing exactly this.

Throughout the last 40 years, the Iranian Revolution of 1979, being one of the most significant revolutions of the 20th century to take place throughout the world, and the resultant Islamic Republic of Iran have not only undergone changes in line with their universal dimensions, but have also experienced different phases internal to Iran's own circumstances. This political system, a product of a multidimensional struggle posed against the internal dictatorship of the Pahlavis and the global hegemonic powers, has in time gained specific features for combining Islam with republicanism and for taking a rigid ideological form. This system was posed as a solution when others had been discredited in the eyes of a growing number of people throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Both the capitalism of the United States and the communism of the the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) had been considered harmful Western fabrications and commands. This intricate process will be further discussed in what follows. Nevertheless, the concept of Islamic republic has faced serious challenges when put into practice, for it had not been sufficiently tested before and was an outcome of a theoretical exploration. The shifting global order and the cultural, demographic, political, and economic transformations that Iran experienced in recent decades created these challenges. Although the political elites in Iran have always tried to find solutions to these problems, the challenges and the theoretical discussions on the concept of Islamic republic still continue. This chapter deals with the theoretical discussions on concept by simultaneously touching upon the concrete developments as much as possible. The first section presents a short overview of the debates on Islam and politics in Iran during the 20th century. The second section next examines the emergence and development of the concept of Islamic republic prior to it having entered Iran's agenda. The intellectual atmosphere in which the concept emerged in Iran is analyzed next, followed by a discussion of Ayatollah Khomeini's perception – as well as those of his followers – to show how the concept of Islamic republic had gained uniquely Iranian features. This

section is then followed by a consideration of the post-Khomeini debates. The study will end with a conclusion.

Between *Mashruteh* and *Mashru'eh*

Analyzing 20th-century Iranian history in a line stretching from the Constitutional Revolution to the Islamic Revolution is commonplace. In the constitutional period, a political community was created in Iran, and many issues began to be more vociferously discussed. Similar to the neighboring Ottoman Empire, Iran also saw an explosion of publications take place, as reflected in the more than 200 periodicals that began publication between 1905 and 1911 (Afary, 1996, p. 116). Through these publications, discussions reached a wider audience. Although the constitutional experience soon ended in failure due to internal and external factors, many of the discussions held in this period continued for the rest of the century and even persist today. The Majles [Iranian parliament] was dismantled after conceding to the Russian ultimatum in 1911, and the breakout of World War I pushed Iran into further chaos. The coup d'état launched in 1921 by Reza Khan, then a colonel in the elite Cossack Brigade, and Sayyed Zia'u-Din Tabatabai, a pro-British journalist, changed the course of events in Iran. Reza Khan first became Minister of War and then Prime Minister in 1923, by which time Reza Khan's rise to power had become more clearly steady. Therefore, his coronation as Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1926 after the abolition of the Qajar Dynasty in late 1925 came as no surprise. Nevertheless, the two years between 1923 and 1925 was a period of transition. Although the end of the Qajar looked obvious, the form of the new regime to replace it was less clear. Rumors and discussions were made that a republic would be declared in Iran resembling that in neighboring Turkey. Yet with the announcement of the Pahlavi Dynasty, the monarchical rule was maintained more powerfully, and the remnants of the constitutional experience were erased. Generally speaking, Iranian history up to modern times is often told through successive dynasties by emphasizing Iran's imperial history, which had started with the Achaemenid Empire in the 6th century BC. Although Iran's pre-Islamic imperial past has always been highlighted, this had been transformed into a state ideology by the Pahlavis in its effort to build a nation. These efforts, which had started under Reza Shah, continued under his son, Muhammad Reza Shah. This imagined imperial continuity also effected the debates around identity in Iran.

Both the revolutions in 1906 and 1979 were anti-monarchical in nature. This common ground brought otherwise conflicting groups together to fight for the same cause. However, hostilities resumed and inter-communal struggles erupted after the revolutions. At the core of the conflict lay the position of Islam in politics. For instance, although the idea of establishing a parliament and drafting a constitution had been accepted by all the revolutionaries in 1906, the balance to be kept between Islam and politics was unclear. For instance, for Sheikh Fazlullah Nuri, a leading cleric of the time, Islam had not been sufficiently integrated into the constitutional order, nor did the ulama did exercise any actual powers.[1] The ensuing debate around the dichotomy of *mashru'eh* [rule according to Sharia] as opposed to *mashruteh* [rule according to the constitution] resulted in the introduction of the 1907 Supplementary Fundamental Laws to the Belgian-style original 1906 Constitution that had suggested among other things in Article 2 that the five Shiite scholars who were to be elected by the Majles from a list of 20 would scrutinize all legislative attempts in order to prevent any law from being enacted that would contradict Sharia (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 90). This was argued in later decades to be an early version of Ayatollah Khomeini's *valayet-e faqih* [guidance of the Islamic jurist], which he would develop in Najaf in the late 1960s. However, Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar, being deeply upset by the constitutional regime, seized the schism between the revolutionaries as an opportunity

to bombard the Majles in 1908 so as to badly shake the basis of the populist alliance. After a one-year civil war fought between the Shah's forces and the revolutionaries, the latter group ultimately entered Tehran in 1909 and the Shah fled the country. In addition, Nuri was hung in Tehran. His attempts and his execution had historic significance to the extent that, after the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini declared him to be the ideological father of the Islamic Republic while simultaneously making every effort to rehabilitate his tarnished image (Afary, 1996, p. 1).

Nevertheless, the constitution, along with its supplementary laws, remained in place under Reza Shah, as well, at least on paper. Reza Shah's centralization policies ran against the interests of not only the centrifugal forces such as tribes and local power centers, but also the ulama, who had enjoyed an autonomous position throughout the Qajar's rule. Although Reza Shah's modernization policies were not as successful as he had hoped, the ulama were stripped of many of their educational, legal, and financial privileges. When the Allied forces occupied Iran in 1941 during World War II, in which Iran remained neutral, and forced Reza Shah to abdicate in favor of his son for his alleged pro-German policies, things started to change, at least for a while. Under young Muhammad Reza Shah, who was 22 years old in 1941, political prisoners were released, political parties were allowed to form, and Iran enjoyed a relatively free political atmosphere. The Shah carefully exalted his image as a powerful and democratic monarch, both at home and abroad. He additionally conducted cordial relations with some of the ulama, most prominently with the Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Hosayn Ali Tababatai Borujerdi. Although this relationship continued until the latter's death in 1961, from the early 1950s onwards, the Shah's attitude had changed drastically.

Several factors influenced the emergence of the idea of an Islamic republic in Iran. The first was the discredited monarchical rule that had increasingly fallen into disfavor throughout the 20th century due to the Qajar and Pahlavi rulers' failure at eliminating some of Iran's chronic problems and injustices. After all:

> when the shah's urban subjects (and perhaps others too) were displeased with him, they cared not for divine grace, hereditary right nor the epithet of Pivot but for his duties as an Islamic ruler to regulate, equalize and maintain the balance.
>
> *(Martin, 2005, p. 12)*

With the exception of the constitutional experience and the nationalist Muhammad Mosaddeq's premiership from 1951–1953 when he was toppled by the coup d'état known as Operation Ajax, which had been jointly organized by the British, the United States, and the Shah's court, the idea of an Islamic republic was the strongest alternative to a monarchy. At a time when several Western ideologies had penetrated into Iran, the Iranian Shiite ulama had earned themselves significant legitimacy throughout the 19th and 20th centuries as a result of the authority coming from classical Shiism and the developments taking place in the country. This powerful foundation of legitimacy enabled the ulama to stay away from formal politics and exercise their influence through prominent mullahs, madrasahs, waqfs, and pious foundations, as well as through their organic relations with guildsmen, merchants, and landlords.

The second factor was Ayatollah Khomeini himself. He was sent into exile in November 1964, first to Turkey for a few months, followed by Najaf in Iraq, where he stayed until 1978, and finally to Paris, where he stayed until he returned back to Iran. The first standoff between Ayatollah Khomeini and the Shah came with the announcement of the White Revolution in 1963, whereby the Shah aimed at accelerating land reform by selling government-owned factories to make up for the losses of the big landlords, by nationalizing the forests, by

introducing a new electoral law that would – among other things – ensure enfranchisement for women, by enabling profit-sharing in industry, and by creating literacy corps for spreading elementary education into rural areas where formal education was virtually nonexistent (Hambly, 1991, p. 279). Being away from the country, he stood aloof from the responsibility for the developments taking place in Iran and was regarded by many as a hope of salvation. This enabled the Ayatollah to embrace the traditional power of a mullahs, while at the same time making use of the modern means of politics.

From secular to Islamic republic

Debates around Islam's compatibility with democracy or republicanism and the possibility of having a Western-type republic without a Western-type democracy have had a relatively long history. Republics were established throughout the Islamic world following the fall of empires such as in Turkey or through the disintegration of bigger states, as in the case of Pakistan. The Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, founded in 1918 and invaded by the Bolsheviks shortly after, is the first example in this regard.[2] In addition, the Republic of Turkey was founded in October 1923 and is the most powerful example of a republican regime in a Muslim country. Syria and Lebanon were later added to Turkey under French mandate (Lewis, 1955, pp. 1–9).

However, although Islam was declared the official religion for some time in some of these cases (e.g., like Turkey), no republic qualified as being Islamic. These experiences would later inspire other countries in accommodating Islam into politics in the modern world. In other words, Islamic republics would not come into existence until the republican experiences occurred before them. Prior to Iran, an Islamic republic was declared as the official regime first in Pakistan in 1947 and then in Mauritania in 1960. Pakistan was a specifically important case for how it reflected the experiences Muslims on the Indian subcontinent had gone through throughout the late 19th and 20th centuries. However, they also made another significant contribution to the idea of an Islamic republic. With the colonization of India, which had been accelerating since the mid-19th century, India had fallen under the impact of British institutions. The situation of the Indian Muslims after the fall of the Mughal Empire was a distressing question for the Muslim elites who were concerned about the rising Hindu domination. Meanwhile, Islam's position under the increasing pressure of the European ideas and institutions was another significant issue. The ensuing debates were followed and influenced by other Muslim countries, foremost of these being Iran because of the dominant Persian presence among the Indian literati. Muhammad Iqbal of Lahore is one good example. He was born, raised, and educated in India (as well as Europe later on in life) to become an eminent Muslim thinker and a great poet who produced poems extensively in Persian. His influence in Iran was great. His prose has been translated into various languages, but his reputation is owed mostly to his poems in Persian. Although Pakistan was founded in 1948, ten years after Iqbal's death in 1938, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, named Iqbal the spiritual father of the state of Pakistan. Iqbal's ideas on Islam, republic, and democracy had played a key role in this.

For Iqbal, the concepts of democracy and republic, which he occasionally used interchangeably, had instrumental value. For instance, Iqbal stated:

> Democracy has a tendency to foster the spirit of legality. This is not in itself bad; but unfortunately, it tends to displace the purely moral standpoint and to make the illegal and the wrong identical in meaning.
>
> *(Iqbal, 1961, p. 120)*

Therefore, according to Iqbal, "spiritual democracy [which is immune from the flaws of Western democracy is] the ultimate aim of Islam" (Iqbal, 1930, p. 42). The link between Iqbal's spiritual democracy with *mardom-salari-ye dini* [religious democracy] of the theoreticians of the Islamic Republic of Iran is obvious. According to Iqbal, only through such a democracy would humans be able to keep away from being prey to their physical and materialistic sides in order to "let man develop all the possibilities of his nature by allowing him as much freedom as practicable" (Iqbal, 1930, p. 51). Furthermore, as far as republicanism, Iqbal (1930, p. 125) considered "the republican form of government is not only thoroughly consistent with the spirit of Islam but has also become a necessity in view of the forces that are set free in the world of Islam." Iqbal's writings were very popular among some of the top Iranian revolutionary thinkers such as Ali Shariati. In addition, Iran's current leader, Sayyid Ali Khamenei, has also shown great interest in Iqbal's ideas and has referred to himself as a pupil of Iqbal by linking his ideas to the ideals of the Islamic Revolution. Although Iqbal's ideas were in fact substantially different from the practices in Iran, this interest in him is worth noting.

The decayed West and the imagined self

The trajectory of Islamic republic as an idea in Iran cannot be understood without considering some developments and political ideas witnessed during the process leading up to the 1979 Revolution. The bitter defeats at the hands of Russia that led to the disastrous Golestan (1813) and Turkomanchay (1828) treaties created unrest among Iranians inside and outside of Iran, especially those living in the lands ceded to Tsarist Russia. The defeats unfolded a process of *tajaddod* [renewal] through which Iran started to adopt Europe's technology, institutions, and, often unintendedly, its ideas. Those who were sent to Europe to learn the advanced sciences often came back with new ideas and practices such as the printing press. Nationalism was the most important European import.

The course of nationalism in Iran has been subject to several studies. The idea, if not necessarily the word, for the Iranian nation [*mellat-e Iran*] was very popular in the 19th century and was enhanced by such developments as the Tobacco Protest which broke out in 1891 when *Akhtar*, a periodical published in Istanbul, disclosed the concession granted by Naser al-Din Shah to a British national for a complete monopoly over the production, sale, and export of all Iranian tobacco (Lambton, 1987, p. 223). The protest was significant on a number of levels. First of all, for the first time in modern Iranian history, farmers, merchants, ulama, intellectuals, and ordinary men formed a common coalition to struggle for the same cause. Second, this was the first instance in modern times when the ulama openly challenged state authority, as exemplified in Hajj Mirza Hasan Shirazi's fatwa denouncing the concession in the following words: "In the name of God the Merciful, the Forgiving. Today the use of tobacco in whatever fashion, is tantamount to war against the Imam of the Age [the Hidden Imam], may God hasten his glad advent" (Lambton, 1987, p. 227). Third, this historic incidence contributed to the nationalist sentiments in Iran. It triggered a sense that "the Shah and his government were selling the country to unbelievers" (Lambton, 1987, p. 90) among those who were upset with the Shah's policies. Aside from the Constitutional Revolution that would occur less than two decades later, nationalism has been one of the leading ideologies in Iran.

Communism, which had found a stronghold in Iran since the end of the 19th century, must also be added to nationalism. The famines and economic instability partly caused by a decline in traditional manufactures due to foreign economic invasion had pushed an increasing number of Iranians to seek employment in the flourishing industries neighboring Russia, particularly in the oilfields in and around Baku (Atabaki, 2007, pp. 37–38). There they established

the Hemmat organization, which in 1906 became Ferqah-e Ejtema'iyun-e 'Ammiyun [The Social Democratic Party] in Iran and were known as *mojahed*s (Chaquèri, 2010, p. 17). Their impact in Iran remained limited, as they were first represented in the First Majles (1906–1908) by individual deputies and then in the Second Majles (1909–1911) under the banner of the Democrats until they became more visible with the establishment of the Communist Party in 1920 following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 (Afary, 1996, p. 264). Thus, as far as organized political movements are concerned, nationalism was first to enter Iran's modern political life and was followed by communism; Islamism, to the extent it existed in Iran in the sense that it had developed in neighboring Turkey and Egypt, was a relative latecomer. In this regard, Islam's already-firm position, especially in informal politics, played a role, but the abstention of the leading clerics from daily politics had been more decisive. Such Shiite scholars as Sheikh Fazlullah Nuri, Sheikh Mohammad-Hossein Naini, Seyyed Abdollah Behbahani, and Mirza Sayyed Mohammad Tabatabai were the first exceptions in this regard. Their abstention did not mean that Islam did not exist in politics, but that no Islamic parties would form apart from some later marginal examples, such as Mosaddeq's National Front (1949) or the Tudeh Party (1941). Otherwise, scholars and intellectuals such as Ayatollah Taleqani, Yadollah Sahabi, and Mahdi Bazargan gave a prominent role to Islam in their political approaches. Navvab Safavi's radical ideas should also be included with these. After the coup d'état in 1953, this process slowed down then later accelerated with Ayatollah Khomeini's rise in the early 1960s.

The nationalist experience of Mosaddeq, the fate that befell his movement, and the crises that the Tudeh Party experienced left space available for Ayatollah Khomeini's leadership. However, the intellectual impact of nationalism and communism/socialism in Iran was far-reaching, as exemplified in the works and activities of such figures as Jalal Al-e Ahmad, Ahmad Fardid, Bazargan, Sharitati, and more. Their combination of modern ideologies alongside Shiism had turned Islam into a strong and all-embracing ideology. In this context, the works of Shariati were of particular significance. His work is a curious amalgam of different an even conflicting ideologies in which Ali b. Abi Taleb (son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad and the first of the Shiite Imams), Abu Zar (one of the companions of the Prophet), Mosaddeq, and Che Guevara appear as heroes of resistance. The most important discussions, however, took place around issues related to identity. Al-e Ahmad's concept of Westoxification, which he borrowed from Fardid and improved upon by criticizing the Westernized Iranian alites and intellectuals who had lost their identity and Shariati's discourse of *bazgasht be khish* [return to the authentic self] as a call for a new identity deeply affected the Islamic ideology of the period. The impact was so widespread that:

> Many if not most secular intellectuals – virtually all leftists, and most of them Marxist-Leninists – began to discover the virtues of the county's religious culture and traditions, to decry Westernization, and to advocate cultural authenticity and 'nativism.' The terms gharbzadegi and gharbzadeh (variously translated, respectively, into Westoxication and Westoxicated, Weststruckness and Weststruck, etc.), which the writer and intellectual Jalal Al-e Ahmad had used to attack the cultural and politico-economic influence of the West, became everyday words used by members of virtually all classes to denounce state projects and decisions, as well as anyone or anything they did not like.
>
> *(Katouzian, 2010, p. 37)*

None of these thinkers, of course, mentioned the idea of an Islamic republic as a specific solution to rid Iranians of the Western hegemony – and this is exactly where Ayatollah Khomeini fits into the narrative.

Ayatollah Khomeini and the idea of Islamic republic

Khomeini's predominant role in the 1979 Revolution is obvious. The question arises in addressing how to establish a link between the structural processes and his personality in the making of the revolution or, as Kamrava (1999, p. 317) put it, "the role of institutions compared with that of human agency." While putting aside this significant debate, Ayatollah Khomeini certainly gave the revolution its ultimate color and played the leading role in the foundation of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Nevertheless, this was a result of a complex intellectual journey on his part. In other words, the idea of an Islamic republic occurred to the Ayatollah as a result of a gradual process. One article dealing with his vision of Islam and republic reads as follows:

> The idea of "Islamic republic" was formulated by the Imam [Khomeini] to implement the order of justice and it was presented for a referendum against other doctrines. In fact, the Honorable Imam has come with it by his apprehension, especially from philosophical and wisdom perspectives, of the pillars of Islam as well as the goals and the aims of the Islamic order. In doing so, he built upon the primary principles of the Quran; the Honorable Prophet's vision (peace be upon him), his way and statesmanship; as well as the precious experiences from the government of the Honorable Ali (PBUH). He also considered the calls of the noble Iranian people for the implementation of the Islamic rules and abstention from false deities [Taghut]. Thus, with the aims of realizing two objectives of executing the divine rule [hakemiyat-e ilahi] and the rule of people [hakemiyat-e mardomi], he introduced, before the revolution and during people's victory, the government of "Islamic republic" to Iranian people as the form of government which they approved in the referendum held in 1979.
>
> *(Khosravi et al., 2016, p. 143)*

These considerations, the likes of which one can see in many different writings, are largely an attempt at creating a tradition for Ayatollah Khomeini's ideas and do not match historical reality. For instance, how long before the Revolution he came up with this idea is unclear. Khomeini first recorded use of the concept of an Islamic republic is in an interview he gave to France's *Le Figaro* shortly before the Revolution on October 14, 1979 (Forati, 2000, p. 222). So far, the fact that Ayatollah Khomeini had not produced the idea of an Islamic republic from authentic Islamic sources but had gradually formulated it owing to the experiences he had gone through over the decades must be clear. This is not surprising at all, because Khomeini rose up to prominence in the anti-Shah camp during the 1960s. The socially and ideologically diverse nature of the opposition in Iran disallowed Khomeini from advocating a clear-cut alternative to the Shah's rule. Otherwise, he would not have succeeded in expanding his basis. The obvious thing was that a new government was to be established in Iran that had "nothing to do with monarchy at all" (Forati, 2000, p. 221). To better understand the emergence of the concept of an Islamic republic, distinction must be made between *Hukumat-e Islami* [Islamic government] and *Jomhuri-ye Islami* [Islamic republic]. Until late 1978, Khomeini appears to have underscored the former concept and not the latter (Martin, 2003, p. 150).

Upon being asked, in an interview about the nature of the Islamic state, Khomeini commented: "We want an Islamic republic: Republic will make the form and the shape of the government and Islam will give it its content (i.e., the divine laws)." (Forati, 2000, p. 224). Although Khomeini made several comments regarding an Islamic republic, a more detailed accentuation of this can be found in the works of such senior mullahs as Ayatollah Hussein-Ali

Montazeri, Ayatollah Abdollah Javadi Amoli, and Ayatollah Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi. These figures and many others played a key role in providing ideological justification to the system by elaborating on many of the vague dimensions in Khomeini's works and speeches. Apparently, the pro-Khomeini revolutionary elites confined republicanism to mere electoral procedures, and the idea of an Islamic republic was predominantly understood within the framework of *valayet-e faqih*. Here, the people do not appear as a source of legitimacy for the system, and their role is restricted to determining its functioning. (Palizban, 2009, p. 117). According to Yazdi:

> Valiyy-e Faqih [the Guardian Islamic Jurist] assumes power, and becomes legitimate, by a general mandate [*nasb-e 'am*][3] from Allah and the Imam-of-the-Time [the Twelfth Imam]. In the time of Occultation, like in the times of the Prophet and the Innocent Imams [the Twelve Imams], the people are not the basis of legitimacy neither in its fundamental sense nor in the sense of determining the person of the Faqih or the criteria thereof.
>
> *(As cited in Palizban, 2009, p. 118)*

Elsewhere, Yazdi argues that "this *Valayat* that we attribute to the *Faqih* is something that Allah designated, that the Imam-of-the-Time explained for him, and the people are not in a position to give him *Valayet*" (as cited in Palizban, 2009, p. 118). Yazdi further argues that:

> The structure and the ideals of the government are shaped by divine revelation and religion in its entirety; the incapability of reason in grasping the value of religion's attitudes; limitations of freedoms; acknowledge the humans' rights for the protection of God's rights; the existence of the imperative and establish rules and the definitive meanings of the Quran as well as the methods of knowing them; the rejection of relativism and pluralism; founding all laws on God; existential [takwini] and religious [tashri'i] servitude; God's right to sovereignty and legislation; establishing laws on unchanging fundaments; imperativeness of Valayet-e Faqih and the legitimacy thereof; the concomitance of religion and politics; absence of contradiction between the nobility of man and the restriction of freedoms; the preservation of Islamic values; emulating the Valiyyi-e Faqih; the existence of definitive knowledge in Scholarly Seminaries [Howzeh-e ilmi] and the prohibition of commenting on fundamental law.
>
> *(Palizban, 2009, pp. 119–120)*

The critical issue in such a perception of republic is its relationship between republicanism and democracy rather than with Islam. The concept of religious democracy is based on the idea that liberal democracy is as harmful as dictatorship and hence must be limited by divine values. Ayatollah Amoli's approach to this point is thoroughly clear:

> Some think that only dictatorial regimes are based on polytheism [shirk]. The black propagandas of foreigners, (on the other hand), made people think that democracy is a valuable and fair system. But it should be known that as faith has different levels, polytheism too has different levels. Although it is true that dictatorship and oppression are two of the worst levels of polytheism this does not mean that democracy is not polytheistic.
>
> *(Khosravi et al., 2016, p. 153)*

Such conservative interpretations of the concept of Islamic republic are based on the interpenetrated revolutionary-religious ideals, humans' obligations as servants of God and the divine goal and wisdom behind their existence on Earth. In such an interpretation, with its deliberately peculiar ontological and epistemological positioning, republicanism is appreciated to the degree it serves the highlighted divine goals. Almost every item in such an interpretation of republicanism has gone under question throughout the 1990s and 2000s in Iran.

Islamic republic after Ayatollah Khomeini

Because Islamic republic has ceased to be a mere intellectual concept in Iran and has functioned as the political system of the country during the last 40 years, its post-1979 development should be analyzed within its historical dynamism. With the constitutional amendments made in July 1989 shortly after Ayatollah Khomeini's death, the Islamic Republic of Iran in a sense gained its ultimate administrative shape. The already dominant position of *valiyy-e faqih* was further reinforced by these amendments as reflected in Article 57:

> The powers of government in the Islamic Republic are vested in the legislature, the judiciary, and the executive powers, functioning under the supervision of the absolute wilayat al-'amr and the Leadership of the Ummah, in accordance with the forthcoming articles of this Constitution. These powers are independent of each other.

The word "absolute" was added to the Article in 1989. To this, many other critical changes can also be seen to have been added, such as giving the *valiyy-e faqih* the power to determine the "general policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran after consultation with the Nation's Exigency Council" (Article 110). Also, the post of prime minister was abolished and the post of the president, the second highest constitutional authority, was reinforced. With Ali Khamenei's election as Khomeini's successor and the new *valiyy-e faqih* in 1989, many of the disagreements that had remained somewhat unspoken under Khomeini came to the fore. Consequently, Khamenei had problems with every president who served during his tenure. Although the content of their disagreements changed considerably, all four presidents that served under Khamenei (i.e., Hashemi Rafsanjani [1989–1997], Muhammad Khatami [1999–2005], Mahmoud Ahmadinejad [2005–2013], and Hassan Rouhani [2013–present]) have complained about their insufficient powers not permitting them to fulfill their election-time promises. This power struggle is often analyzed through the conservative-reformist divide.

Although various political, economic, and social differences of opinion exist between the conservatives and the reformists, the nature of the *nezam* [political system] has always been the most distressing question. This question has always been present since the premiership in the provisional government of Bazargan, who resigned following the hostage crisis in November 1979, and the presidency of Abolhasan Banisadr, the first president of the Islamic Republic of Iran who served from February 4, 1980 until his impeachment by the Majles on June 20, 1981, after which he fled Iran. The same holds for the mullahs, as well. Some leading figures are found, such as Ayatollah Shariatmadari, who disagreed with Khomeini's vision of an Islamic republic, and Ayatollah Montazari, who later in life, took a rather critical stand against the Islamic Republic of Iran. *Valayet-e faqih* was unexceptionally identified as the core problem. Unsurprisingly, therefore, "as their ideas evolved, many post-Islamist intellectuals later discarded the idea of *vilayat-i faqih* as an 'undesirable' and 'undemocratic' and thus unacceptable model of

government" (Bayat, 2007, p. 90). Such intellectual quests for opening up the political realm from its limited scope have a relatively long history in the Islamic Republic of Iran, so much so that:

> The idea of "political development" (taws'i-yi siyasi) originated in the early 1990s from religious intellectuals' reexamination of Iran's closed political structure. It was formulated in a systematic fashion by a research team headed by Sa'id Hajjariyan, probably the most innovative strategist of the religious democratic left.
>
> *(Bayat, 2007, p. 94)*

A follower of Shari'ati's ideas, Hajjariyan attached special importance to political development because:

> Political development was crucial, Hajjariyan concluded, first, because it was a precondition for economic development (similar to the notion that democracy is good for economic growth), and, second, because it could contain the repercussions of economic growth – inequality and social unrest.
>
> *(Bayat, 2007, p. 95)*

These intellectual and social examinations culminated in Khatami's landslide victory in the presidential elections held on May 23, 1997 and came as a crucial turning point. The 2nd of Khordad Movement, Khatami's election date in Iran's Solar Hijri calendar, which was later chosen by the coalition of his supporters, started to advocate a more democratic stand and discourse in almost every field. Furthermore:

> It reopened the question of the fundamental principles of order in the Islamic Republic for the first time since 1979. Khatami's platform of civil society and "the rule of law" (hokumat-e qaanun) evoked an implicit contrast with "*hokumat-e eslami*" (Islamic government), the slogan of the revolution.
>
> *(Arjomand, 2009, p. 93)*

On more than one occasion, Khatami put his finger on this essential point of the relationship among republicanism, Islam, and the position of the popular will in the system. For instance, during the election to the Assembly of Experts, he said:

> The basic question is whether these two (Islam and republicanism) are compatible. In other words, is it possible for a government whilst attributed (*motnaseb*) to God to also be based on the vote of the people? I am convinced that we have started a new experience, in other words a holy government (*hokumat-e elahi*) which is the people's and is named the Islamic Republic. I remember that during the time when the Imam was in Paris a number of Muslim Arab groups which were very revolutionary had suggestions that along with the Imam they create a Muslim Caliphate. The Imam did not accept this. He laid out his plans for an Islamic Republic. For many religious people the mixture of republicanism and Islamism was beyond comprehension. But we began that experience. . . . Some are in opposition to Islamism whilst a number are in opposition to republicanism.
>
> *(Shakibi, 2010, p. 304)*

Also, in a speech he delivered in 1998, he said:

> This system came to power with the vote of the people. The vote of the people approved the constitution and established the institutions of the system. When we speak of the Islamic Republic, Islamic means that people have decided that the country is to be governed on the basis of Islam. According to the constitution, the people are the possessors of rights and the privileges of the government are limited. If in today's world we are thinking of the defence of the Islamic Revolution we must lean on the issue that the people are the possessors of rights and the government has limits. We should be proud that such a system came from Islam.
>
> *(Shakibi, 2010, p. 304)*

The fundamental difference between this position and those of conservatives such as Amoli or Yazdi is more than deliberate. To the reformists' ideas, those of the more radical critics of the Islamic Republic of Iran and *valayet-e faqih*, such as Abdolkarim Soroush, Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari, and Mohsen Kadivar, to name only three prominent ones, can also be added. According to them, Iran's political system is not only non-republican, but also non-Islamic in character. However, the item missing from these discussions ironically is the people themselves, because in the absence of formal political parties and participatory politics, the popular will has also been almost entirely absent in relation to the basic workings of the system.

Conclusion: is the vote of the nation the true measure?

Ayatollah Khomeini had commented about two weeks prior to his departure from Paris to Tehran that an Islamic republic was a unique system (Forati, 2000, p. 224). Furthermore, shortly before the constitutional referendum in November 1979, he commented:

> We have no intention to impose anything on Muslims, and Islam does not allow us to carry a dictatorial rule. We are subject to people's votes. Whatever our people vote for we follow suit. We have no right, God granted us no right, the Prophet of Islam granted us no right to impose anything on Muslims.
>
> *(Fouzi, 2005, p. 144)*

Article 6 of Iran's Constitution reads:

> In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the affairs of the country must be administered on the basis of public opinion expressed by the means of elections, including the election of the President, the representatives of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and the members of councils, or by means of referenda in matters specified in other Articles of this Constitution.

So, the question is if the function of elections is more than their existence. In fact, Khomeini had a noticeably narrow vision of republic, election, and democracy. Later developments further narrowed down the political realm in Iran, which led an increasing number of people to feel underrepresented. A most striking and recent expression of this feeling was the Green Movement of 2009, when millions of people poured out onto the streets in the country-wide mass demonstrations, centered in Tehran in particular and resulting from Ahmadinejad's securing

a second term in a landslide; election fraud was alleged, which soon shifted to challenging the system until they were violently expelled. Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, Ahmadinejad's rivals in the election, are still under house arrest after almost 10 years. Further, Ahmadinejad ironically is also currently acting and tweeting like a freedom fighter, although for many Iranians, he is far from one. Moreover, from the end of his presidency in 2005, Khatami has hardly escaped prosecution and remains an undesirable figure in the eyes of the political establishment. Also, Rafsanjani had already fallen into disfavor when he lost his life in January 2017 for compromising the "line of the Imam," simultaneously and ambiguously meaning both Khomeini and Khamenei. Lastly, despite all political maneuvers, Rouhani will in all probability face the same fate as his predecessors. These presidents were all elected every four years, each for the maximum of two terms, to function, as stated in the Article 57 of Iran's constitution, "under the supervision of the *absolute* wilayat al-'amr and the Leadership of the Ummah" (IPRCIRI, 1992) of Ayatollah Khamenei, who was elected for a lifetime, at least in practice if not in theory, in 1989 to "delineate the general policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran" as put in the Article 110 (IPRCIRI, 1992). As Ayatollah Montazari noted, "this is obviously an appointment and not an election," as the people only vote for the members of the Assembly of Experts, while this assembly elects the *valiyy-e faqih* (Abdo, 2001, p. 16). The result, according to Ayatollah Montazari, is that "the institution of presidency is burdened by extremely heavy responsibilities, while trusted with (almost) no executive power" (Abdo, 2001, p. 18).

In point of fact, when addressing Iran's political system, the main issue is not its name but how it operates. Furthermore, the current system apparently does not efficiently work toward the best interests of the Iranian people. There is a powerful call for reform in Iran. The country's erstwhile reformist and revolutionary leadership over time has turned into the custodianship of the status quo who shut their ears to the necessities of the new Iran they all worked hard to build. This is an irony of fate. Ayatollah Montazari hints at this irony when he recalls Ayatollah Khomeini's statement in *Behesht-e Zahra*, Tehran's main cemetery, right after his arrival in Tehran in February 1, 1979:

> The fate of every generation is in its own hands. . . . What rights did the past generations have to decide the fate of our generation at present? What right did they have to determine our destiny? Every individual is in charge of his destiny. Were our forefathers our custodians?
>
> *(Abdo, 2001, p. 18)*

As Ayatollah Khomeini says in one of his mystical poems:

> We don't know that puzzled and wandering all,
> We are looking for what is in front of us.
>
> *(İmam Khomeini, 2020)*

Notes

1 For a discussion of Nuri's ideas on constitutionalism, see T. Shimamoto (1987) and Hairi (1977).
2 For a discussion of state-religion relations in the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, see: Məmmədov (2017).
3 *Nasb-e 'am* basically means that *valiyy-e faqih* has the same authority as the Hidden Imam and assumes both religious and political powers.

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28

DISCUSSIONS ON DEMOCRACY AND ISLAMIC STATES

A study on the discourses of Mawdudi, Israr Ahmed, and Ghamidi

M. Faisal Awan

Introduction

A heated debate exists in both the West and the Muslim world about whether or not democracy is essentially compatible with Islam. In some Western circles, Islam and democracy are unquestionably assumed to be fixed essences at complete loggerheads with one another (Afsaruddin, 2011). However, this fixation interestingly appears to have been averted among some moderate Islamists, either by giving alternate meaning to democracy or by giving sacredness to the secular form of democracy. On the contemporary Indian subcontinent, this debate has generated the spirit of both Islamic reformism and revivalism.

In the debate surrounding Islam, democracy, and states, Pakistan occupies a pivotal place in the Muslim world. This can be accounted for with several reasons. However, the most important reason for this pivotal status is its ideological roots and *raison d'être*. This state, proclaimed and founded in the name of religion, has exhibited the debate more intensely than any other Muslim country. The debate does not begin with Pakistan's inception as a modern nation-state. Instead, one can partly trace it back to the end of the Ottoman Caliphate and the colonial era on the subcontinent. The onslaught of British colonialism followed by the tragic end of the Ottoman Caliphate (*khilafah* in Urdu and Arabic) had greatly affected the general masses and Muslim political thought on the subcontinent. Despite the fact that the Ottoman Caliphate did not have direct control over the Muslim subcontinent, the caliphate as an institution and center for the Muslim *ummah* [community] carried more spiritual than political or practical value. The historical backdrop to the emergence of political Islam needs to be kept in mind. In 1924, the caliphate was abruptly abolished by the Republican Turks, a unilateral act that caused tremors of dismay to reverberate throughout the Islamic world (Afsaruddin, 2011, p. 147). Not only had it forced the Muslim intelligentsia to redefine their political position in relation to the dominant West, but also to revisit political religious thought under new circumstances. Both secularists and Islamists have many a time revisited the idea of Pakistan as an Islamic or secular state. Among Islamists, this idea has been approached from different dimensions. Right from

the first half of the 20th century, with the demand to have a separate piece of land for Muslims on the subcontinent akin to Medina until the Imran Khan and the contemporary government's rhetorical use of the dream of Pakistan as an Islamic state in line with the Medina model, the dream influencing collective consciousness has remained alive.[1] A part of debate on an Islamic state in Pakistan revolved around the concept of democracy and its intricate relationship with Islam. Contemporary Muslim thought in Pakistan has debated vigorously about how democracy can or cannot be framed within the dream of an Islamic state.

Several streams of thought can be traced historically in this regard. These thought processes also led to Islamic revivalism in the Muslim world in general and Pakistan in particular in the late 20th century. This chapter highlights the main features of the thoughts from three influential intellectuals of the contemporary Indian subcontinent on democracy and its complex relationship with the idea and objectives of an Islamic state. Maulana Mawdudi, Israr Ahmed, and Javed Ahmed Ghamidi reflected greatly on the ideas of an Islamic state and on democracy. Understanding and deciphering these multiple voices over the complex nature of the idea of an Islamic state with democracy would help one appreciate the subject matter better. One distinguishing feature of all three scholars is that none of them had received traditional religious education from any religious seminary, yet all left a profound impact on Muslim intelligentsia on the subcontinent. All three have commented on the idea of an Islamic state, but with variance in its implementation. While Mawdudi and Israr categorized establishing the Islamic state as an Islamic duty, Ghamidi considered establishing the Islamic state as an option, not duty, as well as establishing democracy, but with certain qualifications. While Maududi and Israr Ahmed may well be placed in the orthodox category within moderate Islamists in their approach to an Islamic state and a democracy befitting that state's Islamic framework, Javed Ahmed Ghamidi placed the will of the people as supreme in structuring society and restricted the Islamic state's role in shaping society. He believed that as far as establishing the will of God is concerned, the Islamic state has a limited role. This thought appears to express that an Islamic society (a composition of pious individuals with clean souls) is more important than an Islamic state. Perceived as a religious reformer, his work attempted to reconcile Islam with contemporary modernism. The following discussion on the three 20th- and 21st-century Muslim thinkers in Pakistan will help readers appreciate much better the contents in the debate on democracy and the Islamic state.

Abul Aala Mawdudi's conception of Islamic state and democracy

Placing Syed Abul Aala Mawdudi (1903–1979) as an iconic figure and pioneer of Islamic revivalism in the 20th century who had influenced Muslim intelligentsia from the Middle East to Southeast Asia, as well as Muslims residing in the West, would not be an exaggeration. Maulana Abul A'la Mawdudi, as he is popularly known, was one of the most influential Islamic thinkers in the Muslim world of the 20th century. As an Islamic ideologue, a leading 20th-century interpreter of Islam, an activist, a writer and politician, a scholar par excellence, and a major contributor to the promotion of *al-Islam din wa dawlah*, his writings strongly express the themes that were pivotal to the ongoing Islamic resurgence (Parray, 2010). According to Nasr (1996), Mawdudi's creation of a coherent Islamic ideology, articulated in terms of the elaborate organization of an Islamic state, constituted the essential breakthrough that led to the rise of 20th-century Islamic revivalism.

Mawdudi thoroughly went through the modern Western ideologies, explaining at length and opining about why they had failed to resolve the problems of the modern world and instead

had made it unsafe for all of humanity. Mawdudi saw first-hand the perils of Western colonialism and warned Muslims to beware of Western ideas. Mawdudi perceived Muslims on the subcontinent not as a nation defined by any ethnic, linguistic, or cultural set of origins. To him, Muslims were a community to be distinguished from others only to the extent that they heeded and implemented God's divine plan as set out in the Qur'ān and Sunnah (Brown, 2000). He openly opposed the Muslim nationalism led by the Muslim League, which demanded a separate state for the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent. This demand was out of fear of overwhelming the Hindu majority's rule that would only worsen the plight of Indian Muslims. Carl Brown aptly summarized Mawdudi's disagreement with the Muslim League over the nature of Pakistan as an independent state:

> Better, in other words, to postpone independence indefinitely than to achieve an independent state based on other than truly Islamic principles. Mawdudi believed that the followers of Jinnah and the Muslim League were more nearly embarked on nationalizing Islam than creating an Islamic nation. He wanted none of it. Neither the overwhelmingly Hindu Congress Party seeking a single India that would embrace all religions nor the Muslim League attempting to construct a nation of Muslims (but not, by Mawdudi's stern logic, an Islamic nation) offered an acceptable choice. The much more popular and powerful Muslim League viewed the Jama'at-i Islami as weakening Muslim ranks at a time when all should rally around the goal of an independent Pakistan. To opt out of the campaign for a Pakistan was, in their eyes, to play into the hands of the Congress Party. Mawdudi's response amounted to insisting that the task was to Islamize first, then create a Muslim state. With partition and the emergence of India and Pakistan as separate independent states in 1947, the dispute dividing the Jama'at-i Islami and the Muslim League became moot. The Jama'at split into two groups – those Muslims in what was now Pakistan and those left in India. Mawdudi had for several years before 1947 been living in what became Pakistan, and without hesitation he chose to remain there. Not having been able to cleanse, as he saw it, the Muslim League leadership of its secular nationalist orientation, he now worked to transform the Pakistan they had created into a proper Islamic polity.
>
> *(Brown, 2000, pp. 150–151)*

To create such an Islamic polity, Islam having sway over all aspects of life was important, and the state would be no exception to that. Mawdudi understood the Islamic state not as a territorial but as a cultural and ethical entity, and its boundaries, values, goals, and citizens were defined in Islamic terms (Nasr, 1996, p. 84). For Mawdudi, running a modern state without divine guidance or spirit would be none other than an injustice. His conception of justice required first the enforcement of *deen* [a complete code of conduct from individual to collective level] while running the modern state. According to Mawdudi:

1 State is the essential need of human society, and no collective social life is possible without it.
2 Islam does not separate *deen* and politics. It requires the whole of life to be subjected to the will of God; politics must be framed within Islamic principles for this purpose, and the state must be used for establishing Islam and its stability.
3 *Deen*, state, and governance are so intertwined that a state and government without *deen* would become a means of injustice and result in cruelty. If Islam has no state or government,

> then it becomes partly dysfunctional with God's *deen* being subjugated instead of ruling. Therefore, the state must necessarily be founded on Islamic rules and the government must necessarily follow Islam and keep struggling to enforce the *deen*.[2]

Mawdudi's discourse on democracy is essential for understating its complex interaction with the ideal Islamic state. An important and essential feature of Mawdudi's Islamic state is that *al hakimiya* [sovereignty] belongs to *Allah* alone, not to humans. *Al-amr* [command] and *al-hukm* [rule] rests with Allah, and *al-tashri* [legislation] belongs to Allah; humans only need act in accordance with Allah's will. Mawdudi subjects the will of the people to the will of the God. He cited verses such as "Those who do not make their decisions in accordance with what has been revealed by God are unbelievers" (Qur'ān, 5:44) and "They ask: 'Have we also got some authority?' Say, 'All authority belongs to God alone'" (Qur'ān 3:154) among others (Qur'ān 7:54; 5:45; 12:40; 7:3).[3] When addressing how to realize the goal of the Islamic state, one of the main concerns is the how the will of God or the sovereignty of God can be established (i.e., whether or not through democratic means as the realization of the Islamic state would remain nothing but a dream without taking control of political power). This is the point on which Mawdudi's conception of theo-democracy comes to the fore in his conception of the Islamic state.

Mawdudi's theo-democracy and Islamic state

From the early 20th century onward, many Muslim thinkers have explored the prospects for establishing an Islamic democracy by defining, discussing, and debating the relationship, compatibility, and similarity that Islamic political concepts have with the notions and positive features of democracy (Parray, 2010). Several key Islamic political concepts (i.e., *khilafat, shura, ijma, ijtihad*) and more were reassessed to understand the relationship between Islam and democracy. In Mawdudi's Islamic state, Muslim rulers would confine themselves to implementing God's will as set out in the Qur'ān and Sunna. Incumbent upon them is the discovery and implementation of the *sharia*. Therefore, the state's political system would neither be a theocracy nor a Western-style democracy but instead a mix of two, representing elements from both. The resulting system is a theo-democracy. Though Mawdudi borrowed democratic ideals from the West, he scrutinized them and subjected them to Islamic notions. He tried to Islamize democracy without losing Islamic values. In his writings, he referred to Prophet Muhammad's (*PBUH*) state of Medina as a model. Mawdudi's aim was to emulate the prophetic example in shaping the Islamic state and its mode of governance while remaining intact to the goal of democracy (Nasr, 1996, p. 88). As democratic symbols and slogans begin to crop up in Mawdudi's writings, the Prophet's model was used in increasingly Western terms in his later works until the Islamic state finally became a "God-worshipping democratic Caliphate, founded on the guidance vouchsafed to us through Muhammad" (Nasr, 1996, p. 88). For Mawdudi, democracy remained un-Islamic until it became subject to Islam (i.e., subject to the will of God because, unlike secular democracy that attaches sovereignty to the people, sovereignty belongs to God alone in Islam).

Mawdudi insisted that the Islamic state should be democratic because its leadership should be duly elected and bound by the writ of divine law (Nasr, 1996, p. 84). People should exercise their limited popular sovereignty and choose their executive and legislative authority by consensus (Nasr, 1996, p. 97). The legislative authority was based on the idea of *shura* [a consultative body like parliament]. Legislation would be done on the basis of *ijtihad*, which only a few learned and pious people would do. This refined democracy resulted in the emergence of

Jamaat-e-Islami as an important actor in Pakistani electoral politics. Though the Jamaat never emerged as a victorious force, it was able to guard the ideological roots of the state by pressuring the electoral elite to not deviate from the objectives of the state.

Israr Ahmed on democracy and the Islamic state

Israr Ahmed (1932–2010) was born on April 26, 1932 in Hisar, East Punjab in India. Dr. Ahmed graduated from King Edward Medical College in Lahore as a medical physician in 1954 and received his Master's degree in Islamic studies from the University of Karachi in 1965. Dr. Israr had worked briefly for the Muslim Students Federation during the independence movement and, following the creation of Pakistan, for the Islami Jamiat-i-Talaba (the student wing of Jamaat-e-Islami). He later joined the Jamaat-i-Islami but developed differences with the party's chief and founder, Abul Ala Mawdudi, when the latter opted for electoral politics in 1957 (*Dawn*, 2010). In 1975, he founded Tanzeem-e-Islami, an organization working for Iqamat-e-Deen in Pakistan and in his struggle for a revolution. He also founded Tehreek-e-Khilafat [The Caliphate Movement] in Pakistan in 1991. He vigorously worked to promote the idea of the *khilafat* [caliphate] as an alternate to the contemporary political system at large.

He was not a traditional *aalim* [religious scholar], nor had he graduated from any religious seminary. In 1971, he left his medical profession and devoted his life to establishing Allah's *deen* on His land.

Israr emphasized the primary deficiency of the Muslim *ummah* to be its lack of *iman* [conviction] in the metaphysical verities revealed in the Qur'ān; as such, no effort for an Islamic renaissance can succeed without a revival and internalization of *iman* by means of promoting and propagating Qur'ānic guidance and wisdom (Ahmed, 2006b, p. 5). From the individual to the collective (i.e., state) levels, this conviction should be revived. His conception of the modern state reflected Mawdudi's thoughts on the modern state. He believed that Pakistan had been founded as a result of the British injustice to Muslims and the threat of Hindu domination that could take away Muslims' ability to exercise their faith freely in accordance with the divine will. Israr summed up how this divine will could be established in his thoughts on Islamic state and democracy.

The fundamental thing that Islam requires realizing in its true spirit is an Islamic state, which for Israr meant pronouncing the sovereignty of God on Earth. He differentiated between religion and *deen*. While religion may be reduced to private life, Islam being a *deen* demands its assertion in all spheres of life. For Israr:

> Instead of being a mere "religion" in the ordinary sense, Islam is a deen, a complete code of life whose very nature demands that it be made dominant as a socio-political reality . . . The practical obligations of a Muslim are by no means limited to Salat, Zakat, Saum, and Hajj-the well-known pillars of Islam- but that there are crucial duties beyond these modes of worship as well, including the obligation to strive for the establishment of Islam as a deen.
>
> *(Ahmed, 2006a, p. 11)*

As a close follower of Mawdudi's thought and further developer of it, Israr believed *iqamah al deen* (establishment of *deen*) to be a duty and this could be done by establishing a *khilafat* [caliphate]. If a *khilafat* were to go unestablished, then Islam would be reduced to a powerless religion. In other words, what is dominant and ascendant is *deen*, what is subjugated and powerless is religion (Ahmed, 2006a, p. 24).

Israr considered the modern nation-state to be one of the evils of the modern age that had been elevated to the status of God. Quoting from Allama Iqbal's poetry as he often did, he categorized the modern nation-state diametrically opposed to the Islamic state:[4]

In taaza khudaaon may bara sub say watan hay	Country[5] is the biggest among these new gods!
Jo pairahan is ka hay wo mazhab ka kafan hay	What is its attire? Is it the shroud of deen?
Ye but kay tarasheeda-e-tehzeeb-e-nawi hay	This idol which is the product of the modern civilization
Ghaarat gar-e-kaashaana-e-deen-e-Nabavi hay	Is the plunderer of the structure of the Holy Prophet's deen

His treatment of the modern nation-state at the metaphysical level brings marked civilizational differences to the forefront in the very *raison d'etre* for the state's existence. Modern Western civilization embodies two elements that are in essence contradictory to Islamic thought. One is nationalism, and the other is secularism. An Islamic state would categorically exclude these two elements from its structure (Ahmed, 2002, p. 14). Contrary to secularism, where religion is relegated merely to private life, Islam believes in the dominance of God's commandments both at the individual and collective (i.e., state) levels.

However, what is compatible in the modern age with the spirit of Islam is its republican aspect at the level of its practical efficacy. Here is where Israr considered Islam to be compatible with democracy. In his reflections on democracy and Islam, he joined and followed Mawdudi's thoughts. Israr believed the Western form of democracy to essentially be *kufr*, as it is in theory another name for the sovereignty of the individual. The entire concept of *Khilafah* is based on the rejection or negation of human sovereignty (Ahmed, 2006b, p. 19). He outright rejected Western democracy in several of his interviews.[6] Muslims and non-Muslims can never be considered as equals in theoretical terms. He further developed Mawdudi's notion of popular vicegerency, stating:

> The second term coined by Maulana Abul Ala Maududi to describe the political theory of Islam was that of popular vicegerency. He coined this term to delineate the fact that Islam rejects the idea of "popular sovereignty." Although this is a satisfactory term, I would suggest an improvement to prevent any misunderstanding. In the Islamic political system, the Khilafah or vicegerency actually belongs to the Muslims rather than to all the citizens of a given nation-state irrespective of their beliefs. Instead of popular vicegerency, therefore, I use the term collective vicegerency of the Muslims.
>
> *(Ahmed, n.d., p. 19)*

Non-Muslims are to be treated equally when addressing the protection of their lives and property. However, this equality is not the one connotated by the modern notion of equality. He categorically wrote the following in regard to equality:

> In an Islamic State, non-Muslims cannot take part in the highest level of policy making, neither can they participate in the process of legislation. The topmost priority of an Islamic State, whenever it is established, will be to extend the Islamic Order to other countries. Since non-Muslims do not share this vision with Muslims, they cannot be entrusted to devise, plan, and execute this policy. Similarly, the legislation in an Islamic State will have to be done within the framework of the Qur'ān and Sunnah,

> and those who believe neither in the Qur'ān nor in the Sunnah cannot be entrusted to make such laws.
>
> *(Ahmed, 2006b, p. 14)*

The institution of prophethood reflects the personal caliphate that had ended with the last Prophet Muhammad; afterward, people chose their caliphs through collective decision making. He believed people's democratic choosing of their caliphs to not imply the supremacy of people's sovereignty.[7] In matters where no clear Qur'ānic injunctions are found, Islam orders people to resort to consultation. The status Israr gave parliament was that of a mere consultative body concerning matters where clear directions are unavailable. Parliament reflects *Majlis-e-Shura* [the consultative body] and embodies the Qur'ānic spirit of "*wa amruhum shura baynahum*" ["and who conduct their affairs by mutual consultation"] (Qur'ān, 42:38).

> Though *shura* as the legislative body has been equated with the modern parliament, it is tied to the rope of the sovereignty of God wherein no law that is completely or partially repugnant to the Qur'ān and Sunnah would be subject to legislation or consultation. In outlining the features of the modern Islamic state, Israr mentioned the pledge to *Allah*'s absolute sovereignty to already be present in the Objectives Resolution, which is now an integral part of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
>
> *(Ahmed I, 2006b, p. 9)*

Another feature of Israr's Islamic caliphate system is the power given to the judiciary. In matters where dissent arises or in case of any doubt regarding lawmaking by *shura*, the superior courts of the country would have the authority to declare any law null and void that they consider to be partially or wholly contrary to the limits set down by the Qur'ān and Sunnah (Ahmed I, n.d., p. 9).

Regarding the form of democracy under an Islamic caliphate, Israr preferred the presidential form of government in which the caliph would be elected by direct vote. The caliph would not be subject to the majority of the legislative assembly, the *Majlis-e-Milli*, nor the *Majlis-e-Shura*, but as in the current well-known presidential systems in many countries, the caliph will be given, for a specific period, wide administrative powers (Ahmed I, n.d., p. 10).

Although Israr followed the theory presented by Mawdudi or envisioned by Allama Iqbal to a large extent, in practice he was against taking part in any political activity or electoral politics. The reason he put forth this stance is interesting to observe; to him, democracy was a means for running the system, not changing it. The differences Israr developed with Mawdudi and Jamaat-e-Islami were technical in nature. Mawdudi was a firm believer of taking part in electoral politics because bringing about the revolution would only become possible when the power was in one's hands by means of a constitution. Vali Reza Nasr (1996, pp. 72–73) explained this as follows:

> As pragmatic political considerations began to replace revolutionary idealism, the Jama'at began to look like a controlled and responsible party, aiming to form a government and rule the country. In 1957, when he outlined the Jama'at's new policy, Mawdudi drove the last nail into the coffin of revolution by declaring that "transforming the political system can be done only through constitutional means: elections; . . . transformation of the political order through unconstitutional means is forbidden by the shariah."

Mawdudi may be considered as having followed the top-down approach for bringing the required revolution, whereas Israr went against Mawdudi's decision of using electoral politics as a means for Islamic revolution. Ahmed (2006a, p. 33) wrote:

> The main argument against taking part in the elections, however, has to do with its ultimate purpose. Elections are not held in order to change the established politico-socioeconomic order but only to run it properly. This is a crucial point that is often ignored by many sincere people who believe they can establish Islam through elections. Consider the Republican and the Democratic Parties in the United States, or the Conservative and the Liberal Parties in Britain. These political parties do not take part in the elections because they want to change the established capitalist-liberal-democratic order of their respective countries; they take part in the elections because each has something different to offer in order to run the system in the best possible manner. The details of taxation, health, labor, or immigration policies may be in dispute, but the system itself is basically agreed upon. Since the politico-socio-economic system of a country cannot be changed by taking part in the elections, this is possible only through a revolutionary process that operates outside this system. The establishment of Islam represents a revolutionary change; it cannot be brought about by means of elections. Half a century of Pakistani political history is a living testimony to this fact.

What is important to note is that he does not deny the efficacy of democracy as a system for running affairs. Democracy along with its institutional framework is viable and essential, but not enough to bring about Islamic revolution. As an alternate way to bring about revolution, he seemed to support a gradual approach (comprising different steps), writing:

> Indeed, the first step of any socio-political revolution is to call people towards the new ideology. In the case of Islam, this must be done at a large scale, using all available means of modern communication, in order to attract those who have kept their pristine nature or fitrah intact. But once such persons have been gathered, they must be consolidated into a disciplined jama'ah, and this jama'ah must then struggle as a unit in order that falsehood can be defeated and truth is made supreme. This is how the Prophet (SAW) himself proceeded, and this is how we must proceed too. Devoid of this vision, da'wah for the sake of da'wah alone cannot yield the desired result of the establishment of Islam's ascendancy . . . then we pass through the stages of training and passive resistance.
>
> *(Ahmed, 2006a, pp. 35–36)*

Javed Ahmed Ghamidi on Islamic state and democracy

One of the emerging, powerful, yet controversial Muslim modernist voices is Javed Ahmed Ghamidi (b. 1951), a Pakistani Islamic scholar who attempts to question and answer the status quo of the discourse within Islam and Muslims. He completed his B.A. in English literature and philosophy from the Government College in Lahore in 1972, and studied Islamic disciplines in the traditional manner from various teachers and scholars throughout his early years. He came under the direct discipleship of Amin Ahsan Islahi, one of the founding members of Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan. However, Amin left the party in 1958 after serious differences with Mawdudi and dedicated his life to writing his commentary on the Qur'ān. Javed Ahmad

Ghamidi remained under the tutelage of Islahi and worked with him on various intellectual projects (Baksh, 2017). Building on these ideas and incorporating new information inclusive of Western sources, Ghamidi has occupied a significant position in Pakistani debates on Islam, state, and society, and his ideas have been communicated through a variety of media. The list of his works includes a series of books (*Burhan* and *Meezan*) and articles published in *Ishraq*, the *Renaissance*, and other Islamic journals, as well as numerous television, radio, and web-based interviews (Yasmeen, 2013, p. 100). Ghamidi is the founding president of Al-Mawrid, a foundation for Islamic research and education, and a leading force that works on the reinterpreting the traditional orthodox Islamic discourse of the subcontinent. Currently in self-exile from Pakistan, Ghamidi still stands as one of the most controversial yet powerful voices in Islamic intellectual circles and debates in Pakistan.

In contextualizing Ghamidi's work and role, the temptation is to work backward from his opinions on Islamic truth to situate him as a reformer whose interventions are primarily oriented toward the task of reconciling Islam to the conditions of liberal modernity (Aziz, 2011, p. 597). Undertaking such a task, he has attempted to comment on the idea and nature of the Islamic state and its form of governance. Unlike Jamaat-e-Islami and the traditional ulama who engage mostly with secular and liberal forces, Ghamidi and his fellows are mostly in debate with the Islamists and ulama (Amin, 2012, p. 176). He has vividly expressed his resentment against religious extremism, which he believes to be rooted in the orthodox understanding of Islam fixated in *fiqh* rather than *sharia*. His discourse on the Islamic state was briefly put in his article "Islam and the State: A Counter Narrative." He opined in his article:

> It has been repeatedly pointed out by this writer that, when in a Muslim society, anarchy is created on the basis of religion; then the remedy to this situation is not advocacy of secularism. On the contrary, the solution lies in presenting a counter narrative to the existing narrative on religion.[8]
>
> *(Ghamidi, 2015b)*

In outlining the state, its functions, and its relationship with its citizens, Ghamidi begins by drawing attention to the evolution of the state as an institution up to its present-day form. Ghamidi considers Pakistan to resemble other nation-states in the world. Thus, he disqualifies Pakistan as enjoying any exceptional status in the community of world states, as other traditional Islamists do, wherein Pakistan is considered an ideological state in line with the Medina model. For Ghamidi, three types of states have evolved so far, which he explains as:

> First [is] the state founded in the Arabian Peninsula. The Almighty made it specific for His own self after He Himself had ascertained its boundaries. Thus, at His behest the universal centre of His worship and preaching was set up in Arabia, and at the end of the seventh century AD it was declared through Muḥammad (sws): (no non-Muslim can become its citizen till the Day of Judgement).[9] Earlier, the same status was enjoyed by Palestine for centuries. The addressees of Islam and the Islamic sharīʿah here too are individuals in their various capacities. However, if for such a state it is said that its religion is Islam and only Islam shall reign in it, then this statement is very comprehensible on all grounds. It cannot be objected to.
>
> Second [are] the states whose boundaries would be determined by their conquerors. They would govern them by making their inhabitants subservient to them. In such states, the religion of the royal family or of the ruler would be considered as the religion of the state. Disregarding whether their birth was legitimate or illegitimate, if

> these states are dubbed as Muslim, Christian, or Communist states, then this too cannot be regarded as incomprehensible.
>
> Third [are] the nation-states of the modern era whose boundaries are ascertained by international treaties and which become a source of nationhood themselves for their citizens as soon as they come into existence. Thus, in spite of having commonality or diversity in colour, ancestry, language and culture, they call themselves Egyptians, Americans, Afghans and Pakistanis and express their nationhood in this respect. No one is superior or subservient here. All, in fact, are regarded as equal citizens in all respects and in this capacity participate in the affairs of the state. It is about this third type of state that I had written that they can have no religion. Pakistan is an example of such a state.
>
> *(Ghamidi, 2015a, pp. 174–175)*

Ghamidi thinks states of the third type to be unable to have a religion, and any such effort to be divisive for national integrity. Islam is not against any contemporary idea of nation-state. Ghamidi considers the formation of nation-states as a result of historical evolutionary processes, the evolution that takes the form of global government – and Islam would have no objection to it as long as the principle of equality prevails.[10]

The most important principle Ghamidi has emphasized is the equality of citizens. In modern nation-states, both rulers and the ruled are equal before law. However, to direct the lives of Muslims collectivity in accordance with Islamic *sharia*, the government must be founded on democratic principles. Ghamidi considers only two types of government possible: those based on reason and those based on human knowledge. Either government is endorsed by God through the institution of prophethood or rulers who are chosen by the inhabitants of a land. After the termination of the institution of prophethood, the first of these options is no longer possible Ghamidi (2015a, pp. 174–175).

Ghamidi radically departs from the traditional position of Islamists concerning the Islamic state. Islamization of state is not what Islam requires. Islam primarily addresses human beings in their individual capacity to abide by the commandments of Allah. Ghamidi believes the real aim of Islam to be *tazkiya-e-nafoos* [cleansing of souls].

Ghamidi (2015a, p. 183) outlined a summary of his thoughts on democracy, state, and Islam in his famous yet controversial article in local newspapers in Pakistan under the title "Islam and the State: A Counter Narrative." Ghamidi appears to say in his article that Islamization is not as it is usually perceived by the traditional ulama. Instead, democratization of state is what Islam requires. Ghamidi insists that, according to the Qur'ān, the system of government of an Islamic state is based on the following principle outlined in the Qur'ān (42:38) which states, "conduct their affairs by mutual consultation." In fact, all affairs of state – whether municipal, national, or provincial affairs, political or social directives, rules of legislation, delegation or revocation of powers, dismissal or appointment of officials, or interpretations of Islam for collective affairs of life – all fall under the principle laid down in this verse Ghamidi (2015a, p. 186). Ghamidi gives full sovereignty to the will of the people. The majority is what is able to enact laws and repeal them. For Ghamidi, the supreme principle ultimately comes down to the majority being the authority. This is precisely what democracy is. Not even the religious scholars who interpret the issues related to religion and *sharia* have any priority in deciding matters concerning *sharia* and religion. These scholars indeed have the right to present their views and express their opinions; however, their views can only become laws for people to follow when the majority of the elected representatives accepts them (Ghamidi, 2016). Interestingly, representatives of the people may enact laws contrary to the spirit of Islam, according to Ghamidi; however, even in this case, he believes that only parliament can undo them. The ultimate source of lawmaking

lies with the people. Modern-day parliaments enjoy supremacy over all other institutions in this regard. Parliament may enact whatever laws are deemed feasible by the representatives of the people. People, including religious leadership, may disagree with the decisions of the parliament and express their viewpoints to rectify anything contrary to *sharia*, but no one has the right to violate the laws enacted by the parliament or to defy the system. If this status of the parliament is accepted, the debate on an Islamic state in relation to a secular state also becomes irrelevant Ghamidi (2015a, p. 135). Neither scholars nor the judiciary are above the parliament. Parliament holds and should hold the final authority in the system of such a state (Ghamidi, 2016).

Some intellectuals have described this approach as a major shift toward establishing a harmonious relationship between Islam and modernity. According to Amin (2012, p. 171), this trend can be characterized mainly by an informed consciousness for reconciling Islam through discourse on the aspects of pluralism, democratization, civil society, and global human rights.

Although the primary addressee in Islam is the individual, Islamic *sharia* meanwhile addresses Muslim rulers only if they are democratically elected.

> If Muslims have this majority and if on its basis they become the rulers of a state, then it is their democratic and human right that if their religion has given them a directive regarding the collectivity, then they should follow it and also decide all matters of the followers of this religion in accordance with the sharī'ah revealed by God through His last prophet.
>
> *(Ghamidi, 2015a, p. 178)*

Interestingly, what such a government can and cannot do is also restricted. The assertion of *sharia* law in the public sphere is restricted to only two directives. Unlike the expansive view that the Islamists tend to take regarding the powers of the state, Ghamadi believes that, in religious terms, the state cannot require its Muslim citizens to do anything more than believe in God and the Prophet, perform their ritual prayers [*Salat*], and pay the *zakat* [alms tax] (Zaman, 2014, p. 23). They cannot be forced by law to submit to any directive that reflects a positive injunction of Islam apart from *Salat* and *zakat* (Ghamidi, 2016). As he writes in his book titled *Meezan*:

> These are the religious obligations of a state. No doubt, every state has the responsibility to strive for the welfare and prosperity of its people and to maintain peace and defend its frontiers. However, if a state is to be administered by the Muslims, then the Qur'ān demands from them that they should not be indifferent to the responsibilities of being diligent in the prayer, setting up a system of zakāh, and enjoining what is good while forbidding what is evil.
>
> *(Ghamidi, 2014, p. 457)*

What appears from his writings is that democracy precedes any implementation of *sharia*, and thus relegating the sovereignty of God is subject to democratic procedure. Contrary to Mawdudi, who believed that the struggle for the Islamic state to be the fundamental duty of every Muslim, Ghamidi does not even consider this a duty.

Conclusion

The discussion in this chapter of three major religious scholars on Islamic state and its relationship with modern democratic norms and values reflects how diverse and sometimes diametrically opposed ideas have existed in debates within the Islamists. All three remained in

Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan, and two of them parted ways for certain reasons. Israr Ahmed parted ways due to differences he had developed regarding the strategy of Jamaat-e-Islami, whereas Ghamidi split off due to severe ideological differences owing to his firm conviction in reinterpreting the Islamic discourse in an unorthodox manner befitting the contemporary age.

Some key points from this discussion can be summarized as follows.

1 The discourse on Islam, state, and democracy in Pakistan has exhibited changing approaches within Islamists.
2 The spirit of reformism has swayed Ghamidi's thought, whereas the spirit of revivalism had led Mawdudi's and Israr Ahmed's ideas.
3 Whether at the practical and political level (Mawdudi and Jamaat-e-Islami), the social level (Israr Ahmed and his organization Tanzeem-e-Islami), or the purely intellectual/discourse level (Javed Ahmed Ghamidi and his interpretive community), democracy as an idea or practice (although with certain qualifications) has dictated Muslim discourse in Pakistan.
4 Mawdudi's thinking preferred the parliamentary form of government, whereas Israr Ahmed's preferred the presidential form of government with the judiciary superseding all institutions.
5 Contrary to both Mawdudi and Israr, Ghamidi considers parliament (the will of the people) to have supremacy in deciding matters concerning the running of the state.
6 On the notion of equality in Islamic state, there is a marked difference between Mawdudi, Israr, and Ghamid. While Mawdudi and Israr categorically and disproportionately apply the notion of equality of citizens of state, Ghamidi believes in no discrimination among citizens on any basis, which to him reflects the true spirit of the modern nation-state – against which Islam has no objection.

The contemporary internal debate on Islam, the Islamic state, and democracy in Pakistan represents the unfolding of multiple paradigms that mark the internal dynamic capacity to transform, absorb, and initiate renewed discourse. Though the present chapter has focused on and is limited to the three scholars it discusses, other voices are found whose discourses on Islam and democracy and its relationship with the state in a modern framework show a more inclusive debate. Meanwhile, one important feature in assessing the contemporary debate on democracy should also include the environment within which the intentions and ideas of theologians had formed. The debate on democracy and Islam is not only internally informed, but also externally influenced by broad trends in the public sphere, which itself is not disconnected from global trends and dynamics. The ascendance of the market during the neoliberal era has had huge repercussions not only for Islamists, but also for states in relation to the way society should be shaped. Further study of this would help readers become informed by way of the changing dynamics within which such a discourse is shaped.

Notes

1 Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) came to power in 2018 under the slogan of transforming Pakistan into a state based on the Medina model. Although not a religious party, PTI rhetoric seeks to politically address deep-rooted mass consciousness desiring for Pakistan to be an Islamic state.
2 These words have been translated from his book *Islami Riyasat: Falsafa, Nizam-e-Kaar, aur Ussol-e-Hukumrani* (*Islamic State: Philosophy, Methodology and Principles of Governance*) (Mawdudi, 1998).
3 For further references, see Mawdudi (1998).
4 Israr Ahmed considers Allama Muhammad Iqbal, the famous poet of the subcontinent and Pakistan's national poet, as one of the mentors who had had great influence on his intellectual and spiritual growth.

5 Here the term country means the modern nation-state filled with nationalist spirit.
6 For a detailed interview, see www.youtube.com/watch?v=OPfwrf26VcM
7 For a detailed interview, see www.youtube.com/watch?v=OPfwrf26VcM
8 The original article was published in Urdu in daily *Jang* newspaper. This is a translated version translated by Dr. Saleem Shahzad published in the daily *The News*.
9 Ab ū 'Abdullāh Mālik ibn Anas, Mu'aṭṭā', vol. 2 (Cairo: Dār i ḥ yā' al-turāth al-'arabi, n.d.), 892, (no. 1584). Reference as cited by Javed Ahmed Ghamidi.
10 For a brief clip on nation-states, watch his lecture on Youube, available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=8aX1vHdsF0w

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SECTION VIII

Current trends and future directions

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29

A PANORAMIC VIEW OF CONTEMPORARY TURKISH THOUGHT

Historical developments and current trends

Lutfi Sunar

Introduction: the Ottoman intellectual heritage

This chapter aims to critically evaluate contemporary Turkish thought from a historical and sociological perspective, and to provide a new perspective on its evolution over the last century, its current situation, and future trends. Understanding the intellectual structure that has emerged today is possible by following the political, social, and economic changes that have been experienced during the modernization process. A good understanding of the lines connecting ideas to the past provides a basis for understanding the present. In this regard, aside from the debate about how modern Turkish thought has emerged, multidimensionally analyzing the structure of modern thought in Turkey and tracing its changes can provide its positioning and orientation toward the future.

As an imperial remnant, Turkey has inherited huge problems from its past; however, it has also been unable for a long time to decide how to connect with this great past. Two main issues occurred that gave direction to contemporary thought in Turkey from its very inception. The first was to create a national identity distinct from the Ottomans, and the second was to internalize and functionalize the norms and values to be acquired during the Westernization process. Functioning in relation to each other, these two issues have created a fundamental field of tension that has also shaped the formation of different shades of intellectual life. Contemporary thought in Turkey has emerged in confrontation with the different manifestations of this tension that have appeared at various times. In the beginning, the tendency was to radically break away from its Islamic past in the public sphere and to fully construct a modern society with modern thought. Faced with the impossibility of following this path in building a nation, a process of synthesis and hybridization occurred as a result.

Modern intellectual life in Turkey is based on its heritage from the late Ottoman period. In this regard, a brief analysis of the intellectual developments from the late Ottoman period would be useful for appreciating the formations and transformations that occurred in intellectual life. In this sense and as described by Yusuf Akçura (1981) in his famous treatise *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* [*The 3 Kinds of Policy*] and later made clear by Ziya Gökalp (1992), three main views had emerged toward the end of the 19th century: (1) the pan-Islamist tendency, which approached modernization more critically and sought solutions to defining the state's and society's Islamic

identity; (2) the Turkish/nationalist tendency that sought salvation in a nationalist orientation; and (3) the Westernizing tendency that viewed modernization as inevitable. Although the theoretical differences initially created among these views became unclear in practice over time, these three schools of thought continued to exist individually (Berkes, 1954; Davison, 1995). In this context, the main attitudes following these three (with two shades from each of these expressing the transitivity among the three main veins) can be defined as six basic ideological orientations of contemporary Turkish thought: Islamism, conservatism, nationalism, Kemalism, socialism, and liberalism.

As in all modern societies, modern thought in Turkey was formed against the background of an encounter between the old and the new. Although various problems in classical thought had become apparent in the 18th century, the main problem arose within the framework of the inability over time to respond to the challenges of modern science and its techniques within the science and politics of the 19th century. In this sense, the efforts to maintain the classical intellectual heritage and the efforts to transfer and implement modern institutions and systems had intertwined and formed an anachronistic orientation. Attempts to synthesize what may have become an original modernization experience were unsustainable, perhaps because they were blocked by those at both ends (conservatives and modernists). For example, the positive acquisition and development of new forms in literature was not experienced in politics or thought. The successful blending by Ziya Pasha, Namik Kemal, and Yahya Kemal of modern poetic forms with classical understanding is one example of a successful interaction, while similar examples from intellectual life are rare.

In this sense, the main determinant of contemporary thought in Turkey was the level of its relationship with Islam and historical accumulation. Its distance from Islam and tradition also affected the ways modernization occurred. In the end, the dilemmas between past and present, East and West, and tradition and change, had too much influence over contemporary Turkish thought.

The dilemmas of modernization

The main issue for contemporary thought in Turkey was its understanding of the intellectual structure and social world that formed alongside modernization. In this sense, modernization was understood in different forms within the framework of different effects during different periods. Modernization has been viewed in different ways, such as a Westernization, a cultural alienation, a dominating bureaucratic guardianship, a redeeming idea, a forced transformation, or a global harmony. This diversity thus led to the formation of incompatible views on modernization.

Despite discussing its level of success within the framework of the goals initially set by itself, Turkey is considered to have been irreversibly modernized. The vast majority of the institutions, ideas, and issues that exist in Turkey today are the products of this modernization process. However, this transformation took place at different rates and levels in different areas. For example, in the field of economics, modernization has been more holistic and established, while in comparison less holistic in the field of education. For example, modernization in urbanism and political institutions has been indirectly influential. In comparison to these areas, modernization's impact on the family and everyday relations appears less influential. At the same time, one may think that modernization has not taken place from the point of view of the values that surround the entire social sphere. Therefore, a state of synthesis can be said to prevail today from a social and intellectual point of view.

The narrowed thinking constructed within the framework of this synthesis has also led to modernization having a fragile framework. One of the main discussions of modern Turkish thought can be said to be the character and positioning it has placed on modernization. In this sense, a comparative analysis of works that focused on evaluating modernization, such as those from Mümtaz Turhan, Niyazi Berkes, Şerif Mardin and Kemal Karpat, will be very valuable in terms of conveying the nature and course of these discussions, because these names also represent different outlooks with respect to modernization.

Evaluating modernization with an ethnological methodology and a critical point of view, Mümtaz Turhan (1997) made an important comment in his work *Kültür Değişmeleri* [*Cultural Changes*].[1] Turhan considered modernization as a cultural change. According to him, the cultural systems had inevitably changed as a composition of its material and spiritual elements. Because the Ottoman Empire had been unable to maintain its own economic, political, and social structure, the process of acquiring a new culture from Europe had started in the mid-18th century. Turhan viewed modernization as an opportunity for cultural synthesis. According to him, the problem stems from the method of how the process is executed. Turhan considered this process to have been shaped by top-to-bottom enforcement due to the elements of change and the structure of the political system; thus, modernization's success had been insufficient. According to him, modernization would have been able to be more successful if the cultural change had occurred voluntarily and if social participation in this process had been achieved. In addition, the change that occurred within this process should have started with more rewarding elements such as industry and production instead of with symbolic elements such as clothing. These theories defined policies for the remodeling of the public sphere in Turkey while it transitioned to the multiparty system. Turhan stated modernization would have better progressed from the fields of economics and education. Turhan is confident that mechanization in agriculture, industrialization, and urbanization spontaneously bring about modernization. However, he is seen to have re-evaluated these views in his work *Garblılaşmanın Neresindeyiz* [*Where in Westernization Are We?*] at the end of the 1950s (Turhan, 1965).[2] In this later study, he is more critical toward the idea of spontaneous modernization.

In terms of approaches to modernization, Niyazi Berkes occupies a unique place. He can be stated as being the most influential name in terms of determining the basic approach to Turkish modernization – not just in Turkey, but also in the English-speaking world. Berkes, who had been expelled from Ankara University in the politically tense atmosphere following World War II, went to Canada and turned his efforts toward analyzing the main character of Ottoman/Turkish modernization. After 1960, Berkes tried to bring Marxism and Kemalism together with his writings in the magazine *Yön* [*Direction*]. His work *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* was published first in English and then in Turkish to mark the 50th anniversary of the Republic (Berkes, 1964). In this way, Berkes offered a framework that reproduced Kemalist thought by declaring the main ultimate goal of Turkish modernization to be secularization. Essentially a Turkish nationalist, Berkes played a leading role in building the form of Kemalism that combines nationalism with the left. Unlike Karpat, Berkes viewed the problem of the modernization process to have been the abandonment of the Kemalist strategy of radical change. Berkes claimed the deviations from the revolutionary policies to have produced an incomplete revolution. According to him, reactionary thoughts and traditional values had prevented societal development, and the only way out of this situation would be revolutionary practices.

Another widely used approach to modernization is found with Şerif Mardin. From the perspective of modernization theories, Mardin (1971) basically insisted the main agenda of Ottoman/Turkish modernization to have consisted of creating a bourgeoisie and building a

civil society based on this, with the distinctive aspect of his study being its insistence on treating modernization as a social change. He insisted on understanding what social reality itself is: the source and product of this change. Mardin focused epistemologically on the details of cultural reality and derived important concepts through symbols, rituals, and actions. As a result of these studies, his thoughts diversified and his line shifted from realism to an interpretive line. Mardin, who had brought an interpretation to the stages of Ottoman modernization distinct from the official understanding of history, argued that the main aim of modernization to has consisted of creating a structure detached from the past (Mardin, 2005). According to him, this impossible goal was also the main reason for modernization's failures. The religious- and ideology-oriented reading of Turkish modernization and two different publics being determined that are distinct from one another lay at the heart of Mardin's (1973) famous center-periphery theoretical model. According to Mardin, who argued Turkey to exhibit a patrimonial state characteristic, the continuation of this system during the modernization process had given way to a dual publicness. Thus, the ideas of modernizers and those of the people were separate from one another, and a cultural division had emerged.

Kemal Karpat represents the third approach to modernization. Karpat's (1973, 1982) approach to social change and intellectual continuity were shaped around four main hypotheses: (1) development (political or otherwise) must be based primarily on a cause/factor that can be applied to societies; (2) this factor must be historically present in all stages of change, and at various levels; (3) both the forces that contribute to change and the change itself must be quantified; and (4) political developments and structural changes must be interrelated and quantifiable (this does not limit the ability of the political system to be an independent variable). Karpat (2004) insisted that the role of social strata needs to be studied just as much as the role of the state in the modernization process, that both internal dynamics and external influences need to be studied. According to him, modernization – just like all other social change – can come to a conclusion when a society is nourished on its own qualities. According to Karpat (1972), Turkish modernization in this sense had created an irreversible process in which cultural separations being able to find a state of balance is important. According to him, a modernization process that looks down on and ignores society is just as wrong as modernization process that has been left to its own devices by an uninvolved state. In this sense, Karpat believed Turkish modernization to have its own dynamics of change, and to have a great accumulation.

No matter from which perspective Turkish modernization is evaluated, explaining this process centers on religion-state relations. The framework described previously is ultimately based on the system-level changes that occurred due to the change in the role religion played in social life.

Handling religious life independent of intellectual efforts and initiatives is impossible. Among the processes that are mutually affective and nurturing, religion has the ability to find a self-contained medium through many ways depending on the flow of everyday life and the world of thought. In terms of the formation and transformation of this medium, the place religion has in modern Turkey has always been controversial (Dorroll, 2014). This is because excluding religion from social life and finding a replacement for it in the Ottoman social structure is first of all very difficult, having been the source of political and cultural structures' legitimacy (Cetinsaya, 1999). Perhaps the most important problem contemporary thought in Turkey has faced is how to create the components for filling this gap. Due to the different attempts at filling this gap in legitimacy (i.e., culturalism, history, nostalgia, leader cult, nationalism, technicalness, emancipation-ism) failed, the crisis deepened; each time, religion gained a more symbolic place in the public sphere.

Undeniably, a negative attitude occurred toward religion during Turkey's modernization process (Subaşı, 2018). In this sense, modernization is also known for a long time to have

established itself with an anti-religious discourse. However, the need for legitimizing modernization has also provided religion with an instrumental role. At the same time, Western expansionism and its cultural threat also played a role in giving religion a protected position. Due to these roles and the search for legitimacy, the great gap that occurred at the beginning has closed over time, and religion has increasingly become a complementary element of modernization, even if not in all areas. In one view, this means the collapse of modernization, and in another view, this has led to the rise of a new kind of conservatism. As noted by Necdet Subaşı (2018), Ottoman modernization's view of Westernization as necessary for the safety of religion has ultimately become the modern era's view that religion is necessary for the safety of modernization.

Periodizing contemporary Turkish thought

Periodizing history has always been debated. The measures and principles of periodization have mostly been based on perspective. Jacques le Goff (2015) asked, "Must we divide history into periods?" and found periodization to be necessary for understanding the inner structure and flow of events. Periodization appears essential for monitoring and understanding developments. However, this must be done without forgetting that periodization, not periods, are present in history. When dealing with the history of thought in particular, being more meticulous about periodization is necessary because its starting and end points, as well as changes and transformations, cannot be followed very easily or clearly.

Political developments in Turkey have had very serious impacts on intellectual life. Political atmospheres and public attitudes should be carefully evaluated in studies on intellectual history in terms of determining the forms that thoughts have taken. In this sense, assessments can be made around certain critical historical turns. Classical political periodization in the history of modern Turkey is done around three critical dates: 1923, 1950, and 1980. However, this periodization is not only insufficient for the history of thought in Turkey; it is also not even sufficiently functional in terms of explaining political history. Although periodization has had a very important effect on intellectual life, it also has a problem based on the political history, one that can reduce intellectual thought to pure political ideologies. However, the political thoughts being considered in Turkey always have had wider boundaries than the political ideology with which they are associated. For this reason, a new periodization is needed for analyzing intellectual life.

By considering intellectual thought in Turkey while including the last period of Ottoman political thought, the course of development, the main agendas, the forms works took, and the content of discussions are definable in the framework of six periods: (1) the early modernization period from the 1860s until 1923; (2) the period of nation-building between 1923 and 1945; (3) the period of differentiation between 1945 and 1960; (4) the period of fractional diversification between 1960 and 1980; (5) the period of pluralism between 1980 and 2000; and (6) the post-2000 globalization and neoliberalization period. This periodization has been done within the framework of an analysis of the main factors behind the basic intellectual formations and the main factors behind the singular discussions guiding intellectual life. Now examining the characteristics, agendas, and ideas representative of these periods respectively becomes possible, alongside the dynamics and transformations in the transitions between periods.

Early modernization period (1860s–1923)

When the Ottoman Empire switched to a new system of administrative organizations in the 1830s, a new type of educated group also was formed (Salzmann, 2004). This new type of bureaucrats and intellectuals – having received a modern education, producing new genres of

works, following Europe, and turning Westernization into a basis for their thought – were now side by side with the classical *literati* represented by the ulama who grew up in the madrasas and had featured more prominently since the 1860s (Heper, 1976). In particular, newspapers carried a very important influence in this sense (Karpat, 1964). These intellectuals, known as the Young Turks or the Young Ottomans, thought with European concepts (Mardin, 1962). Although the quest to benefit from Islamic thought was prominent in some, they were usually seen to have a synthesizing attitude. During this period, a distinction and conflict occurred between the traditional ulama and the new intellectuals. A very small part of the ulama initially tended to these public activities. Over time, however, as the main agenda of thought shifted around new elements, the ulama also became involved in discussions, especially with the Second Constitution. This duality actually had an effect that disrupted the development of intellectual life and, although partially overcome later, has always maintained its presence in Turkish thought (Ülken, 1940). During this period, the prominent issues and discussions revolved around the modernization of the state (Navaro-Yashin, 2020). On the intellectual agenda, the quest to convey and adopt the new concepts, ideas, and systems emerging in Europe was decisive. In this sense, two concepts were quite definitive: freedom and legitimacy. The first of these concepts perhaps in content represents the entirety of Western modernity (Mardin, 2006, p. 124). However, the concept of freedom also fed the idea of a new political system while making sense of a socially different type of person and social relationship (Khuri, 1998, p. 25). Therefore, the concept of freedom reflected the way the new intellectuals thought and their demands for participating in the administration. Although initially met with a negative reaction by the established elite of the state, developments in this direction continued, and the constitution was eventually declared. As a result of the Ottoman intellectuals' quest to regulate and correct the state system, the constitution appears to have been a proposal for a system that borrowed from the West while also drawing from Islamic conceptualizations such as *meşveret* [consultation]. At a time when the state and society were being reorganized, the constitution depicted the quest to create a new system without breaking away from the past (by maintaining the dynasty). Yet neither the intellectual nor social foundations for this had existed in Ottoman society. Therefore, the Ottoman state completed its period of rule without being able to fully operate this system. Still, these experiences and initiatives significantly fed the formation of memory and accumulation in modern Turkey.

During the Second Constitutional Era, a very lively intellectual life occurred in all respects (Hanioğlu, 2008). In this short period, Turkish thought prospered with a foundational intellectual life in dialogue with one another, which has never happened since. After the success of the opposition movement, and once the constitutional system was restored, newspapers began to be published in important cities of the empire such as Cairo, Konya, Diyarbakir, and Istanbul, and printing presses began to print works one after the other. In this revival, the debate about the future of the state undoubtedly had a very serious impact. Three main intellectual attitudes can be seen to have emerged in this environment and to have increasingly grown and built their own intellectual frameworks. The first of these is the Turkist/Turanist opinion clustered around the *Türk Yurdu*, where names such as Yusuf Akçura, Ziya Gökalp, and Mehmet Emin Yurdakul were active. Although it did not break away from the Ottomans in the beginning, over time it evolved toward a more nationalist line with the dissolution of the empire, especially under the influence of the Balkan Wars. Another view was the Westernization-modernization view formed by the magazine *İçtihat*, represented by names such as Abdullah Cevdet, Ahmet Rıza, Celal Nuri, and Tevfik Fikret. This view was a more radical and precise proponent of modernization and demanded the transformation not only of the state, but also of society. These two later merged to form the idea of nationalist Kemalism during the Republican Period. The third view was

Islamism, which argued that the state and society should be regulated according to Islamic principles. The main agenda of this view – as propagated by Said Halim Pasha, Mehmet Akif, Eşref Edip, Babanzade Ahmet Naim, and others associated with *Sebilürreşad/Sirat-ı Müstakim* – was the renewal of Islamic thought.

The common point in the idea of legitimacy that had formed within the framework of factors such as the destruction of the state based on different social and political dynamics and the inability to maintain previously established relations was the search for modernization and renewal. The idea of the constitution, despite all its problems, represented an interaction with both the past and the present. This interaction, however, also represented the search for critical renewal in classical Islamic thought and contained a dialogue that was engaged with modern thought. Therefore, although the interaction sometimes remained synthetic in terms of containing a synthesizing and regulatory ability, it also contained originality. During the Republican Period in particular, intellectuals from the most traditional to the most Western appeared to agree on the following two issues: intellectual renewal and social construction. The main factors that distinguished the various thoughts during this period were the method of and basis for this regeneration. One group directed itself to building a new school of thought by leaving the old as much as possible; the other directed itself to building a school of thought by preserving the old as much as possible. Between these two opposites existed the wide range of different shades of reformist thought.

However, the attempt to create a new school of thought by critically evaluating both modern thought and Islamic thought was unsuccessful holistically as it had been disrupted by repression after the formation of the Republic. Afterward, however, it had foundational importance in terms of being the basis for the formation of the intellectual groups that represented a reformist agenda and the search for renewal in Turkey.

The nation-building period (1923–1945)

The Republic was not just a transformation in the administrative model in the history of Turkey. At the same time, the Republic took an increasingly radicalized direction of modernization and Westernization. The Westernism-Turkism synthesis, represented in the person of Ziya Gökalp, was the founding idea of the Republic (Gökalp, 1968). The main basis for this intellectual orientation of the Republic was undoubtedly the decline of a wide range of relations dissimilar to the Ottoman Empire and the formation of an ethnically homogenized society. For this reason, the idea of the Republic was aimed at establishing itself in a more monolithic structure by not taking differences into account nor by making any synthesized effort, as had been done in late Ottoman thought. In the post-1923 period, the leading factors in Turkish thought were nation-building and the effort to break away from the Ottomans. Nation-building seems to be closely related to the character of the new state (Heyd, 1950). The Republican elite embarked on this effort in order to restore a society formed by intensive migrations over a piece of land recovered after a phase of disintegration. They also saw it as an opportunity to break away from the Ottomans. This transformation was built around the secular identity, and an overly repressive and centralizing attitude was adopted to achieve such a major transformation. For this reason, the post-1923 period saw the establishment of an increasingly centralized political structure with an intellectual structure articulating it. This is the period during which modern Turkish thought was torn from the past and modern thought came to be developed within new institutionalizations. While radical modernization proposed Westernization as a single and holistic path on one hand, on the other hand, it sought to establish historicity within the framework of nation-building and the creation of a national identity (Parla, 1985, pp. 61–62). Although this

artificial historical identity, whose proponents tried to establish by putting the Ottoman Empire and Islamic identity within parentheses so as to return to the pre-Islamic identity, could not be established holistically and was thus abandoned over time, its effects are permanent. During this period, Westernism officially prevailed in Turkish thought, and other views did not have the opportunity to become public enough. Within the Westernizing politics, the four main views of Turkism, Kemalism, liberalism, and socialism were all in competition with one another. Later on, when the effect of the official ideology on combining these views disappeared, these views were separated from each other and turned into separate schools of thought.

This early Republican idea, shaped by the search for a break from Ottoman thought, based the construction of the nation around modern norms on ethnic bases but eventually realized it could not succeed in this regard and returned to the idea of Ottoman modernization. In this sense, the two-volume study published by the Ministry of Education on the occasion of the centenary of the Tanzimat [The Reforms] in 1939 showed the quest to establish continuity with the idea of the Tanzimat. Although the young Republic wanted to establish a whole new basis of thought for itself, it could not definitively create the necessary cadres and intellectual framework for this. The holistic renewal of schooling, the closure of alternative institutions with the ability to form different mediums of thought such as madrasas and Sufi orders, reforming universities to establish the intellectual infrastructure of modernization, subjecting printing and publication to strict censorship and control, sending students abroad, and building public thought in a secular form by institutions such as the public houses [Halkevleri] were insufficient for establishing a new school of thought (Parla & Davison, 2004). During this period, a breakaway ideology was formed through revolutions in language, law, and education, and the renewal of many symbols in public life in a reckoning with recent history (Davison, 1998). However, this ideology of rupture led to the search for a new construction of history (Bozdoğan & Kasaba, 1997). The most representative intellectual agenda of this period was the effort to create an ideology for the Republican Revolution and to create an identity around the theses of Turkish language and history.

A significant portion of the elite who had grown up in the last Ottoman period also took on roles and tasks in creating the early ideas of the Republic. Although some fully dedicated themselves to forming a new national identity and ideas, a significant number continued to preserve their own ideas. In this sense, the 1940s are seen as when the one-party rule began to relax; after 1945, different ideas and thoughts began to become evident in the intellectual public opinion, which had begun to relax with the transition to multi-party life. This period between 1945 and 1960 is a period of intellectual distinction in all respects.

The period of distinction (1945–1960)

The post-1945 period represents a time of distinction in contemporary Turkish thought. Liberalism, socialism, nationalism, and conservatism, which had previously competed with each other under the umbrella of Kemalism and seemed to be different branches of it, began being distinct from one another once the political umbrella weakened (Karpat, 2015, pp. 293–386). In fact, while this period saw the jolts of transitioning from a one-party political system to a multi-party system, as well as the economic and social upheaval of World War II accompanying the changes in the world system, Turkey's inability to continue its 25-year policy of good relations with the Soviet Union resulted in it being found within the Western capitalist bloc. These factors brought a radical differentiation from the previous period. Meanwhile, this period is when the intellectual currents that had gone into hiding underground since 1925 began to resurface. The number of magazines and publishers increased again, the literary environment

began to see a revival, and university circles were mobilized. However, the reaction of the state in Turkey was not delayed in such times of transition: the efforts to control the life of thought through pressure and intimidation are seen to stand out. Although this period usually presents a democratic appearance due to the transition from a one-party system to a multi-party system, it was also a time when serious pressure on the press, intellectual life, and universities continued.[3]

The striking effects of the Cold War on Turkish intellectual life had been seen since the 1950s (Örnek & Üngör, 2013). Through this effect, the state ideology was divided into two separate branches within the framework of anti-communism, the right and left Kemalism that changed in form. In the long run, this rupture caused Kemalism in Turkey to lose its social dynamism and to transform into a bureaucratic ideology. During this period, "the radical break with the local culture, under the modernizing programs of the Republicanists, rendered difficult the process of identification of the rising peripheral classes with the established elites" (Göle, 1997, pp. 51–52).

Consensus is found on the elections in 1950 creating a break in Turkish thought, even though this period corresponds to the missing link in studies on the history of Turkish thought (Ahmad, 1977). For some reason, studies carried out regarding this period usually revolve around a few names and publications, with other variations escaping attention. However, the 1950s are when contemporary Turkey in all respects was founded. Therefore, remarkable developments occurred related to the new ideas during this period. The economic outlook had changed due to the rapid industrialization and the rapid migration and urbanization taking place from rural to urban areas; the state began to emerge with new functions. The rapid industrialization and urbanization of the country led to both the emergence of new social problems and the formation of new ideas around these problems. As a result of these socioeconomic developments. the political perspectives and public debates again diversified.

In terms of the developmental politics up to that time, particularly the liberal one in this regard, the emergence of the bourgeoisie as an important new class with social, political, and economic characteristics different from the ruling bureaucrats of Turkey was important. In addition, with the start of democratic elections, the local notables and guildsmen who had been suppressed during the previous period were seen to have returned to the political scene. As a result of this turn, a long-term intellectual construction process also began, with various Islamic groups gaining visibility in the public sphere (Yıldız, 2008). Many religious groups today are either a different form of an old religious group or had been shaped as a new structure per the needs that became evident within the new social structure. During this period, different relations began to be re-established with the decolonization of Muslim countries, and an intellectual interaction was reformed. At the same time, new ideas developed by the left and liberal thought led to a diversification and revival in Turkish intellectual life. A broad consensus is found on these new ideas coming to the agenda and forming the basis of the intellectual life that followed. This period, which ended in a military coup in 1960, therefore embodies a great distinction that would serve as the basis for diversification in the next period.

Fractional diversification (1960–1980)

The post-1960 rapid diversification of Turkish thought is reminiscent of the Second Constitutional Era. Erik J. Zürcher (2017, p. 224) defined this period as the second Republic of Turkey. During this period, which began with a coup and incorporated a Kemalist restoration, new ideas became public more quickly, and existing thoughts diversified within themselves (Pekesen, 2019). In parallel with the political mobility, the development of the publishing world, the expansion of access to education due to urbanization, and the increase in the number

of universities as well as the spread of intellectual currents, this period saw the emergence of a vibrant intellectual life. The 1960s were important for publicizing two ideas. With the foundations that had emerged in the 1920s, the fermentation of thought in academia in the 1940s, the creation of a political party in the form of the Türkiye İşçi Partisi [Turkish Labor Party] in the 1960s, and the nascent unions by means of which university clubs and a social movement emerged that published journals and established associations in tandem with publishers, the left experienced a rise as an intellectual body of thought (Doğan, 2010). During the 1960s, the left also developed in relation to global contexts and divided into various factions; in the 1970s, it experienced diversification (Ulus, 2011).

A similar situation applies to Islamism. Islamism, whose formation had been ongoing since 1908, gradually began to emerge in the 1950s after being suppressed during the one-party period (Göle, 1997). In the 1960s, Islamism found an intellectual basis by developing the faculties of theology and Imam Hatip schools and also gained opportunities to reach society through the traditional religious structures that had developed (Çakmak, 2009). "The primary characteristic of Turkish Islamism derives from the fact that it is deep-rooted in Sufism" (Duran, 2010, p. 8). Islamism became public during this period through publications that increased in number and expanded as a field of discourse in the 1960s. Islamism, which had also gained a political face with the establishment of the Milli Nizam Partisi [National Order Party] at the end of the 1960s, also entered a course of diversification with the divisions among religious groups during this period (Mert, 2009).

In the 1950s, Kemalism moved closer to the left in response to a move to the right by the Demokrat Parti [Democratic Party] under the influence of Cold War jargon against the established political and bureaucratic elite; this also laid the groundwork for the rise of the left after the May 27, 1960 Coup. This rapprochement led to the emergence of nationalism as an independent intellectual and political movement. During this period, which was spent in the search for a nationalist identity, the nation-based nationalism produced during the 1930s and approaches that viewed religion as a national element began to develop. Thus, this period is when nationalism also diversified. The relationship between liberalism and conservatism, synthesized by the Demokrat Parti in the 1950s, began to unravel in the 1960s due to the differentiations from the Kemalist bloc. These two inter-feeding trends, loosely united during this period, were firmly stuck in a narrow space with the rise of Islamism and the beginning of the questioning of conservatism. This nationalist synthesis, which relaxed and diversified, fermented again after 1980 due to the suppression of other thoughts and turned into a low point in Turkish thought until experiencing another rise.

Both Islamism and the left were on the rise in Turkey in the 1960s. This renewed form of Islamism based on the origins of the constitutional era was closely related to the Islamic world's intellectual and political developments (Aydin, 2006). During this period, Turkish Islamists formed an important intellectual basis with the serious influence of Pakistan's Jamaat-e-Islami and Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. During this period, many books were translated from Urdu and Arabic, and an understanding of Islam-based social, political, and economic order began to be presented as an alternative (Üstün Külünk, 2019). Although Islamism as shaped by Kemalism and anti-communism had initially formed as a rejectionist idea, one interpretation of historical origins increasingly began to take root at a societal level. In this sense, the rise of political Islamism alongside the religious groups that carried more folkloric elements were seen to dominate public opinion during this period. In particular, the dilemma of the secular elite, who had become Westernized against the Cold War's dead ends, led these groups to find their place in the political sphere due to the center-right politicians, who were eager to keep up with the religiosity of the countryside, also making room for traditional religious groups. Although these

two currents that derived their source from Islam supported each other from time to time, they bifurcated over the long term. Since the 1980s in particular, the conservative alliance these traditional groups entered into with the state lay against the background of the emergence of small Islamist groups with a criticism of public Islam (Gole, 2002). In fact, the dilemmas of the Cold War not only caused the left to break away from the people, but also resulted in Islamism finding no place in Turkey, which caused an audience and thought centrally compatible with the state to emerge.

In contemporary Turkish thought, the 1970s constituted a dynamic period in all respects. New thoughts that had developed due to student and worker movements were also reflected in political life. This period of politics becoming destabilized and street events outstripping formal politics witnessed divisions and disintegrations in all intellectual movements. This period directed intellectual life both on the left and the right toward a hot debate regarding history (Tokgöz, 2015). Attempts to identify the processes and structures behind the currents with a critical focus on distant and recent history led to the formation of a vibrant intellectual environment. In particular, while the ongoing debate about what type of society Ottoman society had actually been produced a view that the social structure cannot be disconnected from history, this also led to current political formations being synthesized and remodeled with history (Seddon & Margulies, 1984). In fact, efforts to establish continuity in thought can be decisively claimed for this period in which attempts to synthesize were also seen to develop as a result of diversification in thought.

Popular pluralism period (1980–2000)

The intellectual consequences of the 1980 Coup were as important as its political consequences. The intellectual debate that had begun in the 1960s and gradually matured within itself ended with a major break. During this period, in which the military coup suppressed all intellectual movements by suspending political life, the world of thought was also seen to have begun becoming influenced due to the changing economic structure (Kaya, 2008). Liberalization, surviving due to its links to the reorganization of the state, found itself a foundation in the conservative-liberal discourse. A more populist-oriented life of thought emerged after 1980, with deep-rooted intellectual movements' publications being shut down and their representatives banned. A thought fueled by pretentious consumption showed itself through the influencing of the press and the publishing world.

From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, active discussions began on identity and culture. The most important factor affecting these discussions was the search for a new consensus and social reconciliation. The two-dimensional thinking of the 1980s took on a pluralistic view, somewhat due to the fact that the ground had been leveled. With the influence of global developments by the end of the Cold War, comprehensive political ideologies are seen to have gradually softened and more micro-social movements such as feminism, environmental rights, urban movements, and human rights to be on the rise (Şimşek, 2004). Identity politics were on the rise in Turkey during the 1990s (Ayata, 1997), when the search for a new political consensus and the search for what I call "new contractualism" became the basis for the second Republican debate. These identity debates, arising from a critique of Kemalism that had shown a thoroughly repressive face in the post-1980 coup environment, formed a temporary consensus that united the opposing segments (Çolak, 2006).

Another debate that gave direction to Turkish thought in the 1990s took place around culture. In these discussions, which considered culture with all its meanings, while a search occurred for a traditional culture to establish and surround the existing social universe, the effort

also was made to build a socially constructed modern culture positioned as a basis for change. Therefore, a conflict of two cultures also manifested itself as the background of the identity debate in the 1990s (Kaya & Sunar, 2015). As a result of the revival of civilizational discourse, the conflict an Islamic culture – one that had reinvented itself using a critical commentary on modern thought and a criticism of state-centric modernization history – would have with a contemporary culture– one that had formed itself within a rising market and represented a break from the state's interference for the sake of modernization – turned into a synthesis through the gravitational pull of globalization and neoliberalization. In general economic, political, and intellectual terms, the so-called lost decade of the 1990s was actually a period of dispersion and search for direction following the multiplication of old intellectual forms as a result of the coup and the end of an intellectual climate alongside the end of the Cold War (Ünay, 2006, p. 80). This disorganization and plurality created the foundations for the next period.

The globalization and neoliberalization period (post-2000)

Determining this period to have begun in 1999 would be appropriate. The turning point of the millennium was the beginning of a new turn for Turkey. One after another, social, political, economic, and natural events turned this year into a moment of great breakdown. The repressive bureaucratic state model, which began with the February 28 military intervention, clearly was no longer able to continue, and Turkey, which had begun to falter with the end of the Cold War, now had to chart a new direction for itself. The process that began with the capture of Abdullah Ocalan evolved into a political process with the beginning of the EU membership process. The economic crisis that resulted in an economic stand-by agreement with the IMF caused major shocks in the economic structure. Alongside the earthquake of August 17, 1999, the collapse of the state bureaucracy and the self-deployment of the civilian sphere were elements that triggered major transformations. In many ways, while the 2000s had begun with a crisis, the new millennium also began with great opportunity for Turkey. In 2002, the AK Party came to power with great success, and a rapid democratization in politics and bureaucracy was followed by the transformation of the economy by adapting to global processes (Ete, Altunoğlu, & Dalay, 2015). This process of change, which continued until 2010, was a period of great economic growth and also political relaxation in Turkey, during which life in Turkey since 2000 had been spent almost constantly as a stable state under a one-party power; the prominent orientation in this period was globalization and neoliberalization – the nationalism and its forms that had risen in response to this. A changing media and broadcasting order, expanding university space, increased research and development activities, and the emergence of intellectual production more interactive with the world has as a matter of course expanded the field of thought and diversified its focus.

After 2000, two main themes are found to have become evident in the life of thought, one being the theme of liberalization. Both Islamist and leftist thought, which had gradually lost their old, closed structures (and, of course, special focus) in the 1990s, entered the process of opening up and rapprochement within the framework of the search for democratization in the 2000s. On February 28, 1997, these ideas that had approached each other to balance the authoritarianism of the Kemalist-view state became the driving force for democratization with a demand for reformation. But after 2010, the consolidation provided by economic change, the European Union (EU) process, and the need for bureaucratic change became increasingly scattered, and with the polarization between conservatives and secularists, the world of thought began to experience a vicious agenda centered around symbols.

After large-scale political reforms, democratization, and the rapid economic development through the 2000s, the 2010s began with great hope and optimism. However, this period created a great mess contrary to what was expected. Large-scale and controversial social events have taken place in Turkey over the last decade. Economic growth also stalled during this period, and public welfare was severely reduced. With major social tension about the social and political system of Turkey, its intellectual life experienced a huge shrinking. The process that started with the 2010 constitutional reforms brought great social and political tensions. The Gezi Protests in Turkey in 2013 and the failed coup attempt on July 15, 2016 dominated public intellectual debates. Following these events, large-scale conflicts took place in intellectual, academic, and political life about Turkey's current situation and future. One of the most important intellectual features of this period was the decline of meta-ideologies. Islamist thought began to integrate with the state, and the effectiveness of different shades of nationalism increased. The state's determinations in the public sphere gradually increased. Leftist and liberal thought began to lose its public effectiveness and visibility. Kemalism has returned to the public discourse. During this period, the declining economic growth rate and decrease in welfare changed the course of public debates. While entering the 2020s in Turkey, intellectual life is shaped around debates on everyday life and lifestyles. Contrary to previous periods, the general and encompassing lines are seen to have become more obscure and untraceable. For this reason, certain new intellectual syntheses and formations are predicted to emerge in Turkey on the threshold of a new era.

Although this section has defined a periodization and course, intellectual life in Turkey cannot be said to be separated by such sharp boundaries in each period. The defining feature of one period may differentiate from another, as gray areas occur between these periods. As discussed in what follows, the main currents of ideas in intellectual life in Turkey have shown themselves with specific intensity during each period as an element of continuity.

Basic features and issues of Turkish thought

Turkey has been experiencing a crisis of intellectual identity for the last two centuries due to shallow modernization and an ungrounded sociopolitical thought. This identity crisis may be considered around the following factors: (1) the problem of origin and continuity; (2) the problem of tradition and continuity; (3) weak historicism; (4) syntheses; (5) alienation and marginalization; (6) superficial populism; and (7) political polarization.

The modernization projects that had been transferred from the Ottoman Empire to Turkey and that had gradually accelerated and radicalized have created an irreversible origin and continuity problem in intellectual life. In fact, this is a problem faced in all Muslim countries in the modern period. For example, although the Egyptian, Indian, and Iranian thoughts discussed in this series have each faced a similar situation, they can also be said to have continuity encouraged by language, culture, and institutional structures. However, Turkey is a country where almost a generation was raised for a quarter of a century between 1925 and 1950 without any positive contact with its history or past. The break this generation experienced, and the later nostalgic interest in the past, has yet to overcome the disconnect in both language and culture. The fact that a tradition of thought broke its connection with history – even based itself on this denial while simultaneously having to face the West – has literally produced a state of slogans and a dearth of content. After all, the picture of contemporary thought in Turkey can be defined as follows: nationalism vs. the West and Westernism vs. society and history. This hypocritical attitude also poses serious difficulties in establishing the identity of the state. In this

sense, complex references have resulted in the formation of a fragmented state and social identity. Although an opportunity has appeared today for the state to position itself using modern, Turkish, and Islamic elements, a hybrid and eclectic identity exists.

The most basic element of this synthesis is that almost all forms of modern thought in Turkey are invalidated by a lack of tradition. The break with ties from the past has prevented intellectual life in Turkey from finding any framework, foundation, movement, or point of retention from classical thought. In addition, the schools of thought have not been able to build any lasting tradition within themselves, because in Turkey, these schools tend toward politics rather than theory. These schools usually come to the fore of the agenda when political space is at risk, rarely due to interest in theory. This undoubtedly creates a problem of political pragmatism. Therefore, no idea development has taken place with consistent content. Thus, the common problem of these different forms of thoughts is that the lack of tradition while holding temporal transformations to be of great importance. In fact, this weakness, which completely eliminates the possibility of producing thought despite attempts to overcome it with periodic patches, continues to grow. Today, the problem of theorizing appears to continue to exist in Turkish thought. For example, almost no thoughts or theories have come out of Turkey and been translated into the world as a result of natural demands (not artificial channeling).

The most important cause of this problem of tradition is weak historicity; this is a situation in which history has not been evaluated holistically. Instead, the idea of a fragmentary history has been adopted based on a symbolic and nostalgic reading of history, using a case-oriented approach. In this sense, just as much as the Kemalist discourse that considers history as a shackle on our feet, the conservative discourse that considers history to constitute the apex needing to be reached is an important supporter of weak historicity. After all, history and historical figures are like ghosts for the intellectual life of Turkey today. For some, the corporeal absence of these ghosts, who are considered good by some and nightmares by others, leads them to be appropriated and defined as desired. Giving the name of a historical figure to a bridge, a school, a square, or a street, or removing an object of identity from historical characters in films, allows history to be trapped in storage rooms and unique historical strolls to be taken through the Bosphorus in Istanbul by fragmenting history and reducing it to its simple moments. However, building a consciousness of historical responsibility and a social continuity that collects these moments is necessary for temporal integrity.

The identity crisis also leads to the formation of averages and hybrid forms in intellectual life. For example, the relationship of the left with Kemalism has created a leftist Kemalism, the relationship between Islamism and nationalism has created a Turkish–Islamic synthesis, nationalism and Kemalism together have created conservativism, and the relationship of liberalism with the left has created feminism and other forms of Westernism, while the relationship of Islamism with liberalism has brought forth democratic conservatism. Increasing these syntheses, while this may appear to be an opportunity, may have actually created a syntheticism and syncretism that has weakened the depth of thought. In the face of the various initiatives carried out today to overcome this syntheticism, the need exists for a framework of thought that will knead together history and theory with modernity and tradition.

The position and eligibility intellectuals in contemporary thought have in Turkey has always been a subject of discussion. An intellectual's betrayal or a thinker's problem has always drawn interest. But now this wonderful child of modernization appears to have experienced a critical break from society because the role assigned to them is to ensure contemporaneity. Distancing themselves from society on the way to contemporaneity, Turkish intellectuals have practically exiled themselves; they have become marginal and foreign figures. This situation has actually been experienced by all Muslim societies in the 20th century. As conceptualized

by the Iranian critic Jalal Al-e Ahmad (1984), it is a Westoxification (poisoning by West). To him, contemporary Muslim societies are under the heavy influence of the poisonous culture of imperialism. One cannot say that no alternative intellectual movements exist that have set out to overcome this. But these movements have also not become social enough. In fact, the definitive position of the state and modernization's demand for integration into the world have left the Turkish intellectual literally between the state and the world (i.e., the West). In periods when the state had also pursued integration into the world (e.g., the early 1950s, the 1980s, and the first decade of the 2000s), intellectuals have been functional in this regard, but in the periods when integration with the world (i.e., the West) did not fully work, intellectuals also entered into a crisis.

Superficial populism has resulted from the problems of tradition, weak historicity, and alienation, and most importantly from the identity crisis intellectuals have suffered in modern thought and intellectual life in Turkey. Despite having become more obvious today, turning to what is popular, following what appears appealing, and opportunism have always been important problems for the intellectual agenda in Turkey. The fact that a national identity and agenda have not formed is a factor facilitating this popularization in Turkey, where modern thought has always updated itself with inspiration from the West, because populism means that which is de facto, not that which is deep enough, is what gets more attention. Considering the intellectual identity crisis in Turkey, populism is seen to have produced the misconception of mobility and productivity in this sense. This misconception has led to confusing what is important with what is insignificant in intellectual life, what is vital with the incidental. In this manner, while important problems awaiting solutions are left to the side, populism makes room for itself in the aforementioned universe of symbols in the jargon of conflict. In addition, contemporary thought in Turkey has been formed around names rather than events and theories rather than issues. For example, in today's Turkey, while serious problems occur in writing monographs based on a deep examination of certain issues, concepts, and theories, dozens of texts are published around certain names. Contemporary thought in Turkey is like a cemetery list: the grave keepers are trying to convince everyone of the sanctity of the graves.

In any study of contemporary thought in Turkey, creating room for the conflict between conservative and secular intellectual camps now has the right to be considered a so-called tradition. The image of a polarized country was formalized in the 1990s with the claim by Samuel Huntington (1993) that Turkey was a country torn between Eastern and Western civilizations. In fact, this image is not a product of the 1990s. From the very beginning, talking about a progressive-reactionary distinction or a contemporary-bigot dichotomy or separating conservative and secular segments from one another have been common in Turkey. For example, names such as Idris Küçükömer, Cemil Meriç, and Atilla Ilhan in the 1970s contributed to the idea that contemporary thought in Turkey had been formed around a dichotomy by questioning parties' actual positions within these dualities. No matter how the parties are positioned, the widespread belief has existed that a "neighborhood fight" is found in the middle, as popularized in recent times by Şerif Mardin (2007). Mardin has also insisted that the race to "grab the center" is the feature characterizing the main conflict that provides the real picture of modernization in Turkey. In fact, this polarization or conflict is an extension of the discursive violence public discourse developed to legitimize itself, shaped by a fundamental fear formed around the return of the suppressed. This has also become a justification for the violence applied in the name of modernization. Constructing the intellectuals' race to gain position as a social conflict and weighing the efforts to reveal social values using the same scale for measuring the pressure contemporization has had on a society that alienated its own identity actually form the basic logic of the formation of the other qualities mentioned previously.

Conclusion: the current situation and the view toward the future

In the end, saying that contemporary thought has formed in Turkey today as a whole is difficult. However, given the distances traveled and the experience and intellectual accumulations gained, the groundwork for starting again can be said to have been lain. In summary, the main view of contemporary thought in Turkey has formed around the following qualities.

1 In social and political memory, defeat or loss produces a fundamentally protectionist intellectual reflex. This protectionist reflex as an idea is an important factor that prevents the debate from deepening. Recent political conflicts and troubles have created a polarization in intellectual life. Although this political and ideological polarization has not spread to everyday social life, it has led to the formation of remote areas of thought.
2 The development of thought in Turkey is shaped around state power. A period of top-down modernization, secularization, and reform projects has led to ideas being separated from social foundations and to the insulation of social dynamics. Although official secular pressure does not present itself much in this way today, bureaucratic centralism is still one of the most critical problems. Meanwhile, the strict conservatism shaped by a resistance to the ongoing secularist oppression has also cast doubt on innovation and change. In this sense, the developmental areas of thought in modern Turkey can be said to have been narrowed by conservative reflexes within the state and society.
3 In today's Turkey, political concerns gain priority over intellectual development. A world of thought that has been integrated into Turkish political life and – reduced to political ideologies – has consequently been unable to sufficiently develop. The schools and methodological associations necessary for thinking to have a medium and framework have not been sufficiently formed. In this sense and as mentioned in this chapter, the fact that universities have not been sufficiently functional as an institution is an important problem in Turkey due to the problem of strict bureaucratization.
4 The military character of Turkish modernization and frequent military coups and interventions (or attempts to intervene) have made the development and course of thought and the construction of a continuity impossible. After each coup or intervention, the legal and institutional infrastructure changes with publishing houses, magazines, newspapers, and other mediums of thought being shut down. Ultimately, these repressive periods have led not only to the interruption of intellectual life, but also led intellectual life acquiring a cynical and introverted nature. In this sense, institutions, ideas, and relationships are seen to have been transformed by interventions from outside without ever completing their own internal development. This, in turn, has been an obstacle to the emergence of intellectual maturity.
5 The pressure of "application" created by the urgent problems that need to be solved has prevented the development of theoretical thinking. At the same time, because theoretical thinking has not developed, finding solutions to social problems has become difficult. In Turkey, the intellectual and academic sector has remained weak in systematically addressing social issues and creating solutions. The lack of specialized research traditions and lack of continuity in academic institutions has reduced the role of academic institutions in solving socioeconomic problems. In addition, non-university thought and research institutions are seen to be insufficiently developed in Turkey (despite some revival having occurred recently). A disconnect between theory and practice has emerged in modern Turkish thought. These two areas are even often seen as alternative and opposite areas to each other. Thus, the formation of a problem-solving functional world of thought has yet to occur.

6 The break from the intellectual tradition and the inability to build a new tradition have increased the gaps in contemporary thought in Turkey. Today, these gaps are mostly filled with theories and methods that have become widespread in the West. This situation can be monitored by looking at the density of translation works in the field of publishing in Turkey. The large number of translated works made a significant influence the production of a synthetic thought. In addition, this kind of transference results in the received thoughts and concepts being unable to be sufficiently placed. Due to a critical and receptive framework not having formed, Turkish thought cannot be said to contribute sufficiently to the world. In this sense, Turkey's place in global academic rankings, the lack of global journals and publication activities based in Turkey, and the limited number of works translated from Turkish to other languages show Turkey to have weak international interactions. Recently, however, a proliferation of new initiatives can be seen in this area, as well as increased interactions with the world.

7 One of the most important problems of thought in Turkey's modern period has been how the artificial thinking created by state and capital means has stifled the organic thinking that is expected to be shaped by the mobility formed in social layers. Faced with new and great challenges, both internally and externally, the problem of intellectual depth that Turkish thought has been attempting to overcome by synthesizing the old insufficiently matured political ideologies is constantly being renewed.

Notes

1 For a brief English summary of this book, see (Turhan, 1950).
2 It was published in 1959 in Turkish and was translated into English in 1965.
3 See VanderLippe (2012) for a detailed depiction of the formation of the multi-party system between 1938 and 1950.

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30

CONTEMPORARY TRENDS IN EGYPTIAN INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENTS

Muhammad Soliman Al-Zawawy

Introduction

This chapter discusses the development of contemporary trends in the most significant Egyptian intellectual currents, especially those after the revolution of January 25, 2011, which served as a turning point between two distinct periods. The revolution created a new regional situation that has influenced the intellectual struggle within the Egyptian state, both in terms of its political practices and in the evolution of ideas that have arisen from the other Arab Spring revolutions. This has posed a challenge to the prevalent pro-militarist, right-wing trend in the country. Since the July 1952 Revolution and the movement of the Free Officers in Egypt, the army has been a dominant force in the government and the public sphere, strengthening the authoritarian movement from the Nasser era up to the Sisi era. This trend has not only embraced authoritarianism but has also led to the emergence of the far-right wing, which considers itself to have legitimate control over civil society. This trend has become ingrained into state institutions, as well as the state's cultural, media, and educational organs. Security reasons, presented as legitimate grounds to suppress rights and freedoms, are used as grounds to justify control over intellectual and political movements. In fact, by labeling the opposition as a danger within the state, these movements have been attacked by arresting and initiating proceedings against the intellectuals, writers, and activists who have called for public freedoms. This has led to a decrease in the number of intellectuals and intellectual currents compared to the period preceding the 1952 Revolution.[1]

At the regional level, the failure of the Arab Spring that led to the emergence of counterrevolutions has dried the sources of intellectual movements that had somewhat supported or paved the way for revolutions. This has led to the regeneration and strengthening of authoritarianism, be it religious or secular, especially against the intellectual currents that had paved the way for the Arab Spring revolutions in the region.

This chapter will shed light on the important intellectual movements and contemporary trends that emerged after the January Revolution and the 2013 coup in Egypt. Egypt witnessed an atmosphere similar to the dissolution of parties and the control of public space that had happened after the coup in July 1952, during which it entered a similar process of imprisoning and detaining writers, intellectuals, activists, and party leaders from all intellectual and political movements.

Contemporary intellectual transformations in political Islam

After the military coup in 2013, the provisional government led by the army headed by Adli Mansour enacted more than 300 laws to initiate the process of militarizing the state, controlling the public sphere, and restricting freedoms (Al-Monitor, 2016). The military dictatorship also suspended the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt, arrested its leaders, and accused them – along with other Islamic intellectual figures and parties – of having links to terrorism, branding them as terrorists (Human Rights Watch, 2018). This military regime, considering these movements to represent the fight against its attempt to control the religious sphere, has additionally launched a campaign to drain their intellectual resources, blockade public headquarters and agencies, and seize party headquarters, property, and financial resources (Brown, 2017). Meanwhile, the Islamists represent a threat to the regime's control of all public headquarters and agencies (in the eyes of the military regime), given that they won 76% of the parliamentary seats in Egypt's last neutral election (British Broadcasting Company [BBC], 2012).

In terms of intellectual transformations, Islamic movements have transformed from being simply religious groups to being new entities that unite religious and public affairs and perform party work. They have set up political parties alongside their efforts to protect religious communities (Zollner, 2018, p. 9). Confronted with the obstacles of the modern nation-state and the principles of democracy as these Islamic movements began to take their first steps in Egypt, the intentions of the party's program became apparent, also forcing the Islamic movement to abandon its basic principles and ideas about state and society. In order to legitimize its transformation from a movement preaching religion into a political party, the Islamic movement was forced to engage in debates over issues such as its vision of the caliphate, the role of religion in the public sphere, and the strengthening of Islamic law.[2]

Political transformation of the Salafis

Salafist movements are historically right-wing movements in light of the literature that has become the doctrine of Ahl as-Sunnah wa'l-Jamâa [People of the Prophet's Way and Community] within the political history of the emergence of the Ahl-i Hadith school. Ahl as-Sunnah wa'l-Jamâa has developed political concepts and efforts to ensure the unity of the *ummah* such as imamate for the victorious (seizing power through force), not rebelling against the ruler, and differentiating between the caliph and the king. All of this literature is reflective of the political strife in the early centuries of Salafism, which re-emerged through Ibn Taymiyya, and then again with Imam Mohammad bin Abdulwahhab. Such political literature from these periods was often commissioned by those in authority and sometimes in order to help manage political affairs in the country.[3] Socially, Salafist movements have been active socio-religious movements operating as a means of change or resistance to change, while also possessing organizational structures, resources, and tools that are elements of social movements generating mobilization and influence (Tilly, 2005, p. 31). Although Egypt's Salafist movement had generally envisioned politics as an impure and pointless game prior to the revolution, it has nevertheless observably entered politics and formed political parties.[4] On the other hand, some of the Salafists supported the Muslim Brotherhood without nominating themselves in the elections. Thus, after the January 2011 Revolution, the following changes were observed in the conditions of the Salafist current:

1 Salafist responses compared to their previous reservations on taking part in elections and parliament (e.g., that it is prohibited because legislation is an absolute right among the

rights of Allah; that secular laws go against Sharia; that ruling with other than what has been revealed by Allah necessitates His punishment [Arab Democratic Center, 2017]) are based on the grounds that calling for good and preventing misdeeds necessitate this.

2 Salafists, despite initially holding the stance that women holding public duties is inappropriate, have permitted the nomination of women as candidates (el-Şahat, 2015).

3 Christians are permitted to be nominated from the list of Salafist parties. in accordance with the electoral law (el-Şebab, 2015).

4 An explanatory provision in the 2014 Constitution which stated Islamic Sharia to be the main source of legislation was waived (Mübteda, 2013).

Reasons behind changes in Salafi practice

Some researchers have argued that these transformations in Salafist practice are more pragmatic rather than intellectual (Lacroix, 2016), considering that they have not given up on their previous thinking, just their political credentials. Despite their previous hard-line views toward empowering women and Christians, the leaders of these movements have justified their intellectual transformation (Berhami, 2011).

Upon examining the Salafists' political resources that produce their political literature, they state that the most important source for them is the old books of political Sharia (Berhami, 2011). The concept of *ahl ash-shawka* [rulers, governors, bureaucrats, and all who have the influence and authority] is a pivotal concept in the evaluation of *maslahat* [benefit] and *mefasid* [corruption] in Egyptian society. It explains why Salafists think that those who hold hard power in society (army, police, etc.) should be obeyed, and then they retreated from many demands they deemed essential in Morsi's era and hence accepted or even justified the coup against Morsi.

They searched in the jurisprudential tradition for the opinions that allow this, and brought them to light again, considering that they ultimately rely on the rule of "interests and evils" and that the interest requires – from the point of view of those in charge of the party – to enter that political process, which is a pragmatic interpretation, as well. Especially when looking at the history of the revolution, which marked their cooperation with security mechanisms against other Islamic movements, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, their relationship with these external elements has been a way of dividing the religious election map of Islamic movements and eating away at the Muslim Brotherhood's votes. Despite these serious accusations and apart from potential evidence in connection with their political practices, no concrete evidence exists other than their open cooperation in the coup involving the overthrow of President Morsi on July 3, 2013. This movement has buried democracy alive while siding with a military coup involving military control and the blood, incarceration, and arrest of supporters of democracy from all political movements.

Intellectual transformations in the Muslim Brotherhood

Many changes have occurred in the Muslim Brotherhood and its views on state and society, especially after the January Revolution when they went from being the opposition and a religious community to holding power and a political movement. In this context, the transformation is in line with the intellectual disintegration of the movement after it went from opposition to power and was taken down from there with the 2013 coup (Nasser, 2015). Since the beginning of the January Revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood has faced partisan divisions as a result of its internal intellectual conflicts. The mainstream that presently dominates the congregation within the Muslim Brotherhood community is close to a variant of Salafism known as Qutubism

(follower of Sayed Qutub), and this group is known as the conservatives. Mohammad Bedi, Hayrat al-Shatir, Mohammad Izzet, and others lead this group (Tayel, 2014). Another movement known as the reformist group exists under the leadership of Abdulmunim Abu'l Futuh, who left the Brotherhood and founded the Strong Egypt Party. This current is more pragmatic and tends to cooperate with different groups and formations. It is closer to the experience of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey, which has integrated women and secularists into its party.[5] A third formation in the movement involves the young people from within the party who are disgruntled by the movement's outdated values and opposition to diversity. It is a more revolutionary movement because of its de facto participation in the January Revolution. It more closely resembles liberal and socialist political youth movements. Much of this movement is comprised of the activists who founded the Egyptian Movement Party in 2011. Following the July 3 Coup, the group was practically divided into two. The first current is a continuation of the traditional approach, led by the elderly who run the group from abroad, particularly from London. The second is the faction led by a group in Egypt and supported by a group in Turkey (Fehmi, 2015).

However, while the movement does not engage in public debates about its views on the understanding of the modern state in general, it continues to claim the need to restructure the caliphate without determining the shape of the caliphate in modern times and to highlight the words of the movement's leaders. Similarly, they have yet to explain in their works what would happen differently from the practices in the Egyptian state today by implementing the Sharia. One of the three most important objectives is to increase the Islamization of society, namely the role of religion in the public sphere in the form of literature (Trigger, 2013).

In this context, the idea of the Muslim Brotherhood and its transformation after the January Revolution are linked to the following:

1 Acceptance of the national state despite its long history of working to restore the caliphate (Tammam, 2010, p. 8).
2 Acceptance of democracy as a tool for achieving power (Tammam, 2010, p. 8) and the formation of a party despite their historical and longstanding rejection of and hesitation toward this idea since the beginning of their history; the separation of those in favor of creating political parties from the movement.[6]
3 Continued efforts at implementing Islamic law.[7] However, the works representing the movement's ideas do not specify how.
2 An increase in the role of religion in the public sphere by preserving the right of every citizen (preserving and promoting the right to spread good and forbid evil as a means of accountability in the public; See, Freedom and Justice Party, n.d., p. 14).
3 The continuation of intellectual divisions in the movement regarding political violence by authoritarian regimes, and the movement's de facto fragmentation into factions after the 2013 coup, both under its leaders at home and abroad (al-Sharif, 2014).
4 the movement's inability to form a coherent dominant ideology that could be accepted as a political ideology corresponding to the slogan that Islam is the solution despite coming to power. In fact, the movement has used its oppression and victimization as a tool for mobilizing its supporters for restoration of legitimacy without working on its actual slogan (Tammam, 2010).

The future of the fragmentation process of the Muslim Brotherhood

At present, many parameters are found impacting the already understandable outcomes from the fragmentation within the Muslim Brotherhood movement. The most important of these is the agreement with the military regime allowing it to play its constitutional role for a second

time in the event of external or internal pressure for transparency in Egyptian politics. In this case, intelligence agencies can engineer this fragmentation with those they describe as moderates in prisons to revive the role of the movement under the supervision of these units. In this case, the Brotherhood is expected to be gradually weakened without being completely banned, ultimately neutralizing the movement and making it a functional tool in the hands of the army, as with the Brotherhood's experience in Jordan. By allowing only some Brotherhood leaders to work and legally register their institutions, the hawkish wing within the movement will be thoroughly contained (el-Neimat, 2018).

The second possibility is that a people's revolution will succeed in overthrowing Egypt's military regime for a second time. In this case, leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood returning from abroad and the symbolic figures being released from prisons will once again be appropriate. Given the disagreement between the two groups abroad and the fact that older leaders in London are trying to dismiss some of the leaders who oppose them in Istanbul, the measure of political success at this stage will depend on each group's capacity to receive financial support from abroad and attract the most members of each faction for the move.

The Strong Egypt Party trend and Abdulmunim Abu'l Futuh

Abdulmunim Abu'l Futuh, a former leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, was in fact an unrivaled figure of strength in Egyptian politics, especially when his party finished fourth in the 2012 election in terms of the number of votes (BBC News Arabic, 2012). His party defines itself as "left of center" and as one of the socioeconomic democratic parties for its propensity for political and religious freedoms and struggle to free the country from the politically polarized situation between Islamic and secular movements. Sisi has described this party as extremely Islamist and a threat to Egypt's military regime with its cohesive qualities and ability to work with various political movements in the country, as well as its overall rhetoric and popularity in the media (Al-Jazeera.net, 2014).

All this happened despite Abu'l Futuh leaving the Muslim Brotherhood, forming a new party, competing against the Muslim Brotherhood's candidate in the presidential election, calling for early presidential elections by opposing President Morsi, taking part in the June 30 stage, and participating in talks with President Adli Mansour, who was appointed after the coup.

Some believe Abu'l Futuh to disagree with the organization, not the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. After leaving the organization, Abu'l Futuh re-emerged as a model of the spirit of the struggle combined with the Egyptian national project. The Brotherhood has no intellectual opposition to the organization, which he sees as a combination of the new Egypt's national civilian project alongside his experience in efforts to realize the idea of awakening with an intellectual origin. Some liken his departure from the Brotherhood to Erdoğan's departure from traditional Islamic parties and the path of Prof. Necmettin Erbakan, the historical leader of the Islamic movement in Turkey (El-Habil, 2018).

Sufi movements and politics

Traditionally, Sufi currents in Egypt have stayed away from politics in the form of political parties until the January 2011 Revolution erupted. Although they did not win the elections, they did form three parties: the Hizb-ut Tahrir, the Nahda Party, and the Al-Nasr Party. In Egypt, Sufism is regulated under Law #118 (1976), which stipulates the Executive Council of Sufi Cults to consist of 16 members. In accordance with this law, the council controls all decisions taken regarding the Sufi orders recognized by the state (Al-Isnavi, 2017).

The Sufis have launched a campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists, accusing them of dragging the country into contention and excluding other actors. Given the number of their members, their support for the military revolution, the commitment of many of the Sufi leaders to the regime, and their appointment to prestigious positions, their being a tool in the hands of power is a valid interpretation. The leaders of the Sufi cults, with many often employed in government institutions such as the army, police, and judiciary, come from wealthy families (Noon Post, 2018).

In 2014, the Sufi delegations pledged allegiance to Sisi as president with the slogan "*Lailaha illallah Sisi Habibullah*" ["There is No God but Allah, Sisi is the One Loved by Allah"] (Anan, 2017). Sheikh Jabir Qassim, a representative of the Sufi sheikhs in Alexandria, said that the religious discourse crisis stems from the Muslim Brotherhood movement and that the state has underestimated those who have been corrupting Islamic society for 85 years and spreading the false and extremist rhetoric of Wahhabî and Salafist propagators (Masral Arabia, 2015b).

Sufi orders are attached to the legal system and structures of the state such that the state intervenes in the enactment of laws governing the process of the appointment of sheikhs, aside from these Sufi orders being placed under the protection of total power and the fact that their methods and spirituality dominating their rituals do not tend to create political ideas.

The attitude of religious discourse toward reform: between modernity and tradition

After the 2013 coup, the Egyptian government under the control of the military and its media returned to its intellectual tendencies by calling for the regulation of religious discourse. These trends dominated the media after the Sheikh of al-Azhar's meetings with the symbolic figures and after Sisi's speeches, particularly those relating to religion (Egyptian News Today, n.d.). This is an extension of the intellectual struggle between tradition and modernity and between secularism and religion (Brown, 2017).

Despite the request from the ruling authority, the Sheikh of al-Azhar's response to the request for the regulation of religious discourse has been negative. This has led the regime to make constitutional regulations through parliament, which is largely believed to be upheld by intelligence agencies. Many of these regulations enabled the dismissal of the Sheikh of al-Azhar, who appeared to have defied these demands after Sisi publicly said, "You have tired me, o dignified imam!" (Anadolu Ajansi, 2018).

Sisi's demands focused on reforming religious rhetoric on the following issues: more flexibility in the removal of modern provisions, abolition of divorce by verbal statement, the sufficiency of the Qur'an without the Sunnah, and the position of Sheikh of al-Azhar, which had condemned the use of violence against the victims of Rabia and Nahda squares (Anadolu Ajansi, 2018).

A visible attempt appears to have been made to consolidate reformism and state authority in religious discourse as a maneuver aimed at removing political Islamic movements from the public and religious spheres. Despite being one of the fiercest opponents of the campaign, the Sheikh of al-Azhar himself appears vulnerable to manipulation under the pretense of delegitimizing the founding literature on terrorist thought.

In summary, the most important features of this modern contemporary movement are as follows.

1 Reducing the reliance on traditional texts, including the Prophet's hadiths, and replacing it with increased faith in the Qur'an.

2 Working on contemporary and modern interpretations of the Qur'an and considering it as a historical text.
3 Increasing the rational domain in the reformist and modern exigencies (conditions that occur later that create difficulty or distress for people).
4 Ridding the tradition of views and fatwas which do not conform to the modern age.
5 Reducing clerics' and Islamic communities' spheres of sovereignty in the public.
6 Restructuring al-Azhar as an institution in accordance with the views of the military and subsequent reforms in religious education.

In this sort of confrontation, the state replacing the Sheikh of al-Azhar and intervening in university curriculum, as well as the military regime's dominance of mass media and control of cultural and educational institutions in the country, may well lead to a major change in this direction in the near future.

The transformation of contemporary Arab nationalist trends

Some analysts say that the Arab Spring revolutions stemmed from the system created by the Arab nationalism that emerged in the 1950s, which gave birth to the post-independence governments of Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Sudan, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, and worked to consolidate Arab nationalism. Many of these states have already had public uprisings against these systems, and many of them have already been overthrown. Arab nationalist thought, on the other hand, has largely produced military governments and consolidated dictatorships. By establishing tyranny, it has suppressed freedom of thought and expression and failed to achieve any of its goals at the national or Arab League levels as a whole. According to some critics, such as the former Arab thinker Hazim Sağiye (1999), Arabism has remained stuck in the past and not lived up to the requirements of the age.

The Palestinian issue alone has remained the focus of the United Arab Movement since the 1967 War, which led to Arabs rallying over the Three Noes at the Khartoum summit in 1967. The Arabs agreed upon the following principles: no negotiating with the enemy Israel, no reconciliation with Israel, and no recognition of Israel until the rights are returned to the owners; today, however, they have fallen to a position where they implore and beg Israel to accept normalization while asking for nothing in return (Mansur, 2018). The execution of Arab nationalist Iraqi Baath Party President Saddam Hussein and the killing of both Gaddafi and Ali Abdullah Saleh in the Arab Spring events have also led to a new setback for the regime's internal insurgency and foreign interventions in Syria, which in turn has led to a new setback in the process of Arabism at the regional level. These leaders (countries) were the biggest supporters of the Arab League process, while at the same time providing numerous forms of assistance to institutions and channels that support Arab nationalism.[8]

In Egypt, however, they have been unable to compete against the political Islamic movements, which have risen to the level of Arab nationalism as ideological movements and parties since the 1970s, dominating public space and student movements in universities and sweeping away student elections. Their partisan political performance is no different. These parties have been unable to achieve electoral victories, especially in recent years following the January Revolution, which opened the door for everyone to compete freely (Mursi, 2014). In addition to the decrease in the momentum of Arab (nationalist) movements for the reasons mentioned previously, these trends have faced problems in Egypt for other reasons. The most important of these is the blurring (i.e., confusion of the true ideology) of Arab nationalism in addition to disagreements between party leaders and attempts to try to represent all the demands of almost all its citizens (Mursi, 2014).

The problems of Arab nationalism in the age of revolutions

In light of the global trend toward regional blocs, the Arab world suffers from the collapse of its ability to cooperate through regional institutions, whether economic or security-related. In addition to increasing crises and problems among Arabs, especially in an organization such as the Gulf Cooperation Council after the besiegement of four countries in the region, the Arab League is no longer effective regionally, which is a reflection of the practical application of Arab nationalist thinking. Disagreements over the level of cooperation with neighboring countries such as Iran and Turkey, recognition of Israel and normalization of relations, and declining momentum in the Palestinian cause, as well as the rise of Egyptian-Israeli cooperation, have caused problems in the region. Egypt and Israel entered an energy exploration and cooperation forum in the eastern Mediterranean for the first time, excluding Arab and Islamic countries such as Syria, Lebanon, and Turkey, and causing problems in the region (Yeni Arap, 2019). This is yet another problem for Arab nationalist movements since their inception, and they continue to suffer from many problems on the issue of an all-out unity.

The Palestinian Azmi Beshara, who can be considered as the most recent leading thinker representing the idea of nationalism, sees the problem of Arab nationalism as the politicization of the community, which has been formed as a fictional community not ideologically but as a cultural identity. Nationalism, in Beshara's conception, is not a race or a specific group; it is an identity that an individual belongs to freely and therefore in essence is a modern idea. Beshara also thinks that the idea of nationalism should be renewed in dealing with the reality of the regional state (being) and proposes to separate nationalism from the state. Thus, while the state manages to achieve the sovereignty of the nation through citizenship and democracy, this nation lies outside this imaginary community. Only this can address the sectarian fragmentation that has resulted from the nation-state's failure to build a nation and the distorted modernity being founded by selfish elites (Masral Arabia, 2015a).

Therefore, the challenges faced by the nationalist movement can be observed in the Egyptian domestic arena and at the level of the Arab world as follows.

1 The Palestinian cause losing its centrality being a part of the growing trend of normalization at the regional level.
2 Difficulties in implementing the idea of unity.
3 The growing internal division between Arab states building alliance networks outside the Arab umbrella.
4 Increased competition between supporters of the regional state and Arabist identity at the level of thought and practice.
5 Failure of the Arab authoritarian model in the Middle East, especially in the face of non-Arab models (the Turkish model in particular).
6 Arabs' failure to confront American imperialism in Arab regional initiatives such as Arab NATO (Euronews, 2018) and others.
7 The decline of the global left after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, in connection with the founding ideas of pan-Arabism generally having originated from the left and being united in resisting traditional imperialism.
8 Intellectual conflict among the concepts of unity, socialism, and freedom, and their failure to be applied contemporarily (see El-Cabiri, 1990, pp. 157–165).

Given the acceleration of the recent rise of Arabism and the view of some nationalists that Islam does not contradict the Arab national trend, Arab nationalists have tried to build bridges

among the Islamic currents. According to this view, separating one from the other is impossible because each has occurred as a result of Islamic civilization (Saif Al-Dawla, 1986, p. 12). The National Islamic Conference was established in 1989 by invitation of the Pan-Arabism Center after the first National-Islamic Dialogue, which elected Palestinian thinker Munir Shafik as its head (Masral Arabia, 2015b).

After the January Revolution in Egypt in 2011, Arab nationalist movements were unable to develop their literature (or discourse) in parallel with the developments in the Revolution. In fact, these revolutions represented a protest against the nationalist revolution in July 1952. Thus, the nationalist movements in Egypt did not feel the need to reconsider their ideas and again did not work on developing their political literature. Certain leading figures in these movements failed to score any electoral victories, despite claims that they had syndicates reaching around five million members (BBC, 2019). Nevertheless, the youths of the leftist parties participated in preparing the January Revolution in partnership with the April 6 Youth Movement, revolutionary socialists, and others, beginning with youth movements that started the Kifaye [Enough] movement in 2005.

Echoes are still felt from Nasserist movements, which focus on their rhetoric, normalization with Israel, continuation of the Palestinian cause, and hostility to American imperialism. They organize activities resisting encroachment against workers' rights, the sale of trade unions and the public sector, and the removal of their employees. Activities are found aimed at combating rising prices while raising slogans of social justice. Activists in the Karama [Dignity] Party are working against the Egyptian military's persecution and amendments to the constitution. The former presidential candidate of Egypt and former President of the Dignity Party, Hamdeen Sabahi, former ambassador Masum Marzuk, Yahya Abdulhadi, and others are among its most prominent figures.

Thus, the transformation of Nasserist nationalist movements in Egypt has manifested itself in the younger generations. These generations have shown more dynamism in voicing the demands of the people for the Karama [Dignity] Party or the prevailing Social Justice Party. Egypt has paid a great price for abandoning its islands to Saudi Arabia and arresting many of its leaders and young people as a result of its opposition to the civilian arena's takeover of the military state (Masr, 2019).

The transformation of Egyptian leftists

Many researchers believe that representatives in the socialist movement are an extension of the Arab Socialist Union founded by Gamal Abdel Nasser. These currents believe that the economic role of the state should increase and defend the state's distribution of resources among citizens. Within the framework of the economic and social programs initiated by the Nasser regime on the grounds of achieving social justice in Egypt, the distribution of housing, clothing, and food needs (supply items) among citizens was accomplished by the state, and the nationalization of companies and heavy industries was carried out to prevent monopolies for the state's wellbeing. These were carried out in July 1952, when the law was enacted in parallel with the social justice goals championed by the Free Officers Movement. The 1952 Revolution was strengthened by the 1964 Constitution. This constitution defined the principles of socialism and the principles for the mechanisms through which the people possess the means of production.

The Nasser regime established a system that can be defined as state capitalism, whereby the state monopolizes the means of production and manages the economic production process through the intensive exploitation of the working class. Again, this system contributes to the

use of production surplus and capital in financing industrial projects in agriculture, expanding the education system, accumulating more capital, and transforming companies, large factories, banks, and insurance companies into public sector operations through expropriation. However, the collapse of the economic experience during the Nasser period caused a great shortfall in the balance of trade. Austerity measures were taken against the majority of the poor and middle classes, and $200 million was borrowed from the International Monetary Fund. In the end, the Nasser experience met a horrible demise with the 1967 defeat (el-Avdi, 2013).

The youth also criticized the military's policies in recruiting young people and exploiting them for their economic projects. Therefore, they call for deepening the social processes leading to revolution, establishing a revolutionary workers' party, creating the groundwork of wide public resistance against the state of exploitation and mischief for all the poor and oppressed, resisting the military, having social protests, and uncovering oppressive politics and practices (el-Avdi, 2013).

The rise of the ultra-nationalist right[9]

In the period following the military coup in 2013, the forces of the authoritarian regime worked hard to gain stability following the turbulent years since 2011. In this regard, the regime tried to drain the resources of the revolutionary movements and political parties. In parallel, thinkers who believed in Hobbes's idea of state power and political power were chosen to justify the oppression as the basis for political stability. Although the regime did not designate the views of any thinker as its representative, Dr. Mutez Abdulfattah, a professor of political science at Cairo University who became famous after the coup, can be considered one of the regime's most important theorists. He expressed the importance of state power in ensuring stability through a series of articles and many television programs. He is also one of the most important advocates of amending the constitution to extend the presidential term and expand the president's authority over state institutions (al-Shorouk, 2019).

He formulated his views in an article he wrote in the newspaper *Al-Vatan* (September 2, 2013), which happens to be under the control of the intelligence services, shortly after the coup. In this article, he stated that the civilizations of ancient societies needed stages such as those uncovered by the British thinkers Hobbes, Locke, and Mill. In order to rebuild Egyptian society, the idea that Hobbes initially attributed to the idea of the Leviathan must prevail. The oppressive state is legitimized by one thing: the state of war with everyone who would emerge in the absence of the oppressive state (al-Watan, 2013).

Mutez justifies the existence of the oppressive state. Hobbes took a similar stand for a tyrannical state in situations where people cannot live together without state tyranny. Mutez adds Hobbes' remarks to his own to justify a powerful administration with an army and police force that bear their weapons (al-Watan, 2013).

With this logic, the military authority has gathered a group of intellectuals, artists, journalists, and media experts to formulate a public opinion that justifies its existence and to create an intellectual movement that supports this view. In parallel with suppressing opponents from all currents, opposition writer Ala Al-Asavani (2017) described this mob as the "Sisi Ultras." This far-right authoritarian tendency is based on the following principles.

1 Resistance against religious leanings inclined toward the past, especially against the fundamentalist Salafist tendencies that originated from the Arabian Peninsula. After Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman ascended to the throne, a war was waged against this trend within its sphere of origin.

2 To emphasize the two sides of Egypt's national identity (Muslim and Christian) while taking into account the special composition of the Egyptian state as different from the rest of the region.
3 To increase the debate around Egyptian identity as belonging to Mediterranean civilization instead of composing an intellectual wing with its neighbors in the east, and to highlight the Pharaonic and Coptic identities as the origin of Egyptian civilization.
4 To reduce the scale of pan-Arabism and the centralization of the Palestinian cause, and therefore make security arrangements internally – as well as with Israel and Hamas – against armed Islamic groups, and to cooperate in developing a network of alliances in the eastern Mediterranean that extends to Greece and Cyprus.
5 To demonize Turkey as Egypt's main rival in the region, remove Turkey from the Egyptian domain, place it in the category of conspirators against Egypt, and create a defense strategy against Turkey in the media.
6 To fight the activists alleged to be on the same trajectory as fourth-generation warfare (al-Youm, 2019), who are funded from abroad and who aim to destroy the state and state institutions from within.
7 To fight the ideas of unity within the background of Islam, demonize countries that support political Islam such as Qatar, and keep in mind Egypt's military regime's consideration of Turkey as its main enemy in the region intellectually and militarily.[10]

These ideas stem from the Egyptian military doctrine that has been its main manifesto and backs Sisi. This doctrine seeks to consolidate national tendencies in the military and resist any idea that may lead to the disintegration of their ranks, whether this idea be an interpretation of the Islamic religion or on the differences between Christians and Muslims in the military. The British used the Egyptian army in World War I, which had included Ottomans in its ranks, on the side of the Allied Powers against the Central Powers. In addition, the British had made up 10% of the military's foreign security until 1900, despite emerging national sentiments to purify the army from Turks, Circassians, Albanians, and other non-Egyptians (Haşim, 2015, p. 4).

This trend is an extension of the fierce debate sparked by Ahmet Arabi's "Egypt belongs to the Egyptians" movement and Taha Hussein's (2012, pp. 22–23) book, *The Future of Culture in Egypt*. In this book, Taha Hussein refers to the origins of Egyptian identity and its relationship with Europe, referencing Roman civilization and how the Egyptians formulated their basic identities away from the so-called Arab Sultan.

Conclusion

After the 2013 military coup, Egypt has been witnessing a climate that stifles the freedoms of thought and creative ideas. This represents a step backward from the environment where Egypt had witnessed its first fair elections in the country's history after the January Revolution of 2011 where citizens went to the polls in unprecedented numbers in the country. This environment had galvanized publishing and opened the public space to innovators from various groups. It also galvanized the field of cinema, film production, and TV shows on political freedom. In the early days, before the strengthening of the regime's control over society and public space, and the regressive nature of the Mubarak period, the innovative movement was active and had witnessed some freedoms. However, during the Mubarak period, just as in the period of Sadat, the regime took control and took the legs out from under this environment; after this, the conditions of the period came under criticism.

The political polarization in this process, despite the years of freedom after the January Revolution in 2011, sparked heated competition over seats in parliament, over local elections, and over presidential elections. The power of the revolution dissipated, and polarization peaked prior to the dismissal of President Morsi. Innovative intellectual areas in different currents have become restricted. Liberal/socialist movements have failed to create a new approach to their ideas in accordance with the nature of the years of freedom after the revolution. In this period, they remain limited to youth activities and satellite channels (programs) in the parties, just like in the active research activities in the newly established think tanks. The opposition has failed to resolve the secular-Islamic polarization dilemma that had replaced the Islamist-military polarization during the revolutionary years, and this after they had failed to restore things to normal after the military coup and the elimination of different intellectual movements.

Despite the increase in the number of opposition leaders sent into exile and the access of some currents to satellite channels and research centers, the exiled opposition has failed to crystallize new movements of thought and is actually the last active intellectual current to represent a challenge to the current situation. Unlike what happened in the French Revolution, this opposition was unable to inspire the people with creative ideas that could reinforce the revolution in order to eliminate persecution or create political opportunities. In the wake of the coup, the public – with its anger and resentment toward the current situation – is generally hopeless that opposition forces will even be able to produce any intellectual theories or solutions, let alone transform the current scenario.

Notes

1 For Dr. Yusuf Zeydan's and others' views regarding the decrease in intellectual movements after the Free Officers Movement came to power in Egypt, see Zeydan et al. (2016).
2 The most important Islamic movements in Egypt are the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafist movements in general. Salafist movements can be classified in many different ways: given the tradition of Salafism/Madkhaliyya, the method is their position toward the ruler. Political Salafism is located at the far right of the spectrum. Jihadi Salafists are on the far left of the spectrum, while the ranks ranging from right to left are the National Salafists, Activist Salafists, the Independents, and so on.
3 For example, Abu Yûsuf's (b. 182 AH) *Kitâbu'l-Harâj* and other classical books were written at the request of Hârûn ar-Rashîd. The author began the book with extensive advice for the caliph on politics and other issues. Another example is Imam Juwayni's *Ghiyas-ul-Umam fi iltiyas uz-Zulem* [*Salvation of the Ummahs from the Trap of Darkness*], related to the issues that arise due to the needs of one's own time. For example, the monarch's duties toward jihad, and the state of the *ummah* when there are no imams and order. In particular, he wrote a book for Seljuk vizier Nizâmülmülk in the 5th century. Shafi'i qadi Mawardi (d. 450 AH) wrote *Al-Ahkam us-Sultâniyye Vilayat ül-Diniyye* for Vizier Abu al-Qassim Ali bin Muslime (438–450 AH). Additionally, *The Ruler's Behavior in the Management of the Towns* was written by Shihâbuddin Ahmed bin Mohammed bin Abi Rabi for the Abbasi Caliph Mu'tasım. For these and more, see Aref (1994, pp. 105–230).
4 In this section, we will only talk about Alexandria's Salafis and the Nur Party they founded, as they were the largest Salafist powers in Parliament in 2011.
5 *The Flow of Renewal in the Muslim Brotherhood* from the American Intelligence Library, February 22, 2005; for an interview with Abdulmünim Abu'l Futuh, see *el-Meyadin* channel, March 2013, available at http://bit.ly/2I8jhgD (Futuh, 2005, February 22).
6 For more information and experience about the Al-Wasat Party led by Abu Al-Ala Madi and Essam Sultan in 1996, see Lynch (2016).
7 For the statements of Hasan Al-Banna from the Muslim Brotherhood General Guide at the Fifth Conference, see Shakir (n.d.).
8 The Gaddafi regime supported the Arab movements in Egypt and helped establish the Al-Saa't channel, which was led by Arab nationalist journalist Mustafa Bekri and chaired by Gaddafi's cousin Ahmad Kazzaf al-Dam. Bekri and his brother Mahmoud were joined by Yusuf al-Husseini, Amr al-Leithi, and other Arab national announcers before suddenly closing in February 2010.

9 Extreme currents use force to spread their ideas or get rid of their opponents. They even publicly encourage media to target their internal opponents or incite their assassination abroad.

10 Sisi's overall strategy is presented in an interview with Al-Arabiya Al-Hadath before the presidential nomination. See www.youtube.com/watch?v=X5BsEELsyMY

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31

MAPPING THE TRENDS IN IRANIAN SOCIAL, CULTURAL, RELIGIOUS, AND POLITICAL THOUGHT FROM THE POST-1979 ERA TO THE PRESENT

Peyman Eshaghi

Introduction

In this chapter, I try to provide a general map of the most critical social, cultural, religious, and political thoughts in Iran over the past 43 years. To do this, I have distinguished thoughts from movements and attempted to follow the thoughts to wherever they became influential movements. I have followed the current social, cultural, religious, and political thoughts in Iran not just abstractly, but also as they have been manifested in terms of social and cultural embodiments such as institutions and communal activities. In other words, I have not just limited myself to the ideas provided by the thinkers, but have also followed these ideas through their social lives and explained them by referring to the leading institutions and movements that promoted these ideas, as well as the foremost thinkers who elaborated upon them. Meanwhile, I have judged their successes and failures in relation to to their objectives, ambitions, and goals. Therefore, this chapter analyzes Iranian thought through the social meanings that actually appeared and were maintained in Iranian society.

One should consider that what has occurred in the social, cultural, religious, and political spheres of Iran is hard to understand using the classical notions of political and religious theories. This gets harder when coming to the political fragmentations of the Iranian political arena. For instance, the concept of conservatism as used in the United States or in European countries conveys a different meaning when compared to political conservatism in Iran. To resolve this issue, I attempt to use conventional notions and expressions from the social sciences with some modification in order more appropriately explain the reality of Iranian society. Due to the critical role of Islam in shaping them, as well as the considerable share of Shiism in this intellectual tradition, I must address Islam in Iran through its divergent sects and denominations in Iran, primarily Shiism and non-Shiism, in order to handle the social, cultural, and religious thought in Iran. Starting with Shiite social, cultural, and religious thought, I will explain them by referring to Shiism's three main approaches to these issues: fundamental, traditionalist, and religious intellectualism.

Shiite social, cultural, and religious thought

Shiite fundamentalists

The two main groups of Shiite fundamentalists in the context of social, cultural, and religious issues are clergies and non-clergies. Among the fundamental Shiites in the clergy wing, Muhammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi (b. 1934) has probably been the most powerful and prominent in the recent years, as his opinions on the essence of the state and opposition to Western culture have contributed considerably to establishing fundamentalism as it currently exists in Iran (Siavoshi, 2010; Roy, 2008, p. 132). For years, Mesbah Yazdi has been the most significant critic of Shiite modernist thinkers, especially the Iranian religious intellectuals, and has opposed the apolitical and non-conventional Shiite theology. In addition to Mesbah Yazdi, Ali Akbar Rashad (b. 1955) and Hamid Parsania (b. 1958) are other clergymen with academic affiliations who have tried to establish state-funded research centers to articulate the issues mentioned earlier in this article.

Other fundamental intellectual endeavors have occurred in recent years, such as the localization of humanities, Islamization of sciences, establishment of the new Islamic civilization that constitutes the Iranian-Islamic (anti-modern) lifestyle, and the challenge from Islamic medicine as an alternative to global medicine in recent years.

Among the non-clergy fundamentalist thinkers in recent decades, one may mention academicians such as Reza Davari Ardakani (b. 1933) and Qolam-Ali Haddad Adel (b. 1945), both essential critics of the non-Islamic ideology. They have tried to promote all-Islamic systems. While Haddad Adel entered politics and even became the speaker of the parliament, Davari preferred to remain an academic figure. Like Mesbah, Davari, and Haddad, Adil's fundamentalism is mainly based on Islamic philosophy, not hadith or jurisprudence. Shiite jurisprudence is dominated by the so-called traditional scholars who oppose the fundamentalist reading of Shiism in terms of establishing a religious state or exerting Sharia. Reza Davari has rejected the Western model of democracy for years because of its separation of politics and religion. As "the philosophical spokesman of the Islamic regime" (Jahanbegloo, 2007, p. 84) and president of the Iranian Academy of Science, he has played a significant role in conceptualizing the fundamental ideas on religious and political matters. Having understood the West for years as the absolute Other to be set against an authentic Islamic identity and of the belief that Western civilization has reached its termination point (Mirsepassi, 2006, p. 432), Davari has signifcantly limited his assertions against the West in recent years and remained intentionally silent on these issues. After years of defending notions such as Islamic science, Davari has changed his mind and heralds that "science cannot be religious or non-religious," adding that "religious science" is dreaming something impossible and standing opposite his almost half-century's worth of intellectual endeavors (Azmudeh, 2018, p. 6).

In past decades, a new generation of fundamentalist thinkers and lecturers has appeared in Iran. Hasan Rahimpour Azghadi (b. 1964), Hasan Abbasi (b. 1966), and Ali Akbar Raefipour (b. 1984) may be considered the most popular among them. Without having any in-depth religious education, they have provided theological assertions mixed with conspiracy theories and attempted to provide a Shiite ideology for theorizing the current situation and policies of the Islamic Republic. Compared to the last generation of Shiite fundamentalist thinkers, they are more aggressive in their ideas and ambitions, have less religious education and fewer affiliations with religious seminaries, and are more connected to the world and global conspiracy theories.

Shiite traditionalists

Traditionalist Shiite thinkers have tried their best in recent decades to present Islam as a distinct way of life in Iran and to ensure that the society retains its traditional conservative values, which to them are absolutely religious. More than anything else, their main goal has been to maintain and strengthen the Shiite identity of their followers, as they regard Iran to be the hub of Shiism. While they are conventionally apolitical in their thoughts and daily life and do not meddle in political affairs, these Shiite traditionalist thinkers call for a stable country in which Shiism plays a critical role. To them, the nation's most important holidays and festivals should be the religious ones, and Shiism as understood by the high-level jurisprudents must dominate the most significant parts of Iranian society. The most important figures of this way of thought are the Shiite high-ranking jurists who reside in Qom, where many critical Shiite seminaries are located. They are generally called *Marja Taqlid* [Source of Emulation], the term implying the social procedure in which people ask them for their fatwas [Islamic rulings] regarding daily issues (Walbridge, 2001). Traditional Shiite thinkers and activists have established numerous institutions for holding religious festivals throughout the country, using them on specific days of the year.

Among the most important figures of the traditionalist approach over recent decades have been Jawad Tabrizi (1926–2006), Seyed Taqi Tabatabaei Qomi (1923–2016), Seyed Muhammad Shirazi (1928–2001), Mohammad Reza Golpaygani (1899–1993), Seyed Shahab al-Din Marashi Najafi (1897–1990), Seyed Muhammad Shahroudi (1925–2019), and Seyed Muhammad Rouhani (1920–1997). Currently, Seyed Sadegh Rouhani (b. 1926), Seyed Sadegh Shirazi (b. 1942), Hossein Vahid Khorasani (1921), and Lotfollah Safi Golpaygani (b. 1919) are considered the most important figures of this school of thought. They have been successful in maintaining several rituals and holy days on the Iranian calendar, especially joining the Arbaeen pilgrimage in Iraq.

In terms of institutions, the traditionalist approach has established some groups, as well as institutions. Some of these, like the Hojjatieh Society, mainly attempt to defend Islam against other faiths, especially the Bahá'í faith, using modern media and strategies (Fischer, 1990; Sadri, 2004). Others, such as traditional seminaries, research foundations, and Hosayniyas, have also been established for serving similar goals (Calmard, 2004). After the emergence of the Internet, they have been active on it and have established several Internet and satellite television channels such as Imam Hussein TV, Salam TV, Hadi TV, and Samen TV.

Some traditionalist thinkers have tried to propose suggestions for solving the social and cultural problems based on the essential sources of Islam: the Quran and Hadith. One good example is Muhammad Reza Hakimi (b. 1935), a clergyman from the seminary of Mashhad who has proposed the theory of Maktab Tafkik [Theory of Segregation], which calls for purifying the Islamic sciences of philosophy and mysticism and paying more attention to the Hadith (Hakimi, 1996; Ali Akbarzadeh, 2012). He has published a voluminous collections of Hadith using a new style in order to establish Islamic thinking based on its traditional sources. Hakimi has also insisted widely on social justice and believes the traditional sources prove the vital importance of social justice. Therefore, he has been called the most crucial figure of the justice-oriented scripturalist Islamism in contemporary Iran (Mohammadi, 2015).

Beyond the scripturalist approach among traditional Shiites are found some traditional religious scholars with mystical tendencies. Although this approach never became an independent thought, it has had an enormous influence on the minds of Iranians in recent decades. Popular and best-selling books by and about figures such as Hassan Ali Nokhodaki Isfahani (1863–1942), Mohammad-Taqi Bahjat Foumani (1916–2009), Muhammad Hossein Hosseini Tehrani

(1926–1995), Hassan Hassanzadeh Amoli (b. 1928), and Seyed Hasan Abtahi (1935–2016), and the circles of apprentices that formed around them in the big cities of Iran, are some signs of how this mystical approach has flourished within traditionalist Shiism in current Iran, especially during the past decade.

Shiite modernists

If one had to discern the most unprecedented and flourishing Shiite thought in recent decades in Iran, it would be the modernist trend among the Shiite religious scholars. Most of the critical modernist religious thinkers of current Iran have a kind of fundamentalist background, especially in terms of their past political approach. Therefore, the modernists should be considered as a branch of the Shiite fundamentalist thinking. Current Shiite modernists have been among the most passionate revolutionary clergymen, and academicians and were gradually removed from their influential administrative positions in the Islamic Republic. During the presidency of Seyed Muhammad Khatami (b. 1943), they had an excellent chance to regain power and put the fundamentals to the side of the political arena and the state-run propaganda, but they were vehemently defeated, expelled from their government jobs, and were even forced to migrate from Iran. The most controversial figure among them is Abdulkarim Soroush (b. 1945). Others generally are clergymen with formal academic education, such as Mostafa Malekian (b. 1963), Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari (b. 1963), Mohsen Kadivar (b. 1959), and Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari (b. 1950). Most of them enjoyed high political and administrative positions in the first decade of the Islamic republic and have a strong fundamentalist record. After being removed from the formal administration of the state, they later propagated their ideas through non-governmental media, particularly *Kiyan* magazine, and became famous as the Circle of Kiyan in the 2000s. In Iran, instead of being called modernists, they are generally called religious intellectuals. In the past decade and after the migration of the most prominent modernists to the West, the role of Mostafa Malekiyan became increasingly critical. A former clergyman and prominent student of Mesbah Yazdi, currently the most significant fundamentalist clergyman, Malekiyan criticizes his fundamental background, as well as himself as a religious intellectual, and now focuses on spirituality, rationality, and apolitical self-improvement. Although he rarely tries to modernize the Islamic tenets or rationalize them, he calls Iranians to follow a modern and rational life apart from the religious traditions (Malekiyan, 2013; Sadeghi-Boroujerdi, 2014b, p. 279). Religious intellectuals in Iran now live in a transitory period. While most of their key figures have migrated from Iran (like Soroush, Kadivar, and Yousefi Eshkevari), or have grown past being a religious intellectual to arrive at spiritual intellectualism (like Malekiyan), they do not prefer to be called Islamists or even religious, and no longer try to prove their ideas in terms of Islamic theology.

Sunni fundamentalists, traditionalists, and modernists

The Sunni community of Iran consists of approximately 15% of the nation's population, but due to the rural nature of this community, Sunnis are not significantly active in developing the social, cultural, and intellectual thought of the country. Iranian Sunnis are historically dispersed across the country and reside mainly in the western and wouthеastern parts of Iran. They consist of different ethnic groups, mainly Kurds, Turkmen, and Baluchs. In other words, ethnicity is an essential factor in the intellectual journey of Iranian Sunnis. Although insufficient studies exist about contemporary Sunni thought in Iran, it is divided into the fundamental-traditionalist thought that is found in the fundamentalist and traditionalist Baluch thinkers and the traditionalist-modernist thought of the Kurd thinkers.

Most of the Baluch and Turkmen religious thinkers are more inclined to the Salafi/Wahhabi movement or have significant intellectual contact with them. A large part of them admires Islamic missionary movements, such as the Tablighi Jamaat of South Asia. They are generally clergymen and community leaders who had been in the Sunni seminaries of Iran, Pakistan, and India, and are inclined toward Salafism and Wahhabism. Due to the cultural background of their audience, they are usually orators with occasionally a few publications. In other words, they prefer to convey their religious teaching in their sermons at the Friday prayers or other religious events. Among these community leaders can be mentioned Abdolhamid Ismaeelzahi (b. 1947), who is generally considered the spiritual leader of Iran's Sunni population and is based in Iran's Baluchistan region, and Muhammad Hussein Gorgij (b. 1942), based among the Turkmen Sunnis of Northeast Iran; both are graduates of the seminaries of Pakistan.

The case of the Kurdish Sunnis in the eastern provinces of Kurdistan, Kermanshah, and Eastern Azerbaijan is entirely different. Sunnism there is well intermixed with Sufi traditions and other Kurdish minorities who follow Yarsanism. Ahmad Moftizadeh (1933–1993) was probably an essential Kurdish Sunni thinker of recent decades in Iran. Moftizadeh, as a religious thinker and a Kurdish political leader, was an important voice against the Pahlavi state and the post-Revolution regime, and passed long years in prison during both rules. Drawing on the ideas of Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), Syed Abul A'la Maududi (1903–1979), and Ali Shariati (1933–1977), Moftizadeh provided a large body of works on Islamic theology at the personal and communal levels. He founded an intellectual movement among the Iranian Kurdish Sunnis called Maktabi Kuran [School of Quran]. Under the influence of or in close relationship with Moftizadeh, Muhammad Rabiyi (1932–1996), Farugh Farsad (1961–1995), and Hasan Amini (b. 1946) contributed to the Sunni moderate thought in the Iranian Kurdish population. Another important figure, Nasir Subhani (1951–1990), is known for his Quranic interpretations. Establishing a Quran academy in his hometown among the Iranian Kurdish provinces, he was one of the leaders of what is said to be the Iranian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood (i.e., The Iranian Call and Reform Organization). Politically, this group defends a kind of conservative democracy (Rasoulpour, 2013). Now the organization is led by Abdulrahman Pirani (b. 1954), and *Andisheyi Islah* [*Reformation Thought*] is their magazine, which discusses issues such as spirituality, democracy, and women.

Sufism in Iran

Currently, some Sufi sects and groups are found in Iran that are divided into Shiite and Sunni orders. Among the Shiite Sufi orders, Nimatollahi, Zahabi, and Khaksari are the most critical orders, with Nimatollahis being the most significant order among them (Lewisohn, 1998). The Naqshbandi Order is probably the most active Sunni order and is mostly found in the Kurdish regions of Iran. Although Iranian Sufis enjoy a long history and have contributed significantly to Persian literature, thought, and politics, their intellectual influence has diminished enormously over the past decades. During the last few decades, some Shiite Sufis were forced into exile, and their practices have been repressed by the Islamic Republic (van den Bos, 2002a, 2015). As a member of the well-known Sufi family who contributed mainly to the Nimatollahi Order (van den Bos, 2002b), Reza Ali Shah II was considered a *quṭb* [special representative of the Occluded Imam] by his followers (Scharbrodt, 2010). As the author of some 20 books and treatises, he has provided vast literature on mysticism, Sufism, Islamic theology, and history. Sufi scholars have continued to re-configure their thought as a series of techniques for navigating the realm of everyday life, and in post-Revolution Iran, they have positioned themselves as a group on neither side of the orthodoxy–secular divide (Golestaneh, 2014). In the decades following

the demise of Reza Ali Shah II (1914–1992), who had been the master of the Nimatollahi Sufis from the Gonabadi wing, the personal charisma and mystical knowledge of the Sufi masters diminished drastically.

Non-Islamic social, cultural and religious thought

Non-Islamic religious, cultural, and social thought in current Iran is mainly understood as secular thought. Although reports have been found about the increase in the popularity of the New Age movement, missionary evangelist groups, and the Bahá'í faith in Iran in recent decades, they have remained at the margins of the Iranian mainstream religious, cultural, and social thought. In other words, they have tried their best to consolidate their community and convert others. Although news exists of their spread in different urban areas, they may not be considered as seminal movements that will influence the intellectual circles or the masses of Iran.

Among the social, cultural, and religious movements and sects mentioned previously, the new mysticism movement entails some intellectual implications. Mohammad Ali Taheri (b. 1956) and Muhammad Ali Akbari (b. 1962) are among the most important figures of the new mysticism in Iran who have written and delivered several lectures on different topics related to mysticism. What may be called new mysticism or urban mysticism here includes a wide range of methods and strategies that cover psychological techniques and self-help manuals based on religious-scientific theories and the renewal of witchcraft. It flourished in the 2000s, but its influence has mainly decreased over recent years (Mohammadi Doostdar, 2012; Doostdar, 2013, 2018).

Non-religious social and cultural thought

As discussed before and due to the critical role religion has in Iran, I have approached the current social, cultural, religious, and political thought in Iran through their primary religious affiliations. In studying non-religious social and cultural thought as the second part of social, cultural, and political thought in this chapter, non-religious denotes a kind of thinking that is not preliminarily based on theological tenets. Of course, this does not mean that it is necessarily secular or anti-religious, but, as will be seen in many cases, non-religious thought uses religious language to develop its arguments. Among the most important theories in this category are traditional spiritualism, Iran Shahri theory, the ideas provided by Ahmad Fardid and his students, and the feminist movements of Iran.

One of the ideas that have been continuously influential in recent years is the current Iranian spiritualism with its anti-Western attitudes and emphasis on local values, which are a mixture of Iranian and Islamic ones. They are parts of a more significant intellectual trend that Farhad Khosrokhavar (2001, p. 5) calls "neo-conservative intellectualism in Iran." Although it is deeply rooted in the Islamic tradition and Sufism, it has been introduced and practiced far beyond the particular religious meaning understood in its theological terms. The most important figures of this thought in Iran are Seyed Hossein Nasr (b. 1933), Daryush Shayegan (1935–2018), and Seyed Ahmad Fardid (1910–1994).

Nasr, as a university professor and a polymath (Leigh, 1998), has written on vast issues and has tried to reconstruct the Sufi teachings into global, non-sectarian ideas that are compatible with modern life. He also defends sacred science, trans-religions spirituality, and humanity (Nasr, 1987, 1990, 2000, 2009, 2013) and is considered a pioneer of Islamic environmentalism (Quadir, 2013). He lost his positions after the Revolution, and therefore his administrative role faded in the course of later Iranian thought. Dariush Shayegan (1938–2018) had different stages

of thought and, after facing the failures of his ideals through the 1979 Revolution, reformed his views on the originality and importance of the East. Before the Revolution, in 1977, he had founded and headed the Iranian Center for the Studies of Civilizations, but was expelled from the center after the Revolution. Before the Revolution, he had contributed to developing the notion of *Gharbzadegi* [Westoxification, or Occidentosis], which had been articulated by Fardid and Alahmad (Al-Ahmad, 1982), and had defended Asia against the West (Shayegan, 1977; Boroujerdi, 1996). In this way, he was a member of a broader intellectual movement that called for the realization of local values (i.e., Eastern ones; Boroujerdi, 1992). Although Shayegan was radical in his critique of the West (i.e., glorifying Asia and denouncing Westernized intellectuals) before the Revolution, he started to criticize all kinds of ideology in the last decade of his life. This shift was due to his frustration from the ideals he had had for the 1979 Revolution, ideals that he had shared with many non-Islamist thinkers who considered the Revolution as a base to establish a new nation and society, simultaneously democratic and local in terms of its values (Shayegan, 1991).

Seyed Ahmad Fardid (1910–1994) was a controversial thinker both before and after the 1979 Revolution. As an oral philosopher who passed through many different intellectual stages, he had been described as a non-religious and apolitical professor at the University of Tehran before the 1979 Revolution in Iran; however, he later became a staunch defender of the Revolution and frequently praised Khomeini. He became one of the most prominent and influential thinkers of a large body of revolutionary thinkers who would head some pro-state cultural institutions. A graduate of philosophy from Sorbonne University (France) and the University of Heidelberg (Germany), he was heavily influenced by Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), the German philosopher and thinker. For Fardid, Heidegger was the only philosopher whose insights were congruent with the principles of the Islamic Republic (Rajaee, 2010, p. 83). Decades before the Revolution, he had coined the term *Gharbzadegi*, which became a popular idea among the intellectuals and the dominant intellectual discourse of pre- and post-Revolution Iran (Boroujerdi, 1992) and the core ideology in the aftermath of the Islamic State of Iran (Rajaee, 2010, p. 83). In the 1980s, he appeared on Iranian national television and delivered lectures criticizing the idea of *Gharbzadegi*.

Fardid deliberately blended philosophical implications with certain Islamic tenets, openly criticized modern thought, and called for an emancipating third way without explaining precisely how it might occur. He asserted that his wish was to be free from the "modern cave," which for him was filled with self-founded nihilism, enchantment by earthly gods, and historicism (Rajaee, 2010, p. 182). Understanding democracy as "the asceticism of taking refuge in Satan," he believed democracy to not be found in the Quran but to belong to Greece and embody idolatry (Fardid, 2008, p. 77). Fardid's style of questioning the West and speaking in a symbolic manner, as well as his energetic discussions on the utopian future of the Islamic Republic of Iran, tremendously influenced a large group of revolutionary university students, who in him found an idealistic version of activism without barriers. Many of his apprentices became prominent politicians, academicians, and policymakers. Among many other influential figures in the management of culture and politics in Iran, some believe Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the conservative president of the Islamic Republic from 2005–2013, to have been under the influence of Fardid (Mayville, 2013, p. 311).

Another essential theory that falls under the non-religious category is the theory of Iran Shahry (Iran being named by the Sasanian Empire [224–651 AD]), which has been promoted by Seyed Javad Tabatabai (b. 1945), an Iranian philosopher and political scientist living in France. Graduate of Pantheon-Sorbonne University and influenced heavily by Hegel (1770–1831), he was a faculty member and vice dean of the Faculty of Law and Political Science at the

University of Tehran. He has long pondered the conditions that had made modernity possible in Europe and the reasons for its failure in Iran (Boroujerdi & Shomali, 2015). His Iran Shahri theory rejects Islam as an effecting ideology and asserts that Islamism is doomed to failure (Tabatabai, 2001, 2010). The two elements of the Iran Shahri theory are the ideal ruler and the unity of state and religion in Iran (Tabatabai, 1996, 2001, 2008, 2013). He defends a nation-state system in Iran based on the supremacy of the Persian language and the diminishing role of ethnic minorities in Iran. Therefore, Ali Mirsepassi, a scholar of the history of intellectualism in Iran, believes that Tabatabai's ideas about modernity have similarities with the nation-building policies of the Pahlavi Era, which had undermined the role of local cultures and entities in favor of a robust centralist government (Mirsepassi, 2010, pp. 90–92). This theory has been heavily criticized by Iranian social sciences scholars, especially anthropologists. Nasser Fakouhi, the father of modern anthropology in Iran, has consistently retained the view that the Iran Shahri theory is a clean version of fascistic ideologies and is dangerous for Iran because approximately half its citizens' native languages is not Persian (Fakouhi, 2018).

Another cluster of ideas in the past decades has been leftist ones. Left-wing thought has never had a chance to be the sole determinant way of thinking in Iran, but had been influenced here and there from the communist thought to the socialist interpretations of Islam and the public anti-Western discourses in Iran. After the Revolution, leftist thought continued in two ways. First, as embodied in Marxist thought, it continued under names such as the Tudeh Party of Iran, Organization of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, Union of Iranian Communists [Sarbedaran], Communist Party of Iran, Union of Communist Militants, Organization of Iranian People's Fedai Guerrillas, and Organization of Iranian People's Fedaian [Majority]. Beyond the Marxist-Leninist tradition, the Islamist-Socialist organizations were mostly influenced by Ali Shariati (1933–1977), who tried to combine Islam and socialism, and provided a socialist version of Islamic historical figures (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 465). The most important and organized group to use such an approach was the People's Mujahedin of Iran, which was a blend of Islam and socialism (Abrahamian, 1989, pp. 1–2).

All of these organizations lost their prominent thinkers after the crackdown of the 1980s and almost vanished from Iran's intellectual arena after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Afterward, other political organizations continued to live in Iran such as the Iran Party, the Liberation Movement of the People of Iran (JAMA), the Movement of Militant Muslims, and the newer Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution of Iran Organization, who generally approached socialism and social justice under the umbrella of Islamic theology (Chehabi, 1990, p. 272).

I can conclude this section by sharing some ideas related to the situation and rights of women in Iran. Although all schools of thought in current Iran have a counterpart outside of the country in the international arena, Iranian feminism is much more similar to and as influential as its international equivalents (i.e., international feminism). The main ideas of this school of thought come from the seminal feminist works that were translated into Persian in the 1980s and 2000s. Iranian feminists after the Revolution had tried to use the theological tenets and fatwas [legal Islamic opinions] of the reformist jurisprudents to customize them to Iranian society.

Among the Iranian feminist thinkers, Noushin Ahmadi Khorasani and Parvin Ardalan have lengthy intellectual and activist backgrounds. They established the Women's Cultural Centre in Tehran in the 1990s. *Zanan* [*Women*] magazine has also had an essential role in promoting feminist thinking in the Iranian intellectual class. This magazine tried to blend international feminist theories with those promoted by certain religious thinkers who believed the contemporary situation of women in Iran to be incompatible with Islam and that the situation should be practiced as it is in the modern world. The latter may be called indigenous feminists who defend dynamic interpretations of Islamic Sharia (Povey, 2001, pp. 44–72). Although the thinking on women's

rights in Iran carries a lengthy intellectual background, in which even some Muslim scholars and jurisprudents have participated (Sanasarian, 1982), it is still generally considered secular thinking in Iran. Although this thought has confronted many limitations from the judicial system of the Islamic Republic, it has been successful in establishing some campaigns and institutions, and has even penetrated its ideas into the judicial administration, directly and indirectly.

Forms of political thought in Iran

Current Iranian political thought, having been shaped inside Iran, is divided mainly into principlism and reformism, also called the right faction and left faction in Iran. Although thinkers within the country are found who call for an efficient administrative state beyond right and left, they are far less influential in the reality of Iranian political thought.

Political principlism

Islamic principlism, or fundamentalism, is the common name given to the large ideological groups in the political arena of Iran and refers to the most powerful faction. This political arrangement has been the dominant political and economic power of the country for 40 years. Here Islamic principlism is used in its political meaning to refer to those who believe in the theory of *vilayat mutlaghiyi faghih* [the absolute guardianship of the Islamic jurist] in its most comprehensive meaning – one step further than the *vilayat faghih* [guardianship of the Islamic jurist], according to the 1989 Iranian Constitutional Referendum. Iranian political fundamentalists prefer to call themselves Usulgara [Principlists] and pretend to act politically based on Islamic and revolutionary principles. Like other Muslim fundamentalists with regard to political issues, Iranian political fundamentalists believe that fulfilling religious obligations is binding for the public, and laws should sanction and encourage pious behavior. Therefore, they believe in keeping control of the state power forever (Sadowski, 2006). At the time of Khomeini, political fundamentalism had been generally shaped around the concept of the *vilayat faghih*, as was present in his personality. In the most recent decade, the dominant political thought of those who are attached to the state is the idea of the *vilayat faghih*. After Khomeini's demise in 1989 and the succession of Khamenei to power, coupled with the Iranian Constitutional Referendum the same year, the understanding of *vilayat faghih* became stricter theoretically. This understanding led to the practical fundamentalist aftermath of challenging the 2009 Iranian presidential election. Afterward, some principlists who could be called neo-fundamentalists started emphasizing God more and more as the primary source of legitimation of the supreme leader and raised their voices for the decreased role of the people.

Political reformism

Political reformist thought in post-revolutionary Iran has been developed by at least two groups of thinkers: the Circle of Kiyan, who were mentioned before as religious intellectuals, and the staff at the Center for Strategic Research, which was a platform for certain experts within the structure of the Islamic Republic for gathering and suggesting social, cultural, and political policies.

Abdolkraim Soroush (b. 1945), Akbar Ganji (b. 1959), Emad al-Din Baghi (b. 1962), Arash Naraghi (b. 1966), Mohsen Armin (b. 1945), Majid Mohammadi (b. 1960), and Mohsen Sazgara (b. 1955) can be mentioned from the Circle of Kiyan. Most of them became administrators in the reformist government under Khatami's presidency. In political thought, most of

them were influenced by Abdulkarim Soroush and other religious intellectuals. Soroush and other previously mentioned names had been heavily influenced by Karl Popper (1902–1994) and his book *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (1957), which was first translated into Persian in 1984. The Circle of Kiyan provided the human resources needed for the flourishing media and political activism during the presidency of Seyed Muhammad Khatami from 1997–2005. In this period, they were active journalists and intellectuals who found a more significant place and presence in the Iranian public sphere. They recognized reforms in Islamic thought, democracy, civil society, and religious pluralism, and opposed the absolute supremacy of the Supreme Leader (Jahanbegloo, 2007, p. 85).

In addition to the the Circle of Kiyan, the staff at the Center for Strategic Research considered development and democracy as the only solutions for the continuation of the Revolution. They were gathered at the Center for Strategic Research, a leading Iranian think tank on strategy issues that had belonged to the presidency while Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani had been president (1989–1997). Saeed Hajjarian (b. 1954), Mostafa Tajzadeh (b. 1956), Abbas Abdi (b. 1956), Behzad Nabavi (b. 1942), and Mohsen Armin (b. 1954) were among the most important figures who articulated democracy and liberalism in the second decade after the Iranian Revolution. Hossein Bashiriyeh (b. 1953), a professor at the University of Tehran and supervisor for the doctoral dissertations of some of the figures mentioned previously, is the one who provided the theoretical sources on liberalism and democracy by translating certain books on democracy, liberalism, and related topics into Persian. While the members of both the Circle and the Center had been passionate youths in the first years of the Revolution and prominent advocates of the *vilayat faghih*, they gradually witnessed the death of the Utopia (Sadeghi-Boroujerdi, 2014a, 2019) and felt bitterness about their revolutionary past (Mirepassi, 2009, p. 176). They gradually became influenced by international democratic trends and ideas such as development and human rights.

Political reformism is generally used to refer to a range of political thoughts that have called for democratic reforms within the contemporary structure of the Islamic Republic. The reformist political thinkers and activists met many different fates. Both socially and in terms of political position, they flourished under the presidency of Seyed Muhammad Khatami from 1997–2005, then were fired during the presidency of Mahmud Ahmadinejad from 2005–2013. Political reformism is generally believed to have been unable to realize its goals and to have been unsuccessful in promoting democracy and liberalism within the current constitution of Iran; however, it still exists as a political project in the country. The central dilemma of political reformism is whether to remain in the framework of political movements within the lawful political arrangements of Iran and stay inactive and out of power, or join a campaign against the entity of the Revolution and try to overthrow it.

Conclusion

As this chapter has shown, social, cultural, religious, and political thoughts and movements in current Iran have been intertwined since the Revolution of 1979 until the present. These thoughts and movements had generally begun decades before the Revolution, but this should be considered as a landmark in their development and continuation. What happened in Iran in the aftermath of the Revolution was most notably the eight-year war between Iran and Iraq, and the emergence of the new and powerful urban elite in the country, which led to new thoughts and ideas and subsequently caused several movements and other thoughts. The circular movement of these ideas continues in Iran, and seems to be shaping future thoughts and ideas.

Iranian thinkers have mainly been influenced by European and Islamic philosophers. Even the fundamentalist Shiite scholars are known for their expertise in philosophy and mysticism.

Iranian intellectuals are influenced the most by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), and Karl Popper (1902–1994), and these Iranian intellectuals have applied their understanding of the philosophy of these philosophers to Iranian history, culture, and society (Boroujerdi, 1994).

In recent decades, the dominance and influence of giant theories and big thinkers have decreased. These thinkers are becoming less profound than the previous generation of thinkers and generally are unable to reconstruct their thought according to the very current situation of Iranian society. On the other hand, the new generation, millions of whom are educated, will not be persuaded by ideological assertions in the name of theories. Put in a nutshell, the flourishing era of the big thinkers in Iranian society appears to have passed. Aside from this, due to recent developments in Iranian academia, closer interconnectedness between Iranian and international academic institutions, and the use of international works in their language without being restricted to a small group of translated books that had been selected by a handful of intellectuals, many of the big thinkers' ideas have been challenged by national and international academic research. This has led to a kind of fragmentation among the intellectual milieu and democratization of thought in Iran. When considered in line with international trends toward distributing authority, the intelligentsia will apparently be substituted with so-called experts in Iran. Unlike the many Western thinkers who have been prominent university figures, the fact is significant that Iranian intelligentsia have generally not been and still are generally not prominent academic scholars and experts.

On the contrary, although Iranian academia has been criticized mostly due to its dysfunctions and problems, academic researchers have also shown many mistakes and over-generalizations, and the tendency exists among big thinkers to get attached to their goals rather than the indisputable facts, regardless of whether they are fundamentalist, traditionalist, or modernist. Many academic research institutions exist that have numerous publications challenging the assumptions the big thinkers had supported. Nowadays, many *-isms* have lost their influence over so-called studies on the same subject (compare feminist works to the current academic works on sociology and anthropology of gender in Iran). In other words, each area of thought where big thinkers had provided robust, extensive, and notable theories also have so-called studies that dispute those theories by referencing professional knowledge. This new class of academic scholars, whom Rahim Jahanbegloo calls "dialogical intellectuals" in contrast to the revolutionary and ideological intellectuals (whether leftist, secular, or Islamic) of the 1970s and early 1980s (Jahanbegloo, 2007, p. 88) have widely challenged the "intellectual assertions [of the] big thinkers" on the ground that their ideas had not been based on standard scientific research. In this sense, the international standards that have gradually penetrated society now require thinkers to provide solutions in addition to critiques. In this process, the earlier pattern of translating just a select number of Western books into Persian that conformed to a portion of the thought in Iran has been substituted with many studies using a variety of approaches.

With the failure of Seyed Muhammad Khatami's presidency to advance its reformist plans, the disorder and inefficiency of Mahmud Ahmadinejad's government, and the inefficient moderate government of Hasan Rouhani from 2013 until the present; as well as the crises of the secularist political thinking in Iran, which ranges from a liberal democracy to renewal of the Pahlavi Kingdom; and being under the auspices of international sanctions that have hugely influenced Iranian economy and culture, the future of political thought in Iran has remained blurry, challenging, and mobile in recent years.

The vast expansion in the rates that the Internet, satellite channels, and social media have penetrated into Iran in the last decade has been an essential element in challenging the social and

political arrangement of Iran. This has not only contributed to the democratization of the intellectual use of information, but has also helped give voice to those deprived of standard power. These new technologies happened simultaneously with a post-war generation in Iran. Those who attend universities now had been born after the end of the eight-year war with Iraq, which had enormous effects on Iranian societies. The big thinkers of before and after the Revolution are in their 70s and 80s, and gradually dying. Therefore, a new generation with new ideas in a new technological framework in a world with new order is appearing in Iran and will impose itself upon all these traditions of thought and shape the very future of the country on the shoulder of each theory and movement mentioned in this chapter.

Acknowledgment

I would like to thank Dr. Jabbar Rahmani, Mohammad reza Managhebi, and Mohammad reza Moini for their kind suggestions for improving the structure of this chapter.

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32

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ISLAM AND ITS MANIFESTATION IN PAKISTAN

Past, present, and future

Ahsan Shafiq

Background

Political economy has been an established discipline for quite some time now; nonetheless, the addition of the dimension of religiosity to this discipline is rather new (Haqqi, 2015). It came into existence quite recently – more precisely, toward the end of the 20th century. An understandable dissension exists over how to define the Islamic political economy, owing to the very nature of the discipline, yet what is common among all these definitions is the presence of interactions between the economy and the state, the state also being an indispensable part of the political economy itself (Choudhury, 1997a, 1997b; Ghosh, 1997; Khan, 1994). The difference, however, lies in their epistemological underpinnings, as the Islamic political economy is based on Qur'anic epistemology, unlike conventional political economy that has its roots in Western-ethno-centric epistemology (Salleh & Rosdi, 2014). In no part of the world, whether at the micro or macro level, is establishing an Islamic economic system possible unless a socio-political environment exist that facilitates its functionality. For this reason, the success and failure of Islamic financial enterprises is intertwined with the political support for them.

The countries that once comprised the Indian subcontinent[1] have for some centuries been dominated by geographies where religion plays a major role in politics and the social fabric is cloaked with religious doctrines. Islamic polity was at the heart of the struggle for a separate Muslim homeland (Pakistan) that used the overarching ideology of the two-nation theory as justification for its demand. Naturally, people who had struggled, endured hardships, and migrated began to believe that Pakistan's establishment would result in the revival of the ideal Islamic state. After all, thousands of people had been massacred in the communal riots, and Pakistan was solely won in the name of Muslim nationalism. Hence, to the victims, the future Pakistan was going to be a special state established on the foundations of Islam, a feeling rife not only in the masses but present among the close associates of Jinnah,[2] as well (Ahmed, 2004). For this reason, their determination for an Islamic economic system also kept oscillating with the change of regimes between right and left. In times when the regimes wanted support from the ideological right or the opposition from them became fierce, governments extended

support for Islamic finance, and the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) also promoted its establishment and operation. Conversely, in times when the corridors of power were unsympathetic to the Islamic cause, the support for Islamic finance faded and the resolution governments had toward establishing an Islamic economy evaporated into thin air. In Zia's era, when one could hardly quibble about Pakistan's Islamic foundation, the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) was directed to formulate a blueprint for a *riba*-free [usury-free/interest-free] economy (Wilson, 2008). This was followed by the historic judgment by the Federal Shariat Court (FSC) calling for the abolishment of interest from Pakistan's economy. Later, in Musharraf's era in 2002, the bench of the Supreme Court was maneuvered into overruling the practical impacts of earlier judgments against *riba* owing to the government having abandoned the Islamization policy it had initiated earlier alongside its patronage for interest-based banking (Khan & Bhatti, 2008a, p. 159). Hence, overall, the developmental peaks in Islamic economics, banking, and finance in the country coincide with sympathetic regimes and supportive legislation, while the troughs are marred with the reluctance of governments plagued by hand-picked tribunals and politically maneuvered judgments.

Legislative reforms for an Islamic economic system

Islam does not allow distinguishing between temporal and spiritual, between civil and ecclesiastic, or between religious and secular, nor does it envisage the concept of duality of authority, a base principle of Western political thought (Bowering, 2015). This was the precise message profoundly found in the literature and thoughts of all trailblazers of Islamic polity, especially Iqbal and Mawdudi in the context of the Indian subcontinent. The realms of state and religion are intimately intertwined in Islam; hence, no field of individual or social life is exempted from the boundaries ordained by Allah (*swt*).[3] Islam is not merely a way of worship; it also is a way of life, and as such is not static but dynamic. Hence, Islam encapsulates the requisite principles and teachings for managing individuals' and societies' economic affairs.

The Muslim League, which was desperate to whip up support for its two-nation theory, borrowed certain terminologies from Mawdudi's repertoire to attract support from the religious quarter. His contribution to the idea of a separate homeland was so profound that stalwarts like Iqbal[4] and Hasrat Muhani often cited and acknowledged him, and his writings were distributed by the League during its sessions. Continuing from where they had left off, the Jamaat-e-Islami [Islamic Community] (JI) begun to demand greater Islamization after the partition because Mawdudi believed Pakistan was built for no other purpose but to demonstrate the efficacy of the Islamic way of life. These sporadic outbursts later transformed into an organized campaign, and Mawdudi delivered several speeches which were broadcasted on Pakistan Radio in which he presented a coherent plan for Islamization that included the demand for Islamizing the economy.

Hence, all calls for Islamization in Pakistan logically subsumed implicit calls for Islamization of the economy, as well occasionally being loudly enunciated. Mawdudi, despite not being a professional economist, was cognizant of the role of the economic system in restructuring a state according to Islamic guidelines. On March 2, 1948, he delivered a speech from Radio Pakistan about the economic system of Islam[5] in which he laid out an architectural plan for establishing an Islamic economic system for Muslims in the newly built homeland of Pakistan. This demand naturally had endorsement from the state as Quaid-e-Azam himself on the occasion of inaugurating the country's central bank had adumbrated his desire for developing practices compatible with the Islamic ideals for economic and social life.

Following the death of Quaid-e-Azam in September 1948, the government started clamping down on JI. It was declared as a seditious party, its publications were closed, and its

leadership – including Abul A'la Mawdudi – were apprehended. Mawdudi continued his struggle from behind bars by contacting the ulama, including those with great leverage over the government. JI opposed the land reform bill presented by Liaquat Ali Khan on grounds that Islam protected the right of private ownership (Nasr, 2004). With help of an alliance with the ulama, Mawdudi was successful in voicing his demands to influence the content of the Objectives Resolution. The resolution was passed on March 7, 1949 and referred to Pakistan as a democracy in consonance with Islam. It stated that sovereignty belonged to Allah and democracy was to be practiced in Pakistan – but within the limits of Islam. The struggle of Mawdudi and JI, along with other like-minded parties, for eliminating interest/usury from the economy and generally Islamizing the newborn state continued without respite. Article 29(f) of Pakistan's first constitution passed in 1956 unequivocally made eliminating interest from the country as early as possible binding upon the government (Khan, 2015, p. 40).

The constitution was rather short-lived, and martial law was first imposed in the country's history in October 1958. President Iskander Mirza was deposed within three weeks by the concurrent Army Chief Ayub Khan, who then took upon himself the title of martial law administrator. Ayub removed the modifier of Islamic from the country's name but was reluctant to eliminate the clause mandating the government to abolish interest from the country's economic system, which was replicated in the 1962 Constitution, as well. The military ruler, implicated with rolling back Islamization and facing backlash from the Islamist opposition, thus had to immediately backpedal and the modifier of Islamic was added back to the country's name shortly afterwards (Khan, 2015, p. 41). However, the practical steps had left no stone unturned in making Pakistan's economy anything but Islamic. Industrialization, tax holidays, low interest rates, and low duty taxes aimed at economic growth widened and exacerbated the disparity between rich and poor. Meanwhile, the power of trade unions had been curbed using force; hence, the country experienced a growth that nevertheless only helped a particular income group and left the labor class as destitute as before (Falcon & Stern, 1971). Because the government had not openly confronted the calls for Islamism, the CII, first proposed in the 1956 Constitution, was initially established as the Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology on August 1, 1962. Among other things, the council was entrusted with the task of drafting a blueprint for an Islamic economic system. During the 1960s, it made numerous recommendations and called for eliminating *riba* due to its prohibition in *Shari'ah*.

The aftermath of the 1970 elections and the civil war that broke as its result led to the fall of East Pakistan.[6] The events that unfolded after the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 brought to power Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto,[7] who followed his predecessors and also tried to control the activities of the Islamic parties. However, he finally had to reconcile with them, given the gradual rise in Islam's popularity. Seeing this revival of Islamism in the polity, Bhutto also frequently mentioned Islam in his political speeches.[8] Playing upon the resentment against Ayub's economic policies, Bhutto promised to restore the principles of distributive justice and equity to the forefront of Pakistan's development strategy under the slogan of Islamic socialism (Hussain, 2009). The constitutional struggle of Jamaat and fellow opposition parties had succeeded, and Pakistan's 1973 Constitution was enacted on August 14, 1973, the first to be framed by elected representatives of Pakistan. The constitution created a parliamentary form of government, reinstating "Islamic" as part of the state's official name. Many old clauses regarding Islamizing the economic system were also retained in this constitution. Clause 38(f) of the 1973 Constitution reiterated the state's responsibility to eliminate *riba* as early as possible (Khan, 2015).

Bhutto, under his slogan of Islamic socialism, utilized religion to justify measures that were ostensibly taken to increase equity. Rhetoric flourishes related to Islamic principles of equity were used to substantiate the nationalization of industrial and banking assets from 1972–1974,

and similar injunctions were used to validate land reforms (Nasr, 2004). CII, having been established as an advisory body in 1962, had already made numerous recommendations by the late 1960s for eliminating *riba* entirely from Pakistan's banking system to bring it in line with Islamic teachings. CII's meeting on December 3, 1969 was pivotal in this regard, and concluded that Pakistan's banking system had been fundamentally based on *riba*. The CII (1980) in its subsequent meetings drafted a report recommending the abolition of *riba* and submitted it to Bhutto's government, which paid it hardly any heed (Kennedy, 2004).

Article 228 of the new constitution mandated the government to constitute the CII within 90 days and to entrust it with the task of making recommendations to constituent assemblies as to the ways and means of enabling and encouraging the Muslims of Pakistan to order their lives . . . in accordance with the principles and concepts of Islam. Hence, the Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology was re-designated as the CII in light of the new constitution. In 1976, the CII approached known Islamic scholars, Islamic laureates, economists, and researchers of the SBP, and economic organizations in other Muslim countries, in an effort to prepare its recommendations for abolishing interest from the system. The recommendations were presented before Bhutto's government, which apparently showed disregard for them and hence they were not presented to the Parliament for formal debate.

Still regarding Bhutto as a rabid secularist, JI started a movement in 1977 to overthrow Bhutto and his government and establish an Islamic system of government, which later inflated into the popular movement of Pakistan Nizam-e-Mustafa [Order of the Prophet] Movement, incorporating nine jointly opposed parties. This agitation paved the way for Bhutto's ouster, and the Pakistan army, led by General Zia-ul-Haq, staged a military coup on July 5, 1977.

Zia entrusted CII with the task of preparing a blueprint for making an interest-free economy (Hassan, 2007). Under directions from the then president, CII appointed a panel of economists and bankers to assist the council in the delicate task of drafting ways to eliminate interest from the financial institutions. Hence, the constitution had contained the essential elements for Islamizing the economy, yet all regimes until Zia-ul-Haq's had made miniscule efforts toward this cause (Ahmad, 2004).

Government patronage for Islamizing economy

All governments prior to Zia's had made intermittent moves toward Islamizing Pakistan's economy with gawkish reluctance. Zia's was the first era when concerted efforts to Islamize Pakistan's economy were made. Although explicit Islamic constitutional provisions were found in the 1973 Constitution, apparently not even its framers had any intention of implementing them (Khan, 2015, p. 43). While entrusting CII with the task of preparing a blueprint for an interest-free economy, the president directed the council to consider how best to eradicate the curse of *riba* (Kennedy, 2004). Eliminating interest hence became the council's primary objective. A panel of economists and bankers was appointed by CII in November 1977 in order to assist the council in finding ways to eliminate interest from the system. The council meticulously worked toward the task, submitting numerous reports as well as making a number of recommendations to bring the economic system in conformity with *Shari'ah* principles. The state, unlike its predecessors, also took several steps in light of these reports and recommendations. In 1979, interest was eliminated from the operations of two government-owned mutual funds, National Investment Trust (NIT) and Investment Corporation (ICP). Their investment funds avoided interest-bearing securities, and ICP's investor scheme was substituted with a new scheme based on profit and loss sharing (PLS; Hassan, 2007). After July 1979, the government's Housing Building Corporation (HBFC) also started operating interest-free. A new

interest-free investment certificate was introduced: the participation term certificate (PTC). To deduct the annual compulsory wealth tax on surplus wealth as obligatory in Islamic law, the Zakat Ordinance was implemented and deducted from Muslims' bank accounts at the annual rate of 2.5%. This was coupled with the Mudarabah Ordinance, which was promoted to introduce a two-tier fund structure for business transactions in compliance with *Shari'ah*. *Ushur*[9] was levied on the yield of agricultural land at a 10% annual rate, and several laws under the Banking Tribunals Ordinance of 1984 were amended. Under direction from the SBP, which had called for eliminating interest from the banking system, all public or private joint-stock companies were directed to do business only using interest-free modes. After July 1, 1985, all commercial banking in Pakistani Rupee was declared interest-free and deposits started being operated based on PLS (Hassan, 2007). Specialized financial institutions and commercial banks were given a transition period[10] for eliminating interest from their operations. In 1981, special counters were set up in 7,000 local branches to accept PLS-based deposits (Zaidi, 1988).

The changing geopolitical landscape and the events unfolding on the international stage increased Zia's significance. He was a front-line ally of the United States in thwarting the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. During this time, many *madrassas* [religious schools] were built, and many others received government patronage[11] as well as international funding, especially from the Middle East. The concatenation of events in this decade led to a major shift in Pakistan's foreign policy in the Afghanistan and Kashmir fronts, the impact of which continued for years after. The financial support was aimed at building an infrastructure to churn out mujahidin to fight in Afghanistan. Thanks to Zia's efforts, an influx of financial capital and support from Islamic parties became a concoction that fueled the Afghan jihad, resulting in the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan in 1988.

Zia died in a plane crash on August 17, 1988, but his 11-year rule had changed the course of history by re-embedding Islam in the foundations of Pakistan's polity and left deep impressions on his predecessors. The Islamic ethos had become so ingrained in the social fabric that even Nawaz Sharif[12] committed himself to a policy of Islamization when the 15th Amendment was introduced, requiring the state to apply Islamic law.

The role of the state bank and the rise of Islamic finance

The SBP also played a vital role in developing an infrastructure appropriate to an Islamic economy. To aid the CII in its work, the SBP prepared a comprehensive report in 1963 detailing issues related to *riba*. The CII gave its ruling in 1969, pressing the government to abolish modern interest from all banking and financial institutions on the basis that it falls under the definition of *riba*. Later, in 1978, the SBP conducted a comprehensive study enumerating the ingredients of an Islamic financial system (i.e., *Mudarabah*, *shirkah*, *shirakah/musharakah*, *salam*, *murabahah*, *zakat*, and *usher*). The study was conducted by SBP's Islamic Economics Division, which later served as the hub for drafting a comprehensive *Shari'ah*-compliant financial system. Six separate work groups[13] were also formed and assigned the task of hammering out the details for transforming the financial system. In February 1980, a panel of economists and bankers under SBP's patronage finally presented a report prescribing the time frame for eliminating interest and suggesting July 1982 as the tentative date for abolishing interest from the system. In June 1984, the SBP also approved 12 modes of finance[14] for applying Islamic banking operations. After April 1, 1985, finances for all entities, including individuals, started being extended toward the specified interest-free modes of finance. After July 1985, the commercial banking based on the Pakistani rupee was also made interest-free; hence, no bank would now be able to accept any interest-bearing deposits. Additionally, banks' existing deposits were also to be

treated based on PLS. The only exception to this were foreign currency deposits, which continued to operate as before (SBP, 2002).

In August 1985, the process of Islamizing financial institutions faced a major setback when banks were allowed to invest their PLS deposits in interest-bearing government securities. The absence of a proper constitutional mechanism that could continuously monitor Islamic banking operations' compliance with *Shari'ah* also led to a slackening of the Islamization process. Yet another setback was faced in 1991 when the FSC declared the procedures adopted by banks in Pakistan since July 1985 as non-Islamic (SBP, 2002).

Historic judgment on *riba*

The diligence of the top Pakistani courts also significantly contributed toward Islamizing the economy, though this failed to make any real dent in the system (Ahmad, 2004). Numerous Shariat petitions were filed with the FSC[15] to challenge the provision of laws sanctioning financial interest [*riba*]. The court had no option but to dismiss these petitions on the grounds that they fell outside the court's jurisdiction, which had purposefully been constrained this way. This exclusion of the FSC's jurisdiction in dealing with any fiscal law was to expire in three years but had thrice been intentionally extended to 10 years by President Zia-ul-Haq (Kennedy, 2004). This period ended after Zia's demise,[16] and hence, the FSC's newly appointed Chief Justice publicly enunciated through a decision the court's jurisdiction to take on Shariat petitions challenging fiscal legislation in 1991. The court thereafter was swamped with such petitions; 115 petitions were filed just between June and October 1991, challenging 20 separate laws on grounds that they supported *riba* practices. A historic decision was given by the three-member bench of the FSC, and the 20 laws dealing with *riba* were declared repugnant to Islam. The court's verdict also urged the government to adopt the measures necessary for eliminating interest by June 1992. The verdict also declared price mark-ups to be repugnant to Islam on grounds that it was tantamount to financial interest (FSC, 1992).

This decision, which later became known as the *Faisal* decision, put Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif – who at that time had been working to liberalize the country's economy – in hot water. Sharif, on the other hand, had repeatedly expressed his commitment to Islamization in the country, and hence was stuck between a rock and a hard place. Had he embraced the court's decision, he would have risked the ire of the country's business community, while opposing the decision would have antagonized his Islamist supporters. Sharif, who was depending upon the parliamentary support of Islamic parties, understandably encouraged the anxious bankers to contest the decision in the Supreme Court (Kennedy, 2004). An appeal[17] was lodged by the public sector Agricultural Development Bank against this verdict, which kept pending in the court for years. Neither the successive Sharif and Bhutto[18] governments, nor the chief justices of the Supreme Court, wanted to open the issue, fearing the wrath of the public. Hence, the appeal lay dormant for more than five years until December 1999,[19] when the Shariat Appellate Bench of Pakistan's Supreme Court dismissed all appeals filed against the *Faisal* decision. The court also ordered the government to re-enact the 13–20 laws that had been impugned in the earlier decision by bringing them into conformity with the requirements of Islam by June 30, 2000. In light of the court's decision,[20] the government had to form a Commission for Transformation to etch out a strategy for transforming the system from the concurrent financial system to one conforming to *Shari'ah*. The government, having lukewarmly followed up, asked for a two-year extension to June 30, 2002, by which point a government-owned bank, United Bank Limited (UBL), would have already moved a review petition in the Supreme Court for suspension of its earlier judgment on *riba* on the basis that bank interest did not fall under this category

(Khan, 2015). The government, also supported by UBL, moved again to the Supreme Court on June 6, 2002, contesting the earlier decision on grounds that the top court's prescribed parameters for enforcing an Islamic economy were unfeasible and could cause permanent damage to the economy (Kennedy, 2004). In response, the court reversed its earlier 1999 ruling and ordered the FSC to restudy the issue; this has been dangling in the court ever since, with its implementation still far off.

The last invigoration

To many, the Supreme Court's verdict on reviewing the petition against eliminating *riba* was clearly political, arbitrary, and in rather poor taste. Ever since then, private Islamic banks have emerged that operate on a limited scale in Pakistan's financial sector. The results following the October 2002 parliamentary elections in the country had reinvigorated the drive for establishing an Islamic economic system in the country. A coalition of six Islamic parties (the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal [MMA]) won 60 seats in the National Assembly and an overwhelming majority in one of Pakistan's four provinces. JI, the party that has been the vanguard of Islamization in the country, was one of leading parties in the coalition. MMA's 15-point election manifesto also carried the promise to make Pakistan a true Islamic welfare state and create an independent, just, and humane economic system whereby citizens will be provided opportunities for *halal* jobs, business, and investments (Misra, 2006). When asked about the vision he carried for the system of governance, JI's Chief Qazi Hussain Ahmed responded, "One that is run in accordance with the constitution, Objectives Resolution, and the recommendations of the Council for Islamic Ideology" (Waseem & Mufti, 2009, p. 44).

The Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP, currently Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) Assembly passed a *Shari'ah* bill on June 2, 2003 calling for the removal of interest from bank transactions. Additionally, an act drafted by the 21-member Nifaaz-e-Shari'ah Council that had been formed to guide the provincial government regarding Islamization was unanimously passed the same year, which among other things also called for an interest-free economic system (Waseem & Mufti, 2009). In 2003, Islamic banking also started under government patronage in the province. Approved by the SBP, the Bank of Khyber (BoK), an Islamic bank, initiated its operations in November 2003. The bank claimed its transactions were based on profit and loss, and hence would help in abolishing *riba* from the system.

Parallel with the increased attention in establishing an interest-free banking system in one province, the SBP took certain measures at the same time for developing Islamic finance in the country. The Islamic Banking Policy was introduced in 2001, and Meezan Bank emerged with the distinction of being the country's first full-fledged Islamic bank.[21] In light of this policy, three types of *Shari'ah*-based banks were allowed: full-fledged Islamic banks, Islamic subsidiaries, and Islamic branches of commercial banks.

Afterward, several other steps were taken for establishing and developing Pakistan's Islamic finance sector. Following Meezan Bank's creation, Pakistan's first Islamic Term Finance Certificate (TFC) was issued, and the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) allowed *Mudarabahs* to float *Musharakah*-based TFCs. The country's first open-ended Islamic mutual fund was also established, the Unit Trust of Pakistan (UTP) Islamic Fund. An Islamic Banking Department (IBD) and the Shari'ah Board were then established within the SBP. In 2005, Pakistan's first Takaful operator, Pak-Kuwait Takaful Company, started its operations. The SBP also issued draft guidelines on Islamic microfinance in 2007. Only a year later, the *ijarah*-based *Sukuk* [certificate of Islamic compliance, similar to the Western bond] was issued by the

government. By 2010, the Islamic banking sector had captured 6.7% of the market shares in the entire banking industry. In 2013, Pakistan's first *Shari'ah*-compliant index was finally introduced at the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE).[22]

Today, Islamic banking in Pakistan holds almost 12% of the overall banking system assets' market shares. Pakistan's Islamic capital market has remarkably registered double-digit growth. *Takaful* and *Mudarabah* companies have been set up, *Shari'ah*-compliant equities and mutual funds have been introduced, and *Sukuk* offers investments opportunities through capital markets. *Sukuk* has also been a crucial source of funding for various large-scale private and public projects. In parallel with the banks, the *Takaful* (*Shari'ah*-compliant insurance) sector is making strides, and *Mudarabah* companies are catching up to banks.

Out of the 35 banks operating in Pakistan, six are wholly Islamic and 17 others have Islamic branches. In recent years, the Islamic banking industry has witnessed a compound annual growth rate of over 30%, and total Islamic banking assets have swelled over $1.5 billion. Islamic banking has a strong branch network, with over 2,000 branches in Pakistan. The Islamic Finance Department (IFD) has been introduced by the SECP, and two *Shari'ah*-compliant indices have been launched. A huge surge has been witnessed in the net value of *Sukuk* goods in the last few years, and SBP has started *Shari'ah*-compliant open market operations to provide liquidity to Islamic banks. The *Takaful* sector has also marked colossal growth with the emergence of various non-banking financial institutions (Khan & Bhatti, 2008a).

Islamic economics in Pakistan: future directions

Pakistan has made many quantum leaps in developing its Islamic economics and finance industry. Considerable progress has been witnessed; however, this has been intermittent, with each phase being *extempore*, and hence so, have been its results. The calls for Islamizing Pakistan, as well as its economy, emerged soon after its birth. Strongly underpinned in the country's political leaps and bounds, some regimes showed interest – albeit scant – in introducing a *Shari'ah*-compliant economic system, while others were forced to take some lukewarm steps under immense pressure from the Islamic opposition, and even others found no reason to be influenced by the then-feeble opposition unless they themselves were in hot water. These, hence, impeded its implementation. The Islamic fabric of society had yet to implement the practical steps needed, which is why regimes frequently took sporadic and lackadaisical steps toward Islamizing the economy and introducing Islamic finance; however, some regimes resorted to mere Islamic shibboleth, only to titillate the Islamic opposition.

These efforts propelled into a voluminous Islamic finance sector in the country, yet its total contribution stands at a miniscule 13.5% (State Bank of Pakistan, 2018). A *Shari'ah*-compliant index has been introduced, yet only a few companies are listed on it. A huge surge has been witnessed in *Sukuk* goods and *Takaful* sectors, yet in total, they make up only a small part of the total. The economy's Islamization at the macro level has faced a similar fate. Numerous calls for Islamization, strong opposition by Islamists, and a few years of a pro-Islam regime have cumulatively resulted in important constitutional breakthroughs for eliminating *riba*, yet this Islamization was hardly realized in the practical arena; hence, most steps remain merely as laws, acts, and constitutional clauses on paper. Regimes have stunted and courts adjourned the legislative progress on eliminating *riba*; as a result, the case that opened decades ago still awaits its fate at the doors of the country's top court – with not much hope of reaching a decision anytime soon.

Many causes exist for this stunted progress. Islamization of the economy primarily emerged as a desperate remedy for capitulating to the demands from political Islamists and were thus

blemished with dualism and half-heartedness. The movement thus lost real significance and appeal in the eyes of the populace (Khan & Bhatti, 2008b). In addition to the lack of political support, the noncommittal attitude of bureaucrats also distanced the movement from its destination. Some fears also were found among economists and members of the business community about the future shape of Pakistan's economy were it reformed in compliance with *Shari'ah* principles. They worried any such steps to undercut progress would have devastating economic consequences for the country. Though these fears have been determined to be flawed and even absurd at times, they are still widely enunciated (Hathaway, 2004).

The overall environment in the financial sector is also not conducive to Islamic banking and finance (IBF) (Khan & Bhatti, 2008b). The SBP generally works under extreme political influence; hence, its integrity is doubtful. Bankers' lack of Islamic training and education make them unfit for any nationwide Islamic banking initiative. The bankers who come from a conventional background lack commitment and find it hard to allow a chance for IBF to become established in the country. A duality reflected in the general socio-economic governance also appears to be one of the causes. The population, the majority of which wants Islamization, is reluctant to do business with banks operating on the principles of PLS. Depositors are averse to risk, and the business community avoids any profit sharing from their business by not engaging with banks operating under PLS. Another cause often ignored is the magnanimous burden of interest-based loans, both domestic and foreign, which has impeded the transformation of the country's economy into an Islamic system. All major economic booms in Pakistan occurred at the same time as foreign aid, international borrowing, and International Monetary Fund (IMF) support. The government even mentioned in court during a proceeding against *riba* about the absence of a viable interest-free alternative to foreign debt, which has been the major impediment to reforming Pakistan's economy in accordance with Islamic principles. The reference that corruption is rampant in Pakistani society, the society to which the Supreme Court is obligated, means IBF cannot be truly implemented in Pakistan without eradicating the rampant presence of malpractice from its polity. The privatization drive to keep pace with internationalization has increased the competitiveness of local financial institutions. The fear thus existed that a massive outflux of capital and foreign investment would occur should the government move toward Islamizing the economy.

An overview of these aforementioned causes helps one to infer the impediments in the way of Islamizing the economy to be either societal or governmental; hence, bleak prospects abound for their removal, at least in the foreseeable future, owing to their very nature. With the majority of the populace being religiously oriented, the desire for an alternative system still exists and is loudly spoken through their political support for Islamists and interest in Islamic finance and banking. The potential still exists, but the resolve is missing. Had the government shown interest in implementing Islamization at the country's inception, not only would the Islamic finance industry have prospered manifold, the overall drive for Islamization of the economy would also have been realized by now. A decrease in foreign reliance in order to abolish interest would have provided support to the local industry, and self-reliance would have increased its productivity. The *zakat* collection that started in the 1980s could have helped the country achieve its target of poverty reduction. Furthermore, this would have helped establish social justice by bridging income disparities. Islamic finance, which was recognized as being more sustainable by coming out unharmed from the last credit crunch the whole world faced, could help achieve a more stable banking system at the country level, as well.

The Islamic political economy in Pakistan has grown in parallel with the development of intellectual thought in the country. Upon inaugurating the country's central bank right after

the creation of Pakistan as a homeland for Muslims, its founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah, also known as Quaid-e-Azam, expressed the blueprint of its economic system in the following words:

> The adoption of Western economic theory and practice will not help us in achieving our goal of creating a happy and contended people. We must work our destiny in our own way and present to the world an economic system based on true Islamic concept of equality of manhood and social justice. We will thereby be fulfilling our mission as Muslims and giving to humanity the message of peace which alone can save it and secure the welfare, happiness and prosperity of mankind.
>
> *(Bangash, 2018, p. 76)*

Only with Quaid's endorsement was Mawdudi able to deliver a speech from Radio Pakistan in 1948 about the economic system of Islam, in which he laid out an architectural plan for establishing an Islamic economic system in Pakistan (Mawdudi, 1958). Similarly, when Pakistan hosted the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation's (OIC) second Islamic Summit Conference in Lahore in 1974, the country's prime minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto addressed suggestions for establishing an Islamic solidarity fund, as well as a common currency for the Muslim world (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1974).

In the plethora of works produced in these years, despite authors attributing the ruptured position of the Pakistani economy to country's *riba*-based capitalist system, hardly any of them called for replacing it with a socialist system. However, some voices did who were eloquent in prose and poetry, such as Ahmed Faiz and Habib Jalib. Interestingly, despite their widespread audience, their melodic style in presenting socialist ideas never inculcated acceptability of a socialist economic system in the general public.

During the first few decades after its independence, the academic literature was rife with works detailing prohibition of *riba* and stressing the need for an Islamic economic system. In later years, debates about IBF also emerged in the literature. Pakistan was probably one of the first countries to provide opportunities for Islamic banking to flourish. The second oldest journal in the field of Islamic economics, the *Journal of Islamic Banking and Finance*, also started its publication from Karachi, Pakistan in 1984 (Shafiq, 2019).

The social fabric of the country also offered limited support to calls for any system apart from an Islamic economic system in Pakistan. For this reason, Ayub Khan was reluctant to eliminate the clause mandating the government to abolish interest from the country's economic system despite removing the modifier of Islamic from the country's name. Pakistan's biggest left-wing party, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), also had to depend on its slogan of Islamic socialism when explaining to the masses the economic system they were calling for. This Islamic disposition of the Pakistani society was the reason that neither the Sharif and Bhutto governments nor the chief justices of the Supreme Court wanted to open the appeal against *riba*, fearing the wrath of the public. As a result, it laid dormant for several years. The unique disposition of Pakistan's society and the religious polity cultivated in its roots have provided a golden opportunity to implement and demonstrate an economic system that is wholly and not merely partially Islamic. The journey so far has been tiring yet productive, even if the goals have only been partially achieved. Ubiquitously integrated into the entire system, Islamic financial institutions need strong support from the polity to survive and progress. Support from the government, as well the country's legislature, is key – and all too real and not superficial for the process of Islamizing the Pakistani economy and financial sector to be successful.

Conclusion

Islam is essentially not static but dynamic; it is a way of life and a form of monotheistic worship. Hence, it is also more a living reality than a frozen system. Islamic polity from the viewpoint of political philosophy is also the very antithesis of secular Western democracy. Islam repudiates the philosophy of popular sovereignty and instead rests the foundations of its polity on the sovereignty of God (i.e., the political theory of Islam). Having the demand for a separate Muslim state in its roots (i.e., the two-nation theory), Pakistan emerged on the face of this earth with Islamic polity in its roots. That Jinnah could not live long enough to realize the dream of an Islamic Pakistan is an irony of fate as the nascent state had to confront serious geographical, regional, and cultural challenges.

Voices calling for the Islamization of Pakistan appeared shortly after its independence, emanating from stalwart scholars and Islamist political parties with Mawdudi and JI becoming its vanguards. The enacting of the Objectives Resolution and the 1973 Islamic Constitution that declared Pakistan an Islamic Republic were the results of their glorious success and were followed by 11 years of Zia, whose rule expedited the process of Islamization in the country. The implementation of an Islamic financial infrastructure faced a similar fate. Zia made efforts toward Islamizing the economy, though these efforts were piecemeal and disjointed. The diligence of the top Pakistani courts also significantly contributed toward Islamizing the economy, though it failed to cause any real dent in the system. With the successive governments' tepid interest, all the previous impetus had waned and everything was eventually discarded.

In pursuit of Islamizing the country's economy, Pakistan has struggled through committee after committee and resolution after resolution; however, everything has come to naught in terms of its practical manifestation. One may suggest all these efforts that were hatched to have been nothing more than a circumscribed success, that the practical manifestation of a fully Islamic financial system was never reached – yet, the treasure of an Islamic financial infrastructure it did realize is inestimable. The essence of Islam in its roots, regimes oscillating right and left, social fabric garnished with religious traditions, and a strong Islamic revivalist movement have fueled several waves of the economy's Islamization, yet the country seems fated to a dual-system approach whereby conventional interest-based finance probably will continue to dominate for the foreseeable future, as seen in the unique financial mosaic that Pakistan reflects today.

Notes

1 The region of South Asia stretching from Himalayas southward to the shores of the Indian Ocean. It is the region where present-day Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, and Maldives are located.
2 Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan.
3 When writing the name of God (Allah), Muslims often follow it with the abbreviation "SWT," which stands for the Arabic words "Subhanahu wa ta'ala." In Arabic, "Subhanahu wa ta'ala" translates as "Glory to Him, the Exalted" or "Glorious and Exalted Is He." In saying or reading the name of Allah, the shorthand of "swt" indicates an act of reverence and devotion toward God.
4 Muhammad Iqbal once remarked, "Mawdudi will teach a lesson to these Congressite Muslims" (Nasr, 1994, p. 86).
5 The speech was later published as the book *Economic System of Islam* (Mawdudi, 1958).
6 Present-day Bangladesh.
7 Head of Pakistan's left wing, socialist-progressive Pakistan Peoples Party.
8 Bhutto had said "Islam is our faith, democracy is our polity, socialism is our economy" (Gopinath, 1973, p. 40).
9 *Zakat* for the agricultural class is called *ushur*.

10 Financial institutions were allowed a period from July 1979 until July 1985, while commercial banks had from January 1981 until July 1985.
11 This influx of Arab financial, cultural, and political capital continued for several years after.
12 Sharif served for three non-consecutive terms as prime minister of Pakistan (1990–1993; 1997–1999; 2013–2017).
13 These work groups covered the following fields of finance: government transactions, domestic transactions and bank monetary policy, bank deposits and inter-bank relations, loans for fixed investments in different sectors, and financing of working capital requirements and co-operative credit system (Hassan, 2007).
14 An exhaustive list of these modes of finance is available in Hassan (2007, p. 96).
15 The court was established by Presidential Order No. 1 in 1980 and was mandated with the task of examining and deciding whether a particular law or provision of a law was repugnant to the injunctions of Islam.
16 Zia died in a plane crash in August 1988, which brought the left-wing Peoples Party headed by Benazir Bhutto into power. She neglected to extended the constraints on FSC's jurisdiction through Article 203-B (Kennedy, 2004).
17 Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who was depending upon Parliament's support of Islamic parties, understandably encouraged the anxious bankers to contest the decision in the Supreme Court (Kennedy, 2004).
18 Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (1988–1990; 1993–1996).
19 This was some two months after the military coup that had brought General Parvez Muhsarraf to power.
20 The details of the court's 1999 verdict are available in Kennedy (2004, pp. 110–111).
21 Meezan Bank preceded the Bank of Khyber, which was later formed in November 2003 and hence was the first full-fledged Islamic bank of Pakistan.
22 For an exhaustive list of measure taken by SBP and the government of Pakistan during these years, please consult Pakistan Islamic Finance Report 2016 (Thomson Reuters Corporation, 2016).

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